58 So. 208 | Miss. | 1911
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court.
Mrs. Cole brought suit against the Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Company for damages, alleged to have been occasioned her by reason of the fact that she was allowed to get off of the train, or was negligently put off, by the servants of the company at the wrong station. In the declaration filed both actual and punitive damages are claimed, and on the trial an instruction was given for the appellee, authorizing the jury to award punitive damages. The jury returned a verdict for three thousand dollars, from which judgment the railroad company prosecutes an appeal.'
The chief contention in this court for appellant is that the facts did not warrant the court in authorizing the jury to assess punitive damages. The facts are substantially as follows: Mrs. Cole lived about six miles-
The testimony of the boys who were at the Milltown station is of little importance in the consideration of this case. They merely verify the fact that Mrs. Cole got off at Milltown, and that the conductor helped her off, and that one of them went to Mr. Butler’s with her and helped her carry some of the baggage. None of the witnesses claim that there was any impoliteness, rudeness, or misconduct on the part of the servants .of the railroad company; the cause of complaint being that
"While it is not important, in the consideration of this case, to consider the testimony of appellant on the question involved, since if appellee’s testimony warranted the submission of the question of the allowance of punitive damages to the jury, this case must be affirmed, still, in order to more completely state the case, it is not amiss to say that the conductor was put upon the stand, and by him it was shown that the train was due at Low at 4:38 p. m., and was about on time. This would place it at Milltown ten or fifteen minutes earlier. The conductor states that the train stopped at Milltown, and two other passengers got off, a Mr. Beavers and wife. The conductor states that after reaching Low, as he had a lady and child to put off there, he spoke to the flagman, and that employee told him the lady got off at Milltown; and the conductor states that this was the first he knew of it. The conductor denies that he assisted Mrs. Cole off at Milltown, and denies that he called any stations, but stated that it was the flagman’s duty, and when the flagman reached Milltown he called “Milltown,” not “Low.” The testimony of the flagman is about the same as that of the conductor. The flagman states that when he reached Milltown he called that station by its proper name, and several passengers got off; that he helped Mrs. Cole off.
Mr. Beavers testified that he was on the train and got off at Milltown with his wife; that Milltown is a regular flag station; and that he remembers seeing a lady get off there. Beavers also states that there is quite a difference between the appearance of the stations of Low and Milltown; that at Low there is a depot, sawmill, and several buildings; at Milltown there is nothing but a store and an old sawmill. The testimony of Mrs. Beavers is about the same as that of her husband, except
The facts of this case, when considered only on the testimony of Mrs. Cole, make no case for the infliction of punitive damages. The very most that can he said is that the servants of the railroad were only negligent. If it be true that Milltown was called Low by the flagman, or hv the conductor, not a fact surrounding the case warrants the inference that, in miscalling the station, the servant of the company acted with recklessness, or in willful or capricious disregard of the rights of appellee. In the case of Y. & M. V. R. R. Co. v. Hardie, 55 South. 967, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 742, we had occasion to review all the cases on the subject of punitive damages, and to restate the rule on this subject in this state. We shall not go over that ground again.
The case of Y. & M. V. R. R. Co. v. Hughes, 50 South. 627, is a similar case to this, except that its facts make the case a stronger one for the allowance of punitive-damages than the case now before the court; hut this court held, in the Hughes case, that no punitive damages could he recovered. An examination of the original record in the Hughes case shows this. It appears that Mrs. Hughes sued the Tazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad Company for ten thousand dollars actual and punitive damages, and recovered a judgment for two thousand five hundred dollars. The facts show that about 4:30 o’clock on Sunday afternoon Mrs. Hughes boarded the Yazoo & Mississippi Valley train at Vicksburg, hound for Natchez, and that she had never been on the line before, except orce, and was thoroughly unfamiliar with the stops and stations on the line. The ticket carried her from Vicksburg, via Harriston, to Natchez; and
It is needless to further quote from the testimony in the Hughes case. The court, in the Hughes case, speaking through Judge Whitfield, said: “Manifestly this is no case for the imposition of punitive damages. It was therefore fatal error to refuse the defendant the sixth instruction, charging the jury not to award punitive damages.” The case now on trial cannot be affirmed without overruling the Hughes case, and we feel no inclination to do that. When a passenger is negligently carried by his proper station, or put off or allowed to get off at the wrong station, no case for punitive damages is made, unless there is some reckless, wanton, willful, capricious, or wrongful act done on the part of the agent or servant of the road.
