144 N.Y.S. 748 | N.Y. App. Term. | 1913
The plaintiff sold a piano to the defendant under an agreement whereby the defendant was to pay monthly instalments as rental until $1,500 was paid, at which time title to the piano should pass to the defendant. This action was brought under section 139 of the Municipal Court Act, to foreclose the plaintiff’s lien upon the piano for instalments of the purchase money or rental then due and unpaid. The appellant claims that because the agreement under which he held the piano provided that title should remain in the plaintiff until full payment of the purchase price and because the plaintiff could not properly have a lien upon his own property, no action to foreclose a lien would lie. There is no merit in this contention. Section 139 of the act expressly refers to “ a hiring of personal property, where title is not to vest in the person hiring until payment of a certain sum ” and states, “ For the purpose of this section an instrument in writing as above stated shall be deemed a lien upon a chattel.” This language is explicit and the section clearly confers the remedy here adopted by the plaintiff to the exclusion of all others in the Municipal Court.
There is another ground, however, upon which the judgment must be reversed. The appellant set forth in his bill of particulars that the contract of sale was induced by fraudulent representations of the plaintiff’s agents and that upon discovering the fraud the defendant offered to return the piano upon receipt of the $100 deposit which he had paid, and that thereupon the plaintiff agreed to repair the piano and put it in
The judgment appealed from must be reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.
Lehman and Whitaker, JJ., concur.
Judgment reversed and new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide event.