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Guider v. Smith
431 N.W.2d 810
Mich.
1988
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*1 Smith Guider v SMITH GUIDER (Calendar 5, 80577, 80578, Argued April No. 80804. Docket Nos. 1). post, 24, 1988. Rehearing 1212. denied Decided October Wayne brought in the Circuit an action Terrance L. Guider officer, City Smith, police of and against a Detroit Ronald Detroit, civil alleging his federal the defendants violated that him in the Smith shot rights when Officer under 42 USC apparent attempting of an to flee scene neck he was while deadly breaking entering, force to the use and and unnecessary under the cir- apprehend was excessive and him answer, raised the defense the defendants cumstances. In their judgment summary immunity, qualified move for but did not court, plaintiffs proofs, the prior the close of the to trial. At Teranes, J., city granted verdict for the a directed Paul S. gross ground to show evidence was insufficient part city negligence on the or deliberate indifference deadly training supervising use of its officers force, a directed verdict. Smith’s motion for but denied Officer jury trial, judgment Following on a verdict entered the court finding compensatory damages plaintiff, awarding and for the qualified to the defense Smith was not entitled that Officer Appeals, (Michael immunity. Simon, J. J. C.W. The Court J., Kelly, P.J., participating), concurring) af- (Bronson, 79507). (Docket appeals. The defendant firmed Nos. Riley Boyle, joined by opinion by Chief Justice In an Justice Griffin, Brickley, Cavanagh, and and Justices Court held: judgment against reversed should not be immunity. qualified The trial of the defense of on the basis correctly that the defendant was not entitled determined court qualified immunity, the trial court’s to an instruction on References 16-18,268, 2d, Rights 269. Am Jur §§ Civil States, Territories, seq. 2d, Dependencies 99 et §§ Am Jur personal liability Immunity public in civil from officials brought by public employees 63 ALR under 42 USC 1983. actions Fed 744. prosecutor from civil suit for is entitled to absolute When post-Imbler damages cases. 67 ALR Fed under 42 USC 1983: Mich responsive theory instructions were to the defendant’s actual addition, preserve the case. In defendant failed the trial court’s denial of his motion for a directed verdict on immunity grounds, contending that the use of force was not *2 qualified immunity required judg- excessive rather than that for him ment as a matter of law. addressing qualified immunity In1. the issue of in an action brought objec- under USC trial courts must consider alleged tive factors: whether the conduct constitu- establishes a tional violation and whether the constitutional standard was clearly question. undisputed established at the time in If the clearly facts show that the defendant’s conduct violated no standards, qualified immunity applies established constitutional however, established, clearly as a matter of law. If the law was that, proved defense will fail unless it can be circumstances, extraordinary govern- because of the defendant ment official neither knew nor should have known the relevant legal inquiry person standard. The is whether a in reasonable position the defendant’s could have believed that the actions Except which violated the were consistent with the law. circumstances, extraordinary knowledge actual is irrelevant to the determination whether the defendant is entitled to a qualified immunity defense. Ordinarily, appropri- the issue of is not jury. ate for the The threshold test of violation is If one law for the court to decide. there is a i.e., fact, dispute, genuine involving factual issue of material turns, an issue on which so that it be deter- cannot mined before trial what the defendants’ acts were or whether existed, exceptional proceed circumstances the case should However, qualified trial. entitlement to the defense of immu- nity is not lost because of the defendant’s failure to move for disposition. summary properly pleaded may to, prior during, raised or after trial. case, 3. In defendant did not move for a directed qualified immunity grounds, arguing verdict on instead that the that, therefore, force used no was excessive and there was violation, waiving appeal. thus the claim on ground correctly trial court denied the motion disputed regarding probable factual issues cause and the rea- sonableness of the force used the defendant had been raised presented. jury the evidence The instruction of the on the faith, question good whether the defendant acted in even if inappropriate, plaintiff, harmed the rather than defendant. Justice Levin concurred in the resolution of the issues of the v Smith Guider qualified immunity, of his the denial waiver of defendant’s verdict, challenge jury and his motion for a directed instructions. result, concurring Archer, stated that in the Justice was not entitled to the defense Any lost to the defense was under 42 USC 1983. entitlement summary disposition and the case move for when he failed to preserve proceeded immu- to trial. To the defense nity, plead in the it as an affirmative defense a defendant must summary disposition responsive pleading first and move prior to trial.

Affirmed. (1985) App 92; affirmed. 403 NW2d 505 Mich — Rights Pleading — — Officials 1. Civil Government Qualified Immunity. addressing qualified immunity in an action the issue of objec- brought trial courts must consider USC alleged conduct establishes constitu- tive factors: whether standard tional violation and whether the constitutional undisputed question; if the established at the time *3 clearly conduct violated no facts show that the defendant’s standards, applies qualified immunity established however, established, law; if as a matter of the law was that, proved immunity it can defense will fail unless be circumstances, govern- extraordinary because knew nor should have known relevant ment official neither legal standard. Rights Pleading — — — 2. Civil Government Officials Qualified Immunity. appropriate Ordinarily, qualified immunity is not the issue jury; violation is the threshold test of a decide; dispute, if a factual one of law for the court to there is i.e., fact, genuine involving of material an issue on issue turns, so that it cannot be determined before which exceptional trial what the defendants’ acts were or whether existed, proceed circumstances the case should to trial. Rights Pleading — — — 3. Civil Government Officials Qualified Immunity. government brought in an action Failure of a defendant official summary disposition under 42 USC 1983 to move for does not qualified immunity; to offer the defense of waive entitlement to, pleaded may prior during, properly be raised after trial. Mich Opinion of the Court (by Heuer,

Jaffe, Snider, Brian Raitt & P.C. G. Shannon), Spearman plain- and Theodore for the tiff.

