48 So. 823 | Miss. | 1909
delivered the opinion of the court.
The case made by this record is as follows: The original bill was filed by the Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Company on the 15th day of June, 1908; the fiat for -injunction having been issued by circuit Judge W. II. Hardy on the 18th day of June, 1908, and the bill innvoking the exercise of the' equitable jurisdiction of the cliancei’y court in prevention of a multiplicity of suits. To this original bill Virginia M. Barnes and John Goldsby were made respondents. Virginia M. Barnes had sued the Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Company separately at law, and had also brought a suit against the Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Company and the Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Railroad Company at law, for damages for the death of her husband, the engineer on the Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Railroad Company engine at the time of the collision. The Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Company pleaded, as one of its defenses to her suit, the contributory negligence of her said husband, Barnes, the engineer. Goldsby sued for damages for personal injury. On the 16th day of June, 1908, the Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Company filed its amended bill against the same two defendants, Virginia M. Barnes and John Goldsby, and also against certain new parties, Mrs. Maggie Gilbert and the Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Railroad Company, as two ad
On the 10th day of October, 1908, the Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Railroad Company presented its cross-bill to Judge W.'H. Hardy, praying for and obtaining the issuance of a writ of injunction, requiring all these parties, the Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Company, Virginia M. Barnes, and Maggie Gilbert, to come into the chancery court and have all these claims settled there. This answer and cross-bill of the Mobile, Jack
Some comment is made by tbe learned counsel for the appellee to tbe effect tbat Mrs. Gilbert was never made a party, and to tbe effect tbat certain of tbe writs were not served on all the parties against whom they were prayed to be issued, and tbat none of tbe defendants appeared at said proceedings, except Virginia M. Barnes and John Goldsby, who presented a demur
The collision in question occurred on July 12, 1907, at an intersection of the Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Railroad and the Gulf & Ship Island Railroad near the city of Hattiesburg. It will be noted, as a peculiar feature of the litigation, that the two railroads in question in some resj^ects seems to be making common cause against all the plaintiffs suing them, whether separately or jointly. As an example, the attitude of the Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Railroad Company is that by its cross-bill it not only seeks to recover $2,000 from the Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Company for damages to its locomotive and cars, but at the same time enj oins Mrs. Barnes and Maggie Gilbert from prosecuting their suits against it; and so the Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Company also seeks 'to enjoin Mrs. Barnes and John Goldsby from prosecuting their suits against it—one for the death of her husband, and one for a personal injury—while at the same time it is contesting with the Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Railroad Company the question of its liability to that company for alleged damages done to the locomotive and cars of the Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Railroad Company. In other words, these two railroad companies occupy the attitude of seeking to contest with each other in a court ’of chancery the question of damages to the locomotive and cars of the Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Railroad Company, and at the same time both said railroads by means of injunctions are seeking to enjoin all the plaintiffs, in all their suits at law,
The declarations of Mrs. Barnes and John Goldsby charge that these roads did cross at grade, and that the interlocking device had been established, and that at the time of the collision, and for some time prior thereto, it was not in working order, and was spiked down, but that this fact was not known to Engineer Barnes. They further charged that the ]\Iobile, Jackson & Kansas City Railroad Company had obtained the consent ■of the railroad commission to run over the crossing without stop
Again, if, under section 1985, Code of 1906, the proof should show that the death of Barnes, and the injuries to Mrs. Gilbert, to Goldsby, to Toumans, and to the locomotive and cars of the Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Bailroad Company, were all caused by the running of the locomotive of the Gulf & Ship Island Bailroad Company, then manifestly there would arise prima facie cases for all these parties against that company; and that company, the Gulf & Ship Island Bailroad Company, might overcome this presumption by proof that its locomotive was operated in a lawful manner, and not negligently. Suppose, however, the proof should show that the locomotive of the Gulf & Ship Island Bailroad Company was negligently operated, and that this negligent operation was the proximate cause of the' death of Barnes, the injury of the other persons, and the damage to the locomtoive and cars of the Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Bailroad Company; then the Gulf & Ship Island Bailroad Company would be liable for all the injuries and damages, unless it could show contributory negligence on the part of the servants of the Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Bailroad Company, in charge of that company’s locomotive, in which case the Gulf & Ship Island Bailroad Company
Let us take one other view of this curiously conceived bill, and let us present this feature of the case in the language of the very able bief of the learned counsel for appellee. The, counsel say:
“The amended and supplemental bills of the Guil & Ship Island Railroad Company and the cross-bill of the Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Railroad Company allege that the same law and facts apply to all the parties injured in the collision, yet it may be possible under the law and the testimony for both roads to escape liability for the death of the engineer Bames; but it is utterly, impossible for both roads to avoid liability to John Goldsby and the passengers, Mrs. Gilbert and Youmans, for the two locomotives collided on the crossing, thus causing the injuries, and it is inconceivable that the fireman and the passengers could be responsible for the collision, but one or the other of the railroad companies, or perhaps both, are responsible. Therefore the same law and facts do not apply to all the persons suing. If the collision was caused by the negligence of Bames, then Mrs. Bames cannot recover from either of the railroad companies; but the very negligence of Bames would entitle the injured passengers and John Goldsby to recover from the Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Railroad Company, and would prevent the Mobile, Jáckson & Kansas City Railroad Company from recovering against the Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Company for damages to the locomotive and cars, for the reason that the negligence of Barnes is the negligence of the Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Railroad Company.
