241 So. 2d 14 | La. Ct. App. | 1970
Lead Opinion
This is a suit on a promissory note. It was instituted by Guaranty Bank & Trust Company of Alexandria, Louisiana, against C & R Development Co., Inc., and Robert E. Clark. Clark made no appearance and a default judgment was rendered against him. C & R Development Company answered and filed a reconventional demand for judgment against the Guaranty Bank for $13,256.35. The bank then filed a third party demand against Clark, seeking a judgment against him for any sum which it might be condemned to pay to the Development Company.
C & R Development Company instituted bankruptcy proceedings while the suit was pending. A trustee was appointed for it, and the trustee has been substituted for the bankrupt corporation as a party to this suit. The parties stipulated that the balance due by C & R Development to plaintiff bank on the promissory note sued upon was $1,840.30.
Judgment on the merits was rendered by the trial court as follows: (1) In favor of plaintiff and against the Trustee of C & R Development Company and Clark, in solido, for $1,840.30; (2) in favor of the Trustee for C & R Development Company, and against Guaranty Bank, for $12,502.41; and (3) reserving to plaintiff bank all of its rights under its third party demand. Plaintiff, Guaranty Bank & Trust Company, has appealed.
The principal question presented is whether the trial court erred in holding that plaintiff, Guaranty Bank, is liable to defendant, the Trustee of C & R Development Company, under Sections 5 and 8 of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act (LSA-R.S. 9:3805 and 3808).
The facts are that C & R Development Company was organized and incorporated
On April 4, 1968, the Board of Directors of C & R Development Company adopted a resolution authorizing Clark to act on behalf of the corporation in all things necessary in the conduct of the business of the company, including the power to convey on behalf of the corporation title to any and all property owned by it, movable or immovable. All parties agree that the adoption of this resolution had the effect of turning over to Clark the complete management of the corporation, and of formally authorizing him to issue checks on any banking account owned or maintained by the corporation.
Shortly after the corporation was formed, a checking account was opened by the officers in the name of the corporation in the Guaranty Bank. A copy of the above-described resolution was furnished to the bank as evidence of Clark’s authority, on his signature alone, to issue checks on that account. The bank, however, required that there also be a co-signer on the checks, and pursuant to that requirement Mrs. Rolen, the Vice President and bookkeeper, was authorized to co-sign all checks drawn on the corporation’s account in that bank. All checks which have been drawn on the company’s account in that bank thus have been signed by Clark and by Mrs. Rolen.
Clark, while managing the C & R Development Company, also owned another business known as the Pmeville Supply Company. As the sole owner of that business, Clark from time to time borrowed money from the Guaranty Bank. The obligations incurred by Clark to repay these loans made to him, individually or to Pine-ville Supply Company, were personal debts of Clark and were not obligations of C & R Development Company.
The trustee of the Development Company contends that during the period from April 4 to August 4, 1968, while Clark was managing the business of that company, six checks were drawn on the account of C & R Development Company in the Guaranty Bank, all of which checks were made payable to that bank, and that all or a part of the proceeds of those checks were applied to the payment of debts owed personally by Clark to the bank. He takes the position that the Guaranty Bank is obliged to pay or refund to the Trustee that part of the proceeds of each of those checks which was applied to Clark’s personal indebtedness. To support his reconventional demand, he relies principally on the provisions of the Uniform Fiduciaries Law (LSA-R.S. 9:3801-3814), and particularly Sections 5 and 8 (R.S. 9:3805 and 3808) of that law.
The evidence shows that between April 4 and August 4, 1968, six checks were drawn on the account of C & R Development Company in the Guaranty Bank, made payable to that bank, the dates and amounts of those checks being as follows :
$4,060.37 A O' co >
502.81 ^ S On CO >
195.02 u! vo On 00 g
195.02 ^00 qJ oq W
250.00 VO no On CO ‘ r* . V-
7,833.79 rt- ~ 1 — 4 NO 00 > a crq e
Only $27.72 out of the check dated May 15 and the same amount out the check dated July 8, 1968, were applied toward the payment of Clark’s personal indebtedness to the bank. All of the proceeds of the remaining four checks was applied to the payment of debts which Clark owed to Guaranty Bank. The aggregate sum of
All of the six checks above described were signed on behalf of the corporation by Robert E. Clark and were co-signed by Mrs. John E. Rolen. Mrs. Rolen testified that “Very often he [Clark] would bring [checks] to have them signed before they were even filled in with the name, because he would say he didn’t know the concrete finisher’s name.” She stated that she never signed a check drawn on the C & R Development Company’s account which was made out to the Guaranty Bank. Her testimony thus indicates that the Guaranty Bank was not listed as a payee on any of the above-described checks when she signed them. All parties concede that the Guaranty Bank was never informed of the fact that Mrs. Rolen had signed checks of the C & R Company before the checks were completely filled out, and that the bank had no knowledge of the fact that she had done so with reference to any of the above-mentioned checks or at any other time.