Cooper, (by Zausmer, Fink & P.C. Daniel S. Vacketta), Cooper, Fink, H. B. David and Barbara for the defendants. granted leave to consider J. This Court Boyle, against judgment

the issue whether the vidual defendant should be reversed on the basis of the doctrine of USC 1983. the indi- qualified immunity 1) appeal requires This the Court to address the the 2) qualified immunity, substantive law of procedural problems framing which arise resolving claims of in civil actions against police against judgment officers. We hold that not reversed on defendant should qualified immunity. the basis the defense correctly The trial court determined defendant was not entitled to a jury The trial court’s instructions instruction. responsive theory were the case. to the defendant’s actual pre- addition, the defendant failed to motion for serve the trial court’s denial of the qualified immunity grounds, directed verdict on having contended that use of force was excessive, rather than that required judgment for the defendant as a matter of law. judgment affirmed the

The Court against the result the defendant. While we affirm Appeals, so on reached the Court of we do *4 grounds reject analysis the of the different and Appeals. Court of

i police was a Detroit Defendant Ronald Smith v Smith Guider Opinion of the Court assigned unit of to a four-member cruiser officer April defen- Thirteenth Precinct. On the police responded unit to a cruiser dant Smith’s radio two drove into Hague, "priority to "1145 run: one” call males, The cruiser b & the rear door.” Black e, Hague. alley adjacent to 1125 the steps coming men down the saw two The officers personal property. carrying items of the house plaintiff, Jeffrey Neely and the men were The two Terrance plaintiff Neely the Guider. When they dropped police they car, the items saw began through carrying to run back were yard. jumped out of the car and The defendant po- stop, yelling, "Halt, the two men to ordered Sparrow, car, the driver of lice.” Officer police,” got "Stop, yelled, out of the car. as he also got yard, he saw to the back As the defendant plaintiff running straight Neely and the ahead pursued going the fence. The defendant over again yelled, plaintiff front of the house and to the fleeing pursue police.” "Halt, He continued to freeway, running plaintiff, toward who was police.” yelled, time, "Halt, The for the third and plaintiff possibilities concluding kept running and, all that capture exhausted, defendant were plaintiff. The one shot at Smith then fired plaintiff of the neck the back struck bullet causing injuries. serious testify he did not believed

The defendant plaintiff plaintiff only armed, the would have was freeway. escaped if he had reached plaintiff that, the time claimed Neely’s thought carrying be- incident, he he was Neely longings to share claimed from a house that arraigned plaintiff girl friend. with youthful eventually placed May in a 16, 1978, and program. diversion offender August a com- 11, 1980, the filed On against plaint Wayne Detroit Circuit *5 Mich Opinion of the Court police plaintiff alleged officer Ronald Smith.1 The rights that the defendant violated his federal civil sought damages pursuant and to 42 USC 1983. plaintiff The contended that defendant Smith’s use unnecessary of force was excessive and to make plaintiff the arrest of the and thus amounted to a deprivation plaintiffs rights to process, equal protection, due and freedom from punishment. cruel and unusual response complaint, to the the defendant immunity. jury raised the defense of A trial com- September 12, menced on 1983. At the close of plaintiffs proofs, the defendant moved for a di- grounds rected verdict on the that no constitu- alternatively, and, occurred that tional violation qualified immunity. he was entitled to The trial reasoning motion, court denied the defendant’s disputed that issues of fact remained whether defendant violated the constitutional plaintiff.2 request jury The defendant’s instruc- regarding good-faith tion defense was also de- jury nied. The returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff compensatory $472,000 in and awarded damages. Appeals reasoning affirmed,3 also jury

that instruction the defendant was not entitled to a regarding qualified immunity. How- ever, the Court of reasoned that the de- original complaint City included the of Detroit as a defendant 1) city’s policy on the deadly to theories the defendant allow use apprehend entering suspect fleeing, breaking to force 2) unconstitutional, city was grossly negligent the defendant was reckless or training the defendant officer. At the close plaintiffs granted proofs, city’s motion for a trial court directed verdict. 2The court decided that fact issues had been raised whether there probable cause that the defendant would believe the was fleeing a felon who was and whether the force used the defendant necessary was reasonable and under the circumstances. Smith, App 92; Guider v 157 Mich 403 NW2d 505 Guider v Smith Opinion of the Court fendant was not entitled a to testify instruction because he failed that he shooting legal believed that awas act at the granted appeal time of the incident. We leave judgment consider against the sole issue whether *6 the individual defendant should be re- qualified versed on the basis the doctrine of immunity 42 USC 1983.4 under

ii proper regarding qualified test claims of or "good immunity faith” under 42 USC 1983 actions 800; be found in 457 can Harlow v US Fitzgerald,5 (1982): 1717; Harlow, 102 L S Ct 73 Ed 2d 396 the United States Court altered the sub- stantive law of and established procedural goal implementing for the defense. Note, Quick termination of insubstantial civil rights procedural immunity and Qualiñed claims: (1985). fairness, 38 Vand LR 1547 The Court government performing official held that a discre- tionary immunity functions is entitled to from damages [his] "insofar as conduct does not violate clearly rights statutory or constitutional person

of which a reasonable would have supra, p Harlow, known.” Harlow, it To understand the effect of is neces- development qualified sary to examine the immunity doctrine in civil of the

rights litigation. Prior Ray, 547; 386 US 87 S under Pierson v (1967), police 1213; L 288 were Ct entitled to raise 18 Ed 2d officers good an affirmative defense of Smith, 429 Mich 858 Guider v 635; Creighton, recognize that Harlow and Anderson v US We (1987), unduly have been criticized as 107 S Ct 97 L Ed 2d immunity expanding scope qualified defense. We must resolving brought emphasize responsibility when claims that our to the standard. 1983 is to adhere federal § Mich Opinion of the Court probable of unconstitu- cause to claims

faith and immunity defense to tional liability, equivalent This arrests. purposes claims, § 1983 recognized previously defenses of those law. at trial under common could be raised which pp 895D, Torts, 2d, 411-420. § 2See Restatement (5th ed), pp 1056- Keeton, § Torts Prosser & assumed a violation 1060. The defense thus plaintiffs was excusable. which Rhodes, 232; 94 S Ct 416 US In Scheuer v (1974), developed Court further 40 L Ed 2d 90 the notion as dressed properly immunity qualified, "good faith” of a liability. ad- The Scheuer Court defense court had the trial the issue whether against certain dismissed claims execu- officials were on the tive officials absolutely basis rejected from suit. The Court immune of a in favor the claim of absolute qualified immunity qualified ing held that standard and upon depended find- good-faith grounds belief of for a

of reasonable *7 public taken, formed official in the action light question in of all in the time incident pp Thus, Id., 247-248. Court circumstances. improper because that dismissal was concluded lower courts erroneously accepted fact as a had "[tjhere good executive, was no and faith of such a from which the courts evidence before properly finding good faith could be p Id., . . . .” made Strickland, 308; 95 S Ct 420 US v Wood (1975), 421 US den

