232 Mass. 509 | Mass. | 1919
This is an action of contract to recover $491.14 alleged to be due the plaintiff as a commission for procuring a lease of a building in Boston. There was evidence that the defendant orally accepted the services of the plaintiff; that the latter stated he would expect a commission of one per cent on the gross rent for his services; and that the defendant assented thereto.
Afterwards there was correspondence between the parties, which resulted in the employment of the plaintiff to procure a tenant for the building, to whom the defendant executed a written lease in which it was provided that the lessee should pay the taxes during the term. It also contained the following provision: “Yielding and paying as rent twenty-four hundred dollars, yearly, together with eight per centum per annum on the total expense of said improvements and alterations so paid by said lessor, by equal monthly payments.” After the preliminary interview, at
The question is whether the word “rent” includes taxes and ■cost of alterations and improvements during the term, or is limited to $2,400 a year during that period.
The plaintiff at the trial, subject to the defendant’s exception, ■offered evidence of a general custom “in the brokers’ trade in Boston . . . that taxes and interest on cost of alterations, when paid by a lessee, were to be treated as part of the rental in-computing a broker’s commission of 1% thereon.” The trial judge found that such a custom existed and, also, that the meaning of one per cent on the gross rent was one per cent on $2,400 and on the taxes and cost of alterations paid by the lessee, and found for the plaintiff.
It thus appears that after the plaintiff wrote the defendant that the rents mentioned would be net except for the usual
Nor is it necessary that there should have been any intent to defraud the defendant. O’Donnell v. Clinton, 145 Mass. 461, 462. The contract between the parties was in clear terms and free from ambiguity. There was no uncertainty as to the commission which the defendant would be required to pay for the plaintiff’s services. The word “rent” as used by the parties is to be construed in accordance with its usual and ordinary meaning; so construed it means the amount to be paid for the use and occupation of the premises, and does not include the amount to be paid by the lessee as taxes or for cost of improvements. Smith v. Abington Savings Bank, 171 Mass. 178, 184. When in answer to the defendant’s inquiry as to what the usual commission would be, the plaintiff informed him that it would be one per cent of the gross rent, without intimating that the schedule provided for any additional charge, that statement was the plaintiff’s inter
While undoubtedly “rent” may be so construed in a written, lease as to include taxes, cost of improvements and other payments to be made by the lessee, still such an interpretation is-not to be adopted in the absence of a clear intention of the parties, to that effect expressed in the lease. Hodgkins v. Price, 137 Mass. 13. Kites v. Church, 142 Mass. 586.
If we assume that the custom of brokers in Boston was so-general and universal as to be admissible to explain a doubtful contract, it was inadmissible in the case at bar and should have-been excluded. A custom or usage can never be admitted to control or vary the terms or the legal effect of a contract expressing in clear terms the intention of the parties. Boardman v. Spooner, 13 Allen, 353, 360. Brown v. Foster, 113 Mass. 136, 139. Menage v. Rosenthal, 175 Mass. 358, 361. Cesana v. Johnson, ante, 444.
The report recites that the defendant admitted he was liable for $312 and offered to pay that amount, but the plaintiff declined to accept .it. It follows that the defendant’s first, second and fourth requests should have been given, and that the order dismissing the report must be reversed and judgment entered for the plaintiff for $312, without interest.
Ordered accordingly.