Grzankowski v. Southgate Plaza, Inc.Grzankowski v. Southgate Plaza, Inc.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. In my view, Southgate Plaza, Inc. (defendant) met its burden of establishing its entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law, and plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Consequently, I would affirm.
On March 12, 1992, at about 4:15 p.m., Susan M. Grzankowski (plaintiff) sustained injuries in a fall in the parking lot of Southgate Plaza, a shopping center located in West Seneca that is owned and operated by defendant. Defendant moved for summary judgment, contending that at the time of plaintiff’s fall the western New York area was in the throes of one of the largest snow storms in history, with blizzard-like conditions of blowing and drifting snow beginning on March 11, 1992, and continuing into the following day. Defendant contended that it could not be held liable to plaintiffs because the storm was still in progress at the time of plaintiff’s fall.
In support of its motion, defendant submitted the deposition testimony of plaintiff admitting that there had been a heavy snowfall on the day before her accident. Defendant also submitted the deposition testimony of Peter Bella, the maintenance supervisor for the plaza. He testified that all available maintenance workers, including part-time workers, had been called in to remove snow from the plaza parking area on March 11 and March 12. Security guards were also called in to assist in snow removal. Defendant also called in a subcontractor to help clear the parking area with heavy equipment during the night of
Defendant also submitted the Local Climatological Data Monthly Summary for March 1992, which revealed that there was precipitation on March 12 between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m. It also submitted the affidavit of the Highway Superintendent for the Town of West Seneca, who stated that he sent crews out to plow and salt on March 11 and on March 12, 1992, which means that at least two inches of new snow fell on March 12. His crews plowed continuously throughout their shift from 7:30 a.m. until 3:30 p.m. on March 12, 1992.
Defendant submitted the affidavit of Michael Cejka, a member of the American Meteorological Society who has been involved as a broadcast meteorologist since 1979. Cejka reviewed the Buffalo Airport weather data for March 11 and 12, 1992, as well as data from the National Coast Guard Station in Buffalo, the Cooperative Weather Observers in Golden and Silver Creek and the narrative weather radar summaries covering all of western New York. He stated that, on March 11, 1992, a heavy snowfall began at about 1:00 a.m. with snow and blowing snow occurring throughout the rest of the day and the following evening. Over 15 inches of snow fell at the airport. The weather reports throughout the western New York area reported heavy amounts of blowing snow. The next day, March 12, 1992, the storm continued with extremely high winds and temperatures ranging from 13 to 22 degrees. Snow showers began at 7:56 a.m., causing additional accumulations, and continued on and off for most of the day coupled with blowing snow. The winds on March 12 were strong, with an average wind speed of 22 miles per hour gusting to 44 miles per hour. At about 4:25 p.m. on March 12, the airport was reporting visibility down to one-half mile due to snow and blowing snow. The airport reports establish that snow showers and blowing snow were continuous from 7:56 a.m. until about midnight on March 12, 1992. That condition was widespread and was prevalent throughout all of western New York, as evidenced by the reports of the Cooperative Weather Observers in Golden, lo
“It is well settled that a party in possession or control of real property has a reasonable time after the cessation of a storm to take corrective action to remedy hazardous snow and ice-related conditions created by the storm” (Ruck v ISS Intl. Serv. Sys.,
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that plaintiffs raised a triable issue of fact. In opposition to the motion, plaintiffs submitted plaintiffs own deposition testimony and the affidavit of Thomas Casey, a member of the volunteer company that responded to plaintiffs accident. Both plaintiff and Casey indicated that it was not snowing at the time of plaintiffs accident. The fact that there is a lull or break in the precipitation, however, is not sufficient to impose a duty on defendant (see, Whitt v St. John’s Episcopal Hosp.,
Lead Opinion
—Order reversed on the law without costs, motion denied and complaint against defendant Southgate Plaza, Inc. reinstated. Memorandum: Plaintiffs commenced this action against Southgate Plaza, Inc. (defendant), among others, seeking damages for personal injuries sustained by Susan M. Grzankowski (plaintiff) when she fell on snow in the parking lot of the Southgate Plaza, owned and maintained by defendant. Defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against it, and Supreme Court granted the motion.
We conclude that plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact whether the snowstorm had abated and whether defendant had a reasonable opportunity to clear accumulated snow and slush from its parking lot prior to plaintiff’s fall (see, Williams v Scruggs Community Health Care Ctr.,
All concur except Pigott, Jr., J., who dissents and votes to affirm in the following Memorandum.