43 L Ed 2d reh immunity (1975), issue dealt with the the Court again rejecting jury trial, of a in the context immunity in of absolute claims the defendant’s favor of the whether immunity. that The Court held deciding appropriate to use standard qualified im- entitled to an official was objec- subjective encompasses munity both Guider v Smith Opinion of the Court Id., p tive factors. 321. The Court concluded that an officer would not be entitled to if reasonably

he the action or knew should have known that sphere took he within his of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights affected, of the student or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation to rights of constitutional injury or other [Id., p the student. 322.] rejected While the Court absolute Pierson, from for liability executive officials in Scheuer, Wood, supra, the Court also sug- suits, gested damage that alleging constitutional trial, violations not proceed need but could be terminated motion on the basis of qualified Economou, Butz v immunity. 478, 508; 438 US (1978). Thus, Ct S L Ed 2d 895 the Court emphasized "firm application the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will ensure that federal officials are not frivolous lawsuits.” Id. harassed

However, despite admonition, in actual practice subjective good prevented faith early dis- position litigation because trial courts fre- quently deemed the subjective component of the question defense a of fact that required resolution Qualiñed immunity Balcerzak, aby gov- jury. ernment problem officials: The of unconstitutional purpose civil litigation, 95 Yale L J Fifteen years after Pierson v Ray, the United States the Wood recognized test for had disruptive become government of effective due to "the costs of trial broad-reaching discovery.” burdens of *8 supra, pp 817-818. The Court’s Harlow in response limit "subjective was the narrowly element of defense,” id., good-faith the p and to redefine Mich Opinion of the Court longer No could the defense. defendant acted that the

defeated a bare claim injury. cause Un- the intention to with malicious government Harlow, officials are liable der "clearly damages only if their conduct violates statutory or constitutional established” person If known. a would have which reasonable "clearly governing was not law their actions the protected established,” the officers are from liabil- ity. ques- addressing

Thus, in the trial must in courts tion as redefined 1) alleged estab- the conduct consider: whether 2) violation, and whether lishes established the constitutional standard question. p Id., in 818. If undis- at the time puted conduct the defendant’s facts show that no constitutional stan- violated dards, qualified immunity applies as matter of clearly established, However, if the law was law. ordinarily fail would unless extraordinary circum- oficial demonstrates prove stances, nor should can he neither knew legal standard, in which known the relevant have p By Id., the defense should be sustained. case initially defining limits of essentially proposed objective terms, the Harlow Court in govern- disruption

to "avoid excessive many permit insub- the resolution ment and p summary judgment.” Id., 818.6 claims stantial supra, Creighton, n 5 483 US As illustrated Anderson susceptible liability meaning issue more of Harlow was make viewing disposition. inquiry summary would be whether The relevant plaintiffs, light a reasonable most favorable to the the facts position conduct to could have believed his in the defendant’s official considering it as existed when the the state of law be lawful challenged answer would actions. An affirmative defendant took his claims, negative to dismissal but entitle answer would ant could establish disposition summary if the defend foreclose through discovery he the actions took *9 569 Guider v Smith op Opinion the Court appropriate standard, this Under new in circum- stances, the defense of func- immunity as an tions from suit as an well as liability. affirmative defense to ultimate iii Appeals The Court of determined that the defen jury regard dant was not entitled to a instruction ing defense under 42 USC ****7 upon 1983.*This decision was based the erroneous subjective belief that a defendant’s belief in the legality of his actions the time of the incident is necessary support good-faith defense. The Appeals assuming Court of further erred that ap the issue was issue propriate jury for a determination. Appeals

The Court of focused on the facts that testimony [of "the the defendant] not did establish shooting that the defendant believed that lawful,” was and that "there was no testimony to show it was reasonable for him to believe this.” On basis the Court concluded good-faith that the "defendant was not entitled to App instruction.” 157 Mich 101. That subjective focus is and incorrect supra.8 Assuming that there was a violation of alleged were than different those and that his actions were reasonable. Stevens, Brennan, creating Justices accused Court of accountability Marshall "stunningly a rule that restricts the constitutional id., police/’ Court, Supreme Leading 483 647. The US 1986 term: (1987). cases, 101 Harv LR 224 7 preserve The defendant did not the directed verdict motion qualified immunity grounds. only argument verdict directed Court defendant ever made the uncontro verted facts showed no constitutional violation occurred. had 8 assume, arguendo, applicable We that Harlow is in this cause apply action. The United did States Court the Harlow objective reasonableness standard to 42 officers under USC Malley Briggs, 1983 until US 106 S Ct L Ed 2d Mich right, the next inquiry is whether a under the Harlow standard position man in the could reasonable defendant’s with the his were consistent have believed actions law. subjective pub recognize of a faith