. “If these cases were being tried separately in the circuit court, as they should be, but for these injunctions, the following would be about the way the cases would be tried:
“(a) In the case of Mrs. Barnes v. Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Company the plaintiff would prove that Bames was the en*504 gineer of the Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Raili*oad Company; that he was proceeding’ over the crossing under the belief that the derail switch was in good order, and with the consent of the commission to pass over without stopping, and that he had a clear board; that the engineer of the Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Company was seen by witnesses to approach the crossing at high speed, and that he was signaled to stop, but ignored the signals, and the collision occurred, and Barnes was killed. The defendant would attempt to contradict this testimony, especially as to the manner in which its engineer approached the crossing, and would try to show that Barnes was guilty or contributory negligence. This defense would be met by the contention that the Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Company engine was run over the crossing in a reckless and criminally negligent manner, and t.hát contributory negligence would not avail to avoid liability.
“(b) In John Goldsby v. Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Company the sole question would be the negligent operation of the switch engine of the Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Company as the proximate cause of the injury. No question of contributoi’y negligence could arise on this trial. No evidence in regard to the derail switch and the duty .to keep it in repair would be admissible.
“(c) The cases of Mrs. Gilbert and Youmans against the Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Company would be controlled largely by the same 'law and evidence as the John Goldsby case, except evidence of the nature of the injuries sustained. The evidence would have to be established by different witnesses in all the cases.”
The trial of the case of Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Railroad Company v. Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Company would not be controlled by the same law and evidence as the other cases, or any one of them, entirely. The question of contributory negligence of the engineer of the Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Railroad Company might be raised by the Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Company; but the further question which might arise
“Looking at this case from the standpoints of the suits against these railroads jointly, we see, for the reasons given above, that the same law and facts will not apply to all the persons injured. In such event the Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Railroad Company would not be governed and controlled by any law applicable to the plaintiffs suing the roads jointly. If the suits should not be tried against the Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Company individually, nor against the two roads jointly, but should be tried against the Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Railroad Company individually, then the Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Company is not concerned in the litigation at all, and the law and the facts would not apply alike to all the parties suing; nor would the same law and facts apply in the defense of the Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Railroad Company, for some of the persons suing were its servants and others were its passengers.”
It surely connot be necessary to do more than thus clearly state the case made by this record, to show that equity has no sort of jurisdiction in this case;.that the grounds upon which jurisdiction of equity may be successfully invoked in order to present a multiplicity of suits have no existence in this case. The true .ground of this equitable jurisdiction was most admirably stated by Chalmers, Justice, in the opinion of this court
There is a scant suggestion in the brief of the learned counsel for appellant, that the Whitlock case is authority for the exercise of this jurisdiction here; but that contention is not seriously pressed, as most manifestly it could not possibly be. That the total dissimilarity of the two cases, so far as the exercise of this jurisdiction in prevention, of the multiplicity of suits is concerned, may appear at a glance, it is only necessary, having set out the facts making this case,'to now set out, over against them, the facts making the Whitlock case in 91 Miss. 779, 45 South. 861. What were those facts? These in brief: That Whitlock and forty-nine other negroes had sued the Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad Company for damages in fifty separate actions at law. Each one of these plaintiffs claimed to have been a passenger on the very same excursion train, and that he was unreasonably delayed on that train by the negligence of the railroad company, and each demanded actual and punitive damages for the delay, and the demand of each was based upon the identical
Before passing from this discussion of the true principle on which the equitable jurisdiction to prevent multiplicity of suits in reason rests, we must call especial attention to the masterly opinion of Chief Justice Tyson, of Alabama, in the case of Southern Steel Co. v. Hopkins et al., 47 South. 274, just above referred to. In the judgment of the writer of this opinion, this is the ablest discussion of the subject he has met with in any of the Reports, and we will therefore be pardoned for a liberal quotation from that opinion. That court says, at page 276:
“The question here, then, is: What is the principle upon which equity interferes to avoid a multiplicity of suits? In determining this, it may be borne in mind that the jurisdiction is not to be invoked when the remedy at law is plain, adequate, and*508 complete; and that no court has the right to infringe upon the wholesome doctrine of multifariousness -which prevents a mingling in one suit of entirely distinct and separate causes of action between different parties. Subject to these restrictions, the principle and rale is that where numerous parties are jointly and severally claiming against one, or where one is claiming against may liable jointly or severally, and the same title or right of defense will be called in question, and will be determinative of the issue for or against all, a case for the interposition of equity to avoid a multiplicity of suits is made, without the aid of any independent equity. The fact that this unity of claim or defense frequently or generally arises from privity or joint action by or between the many affords an obvious instance of the application of the rule, and it has induced some to suppose that the junction and unity of interest calling for the application of the rule is limited to such cases. But the association and unity of interest in the many as to the other party may be brought about just as well by the nature of the transaction, or the situation and relation of the parties, independent of all privity or joint action. And therefore privity, or joint right or liability, although good examples for the application of the principle, afford no test for the propriety of its application.
