55 Ga. App. 104 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1936
Lead Opinion
National Life Insurance Company brought suit in two counts against Guaranty Mortgage Company of Atlanta and P. C. McDuffie. In the first count it was alleged that the plaintiff was the holder, before maturity and for value, of a certain promissory note signed by the defendants, a copy of which was attached to the petition, on which there was a balance due of $2750. The note was dated May 18, 1929, in the sum of $3250, payable to Bayne Gibson Mortgage Company or order, bearing interest at 6 per cent, per annum until maturity, and at 8 per cent, per annum after maturity. On the back of the note appeared an entry of payment of $500 on the principal amount. Also appeared the following indorsement signed by P. C. Mc-Duffie : '“For value received I guarantee payment of principal and interest of the within note in accordance with its terms and tenor, and of any extensions thereof in whole or in part.” It is alleged in the first count that McDuffie’s liability arises from such indorsement, and that the indorsement rested on no independent consideration, and that neither of the parties has paid the balance due on the note, or interest thereon since February 7, 1934. In the second count, after alleging that the plaintiff is the holder for value and before maturity, it is alleged that Guaranty Mortgage Company of Atlanta is indebted to the plaintiff $2750 and interest thereon at 8 per cent, per annum from February 7, 1934; that McDuffie is indebted to the plaintiff for such sum and interest, by reason of the written undertaking signed by him on the back of the note, as above quoted; that when the plaintiff purchased the note from Bayne Gibson Mortgage Company it contained the contract of McDuffie guaranteeing the payment of principal and interest; and that neither of the parties has paid the principal and interest on the past-due note. McDuffie filed a demurrer on the grounds that the allegations of the first count show that his liability is that of guarantor, and not as surety, and therefore he is not suable jointly with the principal; that the second count expressly alleges that he is a guarantor of the note, and therefore he is not suable jointly with the principal; that the petition as a whole shows that his liability is that of a guarantor, and therefore he can not be joined with the principal in an action
The defendants filed a joint answer in which it was set up that the Guaranty Mortgage Company, answering the allegations of the first count, admitted that the plaintiff was the holder, before maturity and for value, of the note sued on, but denied liability, and in which both of the defendants, answering the second count of the petition, admitted the signing of the note as shown thereon, but denied liability, and by special plea alleged'that the note sued on was one of several representing a loan of $65,000 which was obtained by Guaranty Mortgage Company of Atlanta from Bayne Gibson Mortgage Company on May 18, 1929, secured by a loan deed on certain described realty in the City of Atlanta, and that on May 18, 1929, after obtaining said loan, “this defendant” [presumably Guaranty Mortgage Company of Atlanta] sold and conveyed said realty, including the apartment house thereon, to Mrs. Mary K. Wash, by deed of conveyance in which it was recited that as part of the consideration she assumed and agreed to pay the outstanding loan of $65,000 aforesaid, represented by a series of notes which included the one sued on in the present case; that the plaintiff consented to the assumption of such indebtedness and that she became the principal debtor and the “defendant” merely a surety on said notes; that on May 10, 1932, the plaintiff entered into a binding agreement with Mrs. Wash whereby, in consideration of her paying $500 on the note here involved and thereafter paying interest calculated on the original amount of $3250, rather than on the balance remaining after the payment of $500, the note would be extended for a period of six months after its maturity; that after the said agreement Mrs. Wash did pay the interest at six per cent, per annum on $3250, rather than on $2750 [on which eight per cent, interest per annum after maturity was specified in the note], and the note was extended as agreed on by her and the plaintiff; that such extension was without the knowledge, consent
On the trial the plaintiff proved the execution of the note, and introduced in evidence a stipulation between the parties that neither National Life Insurance Company nor Bayne Gibson Mortgage Company paid McDuffie any sum whatever to procure his signature to the note, the stipulation being limited to the insurance company and the mortgage company. Also, a copy of a letter from Bayne' Gibson Mortgage Company to P. C. McDuffie, quoting a telegram from National Life Insurance Company, as follows: “Will.
