delivered the opinion of the Court.
Thе appellant was indicted in the Hot Spring Circuit Court under the provisions of the 51 st сhap. Eng. Dig., p. 329, title Maiming. The indictment charges, with requisite certainty of time and place, that John Guest, in and upon one Sequal Dortch, did feloniously, wilfully, and of his maliсe aforethought, make an assault; and the said John Guest, wilfully and of his malice аforethought, did then and there, with his fingers, fists, etc., pull, tear, knock and gouge out the right eye of him, the said Sequal Dortch, etc., contrary to the form of the statute, еtc.
On this indictment the appellant was tried in the Court below, and the jury found him guilty of “an aggravated assault and battery.” He moved in arrest of judgment — his motion was overrulеd, and he appealed.
The section of the statute upon which the indiсtment was iramed, is in the following words: “ If any person shall, wilfully and of his malice aforethought, cut, or bite off the ear, cut out, or in any manner disable the tongue, put оut an eye, slit, cut,. or bite off the nose or lip of any person, he shall be adjudged guilty of maiming.”
The sufficiency of the indictment is questioned, and it is argued by counsel that an indictment for mayhem must not only charge the facts which constitute the injury, but must alsо charge, as a conclusion from the facts averred, that the party was “ maimed.” The word “ maimed ” being a term of art, set' apart by the common law, for the description of the offence which no other word can supply.
This we admit to be the ancient rule of the common law. Hawk. P. C., book 2, chap. 23]
This rule is applicable to the indictment under cоnsideration. If the statute had declared that all persons, guilty of the crime of mayhem, should be punished in a particular manner, without attempting to define' thе offence, the question might well arise upon an indictment framed on such a statute, whether it was necessary to aver that the party injured was “maimed.” Our statute, however, not only fixes the punishment, but, by the 1st, 2d, 3d and 4th sections, declares what aсts shall constitute maiming, and although some of the acts enumerated amount tо mayhem at common law, and others do not, yet the blending them together in onе definition, puts them all on the same legal footing; and, inasmuch as the statute сontains all the necessary ingredients to constitute the offence, according to the statutory definition, it follows that an indictment in the words of the statute is suffiсient (Moffat vs. The State, 6 Eng. 169) without alleging the technical words of art appliсable to indictments for the same offence at common law. We think the indictment is good.
The second point made -by counsel is, that the verdict of the jury is not responsive to the indictment. We do not think that there is any thing in this point. The jury found the appellant guilty of “ an aggravated assault and battery,” and assessed his fine, etc. In the case of Cameron vs. The State,
There being no error in the record, the judgment must be affirmed with costs, etc.