“The case made by the bill in this ease is this: An explosion in a coal mine killed one hundred ten persons. The several administrators of these persons have brought several suits against 1he appellant as the owner and operator for damages, insisting lhat its negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. The appellant iii effect says, if these actions are allowed to proceed at law, it will be ruined in costs and expenses, though it be successful in every suit; that the plaintiffs are all insolvent, and thus could hot pay the taxed costs against them, should they be unsuccessful ; that the suits are pending in different courts, and will be called for trial in different courts at the same time; that by reason of this, and the necessity of having the same witnesses in each trial, it is impossible for the defendants to present a proper*509 defense to these multitudes of claims. The appellant says, moreover, that it has one and the same and a perfect defense or defenses to all these suits, which will be put forward in each case, and which will be determinative of all alike; and on this ground it is insisted that this is a plain case for the application of the jurisdiction of a court of equity to avoid a multiplicity of suits. We agree with this contention on principle.
“The first thing to obliterate from the mind in considering the question is that it is immaterial how the unity of title, claim, or defense is brought about. It is the factum of a single title against mány, or a common defense against many, which is the foundation of the jurisdiction. A vested right of property and a vested cause of defense for protection against liability stand precisely on the same basis; and whence and how such right originated is wholly immaterial. 8 Cyc. 911; Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U. S. 125, 132, 1 Sup. Ct. 102, 27 L. Ed. 104. If the unfortunate persons who lost their lives by the explosion had j ointly leased the mine, and their administrators had instituted several actions, as in this case, against the owner, it is conceded that the privity between the plaintiffs established by the contract would justify a bill to have the question of liability determined in one suit. But why ? Only because a single and common defense would, if successful, determine all the suits. Suppose, however, the owner leased to a third party, instead of the operators, and the same accident happened, and a thousand suits were brought or threatened by solvent, or especially by insolvent, parties; what reason is there for, or could there be for, denying the jurisdiction to enforce in a single suit the common cause of defense against all? Ingenuity, we think, cannot discover a substantial distinction between the two cases, under which the owner in one instance may take shelter in a court of equity against the wrongful and vexatious suits, while in the other he must submit to financial ruin in defending a thousand vexatious actions at law.”
The learned Chief Justice Tyson then goes on to show, by ref
“The case, however, of Tribette v. Railroad Co., 70 Miss. 182, 12 South. 32, 19 L. R. A. 660, 35 Am. St. Rep. 642, is directly opposed to our views. That case we consider as overruled by the subsequent one in the same court of Hightower & Crawford v. Railroad Co., 83 Miss. 708, 36 South. 83, 102 Am. St. Rep. 476, in which the court expressly approved the view repudiated in the Tribette case. It is said in the Hightower case: ‘We think the doctrine announced.by Pomeroy is sound .and clearly established by the best-considered modem cases.’*511 After this repudiation of the Tribette case by the supreme court of Mississippi, we will not follow the reasoning of the opinion in that case'to point out its deflection from and opposition, in our opinion, to the ancient, as well as modem, view of the extent of the jurisdiction of courts of equity in reference to multiplicity of suits. That jurisdiction is too well established and too beneficent, when wisely exercised, to be any longer called in question. It would be a strange casus in juridical evolution to meet the needs of society if there was no remedy against a party being vexatiously prosecuted at the same time by over seven thousand separate invalid claims held by insolvent plaintiffs, as in the Sheffield Waterworks case, L. R. 2 Chan. 8, when each case is founded upon the same facts, and when it is alleged and admitted, by the objection to the jurisdiction, that there is a defense common to all the claims. It is to avoid the monstrosity of such a result that the court of cháncery extends its plenary jurisdiction to stay the proceedings at law until the question of liability can be determined in one suit, and therefore we hold that the bill in the case was well filed.”