The evidence shows that the Guaranty Bank regularly mailed monthly bank statements to the C & R Company. Enclosed with each such statement, of course, were the cancelled checks which had been paid from that account during the preceding month. Mr. and Mrs. Rolen do not deny that such statements were sent, but they testified that they never saw them or any of the cancelled checks. The implication is that Clark received these statements and did not show them to the other officers of the corporation. The evidence is clear, however, that the bank had no reason to suspect that Mr. or Mrs. Rolen had not seen these statements each month as they were mailed to the corporation. We think the bank was justified in assuming that the officers of the corporation, and particularly the President and the bookkeeper, saw and examined these statements each month as they were delivered.
Mr. Rolen testified that he trusted Clark completely in the beginning, but that he began to get suspicious of him in May, 1968, about one month after the management of the corporation was turned over to him. He stated that he made repeated demands on Clark to see the bank statements, but that Clark “kept delaying” and did not produce them. Finally, Rolen employed an accounting firm to audit the books and in that manner he determined about August 19, 1968, that corporate funds were being used to pay Clark’s personal debts. Rolen concedes that in spite of Clark’s delaying tactics he did not ask anyone connected with the bank to show him the corporation’s bank statements, or to give him any information about the company’s account, until August 19, 1968.
Mrs. Rolen’s testimony is substantially to the same effect, except that she says she became suspicious of Clark about July, 1968, and that she and her husband went to the Pineville branch of the Guaranty Bank about August 19, 1968, had the branch manager show them the bank statements and determined at that time that the last-mentioned check for $7,833.79 had been issued and applied to Clark’s indebtedness to the bank.
On August 19, 1968, a special meeting of the Board of Directors and stockholders of C & R Development Company was held, with Mr. Rolen and Mrs. Rolen being the only directors present. A resolution was adopted at that meeting rescinding Clark’s authority to act for the corporation in any manner whatsoever. Mr. and Mrs. Rolen presented a copy of this resolution to the bank on the day it was adopted, August 19, and thereafter no other checks drawn on the Development Company’s account and signed by Clark were paid by the bank.
The check dated August 4, 1968, for $7,833.79 was a postdated check. Clark presented it to the bank about July 25 or 27, 1968, requesting that the bank hold it until August 4, and stating that he felt that there would be sufficient funds in the Development Company’s account to take care of
While the above-mentioned check was being held, and before it was paid, the loan offider of the Guaranty Bank had an occasion to talk to Mr. Rolen, and at that time he discussed with him the C & R Development Company account. The loan officer asked Rolen “how much he was willing to go along to help Bob Clark.” The loan officer quoted Mr. Rolen as stating that he was “undecided.” Mr. Rolen’s version of. that conversation was that he told the bank official that he was not going to back Clark any further until he “found out exactly where we stand.” In any event, Rolen’s remarks indicated that he knew that C & R Development Company funds were being used to help Clark in his private business.
Rolen testified that prior to the time the $7,833.79 check was issued, he personally had purchased a part of the stock of merchandise from Pineville Supply Company, had resold it to C & R Development Company and had taken a note from that company representing the purchase price. The bank official was aware of the fact that such a transaction had taken place before the $7,833.79 check was ever presented to the bank. Clark’s representation to the bank, therefore, that the Development Company was purchasing the rest of the stock of Pineville Supply Company seemed reasonable, and his instructions to apply the check to his private indebtedness aroused no suspicion on the part of the agents of the bank.
On the basis of this evidence, the trial judge concluded that the Guaranty Bank is liable to the Trustee of C & R Development Company for $12,502.41, that being the total amount of corporation funds which were applied to the payment of Clark’s personal indebtedness. The trial court relied principally on LSA-R.S. 9:3805 and 3808 in reaching that conclusion.