But appellee relies on the case of Davis v. Y. & M. V. R. R. Co., in 95 Miss. 540, 49 South. 179. In the argu
The case of Southern Ry. Co. v. Phillips, 136 Ga. 282, 71 S. E. 414, is very similar to this. The facts show that Mrs. Phillips sued the Southern Railway Company for damages for being put off at the wrong station. It appears that she bought a ticket and boarded the passenger train at Brunswick for Empire. In making this journey, it was necessary for her to change cars at Jesup. She was accompanied by a small child, and carried a valise. After she had been traveling for some time, and as the train was slowing up for a station, the conductor announced that it was the place for Mrs. Phillips to leave the train, at the same time taking up the'baggage and directing her, with the child to follow him. Acting upon the direction of the conductor, she left the train, which, as soon as she disembarked, rapidly moved away, leaving her in darkness. The place where she was put off was Odessa, a place five miles south of Jesup, without depot accommodations or other accommodations for her safety. It was ten or eleven o’clock at night when she left the train, and for some time the only persons she saw were some negroes. She was very much frightened, and after some time had elapsed a white boy was called to her by the negroes, whom she asked if there were any white people in the community; and he finally secured a place with his mother for her to spend the remainder of the night. Mrs. Phillips contended that the conductor, in causing her to leave the train at a point other than the right place, in the nighttime, was guilty of gross negligence and wanton and willful misconduct. When the conductor took up her ticket, she asked him if she did not have to change at some place between Brunswick and Empire, and he said, “Yes; you change at Jesup” — and told her the train was due to arrive at
The trial court instructed the jury that they might assess punitive damages, and the court in reviewing the case and reversing• it, said: “We are at a loss to see, from the facts as narrated by the plaintiff, any circumstances of aggravation authorizing the recovery of pun
The case of Moss v. Mo. Pac. R. R. Co., 128 Mo. App. 385, 107 S. W. 422, from the Missouri Court of Appeals, is directly in point. The evidence in the Moss case showed that the plaintiff was a stranger on the'line of railway, and that, while entitled to passage to a station called Mora, he was told by defendant’s servants to get off at a place called Dumpville, five miles distant. It was night and raining, and plaintiff, being a stranger, accepted the statement of the servant in charge of the train as to Dumpville being Mora and got off, and did not discover the mistake until the train had left. The court' held that this was no case for exemplary damages. To the same effect is the case of C. C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Quillen, 22 Ind. App. 496, 53 N. E. 1024, and the case of Tennessee Central R. R. Co. v. Brashears, Guardian, Kentucky Court of Appeals, 97 S. W. 349.
After a most thorough search of the authorities, we have not fonnd one case that authorizes the recovery of
The instruction authorizing the jury to assess punitive damages in this case was erroneous, and the case must be reversed and remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
The record presents a case where the question of punitive damages was properly left for the consideration of-the jury. The record shows that the conductor was familiar with the stations on the railroad; that the train arrived at Milltown before dark, and the conductor testified that Milltown and Low were very dissimilar in appearance; that there was a mill at Low, and that there was nothing at Milltown; that there was also a depot at Low and a sawmill and some residences on the hill, close by and in plain view, but there was nothing in sight at all at Milltown. In other words, it is apparent from the record in this ease that there was no possible chance for the conductor to be mistaken; that the place at which the plaintiff was put off was not her point of destination. The conductor was bound to have known that the train had not reached Low. Even a casual glance by the conductor at his surroundings, when the plaintiff was assisted off of the train, would have disclosed that the station was not Low, but some other station. This was the first time- the plaintiff ever was at either Milltown or Low; she did not know one station from the other. She was dependent entirely upon the trainmen for information. If the appellant can escape punishment for its conduct in this case, it is difficult to conceive of a case where punitive damages could be allowed, except where the evidence is clear, positive, and distinct
The leading case in this state upon the subject of exemplary damages, and one which has been followed without one discordant note, and where the distinction is clearly drawn between acts which do and which do not justify the imposition of exemplary damages, is Chicago Railroad Company v. Scurr, 59 Miss. 456, 42 Am. Rep. 373. In that case, the plaintiff took passage at night on defendant’s train from Grenada to Torrence, holding a ticket to the latter place. Shortly before the train arrived at Torrence, the conductor became involved in an altercation with some immigrants who, by mistake, had gotten upon the wrong train, and also with a passenger who, without authority, had pulled the bell cord. Thrown off of his balance by these occurrences, the conductor carelessly and negligently permitted the train to run by Torrence without stopping, and was several miles beyond the depot before he recognized that there were several passengers on board for that point. The conductor took up the plaintiff’s ticket before reaching the next stop, Coffeeville, made to him a statement of the troubles with the immigrants, and with the person who had rung the bell cord, as an explanation and excuse for his own negligence in failing to stop at his place of destination, and promised to make arrangements for the speedy return of the plaintiff from Coffeeville without charge. In that case, the lower court authorized the jury to assess punitive damages. This court, reversing the judgment in the court below, says that, “by a long train of decisions in this state, which simply an