There are one or two other observations due to be made. First, it is said by one of the learned counsel for appellant, that the principal controversy in this case is whether the Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Eailroad Company is liable, or the Gulf & Ship Island Eailroad Company is liable. This is an ingenious effort to" save the case, but it cannot suffice so to do.- The injunctions here were not sued out on the ground that the complainant, the Gulf & Ship Island Eailroad Company was likely to be held liable twice for the same injury, because it was sued individually, and also jointly with the Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Eailroad Company. Indeed, there could be but one recovery, and that recovery against one railroad could be pleaded in bar of any other suit for the same injury. Besides, the mere, doubt as to which railroad was responsible falls far short of entitling this jurisdiction to be exercised, in view of the manifest differences in other respects, both as to principles of law applica
We quote from this last case the following: “Manifestly, as it seems to me, the defendants have no common interest in these questions, or in the relief sought by the receiver against each defendant. • The receiver’s cause of action against each defendant is, no doubt, similar to his cause of action against every other; but this is only part of the matter. The real issue, the actual dispute, can only be known after each defendant has set up his defense, and defenses may vary so widely that no twO' controversies may be exactly, or even nearly, alike. If, as is sure to happen, differing defenses are put in by different defendants, the bill evidently becomes a single proceeding only in name. , In reality it is a congeries of suits, with little relation to each other, except that there is a common plaintiff, who has similar claims against many persons. But as each of these persons became liable, if at all, by reason of a contract entered into by himself alone, with the making of which his codefendants had nothing whatever to do, so he continues to be liable, if at all, because-he himself, and not they, has done nothing to discharge the liability. Suppose A. to aver that his signature to the subscrip
Finally, there is one other most important fact to which attention should be called, and that is that the Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Company, in all its bills, never once set up its defenses to any of the several actions. It merely says that it was not liable, without showing by any statement of facts, why it was not liable in any of the cases. Before any injunction should be issued in the exercise of this jurisdiction, the bills should show,
In the case of Storrs v. Pensacola & A. R. R. Co., 29 Fla. 618, 11 South. 231, that able court said: “A reading of the bill discloses the fact that no community of title or right, or joint interest in the subject-matter of the suit, is alleged in the persons sought to be enjoined; but it does appear that there is a community of interest among them in the questions of law and fact involved in the general controversy, or in the kind of relief asked against each individual person insisting on similar claims against appellee. In view of the fact that the bill fails to allege any sufficient defense, either at law or in equity, on the part of ■ appellee in the suits instituted or threatened, it becomes unne
There need be no apprehension that this court will ever recede from the doctrine approved by all the best-considered modern authorities, the doctrine as announced in Pollard v. Okolona Swings & Trust Co., 61 Miss. 293, or that we will hesitate to approve the exercises of this equitable jurisdiction to prevent multiplicity of suits, in a case falling within the limitations marked out in that case, and in the later cases recently decided by this court. But, when this court is asked, on facts such as appear in this record, to approve the exercise of this jurisdiction in this sort of case, it is asking what no court of equity could with any possibility be brought to consider for one moment.
Just look, in one closing view, at the incongruities of the situation.. Here Mrs. Barnes has brought two actions at law, she being the .widow of the deceased engineer, an employee of the Mobile, Jackson & Kansas Oity Railroad Company—one suit against the Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Railroad Company, and one against the Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Railroad Company and the Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Company jointly. Her husband was an employee of the one company, and not of the other. Her rights of action, as regards the two railroads, were distinct in many respects. So Goldsby sues, being an employee of the Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Railroad Conipany, not an employee of the Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Company. One of the defenses against Mrs. Barnes is the contributory negligence of her husband. That defense is not pleaded against the other plaintiffs, and in some of these suits manifestly could not be pleaded against some of the plaintiffs.
And, lastly, the questions which arise in respect to section 4896, Code of 1906, under the facts in this record, are wholly different, according to the parties whose rights are being considered. In short, there is no possible view of the particular case made by the precise facts in this record under which the exercise of this equitable jurisdiction is entitled to be invoked. And let it always be kept religiously in mind that what a court always decides is the exact ease made by the precise facts in the particular record examined.
From these views it follows that the decree of the court below was correct, and it is affiimed.
