42 W. Va. 587 | W. Va. | 1896
On writ of, error to judgment of the Circuit Court of Hampshire county, rendered on the 6th day of December, 1895, upon a writ of certiorari. On the 18th day of June, 1895, the County Court of Grant County, upon the petition of John B. Eord and seven hundred and eighly nine other voters of that county, entered an order directing a special election to be held on the 27th day of August, 1895, at the several voting places, upon the question of the relocation of the county seat óf Grant county from Pe-tersburg, the present seat, to Maysville, the original county seat. This election was ordered to be held under
On the 13th day of February, 1872, the legislature passed an act saying: “That the county seat of the county of Grant should cease to be at Grant Court House twenty days after the passage of this act, and shall from and after the expiration of twenty days be located at Petersburg in said county.” Grant Court House and the town of Mays-ville designate the same place. Since the 1st day of January, 1872, no other county seat in this state has been relocated by a special act of the legislature, for the Constitution completed on the 9th day of April, 1872, was ratified and adopted by the vote of the people on the fourth Thursday (22d day) of August,- 1872, and from and including that day became operative and in full force. Section 39 of article VI of the Constitution (with parts omitted having no bearing) reads as follows: “The legislature shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following enumerated eases; that is to say: For * * * locating or changing county seats; * * * releasing title to forfeited lands. The legislature shall provide by general laws, for the foregoing and all other cases for which provision can be so made; and in no case shall a special act be passed, where a general law would be proper, and can be made applicable to the case.” The county seat of Grant county was relocated at Petersburg by special act of the legislature passed on the 13th day of February, 1872; that is to
In the nature of things, it is of course beyond legislative power to pass a general law within the meaning of the Constitution, which does not have as its subject-matter a class bound in writing by some class characteristic, and such class must include more than one individual, actual or potential. And no matter what disguise or circumlocution of apparent generality may be used, it is idle to talk about the creation of a class which expressly takes as the class characteristic, to designate the members of the class, the
Tlius we see that this law has selected as its class characteristic the peculiarity of the solitary county of sGrant, which no other county can ever match, for such second county could not get in after the 14th day of February, 1895, for by its own terms that was the limit fixed; and we judicially know that from the 1st day of January, 1872, to the 14th day of February, 1895, Grant county stood alone as the one county whose county seat had been during that period relocated by a special act of the legislature; so that in meaning, purpose, and effect it is a law not in the slightest degree more general, or in a less degree peculiarly and distinctively descriptive of Grant county, than if it had spoken directly out and said: “But in the case of Grant county a majority of the votes cast shall be sufficient to relocate the county seat.” This is classification run mad. Why not say all counties of the state named “Grant”? See Com. v. Patton, 88 Pa. St. 258, 260. This statute, as to the majority clause, no matter what circumlocution or specious guise of classification was used, could have no reasonable application or effect except to point out the relocation at the county seat of the county of Grant as its only subject-matter; and this makes it special, as relating in its necessary effect to one county, and not to a class of counties; for without a class, actual or potential, as the subject-matter, there can be no general law. See Henderson v. Mayor, 92 U. S. 259, 268; Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313, 319; 10 Sup. Ct. 862; State v. Hammer, 42 N. J. Law, 335; 23 Am.
The tendency of recent state constitutions to restrict legislative power from passing local or special laws which are generally intended to promote private, rather than the pub-
Special laws are those made for individual cases, or for less than a class requiring laws appropriate to its peculiar condition and circumstances; local laws are laws special as to place. See Suth. St. Const. § 127, citing State v. Wilcox, 45 Mo 458, 465. A General law is that which relates to a whole class of persons, places, relations, or things grouped according to some specified class characteristic, binding all within the jurisdiction of the lawmaking power, limited as that power may be by its territorial operation or by constitutional restraint. And it is none the less general though at the date of its passage there may be but one, or in fact not one, individual of the class thus created, provided it be reasonable, and uot illusory, in its generalization; and provided that the circle or ring of classification be such as to remain open to receive the potentials which may arise bearing the peculiar mark of the class. See note to State v. Ellet (Ohio Sup.) 21 Am. St. Rep. 780 (23 N. E. 931); Van Riper v. Parsons, 40 N. J. Law, 123; Suth. St. Const. § 127. “A general or public act is universal rule that regards the whole community. * * * Special or private acts are rather exceptions than rules, being those which operate upon particular persons and private concerns.” 1 Bl. Comm. 86. Nothing could more fitly describe the law in question, for we find it as an exception in the body of the
It is said by counsel for appellee (representing the town of Maysville) that this constitutional provision spends its whole force in prohibiting the. legislature from passing an act for locating or changing a county seat by legislative fiat. That a part of its force, or the force of a part of it, is thus spent is true. But let us see how section 39 of article VI of the Constitution (Code 1891, p. 31) reads as a whole, leaving out the most part of what is irrelevant: “The legislature shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following enumerated cases; that is to say, for granting divorces,
The defendant in the writ of certiorari to the county court of Grant county contends that there was no legal service of the writ on it, and that there was no such general appearance as cured such defect in the return of the ser