We yet may § lic official in a claim under *10 controlling the in the situation in which relevant of mind law makes official’s state substantive an plaintiff’s constitu an essential element of Dist Metro tional claim. See Martin v of Columbia politan Dep't, App DC 812 F2d Police US challenged of a act lawfulness upon dependent may the actor’s motive or be purpose intent, and, therefore, for which analyzed. v act undertaken must Gutierrez was be Municipal Dist, 838 Court of Southeast Judicial (CA 1988).9 1031, cases, intent, 9, In F2d these purposeful discrimination, is an as racial such plaintiff’s of the cause of action. Turner element 1988). (CA 4, Dammon, 440, 445, n 3 848 F2d Here, however, the defendant’s motivation or of the chal- is not an essential element intent lenged It is to this conduct. therefore irrelevant addition, plaintiffs opportunity to should afforded an over In be proof an asserted defense of with offers of come unconstitutional motive. As the Appeals Court of United States (CA recognized Haydon, in 853 F2d Sixth Circuit Poe v 1988), impermissible inquire to whether under Harlow it is actually knew his conduct unlawful. defendant official was instance, however, the Court noted that "the relevance motive especially applicable is Poe’s of sex discrimination or intent in deciding claim and, result, equal protection "in clause” as a violation of rights, appellants whether violated established inquiry sensitive to their individual motivations.” there must be an Id., Subsequently, findings genuine p material fact 432. of a issue of concerning a a and direct evidence defendant’s motivation for decision by plaintiff’s gender would necessi that a defendant was motivated alleged conduct trial in order to determine whether tate a Further, "the violation. the test is still established objective Id., p reasonableness of an official’sconduct.” Guider v Smith plaintiff’s Further, claim. while in some instances may the defendant’s motive or intent be relevant plaintiff’s rarely action, to a cause of it will relevant claim defendant’s immu- nity under the Harlow standard. What the defen- dant believed at the time of the incident and the testify failure the defendant to toas his belief is irrelevant to a determination of the threshold question undisputed whether the defendant’s con- Further, duct violated ex- law. cept extraordinary circumstances, actual knowl- edge is irrelevant to a determination whether the defendant was to a entitled defense under 42 USC 1983.10 argue extraordinary

The defendant did not circumstances existed to demonstrate neither he legal knew nor should have known of the relevant Thus, standard. the Court of erred its subjective decision that the defendant’s belief in legality shooting necessary sup- port defense.

Although application quali the of the defense of immunity fully fied has not clarified, been it is qualified immunity clear that the defense of is 11 ordinarily appropriate jury.* not an for issue the In instances clear, where is if defen the. alleges extraordinary justify dant circumstances ing suggests law, his failure to follow the Harlow 10 subjective inquiry may A become relevant where a defendant exceptional justified claims that there were circumstances which his example, may failure to know the settled law. For a defendant counsel, claim reliance on of inquiry advice an therefore whether Nahmod, proper. Rights there was such reliance would be Civil (2d Litigation: ed), 8.15, p Civil Liberties 508. Law Section 1983 § 11 good in circumstances which an instruction on faith be would relatively example, used seem to be would be rare. For such an instruction appropriate warrant, in circumstances where a search albeit one, being Devitt, Wolff, an invalid is used. 3 & Blackmar Federal (4th (1988 ed), Jury 103.90, p Supp). Practice & Instructions 30 § 572 431 Mich 559 op the Court jury.12 However, issue there could be an for the extraordinary since the circumstances must be that such the defendant neither knew nor should legal standard, known have the relevant even this exception primarily objective turn would on fac supra, p tors. Again, recognize we if there that is a factual fact)

dispute (i.e., genuine issue material involving immunity turns, on issue which such that it cannot be determined before trial what exceptional were, or cir defendants’ acts whether proceed existed, the trial.13 cumstances case will any However, it that entitlement does follow to a defense was lost when apparent knowledge It is that the of the defendant is relevant Wilson, extraordinary 219, 244-245; App DC Hobson v 237 US circumstances. (1984), appropriate 737 F2d the court described the inquiry as follows: x, plaintiff alleges Right that defendant violated [A]ssume summary judgment grounds and defendant moves for qualified immunity, on claiming Right x was not well-established and, alleged alternatively, acts were committed when prevented knowing extraordinary circumstances him both from having legal If the to know the standard. and district was reason relevant Right judge x court determines matter of law that as a well-established, question might still remain as to of fact reasonably neither knew nor should have

whether defendant legal purely it. issue and should be known of The first is complaint susceptible and sum- to initial determination on potentially mary judgment papers. for The latter is an issue trial, unique depending each case. on circumstances not) (and ques any disputed resolve The Court need not should "However, disputed fact there are of material fact. if issues tions upon proceed Thus, although turns, immunity . . must question . the case which the 1987). (CA 7, Carlson, 826 F2d to trial.” Green frequently resolved will be issue recognize practice, federal lower courts motion may presented verdict in a motion for directed verdict, i.e., notwithstanding judgment "even motion in a and after cert directed fied (directed (CA 1986), 268, 277, Allphin, F2d n 19 Benson v a trial.” (1986) (partial 93 L Ed 2d 109 107 S Ct den US quali notwithstanding judgment verdict verdict and *12 1982) (CA 5, Graza, grounds); immunity v 684 F2d 1159 Saldana 1146, 1152 (CA 7, 1984). verdict). Jean, F2d Bates v See Guider v Smith op the Court summary judgment. defendant failed to move plead qualified immunity While the failure to in the defense,14 answer results of waiver (CA Boyd 1980), Carroll, 5, v 624 F2d 730 a defen pleads qualified properly may immunity dant who raise the issue of a prior qualified immunity defense during,

