113 Wis. 34 | Wis. | 1902
It appears from the record, in effect, that November 4, 1898, the plaintiff leased to the defendant eight acres of land described, for as long a time as might be necessary to raise and harvest a crop of peas thereon for the season of 1899; the plaintiff to plow the ground and sow the same with peas to be furnished by the defendant, who was to have the direction of the time and manner of doing such work, and have the right to enter the. premises at any time he saw fit for the purpose of such supervision and the raising and harvesting of the crop; and he was to pay to the plaintiff for such labor and for the rental of the land, combined, the sum of $8.50 per acre. June 28, 1899, the plaintiff commenced this action in the municipal court for the recovery of damages for the wrongful conversion of the pea vines of the peas so raised upon the land. The defendant, by way of answer, justified his right to the vines under the lease. Upon the trial of such issues in the municipal court, such proceedings were had that judgment was rendered in favor of the defendant, with costs, which were taxed at $60.55. Erom that judgment the plaintiff filed notice of appeal to the circuit court, and accompanied the same with an affidavit on behalf of the plaintiff to the effect that the appeal was “made in good faith, and not for the purpose of delay,” as required by
“The practice and procedure in said court, so far as practicable, shall comply with the laws relating to justices’ court. . . . Appeals may be taken in the same manner and with like effect as from courts of justices of the peace.” Sec. 7, ch. 352, Laws of 1897.
The appeal, as tahen in this case,'August 14, 1899, required the circuit court to hear the same “on the original papers and the return of the justice.” Sec. 3767, Stats. 1898. It gave to that court no jurisdiction to try the cause de novo. If it got any jurisdiction to try the cause de novo, it was by virtue of the order of the circuit court made November 1, 1899, allowing the affidavit prescribed by subd. 2, sec. 3768, Stats. 1898, to be filed as of “the time of appealing,” as required by that statute. True, the statute authorized amend-mends to “any process, pleading or proceeding” in “furtherance of justice and upon such terms as may be just,” as therein prescribed. Sec. 2830, Stats. 1898. So the statute, for good cause shown, authorized the court, in its discretion, and upon such terms as might be just, to enlarge the time within which certain proceedings might be taken, or to allow such proceedings after the time limited therefor had expired, “except the time within which an appeal must be taken.” See. 2831. This statute, in effect, prohibited the court from .enlarging the time within which'an appeal could be taken, or allowing an appeal after the time for taking the same had expired. As indicated, the appeal, as perfected August 14,. 1899, only authorized the court to hear the cause “on the original papers and the return of the justice.” By the order of November 1, 1899, an attempt was made to give the court a jurisdiction, which up to that time it did not possess, to try the cause do novo. To that extent it was an attempt to ■give a new jurisdiction as by a new appeal, contrary to the statute. But it is claimed that as the order was made on con
By the Court. — The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause is remanded with direction to hear the appeal “on the original papers and the return of the justice,” as prescribed by the statute, and for further proceedings according to law.