after making-the foregoing statement, ..delivered the opinion of the court.
The single question in' the case is whether, as' between Texarkana and Goldthwaite-,' this was an interstate ship-merit. If so the . regulations of the state railroad commission, do not control, and.the court erred in enforcing the penalty. If, however, it was a purely local shipment, the judgment below was right and should be sustained.
The facts are settled , by the special findings, those findings being conclusive upon this court.
Dower
v.
Richards,
The corn-was carried from Texarkana, Texas, to Goldthwaite,-Texas, upon a bill of’ lading which upon its face showed only a local transportation. It is, however, contended by the railway company that this local transportation was a continuation-of a shipment from Hudson, South Dakota, to Texarkana, Texas; that the place from which the corn started was Hudson, South Dakota, and the, place at which the transportation ended was Goldthwaite, Texas; that'such transportation was interstate commerce, and that its interstate character was not *412 affected by the various changes of title or issues of bills of lading intermediate its departure from Hudson and its arrival at Goldthwaite.
.It is undoubtedly true that the character of a shipment, whether local or interstate, is not changed by a transfer of title during the transportation. But whether it be one or the other may dfepend on the cqntract of shipment. The rights and obligations of carriers and shippers are reciprocal. The' first contract of shipment in this case was . from Hudson to ' Texarkana. During that transportation a contract was made at Kansas City for the sale of the corn, but. that dicl not affect the character of the shipment from Hudson to Texarkana. It .was an interstate shipment after the contract of sale as well as before. In other words, the transportation which was contracted for, and which was not changed by any act of the parties, was transportation of the corn from Hudson to Tex-, arkana — that is, an interstate shipment. The control over goods in process of transportation, which may be repeatedly changed-by sales, is one thing; the transportation is another thing, and follows the contract of ' shipment, until that' is changed by the agreement of owner'and carrier. Neither the » Harroun nor the Hardin company changed or- offered to change ' the contract of shipment, or the place of delivery. The Hardin company accepted the contract of shipment theretofore made and purchased the corn to be delivered at-Texarkana — that is, " on the completion of the existing contract. When the Hardin company accepted the corn at Texarkana the transportation contracted for ended. The carrier was under no obligations to carry it further. It transferred the corn, in obedience to the demands of the owner, to the Texas and Pacific Railway •Company,' to be delivered by it, under its contract with such owner. Whatever obligations may rest upon the carrier at the terminus of its transportation to deliver .to some further carrier,' in obedience to the instructions of the owner, it is acting not as''carrier, but simply as a forwarder. No new ^arrangement having'been made for transportation, the corn *413 was delivered to the Hardin company at Texarkana. Whatever may have been the thought or purpose of the Hardin company in respect to the further disposition of the corn, was a matter immaterial so far as the completed transportation was concerned.
In this respect there is no difference between an interstate passenger and an interstate transportation. If Hardin, for instance,. had purchased at Hudson a ticket for interstate carriage to Texarkana, intending all the while after he reached Texarkana- to go on to Goldthwaite, he would not be entitled on his arrival at Texarkana 'to a new ticket from Texarkana to Goldthwaite at the proportionate fraction of the rate prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission for carriage from Hudson to Goldthwaite. The one contract of the railroad companies having been finished he must make a new contract for his carriage to Goldthwaite, and that would be subject to the law of-the State within which, that carriage was to be made. .
The question may be looked at from another point of view. Supposing a carload of goods was shipped from Goldthwaite to Texarkana under a bill of lading calling for only that transportation, and supposing that the laws of Texas required, subject to penalty, that'such goods should be carried in a particular kind of "car, can there be any doubt that the carrier would -be subject to the penalty, although it should appear that the shipper intended after the goods had reached Tex-arkana to forward them to some other place outside the State? To state the question in other words, if' the only contract of shipment was for local-'-transportation, would the state law in respect to the mode of . transportation be set one'side by a Federal law in respect to interstate transportation on the ground that the shipper intended after -the one contract of shipment had keen Completed to, forward the goods to some place outside the State?
Coe
v.
Errol,
• Again, it appeared that this corn remained five days in Tex-' arkana. The Hardin company was under no' obligation To *414 ship it further. It could in any other way it saw fit have provided corn for delivery to Saylor & Burnett, and unloaded and used that car of corn in Texarkana. It must be remembered that the corn was not paid for by .the Hardin company until its receipt in Texarkana. It was paid for on receipt and delivery to the Hardin company.. Then, and not till then, did th’e Hardin company have full title to and' control of- the. corn, and that was after the first contract of transportation had been completed.
It must further be remembered that no bill of lading was issued from Texarkana to Goldthwaite until after the" arrival of the corn at Texarkana, the completion of the first-, contract for transportation, the acceptance and payment by the Hardin company. In many cases-it would work the grossest injustice to a carrier if it could not rely on the contract of shipment it has made, know whether it' was bound to obey, the state or Federal law, or, obeying .the foriper, find Itself mulcted in penalties for riot obeying the law of the other jurisdiction, simply because the shipper intended a transportation beyond that specified in- the contract. It must be- remembered that there is no presumption that-a transportation when commenced is' to be continued beyond the state, limits and the. carrier ought to be -able to depGikl upon the contract which itlias made and must conform to the liability imposed by that contract.
We sec no error in the proceedings and the judgment.of the Supreme Court of Texas is
Affirmed.