Grygorwicz v. TrujilloGrygorwicz v. Trujillo
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI, Sam B. Sanchez, District Judge.
COUNSEL
Ray Twohig, P.C., Ray Twohig, Albuquerque, NM, for Petitioner.
Anthony J. Ayala, P.A., Anthony James Ayala, Albuquerque, NM, for Respondent.
JUDGES
PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice. WE CONCUR: EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Chief Justice, PATRICIO M. SERNA, Justice, RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice, CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice.
AUTHOR: PETRA JIMENEZ MAES.
OPINION
MAES, Justice.
{1} Defendant, Charlie Trujillo, appealed the denial of his claim for a homestead exemption in a foreclosure action. Plaintiff, Tasheena Grygorwicz, initiated the foreclosure action in partial satisfaction of a civil judgment she received for personal injuries resulting from sexual abuse. See Grygorwicz v. Trujillo, 2006-NMCA-089, 140 N.M. 129, 140 P.3d 550, cert. denied, 2006-NMCERT-007, 140 N.M. 280, 142 P.3d 361. The Court of Appeals held that Defendant had waived his right to the homestead exemption because he had failed to appeal within thirty days from the district court‘s
FACTS
{2} Following a bench trial, the district court found in Plaintiff‘s favor on her sexual abuse claim and awarded her $1.3 million in damages. See Grygorwicz, 2008-NMCA-040, ¶ 2. On August 7, 2006, Plaintiff filed a motion to foreclose on Defendant‘s home in partial satisfaction of the judgment debt. Id. at ¶ 3. In response, Defendant asserted his right to a homestead exemption under
{3} The district court‘s foreclosure decree, entered on November 30, 2006, granted Plaintiff the property to either keep or sell in partial satisfaction of the judgment debt. Grygorwicz, 2008-NMCA-040, ¶ 3. To protect the property from neglect or wear during the pendency of the foreclosure, the district court also issued a writ of assistance to put Plaintiff in possession of the property immediately. Id. at ¶¶ 3-4. The decree of foreclosure omitted an allowance for Defendant‘s homestead exemption. Id. at ¶ 4.
{4} The Taos County Sheriff executed the writ of assistance by locking Defendant and his wife out of the house and putting Plaintiff in possession of the property. Id. On December 4, 2006, Defendant filed a claim of exemptions on execution in the district court pursuant to
{5} The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court‘s order of dismissal. Id. at ¶ 20. The Court noted that Defendant properly had raised his homestead exemption in response to Plaintiff‘s motion for foreclosure, as required by
{6} Defendant argued that his subsequent claim for exemptions on execution under
DISCUSSION
{7} The issue before us is whether the Court of Appeals erred by holding that Defendant had “waived his homestead exemption claim by failing to pursue an appeal of the foreclosure decree within the time frame required by
{8} We have held that the district court‘s decree of foreclosure is both final and interlocutory in its operation. The decree serves two functions: first, it determines the rights of the parties in the property; and, second, it fixes the manner and terms of the foreclosure sale. Speckner v. Riebold, 86 N.M. 275, 277, 523 P.2d 10, 12 (1974). Whereas, the court‘s judgment with respect to the manner and terms of sale is interlocutory, the declaration of the parties’ rights may be construed as a final judgment unless modified under the provisions of
{9} Defendant properly asserted his homestead exemption in his answer to the foreclosure action.
The District Court Erred by Denying Defendant‘s Claim for Homestead Exemption
{10} Having determined that Defendant‘s appeal was timely, we next address the district court‘s denial of Defendant‘s claimed exemption, which the Court of Appeals did not reach.
{11} The homestead exemption,
Each person shall have exempt a homestead in a dwelling house and land occupied by him or in a dwelling house occupied by him although the dwelling is on land owned by another, provided that the dwelling is owned, leased or being purchased by the person claiming the exemption. Such a person has a homestead of thirty thousand dollars ($30,000) exempt from attachment, execution or foreclosure by a judgment creditor and from any proceeding of receivers or trustees in insolvency proceedings and from executors or administrators in probate. If the homestead is owned jointly by two persons, each joint owner is entitled to an exemption of thirty thousand dollars ($30,000).
We have held that the legislative purposes of the exemption is to benefit the debtor and to “prevent families from becoming destitute as the result of misfortune through common debts which generally are unforeseen.” Coppler & Mannick, P.C. v. Wakeland, 2005-NMSC-022, ¶ 9, 138 N.M. 108, 117 P.3d 914 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The statute provides a homestead exemption as a matter of right and a court may not frustrate this purpose by denying a properly asserted exemption for a qualifying homestead.
{12} In the present case, the district court‘s denial of Defendant‘s requested homestead exemption is unsupported by the record. Plaintiff argued to the district court that the homestead exemption should be denied due to the punitive nature of the underlying judgment. However, we have held that a court may not deny the exemption on the basis of tortious or malicious conduct. Id. at ¶ 12 (holding that courts may only impose an equitable lien against the homestead exemption under limited circumstances where malicious, fraudulent, or intentional tortious conduct involves the homestead itself). Though an allegation of waste may affect a debtor‘s right to a homestead exemption, id. (“[T]he judgment in the waste action . . . is not the type of debt the Legislature intended to shield.“), the district court issued a writ of assistance putting Plaintiff in immediate possession of the property in order to prevent the possibility of waste. The court‘s issuance of the writ prior to any allegation of waste, and Plaintiff‘s
CONCLUSION
{13} Defendant‘s appeal from the decree of foreclosure was timely. On the merits of the appeal, we hold that the district court erred by denying Defendant‘s right to a homestead exemption. Therefore, we remand this case to the district court with instruction to grant Defendant‘s request for a homestead exemption.
{14} IT IS SO ORDERED.
PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice
WE CONCUR:
EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Chief Justice
PATRICIO M. SERNA, Justice
RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice
CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice
Topic Index for Grygorwicz v. Trujillo, No. 30,939
AE APPEAL AND ERROR
AE-AO Appealable Order
AE-AP Appellate Rules and Procedure
AE-TATimeliness of Appeal
CP CIVIL PROCEDURE
CP-FO Final Order
JM JUDGMENT
JM-WE Writ of Execution
PR PROPERTY
PR-FC Foreclosure
PR-HE Homestead Exemption