The pertinent part of LSA-R.S. 9:3805 reads as follows:
“If, however, such instrument is payable to a personal creditor of the fiduciary and delivered to the creditor in payment of, or as security for, a personal debt of the fiduciary, to the actual knowledge of the creditor, or is drawn and delivered in any transaction known by the payee to be for the personal benefit of the fiduciary, the creditor or other payee is liable to the principal if the fiduciary in fact commits a breach of his obligation as fiduciary in drawing or delivering the instrument.”
LSA-R.S. 9:3808 provides:
“If a check is drawn upon the account of his principal in a bank by a fiduciary who is empowered to draw checks upon his principal’s account the bank is authorized to pay any such check without being liable to the principal, unless the bank pays the check with actual knowledge that the fiduciary is committing a breach of his obligation as fiduciary in drawing such check, or with the knowledge of such facts that its action in pay*19 ing the check amounts to bad faith. If, however, such a check is payable to the drawee bank and is delivered to it in payment of, or as security for, a personal debt of the fiduciary to it, the bank is liable to the principal, if the fiduciary in fact commits a breach of his obligation as fiduciary in drawing or delivering the check.”
The trial judge found that the two quoted sections of the Revised Statutes are applicable, and that the bank becomes liable upon a showing simply that Clark breached his obligation as a fiduciary. He held that the statutes imposed an “absolute liability” on the drawee bank under the circumstances presented here, and that it was immaterial whether the bank had or did not have actual knowledge of the breach of a fiduciary relationship or whether it was in good faith or bad faith.
The above-cited sections of the Revised Statutes obviously were enacted to protect the principal against an unfaithful fiduciary who issues a check on the principal’s account and wrongfully uses the proceeds for the fiduciary’s personal benefit. Here, the principal was C & R Development Company. The Trustee claims that Clark was the fiduciary and that he breached his obligation to the principal, C & R Development Company, by drawing or delivering the above-described checks.
The C & R Development Company, of course, is governed by a Board of Directors, consisting of three people. Two of them, constituting a majority of the Board of Directors, signed each of the six checks which form the basis for the reconventional demand. It thus is more logical to hold that these checks were issued and delivered by the principal, C & R Development Company, rather than by “a fiduciary.” The Uniform Fiduciaries Law does not require the drawee bank to reimburse the principal, where the check is drawn or delivered by the principal.
It is true that Mrs. Rolen relied on the representations made to her by Clark as to the purpose of the checks, and that she signed them before the names of the payees were inserted. We assume that in spite of her carelessness in this respect, the C & R Development Company has the right to recover its loss from Clark. In the instant suit, however, the Trustee is not attempting to recover from Clark. Instead, he seeks to recover from the Guaranty Bank, which was free from any fault at all.
If the Trustee’s position should be upheld here, then it would follow that the same conclusion would have to be reached if all three of the directors and stockholders had signed every check. The bank would be held to be liable to the corporation/ and thus the Rolens as stockholders would benefit, on a showing that Mr. and Mrs. Rolen had misplaced their confidence in Clark and had carelessly signed the checks without determining the purpose for which they were being issued. We think the bank had the right to assume that Mrs. Rolen, as well as Clark, was fully aware of the provisions of these checks and that all six checks were duly signed by two of the three officers and directors of the company.
It is significant, we think, that Sections 3802 through 3809, of Title 9 of the Revised Statutes, uniformly refer to “a” fiduciary. Since the cited sections refer only to a single fiduciary, there is considerable merit to the bank’s argument that the provisions of those sections do not apply to checks drawn on a principal when the checks are co-signed. It is unnecessary for us to determine in the instant suit whether the Uniform Fiduciaries Act could ever be applied where checks drawn on the principal are signed by more than one fiduciary. We hold, however, that Sections 3805 and 3808 cannot be applied to impose liability on the drawee bank, where a check is signed by two fiduciaries and only one of them breached his obligation as a fiduciary in drawing or delivering the check.
