OPINION AND ORDER
On June 25, 2010, Plaintiffs Gucci America, Inc., and certain of its affiliates (“Gucci”) commenced'this trademark infringement action against the owners and operators of a Chinese website dedicated to the sale of imitation handbags and other counterfeit items bearing Gucci’s trademarks. (Doc. No. 1.) Now before the Court is Gucci’s -motion to compel nonparty Bank of China (“BOC”) to comply with subpoenas requesting the production of account documents relating to all Defen
I. Background
The Court presumes the parties’ familiarity with the facts underlying this case, which were thoroughly discussed in the Court’s August 23, 2011 Memorandum and Order (Doc. No. 75 (“August 23 Order”)) and May 18,2012 Memorandum and Order (Doc. No. 98 (“May 18 Order”)); However, to provide context, the Court briefly recites. the facts and procedural history below.
Gucci is a distributor .of luxury handbags, clothing, jewelry, fragrances, and home products. In or around June 2010, Gucci discovered that Defendants and. their affiliates were offering for sale on the internet counterfeit versions of Gucci’s products. On June 25, 2010, Gucci initiated this action against certain Defendants pursuant to the Lanham Act, 15' U.S.C. § 1051 et seq., and related state-law causes of action. Gucci amended its complaint to add additional Defendants on October 4, 2010 (Doc. No. 18) and on 'March 10, 2011 (Doc. No. 55).
On July 12, 2010, the Court issued a preliminary injunction (the “Injunction”), which froze Defendants’ assets and enjoined Defendants from manufacturing, distributing, marketing, or selling counterfeit goods. (Doc. No. 12.) Because Gucci had obtained evidence that certain Defendants had wired the proceeds of the counterfeit sales to accounts at the Chinese headquarters of BOC (the “Head Office”), the Injunction also provided that “any banks ... who receive actual notice of this order ... are, without prior approval of the Court, restrained and enjoined from transferring, disposing of, or secreting any money, stocks, bonds, real or personal property, or other assets of Defendants.” (Id. at 6.) The Injunction also provided that “any third party receiving a subpoena pursuant to this Order shall produce documents responsive to such requests within ten (10) days of service of such subpoena.” (Id. at 9.)
Pursuant to the Injunction, Gucci served a subpoena on BOC on July 16, 2010 (the “2010 Subpoena”) in accordance with Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, requesting documents pertaining to any BOC accounts maintained by Defendants and defining “ACCOUNTS” to include “all ■... accounts at [BOC] held by Defendants; including, but not limited to” two specifically named BOC accounts. (Doc. No. 28-5 at 4.) The 2010 Subpoena also requested “documents associated with any open'or closed checking, Savings, money market accounts, and certificates оf deposit held 'in the name of any of the Defendants, including but not limited to” the two named BOC accounts. (Id. at 6.) Shortly before filing the Second Amended Complaint, Gucci served BOC with a second subpoena on February 23, 2011 (the “2011 Subpoena”), making some new requests for information but largely repeating the same requests contained in the 2010 Subpoena. (Doc. No. 109-4.) Although again seeking documents pertaining to- “any” BOC accounts maintained by any of the Defendants, the 2011 Subpoena specifically identified the same two accounts identified' in the 2010 Subpoena, along with six additional accounts. (Id.) In a supplemental submission, Gucci identified one other account, bringing the total number of BOC accounts connected to Defendants to nine. (Doc. No. 58-9.)
On August 23, 2011, the Court granted Gucci’s motion to compel BOC to comply with the- 2010 Subpoena and the asset freeze provisions of the Injunction, and denied BOC’s cross-mоtion to.modify the Injunction so as to exclude assets held by BOC in any of its locations in China. (August 23 -Order at 1.) On September 12,
On. November 30, 2011, BOC filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s August 23 Order, bаsed principally on a November 3, 2011 letter that BOC received from the People’s Bank of China (“PBOC”) and the China Banking Regulatory Commission (“CBRC”). In the letter, PBOC and CBRC set forth their views as to the application of Chinese bank secrecy laws to disclosures' of customer'information outside of China, China’s commitment to using Hague Convention procedures for document requests, and the likelihood of sanctions being imposed on BOC in China as a result of its compliance with the August 23 Order. (Doc. No. 91-9.) On May 18, 2012, the Court issued its -Memorandum and Order denying the motion for reconsideration. (May 18 Order at 1.) BOC thereafter appealed the Court’s August 23 and May 18 Orders to the Second Circuit. (Doc. Nos. 80 & 99.) . .