to, or after trial.15The threshold test of a is violation one of law and always will be an issue for the court to decide. The defense of assumes the right. occurrence a violation of a constitutional purpose give opposing of a "raise or waive” is to rule party opportunity argue why notice of the defense and an to may claim should not be barred since an affirmative defense defeat Miller, opposing party’s Wright & claim. Federal Practice and (Í987 1270, Supp), p However, Procedure: Civil § once the defense pled raised, has sound in the and the is on notice that the issue will be policy unique does not dictate the "raise waive” rule created concurring opinion. concurring opinion misperceives language Mitchell v Forsyth, 472 US 105 S Ct 86 L Ed 2d 411 When effectively the Court stated that the lost if "is a case is errone trial,” permitted ously stances effectiveness of which time cluding go to to it meant that under certain circum suit, immunity as an functions from go through lost if is the defendant must expense having and to defend insubstantial claims. In con qualified immunity immediately appeal- that the issue of is able, explained immunity Court nature dual as only liability” immunity not suit.” Id. immunity "a mere but "an also from Thus, language the Court’s indicates that the entitlement (as standing opposed immunity liability) from trial from be, practical matter, appeal would as a forfeited if on the former issue delayed until at or after on the trial merits. Nowhere has the implied immunity liability Court stated or from must preserved disposition by way summary of a motion. As the United States for the Sixth Circuit has observed, Mitchell counsels trial courts to different consider three and relatively independent immunity: dismiss, aspects of a motion to summary judgment, Kennedy liability. motion for defense of (CA City Cleveland, 6, 1986), 797 F2d the court stated: protections Mitchell makes it clear that doctrines’ against liability against litigating the various burdens of (citation omitted). conceptually insubstantial claims are distinct Consequently, respect summary decisions with to dismissal or adverse, judgment, preclude interposition do if defense of as defense .... *13 431 Mich 559 op Opinion the Court police by jury A a determination officer did probable not cause to arrest or that excessive have effectuating force an question. was used in arrest would qualified Sevigny resolve a v 1988). (CA Dicksey, 846 F2d addressing A of court the issue immu- nity first must determine whether the conduct police rights plaintiff’s the under officer violated a the Then the constitution. the court must address the issue whether the constitutional standards of right question A in were established. deter- alleged by court that conduct mination a police officer a violation of a estab- lished summary would defeat a defendant’s motion qualified immunity

disposition on grounds. appropriate circumstances, In the same by judgment issue be raised a motion for could subsequent notwithstanding find- the verdict present ing jury that, case, as in the police force.16 officer used excessive

Regardless stage at which the issue addressed, is the defense will supra, objective primarily factors, turn on pp Thus, the Court of discussion 818-819. focused on defen- which subjective is under Harlow. belief incorrect dant’s

iv this Court are whether narrow before issues denying motion for the trial court erred police regard defendant directed verdict test, then, if, objective assessment of the the Anderson Under reasonably circumstances, could as the defendant an officer situated necessary, the defendant would force used was have that the believed granted immunity. we must not be concerned In the instant case it, perceived particular plaintiffs as this conduct with the acting reasonably the circumstances officer as a but supra, Dicksey, p Sevigny perceived it. have should Smith Guider v the Court given by jury instructions officer, and whether prejudicial error. constituted the lower court alleged part, pertinent In amounted force the defendant use excessive deprivation to due of constitutional to a protection, process, equal cruel freedom from moving punishment. for a directed In and unusual nowas that there verdict, claimed defense counsel right. addition, violation of a *14 to the entitled the claimed defendant counsel good-faith immu- the of on directed verdict nity basis right from the to be free constitutional since a clearly estab- force had not been use of excessive judge trial incident. The at the time the lished may due a violation of that there have been ruled probable police process17if officer did not have the he was not reasonable or if the force used cause the circumstances. judge motion trial denied the defendant’s disputed explaining verdict, that for a directed The trial court believed factual issues existed.18 17 ground provision upon most which courts constitutional alleging Fourteenth Amendment— 1983 claim excessive force is the § potential deprivation liberty without the use of due (employing is treated as a force 1973) (CA 2, Glick, process of F2d law. See Johnson 481 1028 analy process substantive due Fourteenth Amendment claim). analyze force sis to an excessive cases, Supreme Despite large the number of force the excessive only brought under Court has decided two excessive force cases force, Freyermuth, Rethinking 692. 1987 Duke L J excessive § (1985), Garner, 1964; 1; 471 US 85 2d 1 In Tennessee v the Court held that 105 S Ct L Ed subject deadly the use of is a to the force seizure requirements Whitley v Fourth Amendment. In reasonableness the (1986), Albers, 475 S Ct L Ed 2d 251 the Court US 106 89 prisoner developed shooting to determine whether the of a standard Eighth Amendment. courts to violated The adherence of circuit process factors has been substantive due to excessive force cases creating as an abstract free of viewed to be excessive force. noted, "[tjhere judge The trial lot of fact that have are a issues during testimony or not been reused there was plaintiff on both the issue of whether probable Sergeant that cause that Smith would believe scene, and, fleeing secondly, was a who was was the felon Mich op the Court disputed factual issues were created testimony presented plaintiff and evidence regarding plaintiff’s probable theory both theory ap- cause and his of excessive force.19On peal, challenges only the defendant the denial of grounds.20 the directed verdict on excessive force Although the United States Court had appears not issue,21 it addressed the law was force22violates established that use excessive Amendment, the Fourteenth Wil- (CA 1985) (en banc). BeeBe, son v 770 F2d 578 disputed questions regard- Because there remained ing occurred, whether the violation the defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict the basis immunity, correctly and the court trial denied Moreover, the motion.23 the defendant did not Sergeant force of The trial Smith force reasonable under the circumstances.” judge incorrectly disputed determined that a factual issue However, probable ap- existed as to pealed cause. has ground. the denial of his motion on that judge questions regarding The trial noted that there were plaintiff defendant, distance between the and the the number of scene, area, layout way officers at the and the which the escaped. could have position plaintiff’s We theory take no on whether alternate *15 presented properly jury. factual issues which were to the submitted 21 Supreme clarify The United States has Court failed to whether only pronouncements its own can a establish right, or whether lower court decisions will have the effect. same Circuit, however, United States held for the Sixth has established, right that in order to be a must be decided by highest arose, the by court the state the where case a United Appeals, Bibb, States Court of Court. Robinson v (CA 1988). 840 F2d 349 22 right Garner, recognized This is not the in Tennessee v n 17 Kelly supra, Judge below, 114; App 92, as noted 157 Mich 403 NW2d (1987). right 505 The Gamer Court did not establish a constitutional force, simply recognized to be free the and extent use from the of excessive but that application implicated specific of force Fourth Amendment applied developed protect right. the standard to that To the Judge opinion suggests that that Tennessee v Garner Simon’s applies question express to liability, of defendant Smith’s we no opinion question. on the merits of that 23 assume, arguendo, applies, We that Harlow while 577 Smith Guider v the Court for a appeal motion of defendant’s the denial grounds, on verdict directed arguing exces- not force used was that the instead no constitutional there and therefore sive injustice, Finding decline we manifest no violation. party depart rule that a our traditional from presented properly for review. not waives claims Napier 222; 414 NW2d Jacobs, Mich See (1987). jury agree trial court’s can we Nor requiring reversal. to error amounted instructions proposed not submit counsel did Because instructions, she believed whether it is unclear good on the irrelevant faith was that defendant’s proofs merits after on the or irrelevant submitted question to submit it was error Harlow. While given good jury,24 the instruction to the faith proof imposed here burden good prove not act defendant did to faith.25This inappropri- may have been instruction party yet the defendant not ate,26 harmed was Glick, supra, Judge Friendly noting set forth n 17 that in Johnson v including good apply, or malicious or faith factors for courts to four purpose. sadistic properly allege that extraordi or establish The defendant did not knew nor nary should demonstrate that he neither circumstances existed to Thus, legal it was not relevant standard. have known of the jury. question appropriate to this to the submit following judge instructions: The trial recited proof prove by preponderance Plaintiff has the burden did not the Defendant Ronald Smith of the evidence that either have entering Terrance honestly the breaking probable the crime of cause to believe that Plaintiff, dwelling occupied was committed or, Guider, that the Defendant Ronald Smith did necessary prevent deadly that the force was believe (fid Guider, escape if he hon- the Plaintiff Terrance it, given estly the and circumstances the was unreasonable believe then belief totality of the circumstances —the facts reasonably Ronald Smith was aware of or should Defendant been aware of at that time. have Toledo, 100 S Ct 64 L Ed 2d 572 See Gomez v US *16 Mich Archer, J. plaintiff. jury but, rather, found that deadly unreasonable, defendant’s use of force was supported by and the verdict is the evidence.