“State of Georgia, County of Fulton. We, the undersigned, Guaranty Mortgage Company of Atlanta and P. C. McDuffie, in consideration of the National Life Insurance Company of Montpelier, Vermont, entering into an agreement bearing date of July 21, 1933, by which it waives any claim which it has or may have had against Mrs. Mary K. Wash by reason of her assumption and agreement to pay a certain loan made by said Company on May 18, 1929, to Bayne Gibson Mortgage Company, and which said loan is secured by a loan deed recorded in book 1259, page 17, in the office of the clerk of the superior court of Fulton County, Georgia, and which said loan deed, the property therein described, and the debt secured thereby were on the same date acquired by National Life Insurance Company from said Bayne Gibson Mortgage Company, do hereby agree as follows: The Guaranty Mortgage Company of Atlanta, having reacquired said property from the said Mrs. Mary K. Wash, subject to said aforementioned loan, does hereby ratify and confirm said notes and the loan deed securing
1. In considering the assignments of error on the overruling of McDuffie’s demurrer to the petition, and to the direction of the verdict in favor of the plaintiff, it is necessary to determine first in what capacity McDuffie signed the indorsement on the note. It is not denied by the Guaranty Mortgage Company of Atlanta or by McDuffie that that corporation executed and delivered the note, and it is not denied by McDuffie that he signed the indorsement quoted above. By indorsement we do not mean a technical indorsement necessary for the transfer of title to a note, but refer to the writing which McDuffie put upon the note and signed. The negotiable-instruments law, which in 1924 was adopted in this State substantially in the form recommended by the commission on uniform State laws, superseded the prior law
In Etheridge v. Rawleigh Co., 29 Ga. App. 698 (116 S. E. 903), the words '•“guarantee . . payment of” were the subject-matter of construction; and while in that case the contract was held to be one of guaranty, it was clearly set out that “In addition to the language of the contract repeatedly designating it as one of guaranty, besides its provisions with reference to the acceptance and notice of acceptance, which could have no possible meaning or relevancy-to any contract of suretyship, and besides the fact that not only does the sponsor apparently fail to join with the principal in the same obligations, but the scope, effect, and extent of his liability under his promise are actually not the same, —in addition to all of these matters which have been specially pointed out, it appears to our minds that the very nature and purpose of the instrument are more consonant with the idea that the sponsor seeks to vouch for the ability and solvencjr of his principal than that he has sought to join with the principal in an indefinite obligation of this particular kind and character.” The elements in that case not being in the present one, it does not control. In Rawleigh Co. v. Salter, 31 Ga. App. 329 (120 S. E.
In McClain v. Georgian Co., 17 Ga. App. 648 (87 S. E. 1090), as to a promise, “For valid consideration, we hereby agree to the faithful performance of the above agreement by [the agent], and assume responsibility for any indebtedness incurred by him,” it was held “that as to the indebtedness the third person is a surety, and not a guarantor,” citing Fields v. Willis, supra, and Watters v. Hertz, 135 Ga. 804 (70 S. E. 338). In Watkins Medical Co. V. Marbach, 20 Ga. App. 691 (93 S. E. 270), it was pointed out that though there be a recital of a nominal benefit to an indorser, this will not necessarily make him a party secondarily liable; but that, the substantial consideration being the credit and indulgence given to the principal, the indorser is a surety. As so clearly presented in Etheridge v. Rawleigh Co., supra, the distinction between a surety and a guarantor stated in the Code, § 103-101, is only an “earmark,” and the fact of benefit does not necessarily establish the obligation as that of a guarantor, but other considerations must be taken into account; in which connection see Smith v. Aultman, 30 Ga. App. 507 (118 S. E. 459), and cit. The real test has been well stated in Manry v. Waxelbaum Co., 108 Ga. 14, 17 (33 S. E. 701) : “In brief, we understand the difference to be this: A surety binds himself to perform if the principal does not, without regard to his ability to do so. His contract is equally absolute with that of his principal. They may be sued in the same action, and judgment may be entered up against both. A guarantor, on the other hand, does not contract that the principal will pay, but simply that he is able to do so; in other words, a guarantor warrants nothing but the solvency of the prin
In Musgrove v. Luther Publishing Co., 5 Ga. App. 379, 381 (63 S. E. 53), it was said: “It is often difficult to tell whether a particular contract is one of guaranty or suretyship. ‘A surety and a guarantor have this in common, that they are both bound for another person; yet there are points of difference between them which should be carefully noted. A surety is usually bound with his principal by the same instrument, executed at the same time and on the same consideration. He is an original promisor and debtor from the beginning, and is held ordinarily to know every default of his principal. . . On the other hand, the contract of the guarantor is his own separate undertaking, in which the principal does not join. It is usually entered into before or
Having reached the conclusion, from the cases discussed above, that McDuffie signed in the capacity of a surety, and not as a guarantor, it is held that the court did not err in overruling the demurrer to the first count of the petition. The second count which alleged that the corporation was indebted to the plaintiff for the balance due on the note, plus interest thereon,’ and that McDuffie was indebted for such sum and interest by reason of his written undertaking as expressed on the back of the note, as above quoted, and that when the plaintiff purchased the note it contained the contract “guaranteeing the payment,” etc., is not equivalent to an express allegation that McDuffie signed as a guarantor, and therefore it is not subject to the ground of demurrer that “it is expressly alleged therein that this defendant is guarantor of the note sued upon; wherefore he is not suable jointly with his principal, the maker of said note.” What is said in the foregoing portion of the opinion is controlling on the demurrer to the petition as a whole. The court did not err in overruling all of the grounds of the demurrer.
