80 Miss. 570 | Miss. | 1902
delivered the opinion of the court.
The municipal authorities of the city of Bay St. Louis was empowered by its charter (sec. 42, p. 446, laws 1886) to light the streets of the city for the public benefit, and on the 21st day of December, 1899, made a contract with the appellant company for that purpose. In pursuance of this authority and contract) the appellant erected poles on and along the streets of said city, and attached to them the wires and other necessary appliances for lighting the streets with electricity, and inaugurated and put in operation an electric light plant, which lighted the streets of the city in conformity with their authorization and contract. The appellee is the owner of four or more properties abutting on Front street, which is the principal street of the city, and its crowning glory, and along said street and adjacent to the lots of appellee, and without his 'consent, the appellants erected their poles and strung their wires, to the great disfigurement, as is said, of the view from said .several properties of appellee. The properties or lots of appellee upon Front street extend to both sides of the street, and a considerable element of their value, it is alleged, consists of an open and unobstructed view of the Mississippi Sound. Appellee, alleging in his bill of complaint the inauguration by appellants of said electric plant and the erection of their poles along the streets abutting his several properties, without his consent, and to his
The authorities are quite uniform that a city or town may light its streets as a means of making them more safe and convenient for public travel. The right to light the town is presumed to have been acquired and paid for, as incident to the right of public passage, when the property was condemned or dedicated for public use. In other words, the taking of the land for use as a street includes not only the right of passage, but of securing a convenient and safe passage; to light it, if you please, for that purpose. It is not a new taking of property for public use, but a completing to that extent of the uses of the first taking by adding appliances included within it, and now constructed by reason of the public need. Keasby, Electric Wires (2d ed.), secs. 29, 76, 77, 82, 84; Lewis, Em. Dom. (2d ed.), sec. 126; Palmer v. Electric Co. (N. Y.), 52 N. E., 1092 (43 L. R. A., 672); In re Public Lighting (Mass.), 24 N. E., 1084 (8 L. R. A., 487); City of Newport v. Newport Light Co., 84 Ky., 166. While the lighting of the streets of a city may be a great convenience to the traveling public, especially under some conditions, the poles, wires, and other necessary, appliances for so doing are often a positive inconvenience to the abutting landowner, considered merely as such. But the proprietary rights of the landowner, whether the fee or a mere easement thereon be in the public, (Theobold v. Railway Co., 66 Miss., 279 (6 So., 230; 4 L. R. A., 735; 14 Am. St. Rep., 564), are greatly modified by the rights of the public, which is entitled to a free passage over the street, and to the benefit of lights constructed and operated for that end.
It is further said that the poles used by appellant are green pine poles, with the bark peeled, and, from rapid decay, are dangerous, and not lightwood poles, as required by the city ordinance; but this grievance, if true, is not made a subject of controversy under the allegations of the bill of complaint herein, which are not framed to present it.
It is also complained that the electric light system of appellant is partly used for private purposes, but it appears from the record that ail the poles set by appellant are necessary for executing the objects of public convenience, and in such case a mandatory injunction is not an appropriate remedy. Johnson v. Electric Co., 54 Hun., 469 (7 N. Y. Supp., 716) ; Keasby, Electric Wires (2d ed.), sec. 30.
2. The contract of the authorities of the city of Bay St. Louis with appellant, as disclosed in this proceeding, is a valid contract, and authorized the latter to make the erections for lighting the streets of the city, and we see nothing in the mode of construction or operation of the plant that authorizes an injunction of any kind.
An injunction may not be granted in this state except where
The grant of the preliminary mandatory injunction in this case was error. In fact, the case presented by the bill does not warrant an injunction of any sort; wherefore the injunction is dissolved, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.