286 F. 645 | 5th Cir. | 1923
This case is here on an appeal from a decree dismissing the bill of complaint filed in this case, on the motion of defendants, as not stating a case entitling it to any relief, and refusing to grant the injunction prayed in said bill. If the bill was properly dismissed, the injunction was properly refused. In ruling upon the propriety of such dismissal, only the allegations of the bill are for consideration.
Said bill of complaint alleges that prior to its filing (it was admitted on the argument to have been in the year 1917) the board of supervis
Bonds to an amount not stated in said bill were issued and used in the construction of said highway. The time of their issuance is also not stated therein. The bill alleges that a special tax of 10 mills to be used in paying interest on said bonds and payment of other obligations arising because of said road has been levied for the year 1921 on the property embraced in said road district.
In January, 1922, the said railroad company, appellant, filed its bill of complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi against D. W. Ducksworth, sheriff and tax collector as aforesaid, and the board of supervisors of said county, seeking to permanently restrain them from levying on the property of complainant and from collecting or attempting to collect said special tax.
The grounds alleged for said injunction were that the said road district, whether intentionally so devised or not, is in law and in fact a fraud prejudicial to complainant’s interests, and was laid out so as to take in all of its property for said distance of 30 miles, when said highway to be constructed is of no special advantage to it, but a direct competitor with it for business by means of automobiles for passengers and trucks engaged in the hauling of freight; that the collection of said tax would deprive it of its property without due process of law, and would deny to it the equal protection of the laws, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and would constitute the taking of its property for public uses without just compensation, contrary to the rights secured to it by the Fifth Amendment of said Constitution; that the total assessed valuation of all the property in said district other than appellant’s own is $i ,990,460 and that its assessment is $521,430.
The case was heard before the court on a motion for preliminary injunction, and also on motion of defendants to dismiss the bill, because insufficient in point of law to justify the relief prayed for. The court denied the motion for preliminary injunction, and sustained the motion to dismiss the bill, and a decree was taken dismissing the same.
It will be noticed that the only grounds of attack made upon this action of the board of supervisors is not that the said road district was not created in conformity with the laws of Mississippi, or that notices were not given as prescribed by said laws, or that the appellant railroad company did not actually have notice of the purpose to create said district and to issue said bonds, or that it made an objection thereto which was overruled, but that the levy of said tax to pay for the construction of said road and the bonds created for that purpose would deprive it of its property without due process of- law, and. deny to it
There is nothing in the bill of complaint, or in the situation, which suggests that the railroad company was not benefited by the construction of said new highway. According to the averments of the bill, the value of the property of the railroad was about one-fifth of the entire taxable property of said district. There is no complaint that all prop
The case is entirely unlike that of Kansas City Southern Ry. v. Road Imp. Dist. No. 6, 256 U. S. 658, 41 Sup. Ct. 604, 65 L. Ed. 1151. In that case a part of the costs of a road was assessed against a railway company according to an arbitrary assessment of benefits to its property on account of its building. The manner of assessment of benefits against the railway company was wholly different from that used in assessing benefits as to any other property in said district, and made so palpable and arbitrary a discrimination between the railway company and other owners assessed that it was held to amount to a denial of the equal protection of the laws. Here there is no assessment for a local improvement, but a'special ad valorem tax levied on all the property in the road district on a valuation as to which no objection of any discrimination or unfairness is alleged.
Be that as it may, we do not think that the facts averred in the bill show any violation of its rights under the Constitution of the- United States, and that the court below did not err in dismissing the bill.
The judgment of the District Court is therefore affirmed.