114 P. 472 | Or. | 1911
Opinion
In this cause the appeal was perfected on January 2, 1911. The transcript was filed on February 28, 1911. On March 10, 1911, respondents moved to dismiss the appeal, because the transcript was not filed within the time limited by law. Appellants filed a motion on March 15,1911, suggesting a diminution of the record, and secured an order on the clerk below to certify to this court a certain order made by the lower court on March 10,1911, nunc pro tunc, as of date January 30, 1911, extending the time for filing the transcript on appeal thirty days. Thereafter, on March 23rd, respondents applied to this court, under the provisions of Section 832, L. O. L., for an order requiring the aifiants in the affidavits filed in this court on March 15, 1911, to appear before the clerk of this court that they may be examined by respondents concerning the statements set forth in such affidavits in aid of an application to vacate the nunc pro tunc order.
The order of this court upon the clerk of the lower court, of date March 15th, above mentioned, is not a provisional remedy within the meaning of Section 832, L. O. L. Nor is this court the proper place to take evidence upon proceedings pending in the circuit court. If the nunc pro tunc order is applied for in the lower court, the right to it must be determined by that court.
The ¿pplication is denied. Motion Denied.
delivered the opinion of the court.
At the time of the trial of this cause, there was a stipulation of the parties made providing that the matter
There is but little diversity in the opinion of counsel regarding the law applicable to this case. The main question presented by the record is: Was the deed intended to be in effect a mortgage? Counsel for plaintiffs maintain the affirmative of this question, while counsel for defendants support the contrary view.
Mr. Grover did not sign the so-called option contract set forth above, for the reason that some of the conditions were thought to be unfavorable to him; and, being signed by Mrs. Hawthorne, it may fairly be treated as an admission on her part of the facts therein stated. This instrument shows that the affairs between Mrs. Hawthorne and the Grovers were in an unsettled condition, as the amount of the consideration was left a
It would seem that Mrs. Hawthorne desired to obtain an absolute deed of the land; but the evidence shows that her main object was to secure the payment of the amount due her, and what she was compelled to pay in order to protect her interest in the property. Mr. Grover’s financial ability did not permit him to pay his share of the mortgages and other claims, and their creditors were pressing for at least partial satisfaction. Mrs. Hawthorne, in the kindness of her heart, desired to make some advances to meet the necessities of the Grovers. She was then owing money, and the end that she evidently had in view was to collect debts due her, and not to acquire title to more land. At any time after the deed was executed, until 1907, it would no doubt have been satisfactory to Mrs. Hawthorne to have had the property sold, to have received the money due her, and to have paid the balance to the Grovers. In short, the
Whatever be the form of the instrument, if intended as security for the payment of money, it is a mortgage, and the right of redemption attaches to it. If the deed in question had contained a condition that it should be absolute and without redemption if the money due from Grover were not paid at a specified time,- there would be a right of redemption (2 Jones,Mort. [6ed.] 1039), and the several declarations in the documents signed by Mrs.
At the time of the conveyance of the land by Mrs. Hawthorne to the corporation, she and her daughters were the officers of the Hawthorne Estate, and they had knowledge of all the transactions with plaintiffs. Therefore this transfer does not affect this case.
The motion of defendants to dismiss this appeal is determined by the opinion this day rendered by this court in the case of Grover et al., Respondents, v. Hawthorne et al., Appellants, and therefore such motion should be denied.
From the foregoing considerations it follows that the decree of the lower court must be reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to the circuit court to enter a decree declaring the deed to be in effect a mortgage, to ascertain, by an accounting, the amount due defendants from plaintiffs, and for such proceedings as may be necessary and proper, not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed : Rehearing Denied.