*1 Secondly, plaintiff issues ma- maintains using her stairs on which necessity the the fact remain as to terial entering only available means of they were she fell because Finally, plaintiff argues issues material leaving building. superior knowledge of the defective regarding remain defendants’ fact superior have they since are architects who steps construction design techniques. and construction knowledge materials arguments by reference all Defendants have answered complied appli the stairs with evidence that their uncontroverted bricks building were constructed with standard-sized codes and cable accepted commonly widely are a used and a wire cut finish which presented evidence that entryway steps. Defendants material built, there been no com years steps had in the ten since were steps Since were they slippery or defective. con plaints that were industry, commonly accepted building of a structed material Barrel, Cole Cracker ordinary care met. the standard of had been 704). case, plaintiff’s 488, being Ga. ways steps could have been made even as to various Wiggly Southern, Piggly is immaterial. Madaris safer 273). scarcely “There slippery by might used in isn’t made somewhat be construction and, knowledge, presence of That is a matter of common water. is, precaution in walking it us all to a measure of since behooves on knowledge people common fall wet surfaces. Tt is v. Consolidated Credit best of sidewalks and floors.’ Gibson [Cit.]” Corp., Blackburn, JJ., Andrews and affirmed. 20, 1995
Decided November denied December Reconsideration Wayne Ellerbee, Paterson, appellant.
O. Laurie Wallace, Young, Thagard, Hoffman, C. Clyatt Clyatt, Russell Smith, Hoffman, Scott & C. Daniel
A95A0955. McCOY al. GROUTAS v. et Ruffin, Judge. interlocutory appeal petition
We Andrew Groutas’s county determine whether violation of a ordinance on owned him or whether Groutas could render liable for responsibility he contracted the ordinance delegated tenant. Because find that Groutas we partial court’s denial of Groutas’s mo- reverse tion for judgment. by a
Groutas owned commercial real estate which was bounded part fence to which electrical outlets were attached. He leased property to an individual who then subleased it to Marion (“RVs”) prop- co-defendant. Webb sold recreational vehicles *2 erty. The plugged RVs were into the fence. the electrical outlets on Webb, McCoy alleging Joe sued Groutas and he received an electrical placed inspecting shock when his hand on the fence while of one McCoy Webb’s RVs. Mrs. sued for loss of consortium. The DeKalb County inspector that testified the outlet attached to fence was in of County violation a DeKalb ordinance because it did not have a ground wire. for summary moved judgment, contending that he had
fully parted relinquished with the and control to the tenant sublessee, and that property. had exclusive of control trial court the motion as to claim but denied as McCoy’s claim for negligence per se based on the violation of the ordinance. Summary appropriate court, viewing when the
the facts and reasonable inferences from most those facts party, favorable to the non-moving concludes that the evidence does not create a any triable issue as to element of Lau’s essential the case. Haskins, Corp. (4) (405 McCoy con- tends issues fact remain regarding whether property Groutas leased to Webb included the tes- fence. But Groutas fence, deposition tified testimony leased sublessee, Webb, is consistent with this. Webb if testified repairs he, Groutas, necessary fence were not respon- addition, sible for paragraph 9 of the lease between gives Groutas and the tenant the tenant exclusive control of the specifically provides only responsible that Groutas was keeping good repair specific roof, items such as the foundation and exterior walls. The specified fence and are in para- outlets graph 9.
