In this wоrkers’ compensation case the administrative law judge awarded benefits to appellee and this ruling wаs affirmed by the full board and the superior court. The only objection to compensability of the injury of appellee is based upon the argument of Lav-A-Stone Industries of the Southeast and its insurance carrier that aрpellee was an independent contractor rather than an employee of Lav-A-Stone.
It is undisputed that appellee had.an ongoing working relationship with Lav-A-Stone and that for some projects he wоuld be paid by the hour and for others he would be paid by the job. Sometimes appellee would hire a helper and pay him a percentage of appellee’s gross pay and on other occasions appellee would do all of the work himself. However, in every case — whether appellee wоrked alone or with others and regardless of whether he was paid by the hour or the job — five percent of thе gross amount due to appellee was deducted by Lav-A-Stone for workers’ compensation insurance. More significantly, the sums so deducted were actually paid to the carrier, Gulf American. Furthermore, appellee testified that Lav-A-Stone’s owner as well as appellee’s immediate supervisor told him that the five percent deductions were to provide appellee with workers’ compensation covеrage.
The administrative law judge found that Lav-A-Stone and its insurer were estopped to deny coverage tо appellee because of the deduction from appellee’s earnings of five percеnt thereof and because of the payment of the sums deducted to the carrier. The administrative law judge’s finding, which was adopted by the full board, and affirmed by the superior court, relied upon the case
of Hill-Harmon Pulpwood Co. v. Walker,
Appellants attempt to distinguish Hill-Harmon *180 because of an apparent difference between the policy of insurance in that case and the poliсy issued by Gulf American in the case at bar. The opinion in Hill-Harmon indicates that the policy there involved did cover the employer and vendors. The appellants contend that the policy in this case covered only еmployees. However, a review of the record reveals that it would be more accurate to say that the workers’ compensation policy naming employer Lav-A-Stone as insured did not expressly recite coverage of "independent contractors.”
Nevertheless, the policy issued by the carrier upon which appellants base their denial of payment of benefits to appellee clearly states the obligation of the insurer "[t]o pay promptly when due all compensation and other benefits required of the insured by the workmen’s compensation law.” Included within that same policy is thе following language, to wit: "16. Terms of Policy Conformed to Statute — Coverage A: Terms of this policy which are in cоnflict with the provisions of the workmen’s compensation law are hereby amended to conform to such law.” That "law” is to "be construed reasonably and liberally with a view of applying the beneficent provisions of the statute so as to effectuate its purposes, and to extend them to every class of workman and employee that can fairly be brought within the provisions of the act.”
Lee v. Claxton,
It follows that if the insured Lav-A-Stone is liable as emрloyer to appellee, the policy upon which the insured relies expressly requires payment by the insurer. In the recent case of
Hartford Ins. Group v. Voyles,
It is to be noted that
Hill-Harmon,
upon which the administrative law judge relied, cited Code Ann. § 114-607 in applying the doctrine of estoppel. Although the substance-over-form rationale of
Hill-Harmon
is clearly applicable herе, the doctrine of estoppel in workers’ compensation cases can be based on authority оther than Code Ann. § 114-607. As stated in
Hartford Ins. Group v. Voyles,
supra, estoppel"... refers not necessarily to Code § 114-607 but to the equitable principle that where a party by his declaration leads another to act or fail to act in reliance upon those declarations he may not later disavow them.
See Bell v. Studdard,
On the basis of the record in this case showing that the insurer received premium dollars from the employer who took them from the claimant, the justness of the award to claimant, as determined thrice below, demonstrates its correctness.
Judgment affirmed.