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Grundy Mining Company v. Douglas W. Flynn and Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor
353 F.3d 467
6th Cir.
2004
Check Treatment
Docket

*3 the coal company. Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. GILMAN, Before MOORE and Circuit (1999), § 725.309 was considered ROSEN, Judge.* Judges; District *4 a “duplicate.” escape order res ROSEN, J., opinion D. delivered the judicata earlier Flynn effect of his court, GILMAN, J., joined. in which had to demonstrate a “material in MOORE, 485-490), (pp. J. delivered a conditions” since the claim’s denial. separate opinion concurring in the result Having this threshold surmounted obsta- only. cle, prevail he then had to on the merits. present The “duplicate” has been OPINION back and forth between Administrative ROSEN, Judge. District (“ALJ”) Judge Law and the Board four Court, times. appeal On three I. INTRODUCTION (1) questions Did Mr. Flynn remain: es- This action for miner’s black lung coal change” gov- tablish under the benefits arises Title IV of under the Fed- (2) Who, erning legal standard? as be- Safety eral Coal Mine Act Health Grundy Fund, tween and the Mining Trust 1969, amended, §§ U.S.C. 901-945 should responsibility paying any bear for (“Black “BLBA”). Lung Act” or Benefits (3) and, award of benefits? Does substan- The petitioner/employer, Grundy Mining- tial support the ALJ’s finding Company, a final appeals from order of the Flynn’s disability total was due to United Department States Labor pneumoconiosis? (“DOL”) (“Board” Benefits Board Review “BRB”) In the granting respon- proceedings, benefits to administrative Flynn. W. Douglas Flynn The re- Board held properly that Mr. had dent/claimant spondent Director of the Office of Work- established a “material and total Programs ers’ Compensation of the DOL disability due to pneumoconiosis. The (“Director”) has been named also as a acknowledged idiosyncrasies Board some party in interest. examining report, yet doctor’s de- judgment ferred to in weighing the ALJ’s long

This case has a and involved histo- the evidence. The Board further held that ry. Flynn Mr. filed first claim for Grundy Mining responsibility must assume lung black benefits while he was for payment since benefits working still in the coal mines. The claim statutory 1984 claim did meet the finally was re- Flynn denied in 1981 because quirements prove totally failed to was to the that he disabled transfer Trust Fund. below, pulmonary pneumoconi- due to the ailment For the reasons set forth we affirm * Rosen, Michigan, sitting designation. The by Honorable Gerald E. United States Judge District for the Eastern District of mine, at the entrance to the that time was of these on each decision the Board’s to coal dust. exposed he remained points. lung for black Flynn applied first PROCEDURAL AND claiming II. FACTUAL in November benefits breathing BACKGROUND by virtue of he was disabled mine engaged coal He difficulties. Employ- Mine Coal A. Claimant’s time, and remained so at the employment History and Medical ment claim ulti- in 1981 when his first employed dupli- filed a mately was denied. was born W. Douglas Claimant 1984, a month after in March cate claim eighth grade, completed May (at the coal age seventy) from retiring coal in the Tennessee working 1932 was that is at It this 1984 claim company. spanned in the mines career mines. His issue here. For ending in 1984. years, more than 50 career, early in his years record, approximately opinions of both Two medical a maintenance Fritzhand, mines as worked to the he are relevant Dr. Martin *5 career, First, of his During part upon examining the latter man. us. issues before man, utility July light and Flynn worked as on behalf DOL Flynn Mr. delivery including 26, 1980, in with the miner’s connection responsibilities with reported pul- mine Dr. 'Fritzhand areas of the to various first supplies non- study function which was monary used lamps electric tending 1 below. as set forth Table qualifying,1 at work station Although his the miners. Study Pulmonary Function Table 1: 1980 Maximum Forced Forced FEVi/FVC Voluntary Vital Expiratory Capacity Ventilation Volume One (“FVC”) (“MW”) Second (“FEVi”) < < < 0.55 3.2 2.51

Qualifying < Standard 0.77 4.3 3.3

Actual

Result well,2 in Table as shown non-qualifying as arterial reported further an Dr. Fritzhand 2 below. which was study on that occasion gas blood study "qualifies” to dem- gas which “quali- 2. A blood study which pulmonary function 1. A disability disability under under 20 C.F.R. demonstrate total total fies” to onstrate 718.204(b)(2)(i) § one in which the 718.204(b)(2)(i) C.F.R. at or be- have values § must meet or fall the MW or FVC FEVj and either Appendix C of 20 at the table values low Appendix B of 20 at the table values below at which for the altitude C.F.R. Part 718 height, age, 718 for the miner's C.F.R. Part was administered. test FEVj gender, which the ratio of or in percent FVC is 55 or less. Study Table 2: 1980Blood Gas pC02_p02 <

Qualifying Standard = (at 37.5) pC02

Flynn’s Actual 37.5 80.0 Result Dr. reported Fritzhand at that diagnosed time chronic pulmonary obstructive Flynn could “ambulate on level terrain no disease employment, related to coal mine than more 200 feet without associated hypertension. well as breath,” shortness and that this “this later, years Four and several months symptom upon climbing increase[d] stairs work, after he ceased coal Flynn mine (J.A. 135.) walking up grades.” again was examined Dr. Fritzhand on doctor further stated that “un- DOL, behalf of the this time in connection able to mow a lawn without associated present claim. In a report dated dyspnea.” Id. When asked to “describe 16, 1984, June Dr. Fritzhand noted anoth- explain limitations ... may be er non-qualifying pulmonary function disease,” due to pulmonary Dr. Fritzhand study, as well non-qualifying as another opined activity could do “mild gas study. best without blood associated] See Tables 3 and 4 be- shortness] o[f] ' (J.A. 133.) Dr. b[reath].” Fritzhand low. *6 Pulmonary

Table 8: Study Function 198k FEVX_FVC_MVV_FEVx/FVC < < <

Qualifying 2.35 3.02 <94 0.55 Standard Flynn’s 3.3 4.2 67.2 0.79 Actual Result Study

Table Blood Gas k- 198k pC02_p02 <

Qualifying Standard = (at 33.9) pC02

Flynn’s Actual 33.9 72.1 Result examination, Following this climbing Dr. Frit- stairs or walking up grades.” (J.A. atl69.) reported Flynn zhand could “ambu- Flynn He also stated that late on level terrain no more than 300 feet was “unable to mow a lawn without associ- breath,” without associated dyspnea.” shortness ated Id. When asked to “de- symptom and that “this upon explain increase[d] scribe and limitations ... may ade, in the Benefits Re- disease,” culminating Frit- and Dr. pulmonary be due September 2000 decision Flynn was able to do view Board’s responded zhand (J.A. activity.” challenged appeal. on sedentary being which is now than “no more 167.) ASHD diagnosed rulings Fritzhand is- following Dr. The summarizes disease) (arteriosclerotic with atrial protracted heart of this during sued the course fibrillation, congestive hypertension, process. review failure, pneumoconiosis as well heart McElroy I: ALJ heard Y.M. employment. to coal mine related 20, July 1987 Decision case and issued (“D O”) awarding benefits. & Order History B. Procedural Mr. not address whether The ALJ did Flynn’s for Black First Claim 1. a “material Flynn had established Lung Benefits previ- of his in conditions” since the denial however, for federal did, initial claim Mr. claim. He find ous filed on November lung pneumoconiosis benefits was totally black disabled due 1970, by the 21, originally denied years of coal mine arising fifty out of his (“SSA”) on Security Administration Social employment. 9, Flynn then filed an election 1971.