On September 17, 2014, the-Second Circuit affirmed the Court’s Injunction but vacated its August-23 and-May-T8 Orders in light of the Supreme Court’s opinion on general personal jurisdiction in Daimler AG v. Bauman, — U.S. —-,
On December 1, 2014, Gucci filed its motion to compel BOC’s compliance with the'2010 and 2011 Subpoenas (Doc. No. 135) and ah accompanying memorandum of law' (Doc. No. 136 (“Mem.”)). BOC filed its memorandum of law'in opposition to the motion to compel on January 23, 2015 (Doc. No. 141 (“Opp.”)), and Gucci filed its reply memorandum of law on February 6, 2015 (Doc. No. 146 (“Rep.”)), After the matter was fully submitted, the parties submitted additional letters relating to recent cases they argue .are relevant to the motion before the Court. , (Doc. Nos. 152, 154,155,156 & 157.) The matter was thus fully briefed as of September 10, 2015.
II. Discussion
As noted above, the Second Circuit has directed the Court on remand to consider (1) whether it has specific personal jurisdiction over BOC justifying an order to compel it to produce .the documents called for in the 2010 and 2011 Subpoenas, and, if so, (2) whether recent decisions from Chinese courts alter the Court’s previous comity analysis pursuant to § 442 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law. For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that it has specific personal jurisdiction over BOC and that the § 442 factors still strongly support ordering BOC to comply with the 2010 and 2011 Subpoenas.
A district court must have personal jurisdiction over a nonparty to compel it to comply with a Rule 45 subpoena. See, e.g., First Am. Corp. v. Price Waterhouse LLP,
1. Statutory Basis for Personal Jurisdiction
A federal statute or the law of the state in which the court is located can provide the statutory basis for personal jurisdiction. See Licci II,
The New York Court of Appeals has noted that, in the banking context, the first prong of the § 302(a)(1) inquiry “may be complicated by the nature of inter-bank .'activity, especially' given the widespread use of correspondent accounts nominally in New York to facilitate the flow of money worldwide, often for transactions that otherwise have no other connection1 to New York, or indeed the United States.” Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL,
With respect to the second prong 6f the § 302(a)(1) jurisdictional analysis, the New York Court of Appeals requires that “in light, of all the circumstances, there must be an articulable nexus or substantial relationship between the business transaction and the claim asserted.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Notably, New York does not require a causal relationship between the business transaction and the claim asserted; it is enough that “the latter is not completely unmoored from the
In answering a certified question from the Second Circuit, the New York Court of Appeals in Lied III applied its § 302(a)(1) analysis to a foreign bank in a strikingly similar situation to that of BOC here. There, the foreign bank “did , not operate branches or оffices, or-maintain employees, in the United States,” Licci III, 20 N.Y.3d at 332, 960 N,Y.S.2d 695,
Here, BOC’s New York conduct'is, if anything, even more substantial, deliberate, and recurring than that of the foreign bank in the Lied cases (collectively “Lic-d ”). As a result, the Court has no.trouble concluding that Gucci satisfies the first prong of § 302(a)(1). Unlike the bank in Lied, BOC owns multiple real properties in New York and maintains two branches that are staffed with employees. (Doc. No. 138, Declaration of Robert L. Weigel, dated Dec. i, 2014 (“Weigel Decl.”), Exs. 14-15.) Moreover, BOC’s Head Office opened a correspondent account at JPMor-gan Chase Bank (“Chase”) in New York to facilitate transfers directly from Chase customers to BOC customers. (Weigel Deck, Exs. 2-8, 17.) This relationship enables BOC to boast that its New York branches are the, “principal U.S. dollar clearing channel of [BOC] worldwide,” and that BOC is “the first choice of U.S. dollar wire transfers to and from China.” (Weig-el Deck, Ex. 17.) Such marketing apparently captivated Defendants, who usеd BOC nearly a dozen times to transfer what Gucci alleges are ill-gotten gains denominated in U.S. dollars from the United States to China. (Weigel Deck, Ex's. 2-12.)
