107 F. 311 | 5th Cir. | 1901
after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of .the court.
_ 1. The first question presented on the record for our consideration is, what relation did the city of Galveston sustain towards the Galveston City Railroad Company, — that of stockholder or creditor ? The contention of appellant is that the city’s relation to and only interest in the railroad company was that of stockholder. The appellee does not insist thai:, as the result of the contract and mortgage, the city was a part’ owner in kind of the railroad property, as set up in its answer, or that it was both creditor and stockholder ; and the appellee’s counsel concedes that if the city’s status was that of a stockholder, common or preferred, it was not a creditor. But the contention is that it was a creditor of the railroad company; that “the question is, what was the substance? and not what was the form of the city’s status”? To use the language of the court in Corcoran v. Powers, 6 Ohio St. 19, “The question in such cases is not, what did the parties call it? but, what do the facts require the court .to call it?” It appears that the city of Galveston passed an ordinance embodying a contract between itself and certain promoters of the Galveston City Railroad Company, whereby the city granted said company the right to construct and operate, for a term of years, railways along and across, certain specified streets of the city, upon certain conditions. In the contract it was provided that in lieu of percentage on the net receipts of said railroad, and in lieu of bonus for the contract, 600 shares of the capital stock of said railroad should be made over and transferred to the city of Galveston; said 600 shares of stock to be paid up by said promoters, or by the company to be formed under the contract and franchise. The railroad company was duly incorporated and organized, and 600 shares of the capital stock of the company, of the par value of $50 each, were issued as fully paid up stock to the city, as .provided by the contract. The city was entered as a stockholder on the books of the company. It, was represented on the board of directors by its mayor, who was by agreement elected a director to represent its interest. It had
“Said party [the promoter of,, the railroads] shall make over and transfer to the city of Galveston, in lieu of percentage on the net, receipts of said road, and in lieu of bonus for this contract, six hundred shares of the capital stock of said railroad; said six hundred shares of stock to be paid up by said party, or by the company to be formed under the contract.”
We find no language in this contract to express or imply the relation of creditor on the part of the city. But the language employed whereby the city was to acquire its interest in the company is apt to express the relation of stockholder. The instrument by which
“There is a sense in which every shareholder is a creditor of the corporation to the extent of his contribution to the capital stock. In that sense every corporation includes its capital stock among its liabilities. But that creditor relation is one which exists only between the corporation and its shareholders. It is a liability which is postponed to every other liability, and no part of the capital stock can be lawfully returned to the stockholders until all debts are paid or provided for. The violation of this well-understood principle is a breach of trust, and a creditor affected thereby may pursue the stockholders and recover as for an unlawful diversion of assets.”
What, then, was the interest of the city which the company undertook to secure? It seems to us clear that it was its interest as a stockholder. When a corporation is dissolved by consolidation with another, or becomes involved in debt and concludes to stop operations and pay its debts, if there are any assets left after paying off the debts they are ordinarily distributed between the stockholders in proportion to the number of shares which each holds. There is no preference of one stockholder over other stockholders, except such preference is expressly contracted for. A preference as to capital stock or a distribution of net assets may be expressly contracted for. Such preferred stockholders, however, are not creditors of the corporation, but are stockholders entitled to a preference over the holders of common stock. Cook, Stocks & S. § 270; Clark, Corp. 367; Coulter v. Robertson, 57 Am. Dec. 168; Hamlin v. Railroad Co., supra. We think the interest of the city of Galveston in the Galveston City Railroad Company was one capable of being secured, and that the evident purpose of the company in providing security for that interest was to give the city a preference in the distribution of the capital stock or net assets of the company over other stockholders. It will not be presumed that the purpose of the company was to make a contract by which the city was, to receive the par value or any part of its stock before all the debts of the company are paid. It would require the clearest language to show that such was its purpose. Our interpretation of the contract fails to disclose any such purpose. But, if it existed, the contract would be contrary to public policy and void. Cook, Stocks & S. §§ 271-278; Warren v. King, 108 U. S. 389, 2 Sup. Ct. 789, 27 L. Ed. 769; Hamlin v. Railroad Co., supra; Miller v. Ratterman, 47 Ohio St. 141, 24 N. E. 496. In Warren v. King, supra, the court said:
“One of the characteristics of capital stoek is that no part of the property of a corporation shall go to reimburse the principal of capital stock until all the debts of the corporation have been paid.”