McCoy also argues County that violation of DeKalb ordi- nance is negligence per jury question there is a toas paragraph whether 14 of the lease absolves Groutas comply See, e.g., with that ordinance. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Life McGivern, Co. 258) (1974) (viola- se). tion of such ordinances Paragraph 14 of the lease reads agrees, expense, as follows: “Tenant at his own comply requirements with all of any legally public constituted author- ity [i.e., County] necessary by DeKalb made reason Tenant’s occu- pancy said agrees to properly Landlord by Tenant’s occu- necessary reason of made requirements
such supplied.) (Emphasis . . .” pancy. addressed whether we have not
Although county electrical compliance with a duty away can contract imposed by a avoid the duties code, that he cannot have held property not the owner of setting. But in a residential housing code — — can contract the case here place” as was “dwelling used as a forth property set improve the the duties avoid Investors, EQK Realty 44-7-14. See 44-7-13 and OCGA §§ App. 653 fence existed wiring on the McCoy that because the “made compliance with the ordinance occupancy, to Webb’s non-delegable re- Groutas’s was therefore necessary” Webb and result of the as a disagree. Compliance was sponsibility. We used the Because Webb RV business. of the outlets for Webb’s compliance business, assuring he was in his RV outlets with the ordinance. exclusive control the tenant both gave the lease because any county well as the trial court erred necessary by occupancy, made *3 per se summary judgment
denying Groutas claim. depen- for loss of consortium McCoy’s right to recover Mrs. v. Lovelace against Groutas. McCoy’s right to recover
dent Mr. (345 139) (1986). (3) Given Salon, SE2d Figure App. denying in trial court erred holding in Division that the our denying in sum- likewise hold that summary judgment, McCoy’s claim. mary as to Mrs. liability in no that Groutas has holding
3. In of our above issue of dam- tort, summary judgment on the his motion for See Fami- by the trial court. likewise have been ages should (439 Gooden, SE2d 211 Ga. lies First Andrews, J., J., Birdsong, P. Beasley, C. reversed. J., J., P. Smith, JJ., McMurray, Pope, P. Johnson J., Blackburn, dissent. dissenting. Presiding Judge,
Pope, control of up possession fully given has Even defective arising from damages premises, he is OCGA repair in under keep to construction or failure Flagler Savage, 258 Ga. 44-7-14. Co. v. § contract, only with (1988). but responsibility can be modified contract; provision relieving a a lease parties to repair in is not effec- keep landlord of the to id. And lawfully on the See persons against tive third Flagler, like case, a rather than a this involved commercial residential lease. EQK Realty Investors, Gaffney
Moreover, 771) (1994) proposition does that a land effectively duty specific may delegate lord where the violation of a (rather just generalized duty or to re regulation than 44-7-14) pair in under OCGA is involved. We did state § may delegate independent a a landlord commercial context to duty generalized repair contractor his under OCGA 44-7-14. § indepen vicariously the landlord not be liable for the would negligence inspected prop dent contractor’s where landlord erty, condition, dangerous precautionary discovered the took mea sures, an independent and hired to make the contractor repairs, independent making but the negligent contractor was holding Gaffney, repairs.1 however, Id. at 654-655. The landlord could elevators, duty delegate which are specifically regulated potential danger. due their inherent See elevators, id. wiring regulated at 655. Like due potential imposed its inherent for danger, and the duties specific regulations those delegated. laws and cannot be See Savings Bank, Fulton v. Anchor (2) (b) Colquitt Rowland, Su- preme pronouncement area, Court’s distinguish- most recent in this important First, able in two ways. case, undisputed unlike this it was Colquitt actually the tenant created hazardous condition. second, Colquitt alleged And negligence did not involve the duty imposed by statute, breach of a specific ordinance, regula- tion. reasons,
For these appeal depend the outcome of this should not on the language agreement. of the lease language upon by relied provide the majority may the basis for a file landlord to a cross-claim full against indemnification who is also a but it preclude liability does not landlord’s I would therefore affirm the trial court’s denial of landlord’s motion *4 for se claims of both
The issue of the appropriateness punitive damages raised summary judgment below, defendant’s motion for and is any case, therefore not before us. evidence failed to exercise safety regulations may effort 1 course, distinguishable from this as the landlord here none of did things. Bettes, Windermere, Ltd. v. damages. support an award 177, 178-179 McMurray Presiding Judge state that I am authorized in this dissent. join Judge Blackburn 1, 1995.
Decided December Johnson, Magill, Burke B. ap- E. Thomas Ansley, & Carter pellant. Knowles, Jr., Knowles, I. Shields, Ralph & Doffermyre, Canfield Jr., Makarenko, Bassler, III, Nikolai Brown Crim Hutton R. THE STATE.
A95A1165. HESTER v. (465 SE2d Pope, Presiding Judge. selling cocaine. appeals his conviction
Defendant verdict, undercover evidence Viewing the group at a intersection and waved approached agents a car defendant, walked group, One of the standing men around. young agent An they wanted. agents what to the car and asked over responded that he any,” and defendant if he “had asked defendant wanted, agent agent what again asked did. Defendant back the car and walked then left said he wanted a Defendant $20. group car and the halfway between the group. About toward Frazier, and after what individual, Rufus co-defendant met another and sold to the car exchange, Frazier went looked like some kind agents piece $20. of crack cocaine intersection, went over present at the Defendant admitted he was having anything to do agents, but denies to the car and talked to the with the sale. State, Timberlake Citing deny the trial court first has evi extraordinary trial because he now for an new
ing his motion testi now has the Specifically, defendant dence not available before. Frazier, right invoked his fifth amendment mony of co-defendant who pled guilty. Tim but has since testify at defendant’s not to newly discovered berlake established the test newly available evi 5-5-23, however, involves while this case OCGA § United discussed significant, dence. And this distinction Carlin, (N.D. 1983), aff'd 734 F2d States v. FSupp. (11th Cir. courts, sound there, taken from other employed
The rationale