The Trustee contends, however, and the trial court apparently agreed, that the drawee bank was liable, even though the Uniform Fiduciaries Law is not applicable. The case of Leadman v. First National Bank of Shreveport, 184 La. 715, 167 So.200 (1936), is cited as the principal authority for that argument. In the Lead-man case the drawee bank was held to be liable to plaintiff for amounts which had been withdrawn from his account by his tutrix, while he was a minor, and applied to the tutrix’s personal indebtedness to the bank. In that case, however, the check was signed by the tutrix alone, there being no co-signer on the check who did not benefit from the payment. Also, in that case the president of the bank had advised the tutrix as to her financial matters, the bank knowingly had accepted collateral belonging to the minor to secure the personal indebtedness of the tutrix, and the bank thus in effect was a party to the acts which culminated in the misappropriation of the minor’s funds. The circumstances presented in that case are different from those presented in the instant suit, and for that reason we do not consider the Leadman case to be applicable here.
For the reasons above stated, we conclude that the Guaranty Bank is not liable to the Trustee of C & R Development Company for the sums which were withdrawn from the corporation account and applied to the payment of Clark’s personal debts. Having reached that conclusion, it is unnecessary for us to consider the additional defense offered by the bank that the Trustee, in any event, is estopped from asserting the ’ claim urged in the reconven-tional demand.
For the reasons herein assigned, we affirm that part of the judgment appealed from which'is in favor of Guaranty Bank & Trust Company of Alexandria, and against E. Cecil Wiley, in his capacity of Trustee for C & R Development Company, Inc., and Robert E. Clark, jointly and in solido, in the amount of $1,840.30, together with interest thereon at the rate of 8% per annum from May 1, 1968, until paid, and 10% of the aggregate of principal and interest as attorney’s fees. We, however, reverse all of the remaining parts of the judgment appealed from, including particularly that part which condemns Guaranty Bank & Trust Company to pay to E. Cecil Wiley, Trustee, the sum of $12,502.41, with 5% interest thereon from judicial demand until paid. All costs of this suit, including those incurred in the trial court and on appeal, are assessed to E. Cecil Wiley, as and in his capacity of Trustee for C & R Development Company, Inc.
Affirmed in part, and reversed in part.
SAVOY, J., dissents, being of the opinion that the judgment of the district court is correct.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
I cannot agree with the conclusions reached by the majority in this case. In construing a statute, the primary object is to ascertain and, if possible, give effect to the intention and purpose of the Legislature as expressed in the statute. Fruge v. Muffoletto, 242 La. 569, 137 So.2d 336.
The majority opinion places an interpretation upon the provisions of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act, which in my opinion
The majority holds that LSA-R.S. 9:-3808 does not apply, and in doing so reverses the trial court which allowed recovery under the reconventional demand of the Trustee in Bankruptcy on behalf of C & R Development Co., Inc.
LSA-R.S. 9:3808 provides as follows:
“If a check is drawn upon the account of his principal in a bank by a fiduciary who is empowered to draw checks upon his principal’s account the bank is authorized to pay any such check without being liable to the principal, unless the bank pays the check with actual knowledge that the fiduciary is committing a breach of his obligation as fiduciary in drawing such check, or with the knowledge of such facts that its action in paying the check amounts to bad faith. If, however, such a check is payable to the drawee bank and is delivered to it in payment of, or as security for, a personal debt of the fiduciary to it, the bank is liable to the principal, if the fiduciary in fact commits a breach of his obligation as fiduciary in drawing or delivering the check.”
(Emphasis ours.)
The italicized portion of 9:3808 raises the legal issue involved in this case.
The majority takes the position that since Mrs. Rolen signed the checks as a co-signor or co-fiduciary, Section 3808 is not applicable on the ground that the provisions of 3808 refer to the acts of only one fiduciary.
In an informative article, 6 Tulane Law Review, 618, is found the following comments concerning the background, intent and effect of this provision in the Uniform Fiduciaries Act, to-wit:
“The Uniform Fiduciaries Act, hereinafter called the Act, was drawn by a committee of the Conference on Uniform State Laws, after a request by bankers that a rule be made by statute to determine when the form of an instrument imposes a duty of making inquiry upon persons dealing with fiduciaries. It was mentioned in the committee reports to the conference that there were general objections to such a measure and also specific objections to it as an amendment of the Negotiable Instruments Law. Nevertheless, because of the appeal of the banking interest and the general feeling of the conference, the committee felt under a duty to proceed with the preparation of a uniform act and let the conference weigh the arguments for and against legislation on the subject. Professor Austin Scott made a study of the question and prepared a draft of the Act, which was adopted substantially as written. The draftsmen apparently believed that the new act would be in harmony with the N.I.L.