April and, Mining Grundy appealed BRB I: claim under review of this request card to a D the Board issued January Act of Reform Lung Black Benefits remanding vacating the award and & O any filing, of this liabili- As a result matter for further consideration. to the DOL’s have transferred ty would McElroy had over- found that ALJ Board Fund, Flynn been entitled Trust had issue, looked the “material 932(c),(j)(3); § See 30 U.S.C. benefits. had estab- held nevertheless 725.496(d). Di- generally § See C.F.R. a matter of law a material lished Co., rector, Quarto Mining v. OWCP Co., 11 BLR Peabody Coal Spese under Cir.1990) (reviewing this (Ben.Rev.Bd.1988). The Board re- 1-174 scheme). statutory however, manded, consider- for further review, round of Following this second of benefits entitlement. ation on the merits lung for black Flynn’s initial claim *7 remand, McElroy ALJ II: ALJ On by the DOL’s finally was denied benefits benefits, in a D & this time again awarded 15, 1981. The director on June district However, 29,1991. the ALJ April O dated determined district director motion Grundy Mining’s to address failed arising out of his coal pneumoconiosis had liability to the and transfer to dismiss claim on employment, but denied the mine Fund. Trust Flynn failed to establish ground that appeal- Grundy Mining again of this dis- disability total result BRB II: his 1993, 4, the Board before ease. ed. On October died, decision, Mr. issue a could Flynn’s for Black 2. Claim Second widow, Flynn, pursued the his Gussie Lung Benefits 4, 1994, the April on his behalf. On find- vacated the ALJ’s again Board once pres- filed the Flynn subsequently and re- of entitlement 13, ings on the merits The district claim on March ent In so but, further consideration. at manded for new claim denied the director its however, re-affirmed the Board ruling, it for a formal Flynn’s request, referred change,” and holding of “material earlier review hearing. lengthy A administrative ar- Grundy Mining’s transfer rejected ensued, a dec- also spanning well over process gument ground only Cir.1994), however, qualify claim—which did not for transfer— rejected Circuit Spese standard. Con- remained open. sequently, the Board now held that a “ma- terial consistent with Sharondale January ALJ III: On ALJ would affirm be established if it could ALJ Campbell a D issued & 0 on remand rein- Campbell’s finding that Dr. Fritzhand’s stating First, the award of benefits. opinion disability. established total pneumoconiosis ALJ found that had been established on the basis x-ray of both the Next, in affirming finding, opinions. and the medical Sec- explained Board permissibly the ALJ ond, he found that Dr. Fritzhand’s 1984 found opinion the doctor’s sufficient to es- (that opinion Flynn could do no more than disability, tablish total finding since this sedentary activity) established total dis- was based on a comparison of Dr. Frit- ability Flynn’s since last coal employ- mine zhand’s 1984 assessment limiting Flynn to ment incompatible sedentary with this sedentary activity with the exertional re- restriction. The ALJ went on explain quirements last coal mine em- that Dr. opinion Fritzhand’s 1984 out- ployment. The Board further held that weighed non-qualifying pulmonary Campbell ALJ acted within his discretion function gas and blood studies because in determining that Dr. Fritzhand’s medi- such results “are not self explanatory, and report cal outweighed non-qualifying physician no has used them to support a test results. conclusion that Claimant is not disabled (J.A. 49.) pneumoconiosis.” due to Proceeding to the issue of pneumoconio- sis, the upheld Board the ALJ’s determi- Finally, regarding causation, disability nation that Dr. opinion Fritzhand’s 1984 Campbell ALJ noted that Dr. Fritzhand was documented and reasoned. Because diagnosed had both pulmonary cardiac and contrary there were no opinions medical report. However, conditions his 1984 record, the Board Camp- affirmed ALJ pointed that, the ALJ report, out in this finding bell’s pneumoconiosis. Finally, Dr. Fritzhand had explicitly stated that while the recognized Board that Dr. Frit- Flynn’s limitation to sedentary activity was zhand diagnosed had heart disease as well attributable to pulmonary disease. Conse- as coal employment-related mine pneumo- quently, Campbell reasoned that “the coniosis, it held that the ALJ had acted limitation pulmonary due to disease that within fact-finding discretion deter- Dr. Fritzhand listed must be related to mining that Flynn’s total disability was pneumoconiosis pneumoconiosis because pneumoconiosis. due to only pulmonary disability that Dr. Fritzhand included in his 1984 medical re- *8 BRB response IV: In Grundy Min- (Id.) port.” ing’s timely reconsideration, motion for

BRB III: The Board affirmed the Board vacated the award and in remanded award of in D benefits a & July 0 dated a D 14, & 0 on July Reconsideration dated 27, 1995. In so holding, the Board first 1997. In ruling, so the Board construed proper addressed the standard for portion estab- the last of Sharondale as “re- lishing a “material change in quiring] conditions.” that a miner show there has decision, In its initial the Board held that been a in worsening physical condi- Flynn (J.A. 30.) had established a change” “material tion.” at The Board therefore pursuant to then-prevailing Spese stan- instructed the ALJ to address on remand Ross, dard. Corp. v. 42 whether any qualitative there was differ-

475 opin- 1984, Dr. Fritzhand’s two ALJ observed that in Dr. ence between Fritzhand pulmonary ions: conducted new function and which, gas though blood studies still not judge, law on re- administrative [T]he qualifying, reflected at mand, least some declin- explain merely must whether he Additionally, values. the ALJ noted disagreed previous with the character- that Dr. Fritzhand had conducted a ization of Dr. Fritzhand’s 1980 medical new 1984, disability] physical examination in report establishing resulting [as shown, “sedentary” through whether claimant has restriction that was more lim- Dr. than iting activity” finding the submission of Fritzhand’s 1984 the “mild in the change Thus, in his opinion, report. medical material doctor’s 1980 Campbell ALJ denial. condition since earlier concluded that established a “mate- rial change conditions” consistent with (J.A. 32.) Thus, purpose the sole the Board’s directives. reconsideration of the “mate- remand was rial change” issue under Board’s re- 27, 2000, BRB September V: On reading vised Sharondctle. Campbell’s finding Board affirmed ALJ 5, 1998, On ALJ

ALJ TV: November and, “material in conditions” Campbell issued a D & on Remand therefore, affirmed the award of benefits. (“ALJ IV”) awarding At the out benefits. process, In the the Board declined to re- set, opined the ALJ this case was visit the issue of whether Dr. Fritzhand’s factually Lisa Lee similar to Mines Di opinion was documented and rea- OWCP, (4th Cir.1996) rector, 86 F.3d 1358 soned based on the law-of-the-case doc- (en banc), denied, 1090, cert. U.S. Instead, trine. the Board endorsed the (1997), 136 L.Ed.2d 711 in which S.Ct. reasoning ALJ’s vis-a-vis the Fourth the meaning Circuit addressed change” because Dr. Fritzhand had con- of the “material standard. The ducted a new physical examination and accepted Lee persua ALJ Lisa Mines as objective new tests and had down- authority, sive it standing and described graded Flynn’s physical from capacity proposition for the that “an administrative activity” “sedentary “mild activi- judge law cannot a finding base of material ty” in Dr. Board did note Frit- disagreement on his or her findings zhand’s could walk 200 underpinnings prior the factual of a deni feet 1980 and 300 feet in (J.A. 23.) Rather, al.” in a material nonetheless held that substantial evidence change analysis, accept the ALJ must supported findings, the ALJ’s and that this correct both the denial and the facts incongruity minor required would not have (Id.) necessary Applying to sustain it. report. ALJ discredit the 1984 standard, the ALJ reasoned that since Grundy timely Mining sought reconsid- earlier was denied and Dr. ruling, eration of the Board’s latest but the opinion part Fritzhand’s 1980 summarily request Board denied this occasion, record considered on that it fol 20, 2000. appeal December This followed. opinion lowed did not establish (Id. 24.) disability. total III. ANALYSIS Campbell inqui- next turned to the *9 ry that him Grundy Mining the Board had instructed to advances three chal- remand, perform on lenges found there to the administrative award of black First, lung Flynn. were differences between Dr. benefits to Mr. it con- in reports. Specifically, finding Fritzhand’s two the tends that the ALJ erred a 476 recipients.” Peabody the miners benefit change

“material in conditions” since (internal Next, Coal, Flynn’s previous claim. at 415 quotations denial 123 F.3d omitted). Mining that the Grundy argues record is and citations to the ALJ’s determi- insufficient sustain on the was dis-

nation merits Change” Inqui- 2. The “Material ALJ’s pneumoconiosis. Finally, to in due abled ry Fully Comported the with Stan- the event the award benefits is dard Announced in this Court’s sustained, argues Grundy Mining that the Decision. Sharondale liability by should be this claim borne starkly As illustrated recitation our Lung Disability Black Trust the Fund. We procedural history of the of this lengthy consider each of these contentions in turn. case, change” “material standard has the engendered during deal great a of debate Properly a A. The ALJ Found “Materi- proceed- course administrative Change al in Re- Conditions” ings now under review. When quired to Avoid the Res Judicata lung filed recent claim his most for black Effect of Denial of Mr. 1984, more than year benefits in after Previous Claim for Benefits. 1981, perti- earlier claim was denied in 1. Standard of Review in regulations nent effect at the time re- Board Whether subsequent quired that his claim be denied change” applied appropriate grounds “on the denial” unless question a purely legal standard is that we “there in con- has been material Director, address de novo. See v. OWCP 725.309(c) (1999).3 § ditions.” 20 C.F.R. Co., 926, 884 F.2d 929 Consolidation Coal regulation length We addressed Cir.1989). (6th extent, however, To Ross, Corp. Upon in v. supra. that the ALJ’s determination “materi possible three surveying constructions al factual we upon findings, rests change” requirement, the “material includ- accept findings must all that are such meaning adopted by the Board “supported in the substantial evidence Spese, supra, and the standard articulated a whole.” record considered as Consolida by the Seventh Circuit Sahara Coal Co. Coal, 929; tion see also Pea (7th Cir.1991), OWCP, 946 F.2d 554 we Hill, body Coal Co. v. 123 F.3d Cir.1997). position to the elected to defer advocated generally, More in the review, by the our must Director. See “keep course of we Lung Specifically, mind that the Act is 997-98. we characterized Black Benefits liberally remedial nature and must be the Director’s “one-element” test as fol- largest to construed include the number of lows: Secretary regula- exceptions

3. The of Labor revised this stated this rule. See tion, along applicable many 725.2(c); others Fed.Reg. § C.F.R. at 80057. The lung adjudication, in black final rules present regulation longer version of this no published on December See change” language, but includes the "material (Dec. 20, 2000). Fed.Reg. 79920-80107 requires that a instead claimant demonstrate Throughout opinion, we cite to the 1999 applicable in "one of conditions Regula- edition of Title Code of Federal 725.309(d). § of entitlement.” 20 C.F.R. Be- regulations in order to the tions to refer regulation apply cause the current does not their earlier form. All other references will here, legal signifi- not determine the need regulations. be to the current cance of this revision. Although regulations generally the revised claims, § apply pending 725.309 is one of *10 change whether a material is statute and language assess included in [T]o 725.309(d). established, § must consider all of the ALJ evidence, unfavor- the new favorable and Sharondale, 42 F.3d 998.4 able, and determine whether the miner Finally, we considered whether the ad- at least one of the elements proven has proper- ministrative decision under review adjudicated previously of entitlement ly found a change in conditions” If against him. the miner establishes in accordance with the standard we had element, of that he has the existence adopted: demonstrated, law, ma- as matter of interpretation, Under the Director’s change. terial properly analyze the ALJ did not Sharondale, 42 F.3d 997-98. In assessing claim, facts. the second the ALJ concluded that because he holding interpre- the Director’s x-ray found the new evidence estab- deference, tation was entitled to we found lished the pneumoconiosis, existence of it struck a reasonable balance be- material change Ross’s con- [claimant] judicata tween res concerns and the reme- shows, dition had occurred. The record dial nature of the BLBA: however, that positive negative both Here, interpretation the Director’s x-ray interpretations by both “B” read- premised on the notion that miners dis- ers and “non-B” readers accompanied by pneumoconiosis arising abled out of 1979 claim as [Ross’s] well as the 1985 employment coal mine are entitled to claim. The ALJ never discusses how Act. It affords a min- benefits under the x-rays the later differ qualitatively from er a entitlement second chance show Thus, those submitted we are provided to benefits his condition has unable to discern on the record before interpretation The implicitly worsened. merely us whether the disagreed judi- that the recognizes doctrine res previous with the characterization implicated by cata is not the claimant’s strength of the evidence or whether physical condition or the extent of his Ross indeed had shown the existence of disability at two different times. The a material in his condition since limits, entitlement is not without howev- the earlier denial. er; a miner whose condition has wors- (footnotes at 999 filing ened since the of an initial claim omitted). benefits, may eligible be but after year passed has portion gives since denial This last of Sharondale claim, parties’ point no is entitled to benefits rise to the of con- principal min[e]r simply because his claim have tention in Arguably, should this case. under a granted. interpre- reading been The Director’s strict of the “one-element” test Director, statutory tation takes into account the endorsed the ALJ’s “ma- request change” inquiry solely distinction between a for modifi- terial is limited cation of the Board’s decision and a re- the new evidence of the claimant’s condi- quest for benefits based on a material tion since the denial of his Accordingly, asking conditions. the ALJ whether this evidence es- interpretation find Director’s to be tablishes at least one of the elements of light purpose previously reasonable in benefit entitlement were 725.309(d) (1999), operative language § 4. Sharondale addressed of these two subsec- identical, 725.309(c) (1999). § while this case concerns tions is however. *11 478 compare

adjudicated against the claimant. There the ALJ then must the evidence claims, miner’s in accompanying the two no in seemingly place inquiry is qualitative to a order determine whether and between the new evidence comparison supports in the record the difference produced in the connection with evidence to in outcome as this element. Yet, in prior applying claim. the “one- the hand, Director, that argues on the other facts in element” standard to the Sharon- reading paragraph of the last of Shar- dale, failing the ALJ for to we faulted immedi- ondale is irreconcilable with the claimant’s x- determine whether the new decision, ately of in preceding portion that from ray qualitatively” evidence “differ[ed] panel which the held that the Director’s facially x-ray evidence that ac- the similar standard entitled to “one-element” was prior the claim. 42 companied agen- a reasonable of deference as exercise remand, at 999. On we directed the F.3d cy quite It policy-making authority. to determine whether there was such ALJ view, unlikely, in Director’s that the the difference, or the a whether critique would the com- Sharondale Court “merely disagreed” with the ALJ decision standards, peting “material accu- deny qualitative- the claim under a to rately the proposed summarize Director’s ly evidentiary similar record. rationale, “one-element” test and an- its nounce of the inter- adoption its Director’s case, Grundy present Mining In the then, in pretation, very para- and the next augmenting reads Sharondale as the basic graph, disregard the strict “one-element” important in one re- “one-element” test the standard and order ALJ to examine in Upon finding at least spect. underlying the of the evidence the denial one of the elements of benefit original prerequisite finding entitle- claim as a to pure change.”5 “one-element” inquiry— ment —the Director, suggests, Judge by 5. The Director also and into the record the we learn that concurrence, x-rays accompanying dupli- Moore likewise maintains in her the the miner's interpretative can April that this dilemma be avoid- cate claim in Sharondale were taken in of Shar- by construing paragraph ed the last of 1986 and May July, November actually mandating ondale compari- as not December of 1989. See Ross v. Sharondale accompanying miner's 86-BLA-4985, son Corp., op. slip No. at 7 Case subsequent argument first and claims. This Thus, 25, 1990) no x- (July (unpublished). Sharondale’s reference to “la- largely on rests rays were taken that and it follows x-rays,” in to "those ter contrast submitted in year none could have been submitted that 1985.” F.3d at 999. In the Director's Moreover, versus it even true "later.” is not view, explicated the as further concur- the ALJ in Sharondale uniformly favored rence, the Sharondale panel only meant to accompany- x-rays the over the earlier "later” failing proper- ALJ in fault the that case for Rather, duplicate the miner’s claim. address all of ly x-rays submitted with the all of the considered 1989 and one erred, duplicate 1985 claim. The ALJ miner's x-rays, remaining x-ray with the words, by favoring x-rays” in other “later given weight because it classified little duplicate support submitted Nothing two B-readers as unreadable. x-rays over those “submitted in 1985.” Sharondale suggests panel meant analysis. fault ALJ for this of Sharondale is de- proposed reading This record, light of this it evident however, seems incorrect, monstrably as shown Sharondale’s reference x-rays is a "1985” very support record cites in the Director error. typographical stated, If assume that there were no such dis- Simply of it. panel x-rays to refer to meant "submitted x-ray tinct "1985” and "later” subsets evi- 1979,” year miner's initial accompanying duplicate dence the miner’s paragraph the last makes co- claim in case. With the benefit of the decision, sense, underlying flowing logi- placed herent with one administrative sentence pick fy test, We are not free to the strict terms the one-element *12 portions prior published choose the of a but must also demonstrate that this that decision we will follow and those that a upon qualitatively rests different disregard. enjoy great do we will Nor we evidentiary record.6 our prece er latitude situations where Indeed, any lingering uncertainty about purportedly by are analytical dents tainted the proper of reading Sharondale surely flaws, as the Director contends is the case has dispelled been in this Court’s subse- Rather, with Sharondale. arewe bound quent decision in Tennessee Consolidated published opinions previous pan the of Kirk, (6th 602, Coal Co. v. 264 F.3d 608-10 els, encompasses parts and this rule all of Cir.2001). There, here, as the employer a prior ruling properly that are construed contended that Sharondale an mandates holdings rather than dicta. John See Cincinnati, inquiry beyond City standard, the one-element son 310 F.3d of -— (6th Cir.2002), denied, cert. under U.S. which “the new medical evidence -, S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 130 compared must be with the preexisting (2003). hardly It can be contended medical evidence on the same issue” to dicta, paragraph the final of Sharondale is determine if a different outcome is war- portion as this is the opinion Kirk, ranted. 264 F.3d at 608. We panel applied which the the “material agreed: change” standard to the facts of the case employer out, As the correctly points it. Specifically, although

before the miner if only the ALJ need assess whether the in that case had met the strict terms of the new medical proved an element “one-element” test —his initial claim was previously held to missing, have been it presence denied failure to establish the would relitigation allow the of cases in pneumoconiosis, of while the ALJ found which the new and old medical evidence that this condition was through established same, essentially were the but in which the evidence accompanying subsequent there a legal had been error in pre- panel claim—the directed the ALJ to con adjudication. Sharondale, vious In inquiry duct a further whether held that such situations were correct- qualitative outcome was attributable to one-year period able within the time af- evidence, ly opposed different to the denial, ter a point, after this ALJ’s different of an assessment essential claimant is not “entitled to benefits sim- ly unchanged evidentiary record. The im clear, ply claim of because his should have been port Sharondale is then —miners governed granted.” whose are 42 F.3d at In claims this Cir order to precedents cuit’s must do more than satis- maintain this limitation in favor of finali- event, cally any into the next. Lisa qualitatively' as discussed from the new evidence.” Mines, below, 11; supra, Lee necessary it is not see for us to venture a 86 F.3d at 1363 n. Harvey, also Lovilia Coal Co. v. pronouncement definitive meaning about Sharondale, Yet, 1997). of 454 n. we fail to see intervening panel because an Cir. so, supports position how already the Director's has done and we are bound to contrary, here. To the these subsequent ruling. Fourth follow this Eighth seemingly Circuit decisions share our 6. As the Director of Sharon- proper reading concurrence ob- own view as to the serve, two our dale and the inquiry sister circuits have declined called for under circuits, course, paragraph ruling. endorse the final other These are ground apparently "require[s] disagree on the it adopt free to rule, enjoy consideration evidence behind ear- different but we such no latitude lier denial to determine 'differ[s] whether it here. ty, year an claim has de- “change and in order measure after earlier been (i) nied, compare determine, the ALJ must conditions” the ALJ must based sum of the new evidence with sum of upon accompanying all of the evidence the earlier evidence on which the denial that the miner subsequent prov- has had been A “ma- premised. en at one of elements of least benefit if only terial exists the new adjudicated previously against entitlement him; (ii) find, evidence both establishes element upon comparison based *13 substantially supportive is more the the new sum of evidence with the sum claimant. in of the evidence considered connection denial, with that the earlier the new Kirk, (footnote omitted).7 at 609 264 F.3d sufficiently supportive more to evidence is explains Kirk the “change” further that outcome; change and, finally a in warrant change” referred to under the “material (iii) merits, upon determine the based standard the actual difference between “is record, entirety the of the that miner the the evidence at presented bodies of differ- is to Significantly, entitled benefits. de- times,” ‘materiality’ “the ent while spite against protests the Director’s the by marked fact the that this of this the in step second Board inquiry, capability the of converting difference has correctly this the perceived case need against an issue the claimant determined evidentiary this comparison under this Cir- into one favor.” determined in his cuit’s mat- precedents, and remanded the Applying F.3d at n. 6. this to standard ter to the ALJ for a third and final time it, panel the before the that facts found expressly purpose. Consequently, for this legal in this case made a error “[t]he ALJ in the legal we discern no error Board’s in judge similar to that of interpretation change” of the “material by that, failing to show on the element standard, Grundy Mining does a change, selected to show material there contend otherwise. in worsening was fact a of claimant’s con- dition.” 609. Kirk also cau- ask, therefore, only It to remains accurately tions that the ALJ must identi- finding “qualitative whether the ALJ’s of a adjudicated fy the elements of entitlement in accompanying difference” the records in against the miner the earlier claim deni- subsequent initial Flynn’s claims al, the proper because these elements are by is supported substantial evidence. As subsequent focus of a “material change” Kirk, explained any in such difference inquiry. must be sufficient to account for the sum, precedents

In our in or have de one more of elements of inquiry fined the relevant that found lacking sufficient entitlement were clarity. adjudication In grant subsequent Flynn’s order of Mr. initial claim. lung claim for more a The specific black benefits than element of entitlement at is- plain light language, In accompanied of this which is miner's claim is not current concurrence, accurately recounted we which is "identical" "substantial- Moore’s Judge ly accompanied fail discern basis for similar” to that which claim, (see 489). id. disagreement Kirk. reading prior Any with our such "sub- recognizes both entails some stantially inquiry plainly that Di- similar” concurrence evidence, test does not call comparison rector's strict one-element and old new comparison accompany- Judge for a of the evidence Moore concedes in her concurrence. (see so, claims, being rely language miner's and current This on the Concurring Op. 486), and that does Sharondale and Kirk to determine Kirk precise require comparison, comparison. to ensure such nature and extent disability total record in- degree sue here is reflect a of worsening in Mr. —the Flynn’s dicates that the evidence submitted con- condition between 1980 and 1984. with Mr. initial claim was Specifically, nection as observed both the ALJ Board, deemed sufficient establish exis- and the Dr. Fritzhand found that pneumoconiosis, tence of but this Flynn capable was activity mild claim was denied for failure to establish only sedentary activity in 1984. In an totally condition disabling. was earlier round of the pro- administrative (See 96,103.) Accordingly, J.A. at to satis- ceedings, the ALJ found that “Claimant’s fy standard, the “material there coal employment, mine although light-duty must be difference the work, required sedentary more than activi- upon evidence as it bears this element of ties,” so that “Dr. Fritzhand’s conclusion disability. total [in 1984] Claimant is limited to seden- tary activities establishes that Claimant comparing the two bodies of evidence totally disabled from his coal-mine *14 accompanying Flynn’s initial and sub- (J.A. 49.) employment.” at Grundy Min- claims, sequent the ALJ focused almost ing does not challenge reasoning exclusively on differences between the appeal, but apparently concedes that a lim- reports 1980 and 1984 of Dr. Martin Frit- itation to sedentary activity, if supported zhand, Flynn who examined on behalf of evidence, by Flynn would render in- particular, the DOL. In Dr. Fritzhand capable engaging in his usual coal mine opined in report Flynn his 1980 that could work or comparable employment. Like- (J.A. best,” 133), activity do “mild at at wise, Grundy Mining dispute does not that report Flynn his 1984 lim- stated was sedentary reported by limitation Dr. sedentary activity,” ited to “no more than Fritzhand, if credited and (J.A. properly sup- 167.) at The ALJ found that Dr. ported, directly bears on the “total disabili- downgraded Fritzhand’s assessment of ty” adjudicated element that against Flynn’s properly supported condition was Flynn in the denial of his earlier claim.8 objective data, in medical examinations, separate physical pul- where Nonetheless, Grundy Mining contends monary studies, function and arterial blood that Dr. cursory Fritzhand’s statements gas studies had in been conducted regarding “sedentary” “mild” versus activ- Flynn’s course of 1980 and 1984 visits with ity cannot qualitative alone establish a dif- physician. physician’s ference between 1980 and reports, 1984 absent underlying We find no basis to medical disturb the ALJ’s support determination evidence that would Dr. Frit- differences downgraded exist between Dr. zhand’s Fritzhand’s 1980 and assessment. record, reports, view, 1984 medical in Grundy Mining’s and that these differences support changed is virtually unchanged outcome on the issue of from 1980 1984. disability. occasions, total question There is no that On both example, Dr. Frit- face, Dr. reports, Fritzhand’s two on their reported non-qualifying pulmonary zhand Flynn It follows appeal from these concessions rector’s brief on is to rest on content has satisfied the strict "one-element” stan- premise that Sharondale man- the incorrect Director, dard advocated because the only inquiry; dates a "one-element” the Di- new evidence establishes an element that was expresses rector no view as to whether adjudicated against Flynn in the denial of his properly performed the additional com- Yet, above, explained earlier claim. more parison required under our Sharondale and required under this Court's "material Kirk decisions. change" precedents. Unfortunately, the Di- studies, Upon his two new gas comparing function and blood the sum physical accompanying Flynn’s examinations both revealed 1984 claim sounds clear with- with the evidence submitted connection [were] “breath (J.A. rhonchi, rales, find out or wheezes.” sufficient 169.) Indeed, and, Grundy Mining notes differences to meet this standard im- reports specifically, support that Dr. reflect more Dr. Frit- Fritzhand’s report provement respect downgraded in one zhand’s assessment from —the “sedentary.” on level “mild” to states that could “ambulate As ALJ ob- served, terrain more feet as- performed no than 200 without the studies (J.A. 135), breath,” still non-qualifying, sociated shortness of while revealed some in declining distance increased to feet while this results individual values. (J.A. 169). Moreover, report, the 1984 Dr. Fritzhand did conduct physical second examination standard, The material explanation 1984. While a detailed however, does demand that a claim “sedentary” limitation might have been ant’s point uniformly new evidence preferable, Grundy Mining’s we decline in- unmistakably a more out toward favorable Dr. vitation assume that Fritzhand’s come. tran requirement Such would choice the words “mild” in finality scend the concerns behind “sedentary” any significance lacks standard, ef and would whatsoever, particularly or medical basis initial fectively penalize miners whose *15 the employer produced any where has not problem claims were denied. This would opinion Flynn capable evidence or that was particularly be acute eases where sedentary more at activity of than the time narrowly prove miner to condi fails Finally, of his second claim. as further entitlement; tions of benefit under such Flynn’s declining evidence of condition be- circumstances, it would be unreasonable (i) tween 1980 and note: that he we insist that the miner’s new evidence ac job remained on the when Dr. Fritzhand companying signifi claim subsequent be him, first examined but had ceased work- cantly uniformly more of supportive visit;9 at the ing physician time of his 1984 benefits, an award of when even a modest (ii) that diagnosed pneumo- Dr. Fritzhand change in the overall record suffice would exam, coniosis following second in con- all of establish the elements of entitle diagnosis trast to his 1980 of chronic ob- ment. All that require that (iii) pulmonary disease; structive that sufficiently different to war be Flynn the record includes statements from rant a different outcome on one or more of required and his co-workers that he assis- elements, these so that we not be need performing tance in during his duties his making that two factfinders concerned are (see years job, few last J.A. at essentially different assessments of 142,144). Kirk, same record. As stated “material,” change must be that it meaning recognize Flynn's We that Mr. new evi- capability “has the converting accompanying an issue dence claim his 1984 does against point decisively determined the claimant into one not all a finding toward however, in his determined favor.” F.3d at 609 benefit Again, entitlement. n. 6. not high bar is so for a miner to demon- Notably, sumption pneumoco- 9. the fact disability that was still work- due to of total against adjudication (See 98, 103, 108.) counted him in the niosis. at J.A. pre- it initial because rebutted judgment. Director, strate a “material conditions” See Griffith OWCP, (6th Cir.1995). governing regulations. Accord- 49 F.3d under the 186-87 affirm the decision of the Board ingly, we parties here agree that Mr. Flynn’s that Mr. satisfies this Flynn’s showing of upon causation rests standard. Dr. Fritzhand’s 1984 report. Grundy

Mining contends that careful examination report B. The ALJ’s Decision to Award Bene- reveals no specific finding Supported that pneumoconiosis fits Is Evi- any Substantial contributed in way Flynn’s disability. dence. In support of argument, employer *16 finding authority.

vant to the inquiry, causation do not com reject The claimant pel findings bears the burden us to the ALJ’s on this proving disability of total due to pneumo expressly recog factual issue. The ALJ and, Grundy correctly coniosis as Mining nized that Dr. opinion Fritzhand’s 1984 notes, diagnosed this causal link must be more than pneu heart disease well as Smith, Nonetheless, Peabody de minimis. Coal Co. v. moconiosis. in determining (6th Cir.1997). 507 To satis that contributing the latter was at least a fy the to” requirement Flynn’s disability, “due of the BLBA cause of the ALJ ob implementing regulations, and its a claim reported served that Dr. Fritzhand his by ant a preponderance “sedentary” finding must demonstrate in a section of the of evidence that pneumoconiosis history is DOL medical and examination merely speculative “more than of physician cause form which the is asked to disability,” but instead “is a contribut pulmonary describe the limitations “due to (J.A. 167.) ing consequence cause of some discernible Accordingly, disease.” totally disabling respiratory impair to his that ALJ reasoned “the limitations due to Smith, pulmonary ment.” 127 F.3d at 507. To the Dr. disease that Fritzhand list physi extent that the claimant relies on a ed to pneumoconiosis must be related be opinion showing, pneumoconiosis only pulmo cian’s to make this such cause is the vague conclusory, nary disability statements cannot be Dr. that Fritzhand included (J.A. 49.) report.” but instead must reflect reasoned medical his 1984 medical 484 Grundy Mining Failed determined, Has to Iden- agree, and we that C. Board tify Liability Imposing inference that Basis

the ALJ drew reasonable on Trust Fund. discretion in evaluat- lies within his “broad (J.A. 39.) medical evidence.” Finally, to notions appeal equity, in an of may not court aside an reviewing set “[A] that the Black Grundy Mining argues it finds another more inference because Fund Lung Disability Trust should bear Moseley Peabody Coal reasonable.” of liability for the award benefits (6th Cir.1985). Co., 360 769 legal Flynn. purely is a issue This that we de novo. See Consolida- address Grundy Min accept can we Nor Coal, This tion F.2d at 929. matter is any causal ing’s assertion that connection resolved, readily inextricably as it is linked support Dr. Fritzhand identified lacks disposition with our in the medical evidence. As underlying change” issue. noted, need not the sole pneumoconiosis be disability, only a cause of a miner’s Grundy Mining’s argument point this Dr. contributing factor. Fritzhand’s 1980 upon premise rests Frit- Dr. alike state that Mr. reports reports “nearly zhand’s are 1980 and history (Petitioner of long identical,” 20), had a shortness Br. at so that breath, only could ambulate a few that he they equally both must establish Mr. without associated shortness lung hundred feet Flynn’s to black entitlement benefits. breath, symptom follows, view, increased Grundy Mining’s It upon climbing walking up grades, stairs or just been must have entitled not mow a without he could lawn initial claim as benefits under his under his dyspnea, frequently that he Yet, associated if benefits present one. had been night awoke during shortness initial awarded under the the liabili- breath, long that he had from suffered ty would have been borne the Trust provides All of this cough. sup chronic provisions Fund the transfer under port pulmonary for a link between disease Quarto Mining, supra, BLBA. See addition, disability. noted (explaining operation F.2d at any opinion scheme). medical contra this, absence statutory From all dicting report Dr. Fritzhand’s or otherwise Grundy that it Mining reasons should not Flynn’s might suggesting that limitations presumably be made for the pay mistak- be other pneumo- due to a condition than claim; deny en decision to initial *17 rather, coniosis. equity dictates the Trust Fund any liability. should assume record, Under assessment “essentially Liability properly of Dr. from report Fritzhand’s is transfers resolve, credibility responsible operator for the ALJ to the Fund matter” Trust finally it “our on those were beyond scope lie limited claims which denied would assign weight Lung of review” to different or before effective date the Black (i.e., 1, opinion. Peabody Benefits Act of 1977 meaning to this medical Reform March Groves, (6th 829, 1978), reopened 277 F.3d and approved Coal Co. v. 836 then denied, Cir.2002), 1147, Caney 537 123 under the Act. See cert. U.S. 1977 Creek Coal (2003). 568, Satterfield, L.Edüd 849 Co. v. 150 F.3d 570-71 S.Ct. 154 Conse (6th Cir.1998); Quarto Mining, the Board’s quently, we affirm determina Flynn’s tion entitled to award of at 535. Mr. initial claim was de an under, to, prior reopened black nied and then lung benefits.

485 such, liability the 1977 Act. As for this Benefits Review Board awarding black lung earlier claim would have been transferred benefits to Douglas claimant W. Flynn. to the Fund had benefits Trust been denied, however,

awarded. claim This was MOORE, Circuit Judge, concurring. upon and this decision became final expiration period appeal- of the allotted I concur in the result in this case that seeking Grundy modification. Min- the award of lung black prop- benefits was therefore, ing, must invoke notions of equi- However, er. because I believe that the ty liability in order to transfer to the Trust majority’s interpretation of Sharondale Fund, obviously because such transfer is Corp. v. Ross and Tennessee Consolidated compelled aas matter of laiv. As the erroneous, Coal Co. v. Kirk is I write held, correctly Flynn’s Board current separately. claim, which was filed in does not Ross, Corporation transfer, statutory

meet the criteria for (6th Cir.1994), F.3d 993 spent consider- (and, matter, practical it was not as a could able assessing time the three alternate been) not have denied before the effective interpretations of the “material change” date of the 1977Act. requirement. These included meaning adopted by the Benefits Review Board in

Yet, Grundy Mining’s equitable Co., Spese v. Peabody Coal 11 BLR 1-174 appeal quickly founders on a flawed logical (1988) (that the “new present premise. In rejecting Grundy Mining’s possibility’ ‘reasonable it would issue, challenge on the “material change result”), administrative already we have held that there awas the standard enunciated the Seventh difference the bodies of evi OWCP, Circuit Sahara Coal Co. v. accompanying Flynn’s dence initial Cir.1991) (“[a] material and subsequent Accordingly, claims. condition means either that ‘the nothing necessarily wrong, there was much miner lung did not have black disease at unfair, less contrary results reached the time of the first application but has Indeed, Flynn’s principles two claims. since contracted it and totally become dis- finality flatly preclude question us from it, abled or that his pro- disease has ing the correctness of the initial claim de gressed point totally to the of becoming nial, and principles these same would de disabling although it was not at the time of if, Flynn’s feat Mr. Grundy ”), application’ the first position and the contends, Mining now the evidence accom posited by the Director. panying essentially the two un claims changed. By holding Ultimately, we chose to defer to the claim satisfied the “material change” stan interpretation Director’s of “material dard, and that properly benefits were conditions,” thereby adopting awarded under already we have what appropriately has come to be named *18 rejected necessary predicates the to Grun Sharondale, the “one element” test. dy Mining’s plea equitable for relief. Con F.3d at 997-98. The test holds that “to sequently, we affirm the Board’s decision assess whether a material change is estab- on point. this lished, the ALJ must all consider of the evidence, unfavorable, new favorable and IV. CONCLUSION and determine whether the miner has above, For the reasons forth proven set we at least one of the elements of AFFIRM the decision and order previously adjudicated of the entitlement against for inquiry comparison If miner the exis- in this between the him. the establishes element, produced demonstrat- new evidence the evidence tence of that he has the ed, law, change. prior Op. claim.” at a matter of a material connection as However, all of it then endorses Grun- must consider whether 477-478. Then the ALJ evidence, reading requiring of as including dy’s that submit- Sharondale the record analysis claims, engage a to in a previous supports the the ALJ ted with accompa- if the Id. to determine evidence finding of entitlement to benefits.” new test, nying subsequent we we did the claim is different this stressed that accepting supported “adopting from the old evidence that the not have unbridled discretion another,” majority that The believes over earlier claim. one construction correct on the last “previously afforded due defer- to be the view based we have Sharondale, paragraph in cases of which it position ence to the Director’s failing in- that “we faulted the ALJ for raising questions regulatory similar of claims at the claimant’s (quoting Id. Brown to determine whether new terpretation.” Co., qualitatively’ Mining x-ray v. evidence ‘differ[ed] Rock Creek Cir.1993)) (6th (internal facially x-ray quotation from the similar omitted). Op. claim.” accompanied prior went on to note that be- that the We Therefore, majority faded a chooses Congress provide cause us with 477. the interpret paragraph it is used this last of Sharon- definition of BLBA, adding requirement an Secretary “the of Labor’s dale as additional the However, the the element” provisions of of to the “one test. interpretation defer- correct Lung interpretation [wa]s Black Act entitled to is not the Sharon- ence,” long as it Id. dale. was reasonable. discourse, thorough we concluded

After all, First of the language Sharondale of the light that it was “reasonable in support interpretation does not the broad language purpose of statute and majority it. assign wishes to The 725.309(d).”1 §in Id. at 998. included premise for simple case stands that however, Now, majority wishes to de- from the passage year after one denial part from this view and restrict the test claim, longer argue can no claimants Di- a manner not at all endorsed solely are entitled to on they benefits rector. their ground prior claims “should majority granted.” “under a The concedes that have been Instead, reading they test en- must demonstrate strict ‘one-element’ Director, provide ‘materi- material new evidence dorsed the ALJ’s change’ inquiry solely establishing change. is limited to the such Id. at 997-98. al embracing interpretation condition In new evidence claimant’s Director’s change,” emphasized the denial of his with the of “material since takes asking interpretation whether this evidence estab- Director’s into “[t]he one of between statutory lishes at least the elements of bene- account distinction adjudi- of the Board’s de- previously request fit entitlement modification request at 477 against Op. the claimant.” cision and for benefits based cated added). Id. majority proceeds a material in condition.” (emphasis “[tjhere this, does not seemingly place is no 998. Outside to state irrelevant, however, Ross, Corp. language 42 F.3d 993 as the of both 1. Sharondale *19 Cir.1994), 725.309(d), § while the involved in 1999 is sections identical. 725.309(c). § involves is case at hand This subsequent in speak to the manner which nied the second claim at the it time was result, in claim assessed. As a filed in should be 1985. See Ross v. Sharondale as way Corp., 86-BLA-4985, no can Sharondale be construed slip op. Case No. 1990) adding any requirements 25, further to the (July 6-8 (unpublished). The “one element” test. majority simply cannot conclude that be- this, x-rays cause of there were no in taken Grundy majority argues, accepts 1985, as in nothing exists the record avail- true, paragraph that the last of Sharon- able to us to indicate way one or the other. supports interpretation dale of the ad- addition, In summarily to dismiss the 1985 analysis requirement. ditional reference a “typographical error” seems paragraph of The last Sharondale stems implausible, as it is a significant rather in expression from the Sharondale court’s error for the entire panel Sixth Circuit previous paragraph of concern with have overlooked. regard subsequent to claimants who file supplemented by claims the exact same Moreover, grammatically speaking, that supported prior evidence that claim. It the Sharondale court was criticizing the readily apparent because of this ALJ for its failure to address and all weigh concern, in spoke we the manner which x-rays submitted with the subse- ferret out might seeking ALJs claims quent only legitimate is the purely a modification of a decision on a context, conclusion. in As used “la- claim, any and not based on material “subsequent.” ter” means See Merriam change, required as is the statute. In Dictionary, Webster Online doing, so we never stated this method (Oct. http://www.merriam-webster.com part should also become a of the Director’s 2003). Hence, the reference to the “later” “one element” test. x-rays can only developed mean those ones addition, subsequent to 1985. the Shar-

Furthermore, majority the meaning the faulting ondale court’s act of the ALJ for give wishes to to this discussion fails to failing'to x-rays produced look all of the an important difficulty take note of textual support appropriate the 1985 claim was totally which an interpre- undermines such in in light of our decision Woodward By tation. out that pointing “[t]he Director, OWCP, 320-21 x-rays never discusses the later differ how Cir.1993). case, In that we discussed the qualitatively from those submitted decision the ALJ to limit consideration 1985,” simply the Sharondale court was x-ray solely to the x- last five admonishing the ALJ for its failure to rays Specifically, taken. Id. at 319. weigh x-rays address and all of the submit- “recognized the need for qualitative evalu- ted with the claim filed in 1985.2 Sharon- evidence, dale, x-ray ation of the as well” as a 42 F.3d at 999. majority asserts quantitative analysis. (emphasis Id. at 321 underlying because the 1990 ALJ de- added). appears The ALJ speaks only x-rays cision taken x-ray to have relied on the later interpre- x-rays there were no submitted filed, support 1985 when the claim tations were submitted to was x- hence the Sixth Circuit’s reference to second and excluded the earlier ray a “typographical Op. interpretations error.” at 478 n. also submitted with the However, Sharondale, 1990 opinion ALJ’s fails to same claim. See Case No. identify 86-BLA-4985, result, what aecompa- slip op. medical evidence 6-8. As previous 2. The miner's quently, claim was filed in the miner filed a claim for benefits finally 1979 and was denied in 1981. Subse- . 1985. F.3d at 995. *20 488 Harvey, not be Co. v. 109 454 Sharondale should lia Coal opinion

our Cir.1997) added) (8th (quot- require compare (emphasis to ALJ to 7 interpreted the n. 11). Mines, claim with n. from the second F.3d at 1363 the evidence Lisa Lee In the earlier claim. that from denied to “textual addition these difficulties” case, to be the sentence for that the order by Grundy’s interpretation, created even qualitative- have would have to said “differ to is its more arduous overcome insistent 1979,” ly and not from those submitted in the in isolation. As paragraph focus on Hence, majority’s the conclusion notes, must, paragraph Director “[t]he the miners “must that Sharondale holds that course, of of be read in the context the satisfy terms of the more than the strict do Appel- it.” precedes entire decision that by “demonstrat[ing] that test” one-element Immediately preceding lee’s Br. at 24. the upon dif- qualitatively rests this court, issue, paragraph at the Sharondale evidentiary record,” is Op. ferent analysis engaging thorough after of by the supported language Sharon- standards, differing change” “material the dale. “one concluded that the Director’s ele- Concededly, it that the cannot be denied ment” test should be accorded deference sen- phrase “the earlier denial” in the last it was a construction of because reasonable the last paragraph tence of of Sharondale Sharondale, regulation at the issue. claim. The does in fact refer the 1979 spoke never F.3d at 998. Director merely Director views as sentence analysis qualitative part as of “material failure serving point “to out that the ALJ’s Indeed, the change” determination. “one the x-ray readings all of sub- to consider espoused by test element” Director duplicate mitted with the claim raised flatly previ- bars review of from evidence possibility that the preponderance of unless until a ous claims might weigh presence against evidence proven. has been Id. at 997-98. change, pneumoconiosis, and a material “[cjourt states, implic- Director As the just conflicting x-ray sub- as the evidence acknowledged itly the irrelevance evi- weighed against the 1979 claim mitted with condition regarding dence the miner’s Appellee’s the existence disease.” -prior the time of first claim'— sen- Alternatively, Br. at 23-24. this last establishment a material —in instructing the might also be read as tence disregarding the standard articulated compare the ALJ to evidence submitted Appel- the Board in its decision.” Spese with the second submitted Br. at 25. lee’s Indeed, previously with the denied claim. Furthermore, majority’s reliance out, appropriately points the Director Kirk, v. Tennessee Consolidated Coal Co. para- these “textual difficulties” in the last (6th Cir.2001), 264 F.3d 602 as further may been the graph of Sharondale have analysis for the support re- why Eighth reason both Fourth case, quirement misplaced. In that Circuits, meaning, uncertain as were to its that, when and old stated the new medical adopt opinion, unwilling part similar, substantially we had they paragraph stated that “seems that “such situations held of the evi- required to have consideration one-year correctable within the time were to deter- dence behind earlier denial denial, period after a that after this it qualitatively’ mine whether ‘differ[s] point, a claimant is not ‘entitled to benefits new Lisa Lee Mines from the evidence.” Director, OWCP, simply n. because his claim should have been ” Cir.1996) added); (emphasis (quoting Lovi- Id. at granted.’

489 Moreover, 998). Hence, acceptance holds that of the Director’s Kirk 42 in condi- ‘change interpretation a of the Sharondale “material “in to measure order the sum of compare the ALJ must is consistent the change” tions’ standard evidence with the sum the new other circuits have dealt with this evidence on which the denial earlier particular, issue. In both the Fourth and “A ‘materi- premised.” had been Id. claim Eighth Di accepted Circuits have the only if evidence change’ exists the new al interpretation rector’s of the “material is establishes the element and sub- both Mines, change” See Lisa Lee standard. stantially claimant.” supportive more of 1363; Lovilia, 86 F.3d at 109.F.3d at Id. In both doing, so courts refused to endorse of paragraph the final which

Through analysis, court did its the Kirk required “seems to have consideration the “one requirement add a new to not the behind the earlier to evidence denial change” “material standard. element” it Rather, qualitative ‘differ[s] Di- determine whether Kirk the approvingly reasserts ly’ from new Lee immediately the evidence.” Lisa “one element” test rector’s Mines, 11; comparison F.3d at n. discussing the need for see also before Lovilia, Furthermore, and old as to rule F.3d at 454 n. 7. of the new evidence so court, evidence. claims based on the same in deciding accept out the Lovilia to the however, the importantly, opinion Id. More approach, pursuant noted that Director’s the be- important reiterates difference Supreme precedent, to Court established “claim and “material tween modification” “[w]hen, case, in like the is issue analysis. discussing the meth- agency interpret whether has erred in the examining in whether employed be od to ing regulations, Supreme its the own subsequent on a evidence submitted provided agen that: Court has stated the on a to that is identical submitted cy’s ‘does not violate interpretation “ALJ must this court stated that the statute, or a federal it must Constitution the sum of the new evidence with compare it controlling is given weight be unless of the earlier which the sum evidence plainly erroneous inconsistent with ” prem- of the claim had the denial been Lovilia, regulation.’ 109 F.3d at 451-52 added). The Kirk (emphasis Id. ised.” v. Med. (quoting Paul-Ramsey St. Shalala simply making the ALJ aware of court Cir.1995)) Ctr., 527-28 attempts in which a to situations claimant 36, 45, U.S., (quoting 508 U.S. Stinson statutory af- requirements circumvent the (1993)). 123 L.Ed.2d 598 S.Ct. year submitting passed, by has ter a violating that we are This demonstrates same in that it will hope exact in principles when in one established demonstrating a treated the court as be stance, accord to the due deference we result, change. As a the Kirk material to ac interpretation deciding Director’s saying is to maintain court order “[i]n instance, it, in then in the next cept finality,” in favor it would this limitation meaning part it fuse with in an to over- prudent engage be ALJs clearly interpretation. Director’s This comparison of the sum the evi- view impetus Lee provided the for both Lisa to out claims. Id. duplicate dence rule reject interpreta Mines and Lovilia there a call opinion the Kirk Nowhere paragraph tion of final Sharondale’s thorough eviden- engage for ALJs in a suggests. now majority qualitative the evi- tiary analysis between misconstruing Finally, the Director’s the old and new claims assess- dence adding “one element” test conditions.” very analysis completely undermines America, UNITED STATES initially accept compelled

reason felt Plaintiff-Appellee, In assessing “one element” test. *22 interpre- of the Director’s reasonableness tation, “prem- we noted that his view was the

ised on notion miners disabled (02-1662); Joan Marie ANDERSON mine pneumoconiosis arising out of coal Sagorski (02-1673); Francis Albert to under employment are entitled benefits Rodger (02-1700); Yates Arthur Bruce Act. It affords a miner chance second Henry (02-1703); Modderman Susan provided to show entitlement to benefits (02-1736); Elaine Robert Lee Sloboda condition has worsened.” (02-1769); Goodwin, Elaine Jr. Ruth it was 998. We concluded that (02-1771), Defendants-Appel Shriver accept to inter- important Director’s lants. it was pretation because “reasonable 02-1703, 02-1673, 02-1662, 02-1771, Nos. light purpose of the statute and the 02-1736, 02-1700, 02-1769. 725.309(d).” § language included in Id. schizophrenic It strikes me as rather Appeals, United States Court of analyze in Sharondale to painstakingly us Circuit. Sixth weigh competing “material Argued and Submitted: Dec. 2003. Di- change” interpretations, choose the test, immediately then after- rector’s Decided Filed: Dec. wards, depart from the test that we have this, adopt. chosen Because I believe

that the interpretation majority Further- wrong. endorses

more, despite ambiguous fact that

language of Sharondale the mean- leaves open paragraph multiple last

interpretations, the rest the decision that it is acknowledge principle

does in a

inappropriate compare the evidence claim

new with the evidence submitted previously

connection with a denied assessing whether To

has been established. retreat from

“one element” test that we endorsed Di-

only violates the deference due above, proves

rector noted but also

utterly contradictory of our own Sharon- reasons, I opinion.

dale For these concur in the

only result. notes Having determined that Mr. Dr( Fritzhand diagnosed heart disease as had satisfied the “material stan pneumoconiosis, well as and that the de- dard, the ALJ turned to the merits of tailed findings set forth in his typewritten benefits, Flynn’s lung 1984 claim for black report provide no basis to discern which and found that the miner had established of these conditions was the cause of disability pneumoconiosis. total due to We Flynn’s Moreover, disability. least affirm this that it provided must decision findings some of these seemingly suggest upon rests substantial evidence the rec Flynn’s pulmonary might condition Coal, ord. See Consolidation disability be the cause of his —Dr. arguing this decision should reported, Fritzhand for example, aside, Grundy Mining be set contends that “normal,” expansion chest lacking the evidence is as to a causal link that he accessory did not “use muscles of pneumoconiosis between and total disabili respiration,” and that his “breath sounds Board, however, ty. agree with the We rales, rhonchi, [were] clear without that the ALJ’s resolution causation (J.A. 169.) wheezes.” proper issue reflects exercise his fact- points, certainly These while rele

Case Details

Case Name: Grundy Mining Company v. Douglas W. Flynn and Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Date Published: Mar 12, 2004
Citation: 353 F.3d 467
Docket Number: 01-3111
Court Abbreviation: 6th Cir.
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