“There is a wide difference between the relation of a creditor and a stockholder to the corporate property. One cannot well be a creditor as respects creditors proper, and a stockholder by virtue of a certificate evidencing his contribution to 1he capital of the corporation. Stock is capital, and a stock certificate but evidences that the holder has ventured his means as a part of the capital. It is a fixed characteristic of capital slock that no part of it can be withdrawn for the purpose of reimbursing the principal of the capital stock until (he debts of the corporation are paid. * * * If the purpose in providing for these peculiar shares was to arrange matters so that under any circumstances a part of the principal of stock might be withdrawn before the discharge of all corporate debts, the device would be contrary to the nature of capital stock, opposed to public policy, and void as to creditors affected thereby.”
Our opinion is that the first assignment of errors is well made, and it is sustained.
2. The master reported numerous claims as simple or ordinary debts, which he held could not be classified as preferential claims or liens over that of the mortgage bondholders, upon the property or earnings of the defendant railroad company in the custody of the court, as they were without equitable liens thereon; hut he held that the interveners had a lien, under the statutes of the state of Texas, upon the net earnings of the corporation, while In the hands of the receiver, for the payment of their said claims, prior and superior in right to the mortgage bondholders. To the master's report the appellant duly filed exceptions. The exceptions were overruled by the court, the report confirmed, and decrees rendered accordingly. This action of the circuit court presents the question whether the statutes of the state of Texas providing for the appointment of receivers, defining their powers and duties, and regulating proceedings under such appointment (Rev. St. Tex. arts. 1472, 1489, 1490), are applicable to receivers in the federal courts.
This court in the case of Bank v. Ewing, 43 C. C. A. 150, 103 Fed. 168, said:
“We do not think tint either the laborers’ lien law, or article 1472 of the Revised Statutes of Texas, regulating the distribution of funds that may come into the hands of a receiver of a state court, should or can be construed to have application to the classification of claims and priority of liens accruing against receivers appointed by the courts of the United States.”
While the language quoted was used in reference to article 1472 of the statutes, and as applicable to the claim of an employé in the immediate service of the receiver, we can perceive no reason why it is not equally applicable to a claim existing against the corpor ation at the time the receiver was appointed, the payment of which is sought to he made from the earnings of the corporation while in the hands of the receiver, as provided by article 1490 of the statutes; that being the article under which the claims in question in this ease were allowed as prior in right to the mortgage bondholders. Article 1490 is as follows:
“All judgments, claims or causes of action when determined, existing against any corporation at the time of the appointment of a receiver, shall be paid out of the earnings of such corporation while in the hands of the receiver, to the exclusion of mortgage action; and the same shall be a lien on such earnings.”
“Tiie several acts of tlie legislature upon the subjects of receiverships do not purport by their language to affect receivers appointed by the federal courts in their official capacity, and courts will construe them so as to embrace such, subjects as the legislature had the authority to legislate upon. These acts were not intended to affect the procedure of federal courts as to receivers appointed by such courts.”
We fully concur in this opinion.
The decree of the circuit court confirming the master’s report upon the interventions specifically set out in the second assignment of errors, and decreeing that under and by virtue of the statutes of Texas the intervéners had a lien upon, and were entitled to payment out of, the net earnings of the property while in the hands of the receiver, prior and superior in right to the complainant and the holders of the bonds secured by the mortgage herein foreclosed, should be reversed.
- 3. The master reported a number of claims as preferential and entitled to an equitable lien, superior in right to that of the mortgage bondholders, upon the earnings of the receivership. Exceptions were duly filed to the report, which the court overruled, and in all respects confirmed the master’s report, and entered decrees accordingly.- “A court of equity engaged in administering mortgaged railroad property, under a receivership in a foreclosure suit may prefer unpaid claims for current expenses of the ordinary operation of the railroad, incurred within a limited time before the receivership, to a prior mortgage lien, in the distribution of the income or of the proceeds of the mortgaged property.” Bank v. Doud (C. C. A.) 105 Fed. 123; Southern R. Co. v. Carnegie Steel Co., 176 U. S. 257, 20 Sup. Ct. 847, 44 L. Ed. 458; Lackawanna Iron & Coal
4. It appears that the intervener the Buckeye Engine Company on September 16, 1892, made a contract with the defendant the Galveston City Kailroad Company under which it sold to the defendant two engines and certain boilers and other machinery, the purchase price of which was $15,000, and for which the railroad company executed certain promissory notes. Some of the notes were paid, leaving the balance, aggregating $7,500, unpaid. By the original contract it was stipulated that the engines and boilers were to remain the property of the intervener until full payment therefor is made. The machinery was delivered and placed in position in March and April, 1893. The contract was filed in the proper office for registration on August 9, 1893. The intervener sought to fix the mechanic’s lien on the property.' The 'master held that said claim of lien was not well founded, but held that:
“By virtue of the reservation by the intervener of title to the aforementioned machinery until fully paid for, and the act of the legislature of Texas (Acts 18S5, p. 70) declaring that all such reservations shall be held to be chattel mortgages, and by virtue of the fact that the said machinery was not delivered until after the mortgage under which the complainant claims had been executed, and that when delivered it carried with it the burden of the lien reserved by the intervener, the said intervener has a specific lien upon said two Buckeye engines for the payment and satisfaction of its said claim, prior and superior in right to the lien thereon created under and by virtue of said mortgage.”