CONCLUSION performing Under officer discre- tionary functions is entitled to the defense of his when conduct does not violate established constitutional person which a reasonable would known. If immunity have established, law was only be if will sustained the officer demon- extraordinary prove strates circumstances can he neither knew nor should have known rele- legal vant standard.

We hold the defendant in this case was not qualified immunity. entitled defense of We judgment therefore affirm the of the trial court Appeals. and the decision of the Riley, C.J., Brickley, Cavanagh, and Grif- fin, JJ., J. Boyle, concurred with opinion part I J. concur in iv of the

Levin, the Court. (concurring). granted J. We leave to

Archer, appeal to consider the sole issue whether against judgment the individual defendant should on the reversed basis of the doctrine of immunity under 42 USC 1983.1_ provides:

1 42 USC 1983 who, ordinance, Every person any statute, under color custom, regulation, usage, any Territory State or or the *17 Guider v Smith Opinion by Archer, J. majority to the defendant failed holds that preserve the of motion for the trial court’s denial grounds, on directed verdict the use of force was because he contended excessive, rather than that required judgment a matter for the defendant as majority basis, the holds that law. On this the raising precluded the defense from defendant was by agree Although result reached I here. with grounds. majority, I do so on different defendant was I hold that individual would not entitled to defense Any § to the entitlement failed to move for Smith lost when defendant proceeded summary judgment case and the Accordingly, I affirm the result would also trial. Appeals, but for the Court of reached reasons outlined below.

FACTS eighteen April plaintiff, years then On telephone friend, old, from his Jeff call received plaintiff requested Neely. Neely assist removing belongings from a house him in his girl sharing Neely had with his claimed he been plaintiff parked Neely’s direction, friend. Under girl Neely car a house that said was his his behind Neely re- nor testified friend’s. Neither garding They entered of this house. the address Columbia, any subjects, subjected, to be District or causes jurisdic- person or within the United States other citizen rights, privileges, deprivation any or tion thereof laws, by the and shall be Constitution immunities liable to the secured law, equity, party injured suit in an action purposes proper proceeding of this For other redress. section, Congress exclusively applicable to the any Act of to be a statute of shall be considered District of Columbia District of Columbia. Mich Archer, J. trips from the door. Plaintiff side made two to the Neely’s alleged belongings. car with police Defendant Ronald Smith awas Detroit assigned officer the Thirteenth Precinct.2 to a four-member cruiser unit night question,

theOn responded defendant Smith’s cruiser unit Hague, males, radio run of "1145 two Black [breaking entering], the rear door.” Defendant was familiar with the address because he knew the prior owner had been inside the house alley occasion. The officers drove into the behind headlights the house their with off. *18 making trip

Plaintiff was his third to the car carrying Neely’s alleged belongings when he and Neely dropped police Neely observed the car.3 Plaintiff and they carrying began

the items were and through yard. police to run the back officers breaking two, observed the fit who and enter- ing description, stop, by and them ordered to yelling police.” yelling "halt, time, After the third police,” "halt, defendant Smith fired one shot plaintiff, striking him in the back of his neck. warning No shot was ever fired.

Officer Smith testified that he fired he because suspect was afraid he would lose the between two safety, where, pursue houses for own his he would not be able as fast. Defendant Smith did not see anything that would lead him believe that plaintiff was armed. Michigan permitted time, At that law use

deadly necessary, apprehend force, when a flee- high A cruiser car is a four-door sedan with colored beam head lights spotlights and colored on left and sides of the front lights flashing windshield. are There in the rear window. The words appear "Detroit Police” and the vehicle number on each of the front passenger Usually, are doors. there four officers in unit. each One uniform, generally plain is four the other three wear clothes. thought carrying Neely’s belongings Plaintiff he was from the However, Neely taking by house. knew he was items owned occupants without their consent. Smith Guider v Archer, J. Department’s policy

ing 5*TheDetroit Police felon.4 an even nar firearms delineated on the use of scope officers. the use of firearms its for rower The deadly policy to seven force limited the use entering breaking in felonies, and was of which police department Accordingly, internal cluded. investigation use Smith’s that defendant concluded justified. deadly force was complaint August 11, 1980, filed a