There is no conflict between the case of Y. & M. V. R. R. Co. v. Hughes, 50 South. 627, and Davis v. Railroad Co., 95 Miss. 540, 49 South. 179. These opinions were written by the same judge. In Hughes case, the destination point of the plaintiff was Harriston. The flagman came through the car and called the station Harriston, which was in fact Glass. Mrs. Hughes, thinking it was Harriston, arose and prepared to disembark. She testified that she asked the flagman if it was Harriston, and he replied, “Yes, ma’am,” and assisted her to alight. It was a mistake, pure and simple. The flagman said that he called the station Glass; that he saw plaintiff standing in the aisle preparing to get off, and volunteered to assist her, without any knowledge as to her destination point. In that case the court held that punitive damages were not proper. In Davis case, the-facts were that it was after dark, and the station Etta was called, and the conductor told plaintiff that they had reached Etta, and appellant then got off, but, before getting off, told the conductor that he was not familiar with the ground, and wanted to be certain that they were at his station. The conductor assured him that they were there, although the conductor himself
The Davis case is on all fours with the case at bar. The conductor in this case says that he knew (indeed, he was bound to know) that the plaintiff’s destination point was Low. She testifies that the conductor came through the cars and announced Low. When he got to where the plaintiff was, he picked up her baggage, and she followed him, and “he set my baggage down on the ground, and got back on the train, and it pulled out. ’ ’ This. action on the part of the conductor was not simply an implied invitation to alight, but it was in the most emphatic manner an express invitation — in fact, it was practically a command — to alight. There is no evidence in the record that the conductor simply make a mistake in announcing the station, no evidence of momentary forgetfulness, and that this negligence was caused by anything, except inattention to his duties. But, even if he had made a mistake in announcing the station, and he really believed, when he carried out of the car plaintiff’s baggage and assisted her in alighting, that it was her station, yet after he (the conductor) had left the coach and reached the ground the surroundings clearly indicated to him that the train was not at Low, and that it was some other point. The slightest observation would have informed the conductor .that he was putting plaintiff off at the wrong place. The least attention-^-a mere glance at the surroundings — would have disclosed to him that he was putting this lady off at the wrong place. The court should not, under the circumstances, declare, as a matter of law, that the evidence was in
The day has long since passed when the question as to whether it is necessary, in order to recover punitive damages, for the evidence to be direct that the act was done intentionally or wantonly inflicted; but, upon the other hand, the proposition is well settled that, in the absence of intention or of a wanton injury, a negligence so gross as to evince a reckless disregard of consequences is sufficient to justify the imposition of punitive damages.
This court, in the recent case of Railroad Co. v. Dodds, 97 Miss. 869, 53 South. 409, says: “Punitive damages are only allowable when there exists some element of intentional wrong, or, in the absence of intention, there must be negligence so gross as to show a reckless disregard of consequences.” This expression has been used so frequently by this court — in fact, scarcely a report can be found published within the la'st fifty .years but what the rule as to the infliction of punitive damages is not laid down as in the Dodds case, supra, and not only by this court, but by almost every court in America — as to have become crystallized into a rule. Railroad Co. v. Brown, 77 Miss. 342, 28 South. 949. The difficulty lies, not so much in formulating a rule, but in applying the different facts and circumstances as they arise. It frequently occurs that the evidence is such as to justify the court in holding, as a matter of law, that punitive damages should not be inflicted. But whether the conduct is so reckless as to characterize it as gross, so as to justify the imposition of exemplary damages, is like the question of simple negligence or contributory negligence. In such instances, the rule is well settled that such questions
In Nesbit v. City of Greenville, 69 Miss. 22, 10 South. 452, 30 Am. St. Rep. 521; Fulmer v. Railroad Co., 68 Miss. 355, 8 South. 517; Alabama & V. Railway Co. v. Summers, 68 Miss. 566, 10 South. 63; Railroad Co. v. Jobe, 69 Miss. 452, 10 South. 672, and Railroad Co. v. Turner, 71 Miss. 402, 14 South. 450, the rule is stated to be that, unless the evidence of negligence is so plain and convincing that all reasonable men would draw the same inference from the facts adduced, it is a question of fact for .the jury.
In the recent case of Southern Ry. Co. v. Floyd, 55 South. 288, the rule is thus stated: “Where the facts are conceded, but the inference in regard to negligence is still doubtful, depending upon the general knowledge and experience of men, it is the judgment and experience of the jury, and not the judge, which is to be appealed to.” And, again, in Abernathy v. M., J. & K. C. R. R. Co., 97 Miss. 859, 53 South. 540, this court says: “It is a close case, an exceedingly close case, on the evidence ; and because it is so exceedingly close and doubtful, because reasonable men might differ as' to the question of contributory negligence under all the circumstances, for that very reason, the jury should have been left to solve the question.”
In Stevens v. Railroad Co., 81 Miss. 206, 32 South. 312, this court, quoting from Bell v. Railroad Co., 87 Miss. 234, 30 South. 821, says: “So many questions are integrated usually into the solution of the question of negligence- — it is so necessary to examine all the circumstances making up the situation in each case- — that it must be a rare case of negligence that the court will take
The purpose of the legislature was that in all actions of negligence, whether gross, simple, or contributory, the question of negligence was to be left to the jury, if there be any evidence tending to prove the issue. It may be said that this was the rule without the statute. So it was; but this rule had not been observed by the courts in all cases, but in numerous instances the judge decided the question according to his own idea of what constituted negligence; and, in order to make the courts more careful in not trenching upon the province of the jury, and in not being so free and liberal with peremptory
The writer of this opinion thinks that the verdict is excessive, and on that ground should be reduced, or otherwise reversed.