The second assignment of error is that the court erred in sustaining the plaintiff’s demurrer and striking the special plea of the defendants that they were released from liability on the note, in that after the sale by the principal of the property securing the loan evidenced by the note, which assumption was consented to by the plaintiff, the plaintiff granted to the purchaser an extension of time without the knowledge, consent, or ratification of either of the defendants, it being alleged that in consideration of the purchaser paying $500 on the said note and thereafter paying an
On trial it was admitted by MicDuffie that as president of the Guaranty Mortgage Company of Atlanta he executed the note on its behalf, and that in his personal capacity he signed the written indorsement on the note. He testified that he intended to be bound only as a guarantor, that he so notified Bayne Gibson Mortgage Company before the transaction was consummated, and that it
Judgment affirmed.
Rehearing
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING.
In their motion for rehearing the plaintiffs in error submit that, while headnote 1(a) of the opinion correctly states the law, the effect of headnote 1(c) is that “if the contract was signed contemporaneously with the execution and delivery of the note by the maker, and though Value received' was acknowledged in the writing, it could be shown that the real and substantial benefit is that flowing to the principal." The headnote which is thus questioned stated a principle of law, in connection with the ruling on the demurrer to the petition as elaborated in the first division of the opinion, and was not dependent on parol evidence for the facts it included as premises. To the petition was attached as an exhibit a copy of the note sued on, from which it is apparent that the note was signed in the name of Guaranty Mortgage Com
It is also suggested that in holding McDuffie to be a surety this court overlooked the decision in Baggs v. Funderburke, 11 Ga. App. 173 (74 S. E. 937). Such is not the case, and there is nothing in that decision that is contrary to what has been here ruled. It was there shown that an action was brought on a note signed by Deal as maker, and by Baggs as indorser, in the following language: “For value received, we hereby guarantee the payment of the within note at maturity, or at any time thereafter, with interest at the rate of 8 per cent, per annum until paid, waiving demand, notice of non-payment, and protest;” that by demurrer the point was made that the contract of Baggs was one of guaranty; that the averment in the petition that he received no independent consideration was an attempt to vary the contract of guaranty; and that the trial court was without jurisdiction of the case so far as Baggs was concerned. The demurrer was overruled by the trial court. As pointed out by movants, the first headnote in that case is: “A contract on the back of a promissory note, signed by one other than the payee thereof and in the following words, ‘For value received, we hereby guarantee the payment of the within note at maturity, or at any time thereafter, with interest at the rate of 8 per cent, per annum until paid, waiving demand, notice of nom payment and protest,’ prima facie imports a contract of guaranty.” But the petition alleged, as in the present case, that the indorse
It is submitted by movants that their construction of the writing on the back of the note in the present case has been affirmed and adopted by the Supreme Court of Georgia, in Paris v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 143 Ga. 324 (85 S. E. 126). We are of the opinion, however, that counsel has construed too broadly the holding in that case. In the first headnote it is apparent that the contract signed by “third persons” was to “guarantee payment . . as against the maker previously liable thereon.” Here was a case of third persons being brought in, not simultaneously with the maker of the note “previously Halle thereon” (italics ours), but subsequently to his undertaking, and, under the language employed, the third persons were making themselves secondarily liable and signing as guarantors; and the contract is distinguishable by its terms. We are also referred to the testimony of McDuffie on the trial, after the court had overruled the demurrer to the defendants’ answer; and it is submitted by movants that he clearly showed that by his dealings with Bayne Gibson Mortgage Company he indicated his intention to be bound only as a guarantor. There is, .however, nothing in his testimony, or elsewhere, that shows that the plaintiff, the transferee of the note in which Bayne Gibson Mortgage Company was named payee, was ever
Rehearing denied.