No exceptions to the master’s report were filed by the intervener, but exceptions to the report were duly filed by the'appellant, complainant below, which were overruled, and the report confirmed by the court.
The statute of Texas provides that:
“All (reservations of the title to or property in chattels as security for the purchase money thereof, shall be held- to be chattel mortgages, and shall, when possession is delivered to the vendee, be void as to creditors and bona fide purchasers, unless such reservations be in writing and registered as required of chattel mortgages: provided, that nothing in this law shall be*323 construed to contravene the landlordiand tenant act.” Article 3327, Rev. St. Tex.
The supreme court of Texas, in Harling v. Creech, 88 Tex. 300, 31 S. W. 357, held that the effect of the statute was to forbid conditional sales of personal property, or, rather, to convert all such contracts into chattel mortgages, and required registration of them to protect creditors and bona fide i>urehasers of the property.
The statute providing for registration of chattel mortgages is as follows:
“Every chattel mortgage, deed of trust or other instrument of writing intended to operate as a mortgage of or lien upon personal property which shall not he accompanied hy an immediate delivery, and he followed hy an actual and continued change of possession of the property mortgaged or pledged by such Instrument, shall he absolutely void as against the creditors of the mortgagor or person making the same, and as against subsequent purchasers and mortgagees or lien holders in. good faith, unless such instrument, or a true copy thereof, shall he forthwith deposited with and filed in the office of the county clerk of the county where the property shall then he situated, or if the mortgagor or person making the same he a resident of this state, then of the county of which he shall at the time he a resident.” Article 3328, Rev. St. Tex. »
The circuit court held, in effect, that the intervener had a chattel-mortgage lien by virtue of the contract in question, and decreed that it had a specific lien on said engines which was superior to that of the appellant’s mortgage. In this we think the court erred. Both mortgages were subject to the registration laws of the state of Texas. The lien first registered as provided by those laws is superior. The record shows that the chattel mortgage was recorded on August 9, 1893, while the mortgage to appellant was recorded on May 27, 3893. T3ie only ground, as appears from the report of the master, on which he based his ruling, and presumably the only ground on which the court sustained that ruling, — no other being disclosed by the record, — is that the engines were not delivered until after the mortgage under which the complainant (appellant) claims had been executed, and that when delivered it carried with it the burden of the lien reserved by the intervener. While the mortgage to appellant is dated January 1, 1893, it was not signed in the presence of and attested by subscribing witnesses, and it was not acknowledged until May 13, 3893. Rev. St. Tex. art. 630, provides that:
“Every deed or conveyance of real estate must he signed, or acknowledged, by the grantor in the presence of at least two credible subscribing witnesses thereto, or must he duly acknowledged before some officer authorized to take acknowledgments and properly certified to hy him for registration.”
“To convey title, it is necessary to deliver a completed deed.” 9 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 3.50; Walker v. Renfro, 26 Tex. 142; Railroad Co. v. Garrett, 52 Tex. 133; Tuttle v. Turner, 28 Tex. 759. A deed takes effect at the time of its delivery. Tuttle v. Turner, supra. “The law presumes, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the date of the deed is the date of delivery,” but “this presumption is disputable, and the time of delivery may always be proved.” 9 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 153.
It does not appear when appellant’s mortgage was delivered. There is no evidence on the subject. There are a number of authori
5. The award of $7,500 to the special master commissioner as compensation for his services in selling the mortgaged property under the decree of foreclosure is complained of by appellant as unreasonable and excessive. There was no reference had by the circuit court to ascertain what would be reasonable and just compensation to rhe special master commissioner, and it does not appear that any evidence on the subject was introduced before the court. Questions of this sort rest largely in the discretion of the circuit court, and are rarely interfered with on appeal; but, as this cause must be reversed and remanded, the circuit court is directed to order a reference to ascertain what would be reasonable compensation to be allowed said special master commissioner, and that all parties inter