6 Ga. 119 | Ga. | 1849
By the Court.
delivering the opinion.
Three grounds of error are assigned upon the record in this case, to the judgment of the Court below:
1st. Because the Court erred in admitting evidence going to show that the decree against Perryman was for too large an amount.
2d. Because the Court erred in not charging the Jury as requested by complainant’s counsel, and charging them as stated in the record.
3d. Because the Court erred in deciding that the defendant’s counsel in the Common Law action, and counsel for the complainant in the bill, should open the argument to the Jury; and that the counsel for the plaintiff in the Common Law action and counsel for the defendant in the Equity cause, should conclude the argument.
There are several specifications of error made on the record*,
For the reasons already stated, we think the Court ought to have charged the Jury as requested; and that it was error in refusing so to charge; and that the charge, as given, was erroneous in point of law. These notes not being negotiable, although Dennard may have paid a valuable consideration for them, without notice of the existing equity between Perryman and1 Guerry, at the time of the assignment of the notes; yet he holds them subject to that equity. Chamberlain vs. Day, 3 Cowen’s R. 353. The law which governs and must control this case is, that the decree in favor of Guerry against Perryman, is conclusive evidence of Perryman’s indebtedness to Guerry, the amount of money specified in the decree. Guerry had the equitable right to set off the amount due him by the decree from Perryman, in a suit on the notes by Perryman against him. Dennard having derived his title to the notes from Durham, and Durham from Perryman, they, as the assignees of Perryman, stand in his shoes, and the same equities attach to the notes in their hands in favor of Guerry, as would have attached to them in the hands of Perryman, had the suit been instituted on the notes by Perryman. There being no notice to Guerry, of the assignment of the notes by P erryman, to the assignees, or either of them, prior to the rendition of the decree against Perryman, in favor of Guerry, or at any other time,
It was a distinct and independent suit on the Chancery side of the Court, and we have not been able to perceive any reason why it should not have been treated so at the trial, or why the trial should have been embarrassed with the Common Law suit which had been enjoined by the interlocutory order of the Chancellor. Viewing the suit as a proceeding in Chancery exclusively, the solicitor for the complainant in the bill was entitled to open and conclude the argument to the Jury, and'not the counsel for the plaintiff in the Common Law action which had been enjoined. Let the judgment of the Court below be reversed.