Furthermore, with respect to the second prong of the § 302(a)(1) analysis, there is a strong relationship between BOC’s New York conduct and Gucci’s subpoena requests. Specifically,. Gucci alleges that Defendants’ use of BOC’s correspondent account at. Chase and BOC’s relationship with Chase in New York to effectuate wire transfers between the United States and China were crucial components of their counterfeiting operation.. Gucci’s 2010 and 2011 Subpoenas seek information about those very transfers, as well as Defendants’ relationship with BOC. Clearly, there is more than “an articulable nexus” between BOC’s New York business activity and Gucci’s discovery requests.
BOC’s efforts to distinguish Lied are unpersuasive. BOC asserts that “there is a -vast difference between a bank’s purposeful use .of a correspondent account in the United States to make illegal payments for a client, as in Lied, and BOC’s passive receipt of transfers that [D]efen-
Moreover, the cases that BOC relies on to support its argument that “receiving a transfer of funds, whether via a U.S. correspondent account or through wire services, does not subject the recipient to personal jurisdiction” (Opp. at 15), are equally inapplicable to the instant facts. None of those cases involved a foreign bank deliberately thrusting .itself into the New York financial market by establishing a New York office and a correspondent account with a New York bank to repeatedly facilitate the transfer of money from its clients’ bank accounts in the United States to their accounts abroad. Rather, the cases either involved banks with no New York operations that passively received money via a New York correspondent account, see e.g., Rushaid v. Pictet & Cie,
Here, BOC is a bank that is in the business of providing banking services to individuals in China and the United States. (Weigel Deck, Ex. 13.) Critical to serving those clients is the existence of a correspondent account at a reputable New York bank to conduct secure, efficient, and quick .wire transfers. BOC cannot credibly compare itself to a passive recipient of a few one-off wire transfers that by pure happenstance were routed through a domestic correspondent bank accdunt.
Finally, BOC asserts that Gucci cannot demonstrate the requisite nexus between BOC’s New York-based сonduct and the Subpoenas, since the information sought by Gucci is in fact located in China and the active task of crediting .Defendants’ Chinese bank accounts took place in China. (Opp. at 10 — 11,14.) However, the Second Circuit, in Licci directly addressed and rejected the argument that the effects óf the entity’s in-forum, conduct must also take place in New York for jurisdiction to be proper. In fact, the Second Circuit con-
BOC’s argument that the information that Gucci seeks is physically located in China, not New York, is equally unavailing. BOC seems to be invoking a species of the “separate entity rule,” which “provides that even when a bank garnishee with a New York branch is subject to personal jurisdiction, its other branches are- to be treated as separate entities for certain purposes.” Motorola Credit Corp. v. Standard Chartered Bank,
2. Constitutional Due Process
When assessing whether the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over an entity is constitutionally proper, courts must apply a two-step test: first, they must determine whether the entity has sufficient “minimum contacts” with the forum, and second, they must find that the exercise of jurisdiction under the circumstances was “reasonable.” Licci IV,
As an initial matter, the Second Circuit noted in Lied IV that it would be “rare” and “unusual” for a сourt to firid that an entity’s conduct satisfied § 302(a)(1), “yet, in connection with the same transaction of business,” that the entity did not have sufficient minimum contacts with New York or that the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be otherwise unreasonable. Licci IV,
a. Minimum Contacts
Court often analyze the, “minimum contacts” inquiry as two separate prongs: (1) the “purposeful availment” prong, whereby the.court determines whether the entity deliberately directed its conduct at the forum, and (2) the “relatedness” prong, whereby the court determines whether the controversy at issue arose out of or related to the entity’s in-forum conduct. See, e.g., Chew v. Dietrich,
As the Court has already noted, BOC’s in-forum conduct is deliberate and recurring, not “random, isolated, or fortuitous.” Licci IV,
' Once again, the Lied decisions demonstrate* that BOC had the requisite “minimum contacts” with New York. - In Lied IV, the Second Circuit concluded that “the selection and repeated use of New York’s ■banking system ... constitutes ‘purposeful availment of the privilege of doing business -in New York.’ ” Licci IV,
Relatedness, the second prong of the minimum contacts inquiry, is a sliding-scale test: when an entity has only limited contacts with a forum, relatedness requires that “the plaintiffs injury was proximately caused by those contacts,” but when an entity’s contacts with the forum “are more substantial,” it is not unreasonablе to exercise personal jurisdiction “even though the acts vnthin the state, are not the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury.” Chew,
Under the Chew sliding scale, BOC’s contacts with New York are sufficiently “substantial” that they need only be a “but for” cause of Gucci’s 2010 and 2011 Subpoenas. As noted previously, BOC has significant operations, employees, and physical locations in New York, actively solicits business and customers in New York, and has deliberate and recurring contacts with New York. Furthermore, BOC provides extensive services to its clients in New York, including a correspondent account at Chase that its Head Office established to facilitate U.S. dollar-denominated transfers. Therefore, contrary to BOC’s assertions, BOC bears little resemblance to the defendants in SPV OS US Ltd. v. UBS AG — which were “foreign banks alleged to have providеd services to foreign investment funds, acting entirely abroad and with only sporadic or indirect contacts with the United States,” with no physical presence or employees in New York, and which did not “directly or purposefully solicit, market, or otherwise seek out business from potential customers located in the United States.”
