Plaintiff brought ejectment for a tract of land, the east half of northwest quarter, section two, township sixty-four, range nineteen, and on the trial he put in evidence a chain of legal title from the United States through mesne conveyances to himself. The claim of the defendant is based on a sale of the land for taxes, and, also, on the ground of estoppel. Two questions are, therefore, presented for consideration by the record. 1. Whether the trial court erred in holding that the •sheriff’s deed to Perkins, purporting to be based on a 'judgment for the sale of the land for back taxes, was void on its face in so far as it concerned the land in dispute. 2. Whether the court erred in refusing to give defendant’s declaration of law on the question of estoppel.
I. As to the first point: The sheriff’s deed to' Perkins by its recitals, sets out that' a judgment was rendered in favor of the state to the use of the collector “and against John Corbett, and against the real estate hereinafter described, for the sum of-dollars, for certain delinquent state, county and special taxes, and interest as hereinafter set forth, assessed and found by • said court to be due upon the following described real estate, viz. :
Tract No. Parts of Section. Sec. Twp. Range.
1 North half, southwest, southeast, 1 64 19
West half, northeast.......... 2 64 ' 19
Northwest quarter............. 2 64 19
Southwest, irortheast........... 3 64 19
“And that the taxes and interest found due upon said real estate, and the years for which the same were assessed, are upon each of the above described tracts, as follows, viz. : Tract No. 1, for 1865, $0.75; 1866, $4; 1867, $12.04; 1868, $21.45; 1869, $11.42; 1870, $24.65;
The land here in question is a part of the third tract mentioned and set forth in said judgment and deed. But as to said third tract, and, indeed, as to all the tracts, except the first, no judgment -was rendered as it affirmatively appears from the recitals in the deed. It is at first stated that judgment was rendered ‘ ‘ against the real estate hereinafter described for the sum of-dollars.” The recitals then specify that “the taxes and interest found due upon said real estate and the years for which the same were assessed, are upon each of the above described tracts as follows, viz.” etc. Then follows the amounts and the respective years that taxes were found and adjudged to be due against said tract number one, but nothing appears against the other tracts, or either of them.
The rule is well settled that “general words of description may be modified and restricted by particular words following them.” Jones on Chat. Mort., sec. 377; Smith v. McCullough,
But, further, should we attempt to rely on the general words in the beginning of the deed that reliance
II. In regard to the question of. estoppel: Defendant next introduced evidence tending to show that he bought the land for a full price, in good 'faith, without ahy notice of any adverse claim or title, also tending to show that at the time when • defendant was about to consummate. the purchase of the land from Hughes, and before the money was paid or the deed delivered (the
party,” said he, “who negligently or culpably stands by and allows another to contract on the faith and understanding of a fact which he can contradict, cannot after-wards dispute that fact in an action against the person whom he has himself assisted in deceiving.”
In Niven v. Belknap,
The same principle is forcibly asserted In Wendell v. Van Rensselaer,
In a later case the doctrine of the one just cited was reaffirmed, the learned chancellor remarking: “Where one having title acquiesces, knowingly and freely, in the disposition of his property for a valuable consideration, by a person pretending to title, and having color of title, he. shall be bound by that disposition of the property. * -* -x pp js <peemed an act of fraud for a party, cognizant all the time of his own right, to suffer another party, ignorant of that right, to go on, under that ignorance, and purchase the property, or expend money in making improvements upon it.” Storrs v. Barker,
In the case at bar, the tax deed made in October 1878, was put on record January 1, 1879, since which time Perkins, the grantee therein, and Hughes, his grantee, under deed dated January 31, 1882, have made valuable and lasting improvements on the land which was “ wild, vacant, and unimproved,” and Hughes was, at the time of defendant’s purchase, in possession of the land with color of title. The plaintiff’s deed (which is the second one in. a series of mesne conveyances from Corbett, the original patentee, his patent bearing date in T859, and recorded June 10, 1876), is dated April 20,
Do the circumstances of this case materially differ in principle from the one supposed % Was it not equally ¡obligatory on the plaintiff to speak in the real case as in the hypothetical one % It would seem if the evidence on ,the part of defendant is to be taken as true, that but one answer, and that in the affirmative, can be returned to
In conclusion, it only remains to- say that the authorities, the equity and good conscience of this cause require that' it be held that there was sufficient evidence to warrant the giving of the third declaration of. law asked by defendant. And there was sufficient evidence to warrant
For the reasons given, the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded.