OPINION
GTE North, Inc. (GTE), an incumbent local telecommunications carrier in Michigan, sued the defendants, members of the Michigan Public Service Commission (MPSC or the Commission), under the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 (FTA or the Act) after the Commission issued an opinion and order directing GTE to (1) publish tariffs in which GTE would offer to sell elements of its telecommunications network at rates predetermined by the Commission, and (2) allow competitors to purchase pre-assembled platforms of GTE network elements. In its complaint, GTE alleged that the MPSC’s order conflicted with, and was preempted by, the FTA, and that enforcement of the order infringed GTE’s statutory rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
GTE moved for summary judgment, and the defendants filed a cross-motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court granted the defendants’ motion and dismissed the case without prejudice, holding that it did not have jurisdiction to review the MPSC’s order under 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6), the FTA provision limiting federal judicial review of state commission orders approving or rejecting final interconnection agreements, because the challenged directive was merely an interlocutory order. See 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6) (1996). GTE timely appealed the district court’s decision to this court.
Based on the language and legislative history of § 252(e)(6), we conclude that the limitations on federal review set forth in that provision do not apply in this case, and that the district court has general federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to hear GTE’s challenge to the February order.
I
Before addressing the basis for the district court’s jurisdiction over GTE’s claims, it is necessary briefly to describe the administrative context in which the MPSC issued the challenged order. In the spring of 1996, AT
&
T and Sprint attempted to negotiate an interconnection agreement with GTE pursuant to § 251 of the FTA. Congress passed the Act in 1996 in an effort to promote competition in local telephone markets by ending regulated monopolies previously enjoyed by incumbent local exchange carriers (LECs) such as GTE. Before Congress enacted the FTA, state public utility commissions regulated local telecommunications markets by granting companies that incurred the expense of establishing local networks the exclusive right to provide service in the
Although the FTA circumscribes state commissions’ power to regulate local markets, it does not exclude state commissions from the FTA approval process. To the contrary, it invests them with authority to approve or reject interconnection agreements negotiated in accordance with the Act, which requires LECs to permit rival carriers to: (1) utilize the LEC’s network and facilities; (2) purchase unbundled network elements from the LEC; and (3) purchase at wholesale rates any telecommunications service that the LEC provides at retail to subscribers who are not telecommunications carriers. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)-(4) (1996); see also id. § 262 (establishing procedures for negotiation, arbitration, and approval of interconnection agreements). To facilitate new competitors’ entry into local markets, the FTA outlines specific procedures that LECs and new market entrants must follow in negotiating, arbitrating, and approving interconnection agreements. See generally id. § 252 (1996). LECs and their competitors may negotiate interconnection agreements voluntarily, through mediation, or through compulsory arbitration before a state utility commission. See id. § 252(a)-(b) (1996). When a final agreement is reached, the telecommunications or public utility commission for the state in which the LEC is located must approve or reject the agreement. See id. § 262(e) (1996).
Once a state commission rules on a proposed agreement, Section 252(e)(6), the FTA provision at issue in this case, authorizes any aggrieved party to “bring an action in an appropriate Federal district court to determine whether the agreement ... meets the requirements of section 251.” Id. § 252(e)(6) (1996). If a state commission fails to approve or reject a proposed agreement within a certain time — 30 days from the date of submission if the agreement resulted from compulsory arbitration, or 90 days from the date submitted if the agreement resulted from voluntary negotiation or mediation — the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) may preempt the state commission’s jurisdiction and rule on the validity of the agreement. See id. § 252(e)(4) — (5) (1996).
In this case, AT
&
T and Sprint petitioned the MPSC for compulsory arbitration under § 252 when the negotiations they began with GTE in 1996 did not produce an agreement. In March 1997, before a final agreement was reached, GTE filed a complaint in federal district court alleging that an order issued by the MPSC on January 15, 1997, concerning GTE’s interconnection obligations to Sprint and AT
&
T violated the FTA. The district court dismissed GTE’s complaint, holding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to review the challenged order because it was not an order approving or rejecting a final interconnection agreement.
See GTE North v. Strand,
No. 5:97-CV-20,
Then, while arbitration proceedings between GTE, Sprint, and AT & T were still pending, the MPSC initiated unrelated state law proceedings against GTE and other incumbent LECs in order to establish terms of interconnection to Michigan local exchange networks generally. These proceedings concerned GTE as an LEC, but not specifically as a party to the AT & T and Sprint arbitration. In connection with these general interconnection proceedings, the MPSC required GTE and Ameriteeh, as Michigan LECs, to file with the Commission “Total Service Long Run Incremental Cost” (TSLRIC) studies for both regulated and non-regulated telecommunications services. In addition, the MPSC directed GTE to publish tariffs in which GTE would offer to sell its network elements and wholesale services to any
On February 25, 1998, in the course of the state proceedings against GTE and Ameritech, the MPSC issued the order contested in this appeal. In the. February 25 order, the MPSC used GTE’s TSLRIC studies to establish the rates at which GTE would be compelled to sell unbundled network elements to its competitors. In addition, the order stated that the FTA requirement that GTE allow competitors to access pieces, or unbundled elements, of GTE’s local network did not preclude GTE’s competitors from requesting access to pre-assembled, fully operational local service platforms. Upon receiving the order, GTE sued the MPSC in the district court, alleging that the Commission, acting pursuant to Michigan law, violated the FTA when it issued the February 25 order: (1) directing GTE to provide competitors with access to pre-assembled, fully operational service platforms; and (2) requiring GTE to publish tariffs offering to sell elements of its network at rates predetermined by the Commission.
In its motion for summary judgment, GTE argued that the Commission’s mandate directing GTE to provide competitors with access to pre-assembled network platforms violated § 251(c)(3) of the FTA because that provision requires LECs to provide competitors with access only to “unbundled network elements.” 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) (1996) (emphasis added). According to GTE, Congress deliberately limited incumbent LECs’ obligation to grant competitors network access by requiring LECs to provide competitors only with “unbundled,” or separated, network elements that the new carrier would have to assemble before it could provide service. Ibid. In addition, GTE argued that the portion of the February order directing it to offer pre-assembled platforms to all potential competitors violated the FTA because the Act specifically states that only competitors who request unbundled access (“requesting carriers”) are entitled to network access under § 251(c)(3), and then only after negotiating individual interconnection agreements. See ibid. GTE made a similar argument in challenging the MPSC’s second directive, which, according to GTE, violates the FTA because it requires LECs to publish tariffs offering to sell network elements to all interested competitors at predetermined rates even though §§ 251 and 252 of the Act specifically require competitors to negotiate individual terms of access with LECs. 1 See 47 U.S.C. § 252(c)(2)-(3) (1996).
II
This court reviews
de novo
the district court’s denial of GTE’s motion for summary judgment.
See Greene v. Reeves,
The party opposing dismissal has the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction.
See Moir v. Greater Cleveland Reg’l Transit Autk,
Jurisdiction Over the Challenged Order
Based on the scope of the applicable statutory provisions and the nature of the challenged order, we conclude that the district court has general jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to hear GTE’s claims. Section 252(e)(6), which prohibits federal review of interlocutory orders entered in the course of FTA proceedings, plainly does not preclude review of the February 25 order, which was entered in an independent state law proceeding unrelated to the AT
&
T-Sprint arbitration. Moreover, even if one could interpret § 252(e)(6) to encompass GTE’s claims, to do so would frustrate Congress’s intent by allowing state commissions to insulate from federal review decisions allegedly preempted by, or otherwise contrary to, federal telecommunications law. We therefore reverse the district court’s order dismissing GTE’s complaint, but express no opinion on whether the order directing GTE to sell pre-assembled platforms and other network elements at predetermined
To survive a motion to dismiss based on lack of federal question jurisdiction, the non-moving party must show first that its claims arise under federal law and, second, that § 1331 jurisdiction is not “preempted by a more specific statutory provision conferring exclusive jurisdiction elsewhere.”
Connors v. Amax Coal Co.,
Because GTE’s claims arise under federal law, the district court has jurisdiction under § 1331 to decide the case unless GTE’s claims are subject to the limitations on federal review set forth in § 252(e)(6), which we conclude they are not.
See
47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6) (1996);
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
The text and legislative history of the FTA make clear that § 252(e)(6) is the exclusive basis for federal judicial review only of orders entered in negotiation or arbitration proceedings under § 252 of the Act. Section 252(e)(6) provides that, “[i]n any case in which a State commission makes a determination under this section, any party aggrieved by such determination may bring an action in an appropriate federal district court to determine whether the agreement or statement meets the requirements of section 251 of this title and this section.” 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6) (1996) (emphasis added). Because the MPSC initiated the state law proceedings that resulted in the challenged order independent of the procedures prescribed in the FTA, § 252(e)(6) does not limit federal judicial review of the February 25 order, and the MPSC’s failure, thus far, to incorporate the terms of the order in a final decision approving or rejecting an interconnection agreement does not bar review of GTE’s claims.
In holding that GTE’s suit was premature because the MPSC had yet to issue a final order reviewable under § 252(e)(6), the district court relied heavily on its prior decision in
GTE North v. Strand,
No. 5:97-CV-01,
Although the order at issue in this case is clearly distinguishable from an interlocutory order entered in a § 252 proceeding, the commissioners urge us to overlook the order’s state law origins because the order establishes rates that the parties agree will likely be incorporated in a final agreement subject to review under § 252(e)(6). Were we to adopt this approach, we would simply equate the February 25 order with an interlocutory order in a § 252 proceeding that GTE could not challenge in federal court until the Commission issued a final decision approving or rejecting an agreement incorporating the terms of the order. Recharacterizing, the February 25 order in this manner appears consistent with the FTA if one reads § 252(e)(6) broadly to govern not only claims that a state utility commission erred in approving a final agreement negotiated under § 252, but also claims that the commission violated the FTA by approving an agreement that was not the product of a § 252 proceeding. Although this construction of § 252(e)(6) is superficially appealing, we cannot adopt this approach and assume that GTE would eventually be able to seek federal review of the challenged order because any approach that equates a decision arising out of independent state law proceedings with an interlocutory order in a § 252 arbitration ignores the 'critical fact that the former may be enforced against the parties even if it is never incorporated in a final interconnection agreement.
At first blush, § 252(e)(6) seems to guarantee adequate, albeit deferred, judicial review of the Commission’s February 25 order.
See, e.g., Thunder Basin Coal v. Reich,
In determining whether the lower court has jurisdiction over GTE’s claims despite the limitations in § 252(e)(6), this court must look “not only [to] the particular statutory language, but to the design of the [FTA] as a whole and to its object and policy.”
Crandon v. United States,
We disagree, and find that in this case § 252(e)(6) cannot be relied upon to provide adequate federal review because there is a chance, regardless how small, that GTE’s competitors may obtain service from GTE on the terms set forth in the February 25 order without ever executing a final agreement. Indeed, we think the appropriate inquiry is not whether, in the court’s estimation, it is more likely than not that the challenged order will be incorporated into a reviewable agreement, but whether there is any possibility at all that an LEC’s competitors could enforce the terms of the challenged order by means other than those prescribed in the FTA. If there is such a chance, § 252(e)(6) does not provide the party challenging the order with adequate review under Califano, and the federal district courts have general jurisdiction to review the order under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Under Michigan law, a buyer interested in purchasing network elements from GTE at the rates established in the February order need not execute a final interconnection agreement with GTE to enforce the tariff; it need only petition a state court for an injunction enforcing the terms of the tariff against GTE.
See, e.g., Rinaldo’s Construction Corp. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co.,
[W]here a plaintiff seeks relief against a telephone company in a [state] court of general jurisdiction, under Valentine [v. Michigan Bell,388 Mich. 19 ,199 N.W.2d 182 (Mich.1972 ], the court may entertain (1) a cause of action in tort, or (2) a claim that the telephone company has violated the regulatory code or tariffs.
Id.
at 653-54 (emphasis added). As the Michigan Supreme Court went on to explain, “[clauses of action in tort and those causes of action alleging that a telephone company has violated the tariffs or code are not cases in which the rationale underlying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction [requires the state courts to defer to the MPSC].”
Id.
at 654. Because an interest
The district court has subject matter jurisdiction under § 1331 to review federal preemption claims.
See Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
Indeed, to hold to the contrary would have enormous negative implications: if only certain actions (final orders approving interconnection agreements) by state commissions are reviewable in federal court, and if, as the district court held, § 252(e)(6) is the exclusive.basis for judicial review of state commission actions that in any way relate to interconnection agreements, state commissions may insulate regulatory requirements that violate the FTA from federal, and possibly even state, court review. This interpretation of § 252(e)(6) conflicts with Congress’s decision to establish federal procedures for negotiating interconnection rights and to concentrate judicial review of interconnection agreements in the federal courts. It is also antithetical to the principle that parties injured by a governmental entity’s failure to adhere to the law may seek redress in the courts. Finally, denying review and forcing GTE either to violate the February 25 order, or to comply with the genéral and immediate obligations imposed by the order in the hope that the order would one day be incorporated into a reviewable final agreement, would undermine both the letter and spirit of the FTA.
Section 252(e)(6) circumscribes federal review only of cases born of § 252 proceedings. Because the MPSC’s February 25 order was not the product of § 252 arbitration, but of an independent state law proceeding, § 252(e)(6) does not preclude jurisdiction over GTE’s claims. We therefore hold that federal review is available under § 1331 to determine whether state commission orders violate federal law except in cases in which the challenged regulatory action is clearly an interlocutory order arising out of § 252 proceedings. We confine our holding to the jurisdictional question because it is for the district court to determine on remand
Ill
The MPSC argues that, even if we have jurisdiction over GTE’s claims, it would be prudent for us to abstain from ruling on the merits of the case until the rates specified in the February 25 order are incorporated into an interconnection agreement approved by the Commission. We decline to express an opinion on the merits of GTE’s claims, but not on the grounds urged by the defendants. Although the Michigan courts have concurrent jurisdiction over GTE’s § 1983 and preemption claims, we should decline to decide this case only if the requirements for abstention established in
Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,
Burford abstention is appropriate where “timely and adequate state-court review is available” and:
(1) when there are difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the case then at bar; or
(2) where the exercise of federal review of the question in a case and in similar cases would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern.
New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans,
Pullman
abstention is similarly inappropriate because
Pullman
abstention is warranted only when a state law is challenged and resolution by the state of certain questions of state law may obviate the federal claims, or when the challenged law is susceptible of a construction by state courts that would eliminate the need to reach the federal question.
See, e.g., Babbitt v. United Farm Workers National Union,
Younger
abstention is also inappropriate. In
Younger,
the Supreme Court held that federal courts should abstain from deciding cases within their jurisdiction only when: (1) there are ongoing state court proceedings; (2) those proceedings involve important state interests; and (3) the parties have an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional issues in the state proceedings.
See GTE Mobilnet of Ohio v. Johnson,
That GTE has a right to appeal does not, however, satisfy the requirement that a federal court may abstain under
Younger
only if the parties are involved in ongoing state proceedings. The Supreme Court held in
NOPSI
that the availability, or even the pendency, of state court review of a “legislative or executive action” does not justify
Younger
abstention.
NOPSI,
Finally, the district court is not required to abstain from deciding this case under the Johnson Act, which prohibits federal courts from enjoining compliance
In addition to the fact that the requirements for abstention established by the Supreme Court are not satisfied in this case, abstention is not warranted here because waiting to review the propriety of the February 25 order until it is incorporated into a final arbitration agreement will deny GTE a timely and adequate remedy at law. GTE, whose suit against the MPSC is based on
Ex parte Young,
For the foregoing reasons, abstention is not warranted in this case.
IV
In holding that GTE’s claims fell within the purview of § 252(e)(6), the district court effectively denied GTE any assurance of federal review because under § 252(e)(6), federal review is wholly contingent on a state commission’s decision to approve or reject a final interconnection agreement incorporating the terms of any challenged order, an event that need not occur for a competitor to enforce the tariffs established in the February 25 order against GTE. The challenged order was the product not of § 252 proceedings, but of proceedings initiated by the MPSC under Michigan law, and as such may be independently enforced by the Michigan courts. The district court therefore erred in concluding that § 252(e)(6) provides an adequate opportunity for deferred review under either Califano or Thunder Basin.
It is presumably because § 252(e)(6) does not provide GTE with an adequate assurance of federal review that the MPSC does not seriously defend on appeal the district court’s conclusion that § 252(e)(6) satisfies
Thunder Basin
because it defers, but does not preclude, federal review. Rather, the MPSC argues that “there is neither a need nor a requirement for the federal District Court to review [the February 25 order]” because that order is fully reviewable in Michigan state court. Although this argument may be relevant to
In upholding jurisdiction over GTE’s claims under § 1331, we emphasize that it is precisely because state utility commissions play such a critical role in administering the FTA’s regulatory framework that they must operate strictly within the confínes of the statute. We therefore REVERSE the district court’s ruling, uphold its jurisdiction under § 1331, and remand the case for determination on the merits if and when the district court finds GTE’s claims ripe for review. 7 In so doing, we hope to further the goals of the FTA by affirming state commissions’ statutory role and rejecting an unduly expansive interpretation of § 252(e)(6) that would permit state regulatory authorities to insulate from federal review orders alleged to be contrary to, or preempted by, federal law.
Notes
. Although GTE claims that it will be disadvantaged if its competitors are not required to negotiate individual terms of network access, any harm GTE may suffer on this score will arguably be temporary because universal subsidies are due to be phased out under the FTA.
Cf. AT & T Coip. v. Iowa Utilities Bd.,
The counter-argument is, of course, that even if the tariffing requirement established in the February 25 order were struck down once the Commission approved an agreement incorporating the terms set forth in the tariffs, GTE could not recover damages for harm suffered in the interim, nor could it "turn back the clock and recreate the atmosphere of negotiations that would have prevailed if [its competitors] had not been operating for months under tariffing arrangements.” Appellant's Br. at 24-25.
.Section 261 of the FTA provides that state commissions can impose their own rules "in fulfilling requirements of this part, if such regulations are not inconsistent with the provisions of [the FTA].” 47 U.S.C. § 261 (1996). State commissions may also impose additional requirements on LECs if such requirements "are necessary to further competition in the provision of telephone exchange access, so long as the State’s requirements are not inconsistent with the [Federal Communication] Commission's regulations to implement this part.” Id. § 261 (b)-(c).
. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 251(a)(1), 251(c)(1) (requiring incumbents and their competitors to negotiate in good faith the specific terms and conditions of interconnection agreements).
. In
Strand,
the district court noted that an MPSC order is a "determination” subject to federal review under section 252(e)(6) only if
. In Iowa, the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's decision vacating, as inconsistent with the private negotiation provisions of the FTA, the FCC’s “pick-and-choose” rule, which required incumbents to offer network access to any potential competitor on the same terms enjoyed by earlier competitors who negotiated individual agreements with the incumbent. The Eighth Circuit vacated the rule on the basis that it allowed late market entrants to obtain the benefits of previous competitors' agreements without having to accept the trade-offs that the initial competitors had to make in order to obtain favorable terms of access. See id. at 738. In reversing the Eighth Circuit and upholding the rule, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the rule undercut incumbents' bargaining power and contravened the purpose of the negotiation provisions of the FTA, and affirmed the FCC's authority to promulgate the rule on the basis that it tracked the language of a particular FTA provision (§ 252(i)) "almost exactly.”
In the same opinion, the Supreme Court also reversed the Eighth Circuit's decision vacating FCC Rule 315(b), which prohibits incumbent LECs from separating already combined network elements before leasing them to competitors under the "unbundled access” provisions of the FTA. The Eighth Circuit determined that the rule should be vacated because it required leased access to "bundled" elements, in violation of the FTA. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that, although § 251(c)(3) directs incumbents to grant competitors access to "unbundled” elements that the competitors may then “combine” and thus "forbid[s] incumbents to sabotage network elements that are provided in discrete pieces,” § 251(c)(3) "does not say, or even remotely imply, that elements must be provided only in this fashion and never in combined form.”
Iowa,
. GTE was prudent to sue the Michigan commissioners under
Ex parte Young
because it is virtually certain that a state utility commission's decision to accept regulatory authority under the FTA cannot legitimately be construed as a valid waiver of sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court’s recent decisions in
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank,
It is precisely because the waiver doctrine no longer provides a reliable basis for seeking relief against state commissions that we disagreed in
Michigan Bell Telephone Co. v. Climax Telephone Co.,
. To determine whether a claim is ripe for decision, the reviewing court must consider both the “fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.”
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,
In this case, the district court must decide whether the ripeness inquiry demands that one of GTE's competitors actually request access at the tariff rate before deciding the case, or whether the order itself gives rise to a justiciable claim because it imposes an immediate obligation on GTE to sell network elements at predetermined rates.