Accordingly, the Court finds that BOC purposefully availed itself of this forum and that its conduct was sufficiently related to the subpoena enforcement action that is the subject of this dispute. The Court thus concludes that BOC has sufficient minimum contacts with New York for the Court to have personal jurisdiction over Gucci’s motion to compel.
b. Reasonableness
In determining whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would comport with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,” courts consider five factors: (1) “the burden that the exercise of jurisdiction- will impose on the [entity],”' (2) “the interests of the forum state in adjudicating the case,” (3) “the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief,” (4) “the interstate'judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of the controversy,” and (5) “the shared interest of the states in furthering substantive social рolicies.” Bank Brussels Lambert,
The burden on BOC of submitting to 'jurisdiction in New York is minimal. BOC has been litigating this action in New York since June 2010. Moreover, BOC has initiated multiple lawsuits in the Southern District of New York and maintains physical operations here. In addition, “the conveniences of modern communication and transportation ease” any burden BOC might experience from further contesting the 2010 and 2011 Subpoenas. Licci IV,
With respect to the forum’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, courts do not “compare the interests of the sovereigns” but rather “determine whether the forum state has an interest.” Nowak,
As for “the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief,” Bank Brussels Lambert, 305 F.3d at 129, there can be no doubt that Gucci has a strong interest in BOC complying with the 2010 and 2011 Subpoenas because, as the Court already found, “the documents sought by the Subpoena[s] are likely to provide the most fruitful avenue for discovering the identity of additional infringers” and “the most effective measure' of the revenues generated by Defendants.” (August 23 Order at 6.) Because “there exists substantial doubt that [Guсci] could, adequately resolve the dispute” by other means, Nowak, 94 F.3d at 718, Gucci’s interests in obtaining its desired relief in its desired forum are even greater. (See August 23 Order at 10 (easting doubt on the viability of a Hague Convention request yielding Gucci the information it seeks).)
With respect to the international judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution to the. controversy, the Court’s retention of jurisdiction over this action would undoubtedly provide the fastest and -most practical means of resolving this dispute» The Court is already intimately familiar with the parties, facts, and legal issues, see Ballard,
Finally, a balancing of the substantive social policies at issue further supports exercising personal jurisdiction. As the Court already concluded in its original § 442 comity analysis under the “balance of national interests” factor, Gucci’s interest in compelling BOC to comply with the
Accordingly, having carefully considered each of the factors discussed above, the Court concludes that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over BOC to compel it to comply with the 2010 and 2011 Subpoenas is consistent with “fair play and substantial justice,” Burger King,
B. Comity
In its August 23 Order, the Court conducted a detailed comity analysis and concluded that a balancing of the § 442 factors strongly supported ordering BOC to comply with Gucci’s document requests. (August 23 Order at 13.) The Second Circuit upheld this conclusion, holding that there was “nó abuse of discretion in this analysis” and that “BOC’s arguments to the contrary are without merit.” Gucci II,
The Court’s initial comity analysis considered seven factors. Five of those factors came from § 442(l)(c): (i) “the importance to the investigation or litigation of the documents or other information requested;” (ii) “the degree of specificity of the request;”, (in) “whether the information originated in the- United States;” (iv) “the availability of alternative means of securing the information;” and (v) “the extent to which noncompliance with the request would undermine important interests of the United States, or compliance with the request would undermine important interests of the statе where the information is located.” Two additional factors that the Court considered included “the hardship of compliance on the party or witness from whom discovery is sought” and' “the good faith of the party resisting discovery.” (August 23 Order at 6 (quoting Minpeco S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc.,
The Second Circuit directed the Court to “consider the question of comity again in light of the newly available December 4, 2013 Judgment of the Second Intermediate People’s Court of Beijing-Municipality, and any subsequent judgments it finds’ relevant.” (Doc. No. 127- at 44.) After the Second Intermediate People’s Court of Beijing Municipality issued the December 4, 2013 Civil Judgment (Doc. No. 142, Declaration of Yuqing Zhang, dated Jan. 22, 2015 (“Zhang Deck”), Ex. 10 (“Beijing Intermediate Court Judgment”)), - BOC appealed the Beijing Intermediate Court
The controvеrsy underlying the Beijing judgments is a private civil suit between BOC and some of the Defendants in this action; Specifically, the plaintiffs in that action — who are Defendants here — -alleged that1 BOC unlawfully froze their bank accounts as a result of the litigation before this Court, and argued that the terms -and conditions of their account opening documents did not permit BOC to suspend their banking services. (Beijing Intermediate Court Judgment at 2-3.) Consequently, the account holders sought an order directing BOC to lift the account freezes and to pay all litigation costs associated with the case. (Id. at 2.)
The Beijing Intermediate Court held that BOC “failed to produce evidence to prove that [the plaintiffs] actually made any operation with malicious intent, or defamed or damaged the reputation of the bank, or maliciously attacked the electronic banking system of the bank,” which the Beijing Intermediate- Court found was the necessary, prerequisite for BOC to freeze the plaintiffs’ bank accounts. (Id. at 6-7.) The Beijing Intermediate Court further noted that the action before this Court “is still on-going and pending,” “no judgment has taken effect in China,” and BOC “failed to produce evidence sufficient to prove that it has justifiable reason ... to cease to provide services” to the account holders. (Id. at 7.) The Beijing Intermediate Court therefore concluded that BOC had no contractual or legal basis for suspending the plaintiffs’ accounts and ordered BOC to resume providing banking services to the account holders. (Id.)
On appeal, the Beijing High Court noted that under Chinese commercial banking law, “the lawful business operation of a commercial bank [should be] free from interference of any entity or individual,” “a commercial bank shall protect the lawful interest of depositors from being damaged by any entity or individual,” and “personal savings deposit business with commercial banks shall be based on the principles of voluntary deposit, free withdrawal], deposit bearing interest, and the confidentiality for the depositor.” (Beijing High Court Judgment at 8.) After de novo review of the Beijing Intermediate Court Judgment (Doc. 137, Declaration of Donald Clarke, dated Dec. 1, 2014 (“Clarke Decl.”) ¶ 13), the Beijing. High Court held that BOC “failed to produce-evidence to prove that [the account holders] violated any contractually agreed terms, [that BOC] unilaterally terminated services for their -bank accounts, [and] thus there is no contractual or legal basis for BOC to unilaterally stop financial service and. suspend usage of the accounts.” (Id.) The Beijing High Court Judgment directed BOC to pay 140 .ren-minbi in court fees .(approximately $22.00 at current exchange rates) and upheld the Beijing Intei-mediate Court’s injunction. (Id.)
