18 La. 590 | La. | 1841
delivered the opinion of the court.
This case having been remanded for further proceedings, see 13 La. Rep., 17; the lower court, according to the instructions of this court, permitted the plaintiffs to introduce parol evidence, to prove the execution of the act of settlement of the estate of Francois Chauvin Delery, and to show that the slave Celestine, by them claimed, is the same that was inherited by the plaintiffs’ mother from her father. The defendant took a bill of exceptions, and judgment having been rendered in favor .of said'plaintiffs, said defendant and his warrantors appealed.
The additional evidence adduced before the inferior court,
This cause is now before us on its real merits, and we shall therefore proceed to examine all the various grounds upon which the 'defendant and his warrantors attempt to resist the plaintiffs’ claim, and endeavor to maintain the title which was transferred to the said defendant by the adjudication made to him by the marshal of the United States. They contend :
1. That there is no competent proof of the heirship of the plaintiffs ; as the only proper and legal proof of such heirship is the mortuary proceedings of their deceased parent.
2. That parol evidence was improperly admitted of the slaves in question, having been donated to plaintiffs’ mother, inasmuch as the will of Francois Chauvin Delery does not recite the names of any of the slaves therein stated to have been formerly given.
3. That Francois Chauvin Delery, by his will, mentions eight children as his heirs and universal legatees, whilst only seven are recited in the act of partition or settlement of his succession.
4. That all the heirs and parties to the act of' partition, whose names are therein recited, did not sign it.
5. That said act is an -act under private signature, which never was registered according to law; and is not valid against bona ficle purchasers and creditors.
0. That the plaintiffs have not made out their title to the slave Celestino; and that the identity of the slave Fanny is not satisfactorily established.
I. The testimony introduced to prove the heirship of the plaintiffs was not objected to in the court below; and although it is true that the registers of marriages, births and deaths are higher and moro proper evidence than proof by witnesses, yol the existence of the former will not bo presumed, as it must bo positively proved that such registers or other proceedings do exist. 11 Martin, 718 ; 8 Martin, N. S., 269.
II. This is one of the legal points which wore the subject of the decision of this court reported in 13 La. Rep. 17; and we fully concur in the opinion then pronounced. It is obvious that the parol evidence complained of does not go to establish a title or a donation by parol, but merely to identify a slave which was inherited by plaintiffs’ mother from her father’s estate, and to show the fact of said slave’s having been put in her possession and kept by her as part of the inheritance. Such fact is independent of the act of partition and settlement which was subsequently passed between the heirs, as her said possession was far anterior to the execution of the said act, and commenced in 1810, at the time of her marriage with the plaintiffs' father, who, after her death, became their tutor and never had in himself any right or title to the property in dispute. Tt is true, that the will of Francois Chauvin Delery recognizes that he gave a female slave, valued at #000, to each of his married children, in advance of their shares in his succession, en avail-cement cVhoirie, and that those slaves are not named in the said will; but this does not constitute the real and only title under which the plaintiffs are entitled to claim the slaves in question ; it is on their right of inheritance in representation of their deceased mother, to whom the slave Celestine was delivered by her father in advance of her rights to his future suc - cession, that their title is based, and in such a case, we understand that proof of the right to inherit, and of the identity af the property inherited, is a.ll that can be required to show that
III. The defendant ought to have shown, that the eight children mentioned in the will, were in existence at the lime of the death of the plaintiffs’ ancestor, in order to establish this point.
I IV. The view we have taken of the second ground, renders |he examination of this question unnecessary : the act of partition or settlement objected to, cannot add anything to the lilaiiitills’ right, nor can it .lifecl it; it serves only to show
V. The Art. 2242 of the La. Code is not applicable to this case: the defendants cannot pretend to be creditors of the plaintiffs’ ancestor, nor can they maintain to have purchased the slaves in question from the same person and under the same title. Moreover the plaintiffs and their mother had been in possession of said slaves since 1810, at which time Celestine was really delivered to their said mother; whilst the act complained of was only executed in 1823.
VI. From the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs, we are of opinion that they have completely made out their case, and that the slave Fanny has been satisfactorily identified to be the child of the female slave Celestine.
With regard to the judgment rendered by the lower court in favor of the defendant- Bagneries against his warrantors, we think it is correct, except that the interest on the amount of said judgment should run from the 27th of November, 1834, and not from the 18th of October previous, and that instead of' ordering the said amount to be first recovered of the creditors, said judgment should have been in conformity with the 711 th Article of the Code of Practice, to wit: “if the purchaser has been evicted from the thing adjudged to him, on the ground that it belongs to another person than the party in whose hands it was taken, he shall in that case have his recourse for reimbursement against the seized debtor and the seizing creditor ; but upon the judgment obtained jointly for that purpose, the purchaser shall first take execution against the debtor, and upon the return of such execution, no property found, then he shall be at liberty to take out execution against the creditor.” It is thus perfectly clear, that the defendant must first proceed against Louis Guerin, and that he cannot take out his execution against Dennistoun & Co., until from the return of the first writ it is ascertained, that no property has been found to satisfy the claim.
It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judg-