On against City Wayne Detroit Circuit alleging Smith, officer Ronald Detroit civil violated his federal the defendants recovery theory of Plaintiffs 42 USC 1983. under deadly force to use of defendant Smith’s was that apparent apprehend the scene of an him as he fled entering breaking unneces excessive and sary deprivation to a and amounted the circumstances rights.5 In the

of his constitutional complaint, raised the defendants to the answer immunity. defense of September by jury commenced A trial presid- S. Teranes Paul with the Honorable ing. motion trial, did not file a defendants Prior to City summary judgment. mo- of Detroit’s granted close of at the verdict was tion for directed ground proofs plaintiff’s the evidence on the *19 negligence gross or delib- to show was insufficient city part in train- of the indifference on erate ing supervising in the use officers its or deadly denied defendant The trial court force. verdict because for directed Smith’s motion probable remaining questions cause ex- whether only used Smith defendant isted and whether The the circumstances. force under reasonable 4 747, 753; Hartfelder, App See, 318 NW2d e.g., 113 Mich v Werner (1984). (1982), 906 den 418 Mich 825 lv 5 granted plaintiffs to amend motion Subsequently, the trial court rely explicitly Fourth Amendment. complaint on the 582 Mich 559 by Archer, J. questions fact,

trial court considered these to be jury. resolved jury concerning

The case went to § the 1983 liability 18, of defendant Smith. On October jury found in favor of the damages. compensatory $472,000 awarded him parties appealed. Both

The Court affirmed the trial court’s quali- decision that defendant to a entitled immunity fied defense.6 granted 6, 1987,

On October this Court leave to appeal to consider the sole issue whether judgment against the individual should be reversed on the basis of the doctrine of 42 1983.7 USC

ANALYSIS Fitzgerald, In Harlow v 800; US 102 S Ct (1982), 2727; 73 L Ed 2d 396 the United States subjective Court held that evidence of an good longer officer’s faith is no relevant analysis qualified immunity. As stated Har- low: Qualified "good faith” is an affirma-

tive pleaded defense that must a defendant Toledo, official. Gomez v 446 US 635 S Ct [100 (1980). 64 L Ed 2d Decisions 572] "good have established that faith” de- fense has both an "objective” "subjective” and a aspect. objective element presump- involves a knowledge respect "basic, tive unques- rights.” Strickland, tioned constitutional Wood v US 43 L S Ct Ed 2d [95 (1975). subjective component "per- refers missible intentions.” . . . Smith, (1987). 92, 100; App Guider v 157 Mich 403 NW2d 505 Smith, Guider Mich 858

1988] Guider v Smith 583 Opinion by Archer, J. subjective good-faith element proved

frequently incompatible has with our ad- Economou, 478; in Butz monition 438 US 98 S [v (1978)], Ct 57 L Ed 2d 895 insubstantial proceed claims . . . should not to trial. In the of Butz’ attempted balancing context values,

competing it now is clear that substantial litigation subjective good costs attend the government faith of only officials. Not are there general subjecting costs of officials the risks govern- trial —distraction of officials from their duties, action, mental inhibition of discretionary people public and deterrence of able from service. special There "subjective” inquiries are costs to inquiry this kind. . . . Judicial subjective into mo- tivation ery may broad-ranging therefore entail discov- deposing persons,

and the of numerous includ- ing professional colleagues. Inquiries official’s peculiarly disruptive this kind can be of effective government. Consistently with the balance at which we Butz, aimed in today allega- we conclude that bare subject govern- tions of malice should not suffice to ment officials either to the costs of trial or to the broad-reaching burdens of discovery. We therefore government hold that performing officials discre- functions, tionary generally are shielded from lia- bility damages for civil insofar as their conduct statutory does not violate person of which a reasonable Navarette, would have known. See Procunier v 555, 434 US (1978); 565 S Ct 55 L Ed 2d [98 Strickland, v Wood US at 322. [Harlow Emphasis at 815-818. added.] stage Harlow set the for a new era in the law of qualified immunity. After immu- nity purely legal question, is a decided prior judge 818- to trial.8 As stated in Harlow 819: (CA 1985). Hooper, Donta F2d Mich *21 by Archer, J. an reasonableness of objective

Reliance on the conduct, to by reference as measured official’s law, avoid excessive should clearly established permit the resolu- disruption government and summary claims on many insubstantial tion of judge ap- summary judgment, On judgment. determine, currently only not propriately may law, clearly law was applicable but whether If occurred. at the time an action established established, clearly time was not law at that expected to antici- reasonably not be official could could he subsequent legal developments, nor pate the law forbade fairly said to "know” be Un- previously as unlawful. identified conduct resolved, immunity question is til threshold If the law was discovery should not be allowed. established, immunity defense ordinar- fail, competent public reasonably since a ily should governing his conduct. know the law official should Nevertheless, pleading if the defense the official prove and can extraordinary circumstances claims nor have known neither knew should that he standard, the defense should legal the relevant pri- turn again, the defense would But sustained. marily objective factors. [Emphasis added.] Harlow, 1983 defen- forth in Under the test set § if their are entitled dants statu- not violate a conduct did a reasonable which or constitutional tory Harlow rejected have known. person would test qualified subjective element are standard. We objective of a purely in favor Court’s con- Supreme the United States by bound However, apply I do not 1983.9 struction § the defen- Harlow to these facts because analysis given States statute the United to a federal The construction Clark, Lyon 124 Mich in state court. v Court controls (1900). 1058; 105; 82 NW NW Guider Smith v Opinion by Archer, J. dant forfeited any entitlement immu- nity by failing to move for summary judgment.10

Harlow had been decided over year prior the start of trial.11 the Court deter- that qualified mined immunity was a threshold question to be resolved on a motion for summary judgment prior to trial.12 Notwithstanding defen- Harlow,13 dant’s awareness did not motion file a for summary judgment prior to trial. importance filing a motion for summary judgment 1983 actions reemphasized § the Court Mitchell US 105 S Forsyth, Ct 86 L Ed 2d *22 Mitchell,