As an initial matter, it-is important to note that the Beijing judgments impact only a few of the seven factors the Court considered. Nothing in the Beijing judgments changes the Court’s conclusion that: (i) “the documents requested in the Subpoena[s] are important to the instant litigation,” (ii) “the Subpoena[s] [are] sufficiently specific,” and (iv) “Hague Convention requests in circumstances similar to those presented here are not a viable al-
With respect to the balancing of national interests, the Court noted that while China has bank secrecy laws that prevent disclosure of an individual’s account information without consent, such protection can be waived by several different public bodies. (August 23 Order at 10 (discussing declaration of BOC’s Chinese bank law expert).) Accordingly, the Court concluded that “China’s bank secrecy laws merely confer an individual privilege on customers rather than reflect a national policy entitled to substantial deference.” (Id. at 11.) Weighing against China’s interests, the Court concluded that the United States “has a powerful interest in enforcing the acts of Congress, especially those, such as the Lanham Act, that are designed to protect intellectual property rights and prevent consumer confusion.” (Id.) Overall, the Court determined that this factor “clearly weighs in favor of’ Gucci. (Id.)
The Beijing judgments, if anything, shift the balance of national intеrests more firmly toward the United States because they acknowledge that BOC had broad contractual rights over its customers’ account information, such as the power to suspend or terminate service in certain circumstances.- (Clarke Decl. ¶¶ 16-18.) That'BOC did not sufficiently prove the existence of those circumstances does not change the fact that the Beijing judgments recognized BOC as lawfully having that authority. The Beijing judgments do not provide any support for BOC’s assertion that China’s bank secrecy laws are rigidly enforced or a matter of strong state policy that trump the United States’ interest in enforcing the Lanham Act. Accordingly, the Court concludes that this factor “clearly weighs in favor of’ Gucci.
As- for the hardship of compliance, the Court initially found that this factor weighed in favor of Gucci because it concluded that BOC’s representations ’ that it would face significant criminal and civil liability from complying with the 2010 Subpoena were unduly speculative. Specifically, the Court determined that the Chinese cases that purportedly demonstrated that Chinese courts take customer bank account secrecy seriously did not in fact sup.port BOC’s assertion that compliance with the 2010 Subpoena would subject BOC or its employees to heavy fines or incarceration. (August 23 Order at 11-12.) In fact, the Court concluded that BOC could point to no case where a Chinese bank was subjected to liability for disclosing the type of bank account Information sought by Gucci. (Id. at 12.) In light of the speculative nature of BOC’s professed hardship, the Court' determined that the factor supported granting'the motion to compel.
Because the Court previously found that a balancing of the § 442 factors “strongly weighs in favor of’ granting Gucci’s motion to compel, and the Beijing judgments actually strengthen that determination, the Court reaffirms its comity analysis and concludes that ordering BOG to comply with the 2010 and 2011 Subpoenas is consistent with § 442 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that it has specific personal jurisdiction over BOC with respect to the 2010 and 2011 Subpoenas and that exercising such jurisdiction comports with due process and principles of comity. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion to compel is granted. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT BOC shall produce all documents requested in the 2010 and 2011 Subpoenas as they pertain to all Defendants, including but not limited to (1) all documents and communications regarding Defendants or their accounts, (2) all documents associated with any accounts or deposits held in any Defendants’ name, and (3) all documents relating to any checks, money orders, or other negotiable instruments purchased by Defendant. For clarification, “all Defendants” covers all Defendants who have been named in this action, including those in the Second Amended Complaint: Weny-ing Guo, Xiaochao Shang, Lei Xu, Fen-gyuan Zhao, Liqun Zhao, Ming Zhao, and Peiyuan Zhao. IT IS FUTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiffs shall submit a letter to the Court by October 15, 2015 apprising the Court of BOC’s compliance with the 2010 and 2011 Subpoenas. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motion located at docket number 135.
SO ORDERED.
Notes
.' Citing the amended Rule 45, which provides that "[a] subpoеna may be served at any place within the .United States,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(b)(2), (he Second Circuit suggested that the Court may consider BOC's contacts nationwide iti' evaluating personal jurisdiction. See Gucci II,
. Because the Second Circuit explicitly cab-ined the Court’s reconsideration of its comity analysis to the Beijing Intermediate Court Judgment and "any subsequent judgments it finds relevant,” such as the Beijing High Court Judgment, the Court does not consider the numerous arguments the parties raise with respect to the Court’s comity analysis that have nothing to do with the Beijing judgments. (See Mem. at 23-24; Opp. at 23-24; Rep. at 8 — 9.) In ,any event, most of the parties’ arguments are simply rehashes of ones previously madé in connection with the Court's initial comity analysis.