* * * * * *
“ * * * One taking an instrument drawn or endorsed by a fiduciary for a personal debt, under the Act, necessarily acts at his peril if in fact a personal debt of a fiduciary is satisfied. Prior to the Act such a transferee might be protected as a holder in due course, in a suit by the principal to recover the instrument. Thus, prior to and after the adoption of the N.I.L. there have been cases which do not impose a rule of absolute liability nor even of constructive notice where a fiduciary instrument was taken for a personal debt. However, the Act provides that there is absolute liability if the instrument is transferred in payment of, or as security for, a personal obligation.
******
“The rule of absolute liability is commendable, although it is an amendment of the N. I. L. The presumption from*22 the facts appearing on the face of the transaction is that the transfer is unlawful. Business practice in this field indicates a general disregard of the facts which create the presumption, so not only would such transactions be in subjective good faith but they also would be sufficient to meet the low objective standard of good faith. To correct this situation the rule of absolute liability is almost necessary.”
Section 3808 creates absolute liability on behalf of the bank when certain limited circumstances exist. Those limited circumstances may be paraphrased as follows. Where a principal has a checking account in a bank and a fiduciary, who is empowered to draw checks upon his principal’s account, draws a check upon his principal’s account in the bank, payable to the bank and delivers such to the bank in payment for or as security for the fiduciary’s personal debt to the bank, the bank accepts this check and applies the principal’s funds to the payment of the fiduciary’s personal debt, then the bank becomes absolutely liable to the principal if the fiduciary in fact breaches his obligation to the principal in drawing and delivering said check. A bank which allows a fiduciary to pay such personal debts under these circumstances, does so at the risk of having to return the money to the fiduciary’s principal.
The principal in this case was a corporation, a separate and legal entity existing separate and apart from the persons participating therein. It is to be looked upon, treated, and the law applied to it as such an entity. One forceful reason for this is exhibited by the circumstances of this case. This corporation is represented herein by the Trustee in Bankruptcy, who, in effect, represents creditors. Creditors of the corporation have a right to rely upon the provisions of Section 3808 as a protection against the depletion of the corporate funds by such a conversion committed by a fiduciary.
As stated by the majority, the statute refers to “a fiduciary” or “the fiduciary”. In this case, however, “a fiduciary” (Robert Clark) was empowered to draw checks upon his principal’s account in the Guaranty Bank, and “the fiduciary”, (Robert Clark) did draw checks upon his principal’s account in the Guaranty Bank with the Guaranty Bank as payee, and “the fiduciary” (Robert Clark) delivered the checks to the bank for the purpose of paying his personal indebtedness to the bank. The fact that Mrs. Rolen was enticed by Clark to cosign these checks in blank thereby inadvertently assisting Clark in his endeavor of committing a fraud and conversion of the funds, does not make it any less a fraud and does not exonerate the bank from liability.
It is further important to note that the total sum of the checks involved was $13,037.01. Of this amount, $12,502.41 was applied to Clark’s bank debts. There is no issue as to the remaining $534.60, nor was the trial court called upon to rule on the status of this sum. The record is not clear but there is some indication that Clark could have been paid this in cash. Assuming, arguendo, that cash was delivered to Clark, such sums would not be subject to recovery from the bank by the corporation under the first portion of Section 3808. This sum would represent an actual “out of pocket” loss to the bank, and the bank, being in good faith, is protected under the first portion of Section 3808. The liability of the bank under the second portion of Section 3808 does not create an actual “out of pocket” loss to the bank but places the bank back in the position that it was prior to the application of the funds to the personal debt of Clark. The bank had loaned money to Clark personally, and under Section 3808 is relegated to collecting its indebtedness from that debtor. The bank cannot rely upon Clark’s authority to write checks on his principal for the payment of this indebtedness. I conclude that this is the intent and purpose of this provision, and even though it may seem in
For these reasons the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. I dissent.
Rehearing
On Application for Rehearing.
En Banc. Rehearing denied.
SAVOY and CUTRER, JJ., are of the opinion that a rehearing should be granted.
CULPEPPER, J., recused.