In Supreme the United States Court held: qualified entitlement immunity] is an [to

immunity from rather a suit than mere defense to liability; and an like absolute it is immunity, effectively erroneously permitted lost if a case is to trial.[14] go to at [Id. 526.]_ 10 Michigan change in Court Rules were amended 1985 to summary judgment name of a motions for motion. These motions are now called summary disposition. MCR 2.116. day Harlow was June decided 1982. The first of trial was 12,1983. September Additionally, Briggs, 335, 341; Malley Id. at in v 475 US 1092; (1986), holding S Ct 89 L Ed 2d 271 reaffirmed in its Harlow, ruling qualified immunity that the entitlement to is deter by objective mined motion for test and that the on issue should be resolved a summary disposition. 13Defendant Smith aware of was Harlow because the decision was support cited close of his to motion for directed verdict at the proofs. plaintiff’s 14Although the focus of Mitchell Court was to resolve the issue ruling qualified immunity whether lower court on a "final was subject appeal, order” ioned its to an immediate the Court nonetheless fash holding great with deference the basic found in to tenets example, preceding opinion For Harlow. the text of the the above- quoted language, expresses following: allegations plaintiff’s a claim of Unless state violation law, pleading qualified

clearly established a defendant immu- Mich Archer, J. City Kennedy Cleveland, 797 F2d 297 In (CA 1986), 107 Ct den 479 US S cert (1987), the United States Court 94 L Ed 2d 185 for the Sixth Circuit considered whether pretrial ately immedi- denial of resolving appealable. issue, the court In describing stages interpreted at Mitchell as two interposed immunity may which the doctrine of be summary judgment. The first in a motion for instance arises to objectively right, may complaint is when the insufficient of a established and describe a violation statutory or constitutional well-known complaint while in second instance the upon descriptive, sufficiently yet the claim it is is to which based insubstantial. contrast Kennedy Mitchell, further stated "decisions summary judgment, respect if with to dismissal interposition preclude adverse, do not liability to as a defense defense 797 F2d 300. the merits.” Kennedy Accordingly, alludes extent to the defendant’s immunity raise during any point trial, it Supreme the United States is inconsistent with thus, I do not Court’s decision Mitchell and precedent. it consider

In accordance with the United States holding Mitchell, hold that Smith Court’s we effectively any right lost

nity ery. the commencement of discov- is entitled to dismissal before Harlow, 526, quoting 457 at US 818.] [Id. complaint adequately alleges plaintiffs the commission Even if the law, clearly is entitled to sufficient to that violated established the defendant acts summary disposition discovery if fails uncover evidence genuine committed as to in fact create issue whether recognized trial an entitlement not to stand those acts. or the thus litigation conditioned on the resolution of the other burdens face essentially legal question of which whether the conduct Thus, complained 472 US the to the established law. violated interpretation congruent of Harlow is indeed Mitchell Court’s bar. conclusion reached in case at 587 Guider v Smith Opinion by Archer, J. proceeded defense when the case trial. To avoid specif- result, § defendants a 1983 suit must plead ically qualified immunity in their first re- sponsive pleading as an affirmative defense15 and summary disposition prior move for summary disposition pursue If trial. may denied,

is defendants interlocutory appeal of the denial.16 Accord, Mitchell, at 14-15.17_ 15 specifically employ "qualified Defendants did not im words munity” complaint. in their answer to the defense was raised in captioned, "Special the section of the answer and Affirmative Defen states, part: ses.” It 2. That the individual defendants at all times herein men- good

tioned acted in scope peace faith and without and malice within the City of their as duties officers of the of Detroit and Michigan. State officersof the force, any, plaintiffs) 6. That if used on the was reasonable necessary protect circumstances to themselves so any damages injury allegedly by plaintiffs) or suffered were due to and/or misconduct in the unlawful assault and defendant^). battery plaintiffs) upon committed these employees 7. That the actions defendant and its in all reasonable, respects proper legal. were Strickland, 992; 308; Under Wood v 420 US 95 Ct 43 L Ed 2d 214 S (1975), (1975), reh 921 den 421 US defense was (1) reasonably if unavailable that the action either: he knew or should have known sphere responsibility within he took of his official plaintiff’s clearly rights, would violate the constitutional established (2) deprivation or he acted with malicious intent to cause a injury. constitutional or other defendants’ answer marginally sufficient to address the elements of the Wood test for qualified immunity. However, subjective aspects Harlow eliminated the of the Wood Accordingly, allege test. an individual 1983 defendant must now § statutory that his actions did not violate a person of which a reasonable would have known. We reiterate that is an affirmative defense that pled by must be a defendant official. Harlow 815. Defendants who plead specificity waiving fail to with risk of incur the See, Dilworth, excluding e.g., defense and it from the case. Satchell v 1984). (CA 781, 745 F2d 784 16 2.116(J)(2)(a). See MCR See also United States Archer-Daniels- (CA Co, 8, 1986), Midland den 481 F2d cert US S Ct 95 L Ed 2d Dollar, (CA 1558, 1560 11, 1988). See also Rich v F2d *24 Mich Archer, J. Defendant moved for a directed verdict at plaintiffs’ proofs. close preserve This to was insufficient defense because begun already defendant had to defend the action By effectively time, trial. defendant had his lost from suit.18

CONCLUSION qualified I would hold that the doctrine of immu- require nity judgment not does a reversal of against Smith on facts of this case. defendant Any was lost when entitlement defense summary judg- Smith failed move preserve proceeded To ment the case to trial. qualified immunity defense, must the plead a defendant immunity as an affirmative defense responsive pleading move for sum- in the first prior mary disposition to trial. The result reached by the is affirmed._ requirement holding This is with Harlow’s consistent clearly judge time the law was established at the determine whether If the that time an action occurred. then law at was qualified immunity. If the law official is entitled established, ordinarily fail. Until should resolved, discovery immunity question should not be is this threshold allowed. Harlow at 818-819.

Case Details

Case Name: Guider v. Smith
Court Name: Michigan Supreme Court
Date Published: Oct 24, 1988
Citation: 431 N.W.2d 810
Docket Number: Docket Nos. 80577, 80578, 80804, (Calendar No. 1)
Court Abbreviation: Mich.
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