*1 TEX. CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 20.19
(Vernon 1977). State, In Tarpley v.
S.W.2d 525 (Tex.Crim.App.1978), appel
lant argued grand did not
consider all testimony the available before returned an indictment him. The “go Court refused to behind the actions of grand jury to determine whether suffi justify
cient evidence existed to the return Id. at 532. We have
of an indictment.” second-guess
also refused to grand jury type of situation. Burkhalter v.
State, 223 (Tex.App . —Cor
pus 1982), pet. improvi dism’d as Christi
dently granted,
App.1983). Appellant’s fourth and final
ground of error is overruled. of the trial court is af-
firmed. SERVICES,
GROUP HOSPITAL INCORPORATED, Appellant, v. AND
ONE TWO BROOKRIVER CENTER, Appellee.
No. 05-84-00228-CV. Appeals Texas,
Court of
Dallas.
Jan. 1986.
Rehearing Denied Feb. *2 Dallas, appellant. Cooper,
R. Brent Jr., Dallas, appellee. Figari, E. Ernest STEPHENS, WHITHAM Before HOWELL, JJ.
HOWELL, Justice.
Two
dispute.
This
a contract
One
(Landlord) brought suit
Center
Brookriver
(Ten-
Service, Inc.
Group Hospital
ant)
charges allegedly
owed to Land-
amount attributable to normal electrical us-
lord under a lease
age.
occupan-
After the commencement of
asserting
counterclaimed
that Landlord had
cy, Tenant
to pay
refused
Landlord for
violated the Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
charges,
after hours
conditioning
air
as-
TEX.BUS. &
seq.
COM.CODE 17.41 et
serting
billing”
that Landlord was “double
(Vernon Supp.1985). The trial court direct-
by charging
per
both the
$50
flat
*3
ed a verdict for Landlord on the counter- hour fee and
“extraordinary
for
electrici-
Following jury verdict,
claim.
a
ty.”
part
Tenant claimed that
the $50
went
favor of Landlord and Tenant now hourly charge
electricity
included
need-
appeals
points.
affirm,
on nineteen
operate
conditioning.
ed to
air
Land-
modifying
judgment.
the trial court’s
argued
lord
conditioning
that
the air
parties
agree-
entered into a
charge
replacement
reflected
and mainte-
space
March,
ment for
office
an
tower in
electricity.
nance costs and
not
include
parts
signifi-
1980. Three
lease are
payments,
After some initial
Tenant also
dispute.
“operating
cant to this
cost
pay
to
extraordinary electricity
refused
provision” obligated
pay
Tenant to
certain
charges
claiming that Landlord
vio-
costs,
operating
defined
including heating,
provision calling
sep-
lation
the lease
for
cooling
utilities,
that
costs in
exceeded
metering
argued
arate
equipment. It
that
(“base costs”).
the base
Landlord
any agreement
representative
between its
oper-
was to furnish an
advance estimate
modify
and Landlord could not
the terms of
ating
beginning
year.
costs at the
of each
the lease
a
because
lease clause forbids
Any excess of estimated
base
costs over
oral modifications and because the Statute
monthly
was to
to
be added
rent.
purported
of Frauds
modifica-
rendered
year,
At
end
of each
the difference
disputed
Tenant
unenforceable.
also
between estimated costs and actual costs
charges
pay
and refused to
would be reconciled.
provision.”
cost
filed
Landlord
conditioning
“air
provision” required
categories
suit
to collect the three
conditioning only
Landlord to
air
charges.
during normal business hours. Tenant was
error,
point
In its
com-
first
Tenant
request
conditioning
entitled to
air
directing
plains
the trial
erred
per
hours at $50
hour.
Deceptive
a verdict for Landlord on the
Finally,
“extraordinary electricity
Practices
Tenant
Trade
Act counterclaim.
provision”
charge
Landlord
for
allowed
pro-
alleged that Landlord had violated
extraordinary
by
electrical
deemed
“represent-
forbidding
seller
vision
a
from
to be
Landlord. Electrical current was
ing
agreement
that an
or involves
confers
supplied through
obli-
meters. Tenant was
remedies,
rights,
obligations
or
which
gated
pay
extraordinary electricity
for
involve,
or
have or
which
monthly.
prohibited by
& COM.
law.” TEX.BUS.
finished, rep-
being
As the facilities were
(Vernon
17.46(b)(12)
Supp.
ANN.
CODE
§
subcon-
parties
resentatives of the
and the
1985).
falsely rep-
accused
Landlord is
At
weekly meetings.
tractors held
one
(1)
resenting
for both
that it could:
bill
meeting the
contractor informed
electrical
conditioning
air
extra
and the amount
separate
Landlord and
meters
extraordinary electricity
to air
attributable
equipment
item
would
each
of Tenant’s
lease,
(2)
(3)
conditioning,
orally modify the
$100,000.
par-
approximately
Neither
provided
electricity
bill for
metering,
ty
willing
for the
through
single
a
meter.
single
suggested that a
the subcontractor
succinctly
position is
employed.
be
found that
meter
“The
down
stated
its brief.
case boiled
(1)
parties agreed
Landlord would
meant.”
controversy over what the lease
meter, (2)
would
single
nothing
than con
(3)
suit
more
involves
electricity, and
bill Tenant for all the
of con
interpretation.
Mere breach
tract
Landlord would credit
allowing
of contract
every breach
a DTPA claim.
tract will not
Century
Forest
DTPA claim.
Treating
Dura-Wood
be
into a
claim to
elevated
(5th
Industries,
Cir.
675 F.2d
some
must contain
We believe that
case
Development v.
1982);
overreaching
victimizing
element
USLife
Ashford
Services,
Estate
Real
DTPA claim.
unwary in order to create a
Dannenmaier,
(Tex.1983);
Holloway
respon-
parties
this contract were
Both
(Tex.Civ.App.
— Fort
coun-
people,
sible
well advised
business
dism'd).
us
Tenant asks
Worth
provided
explicitly
Had the contract
sel.
claim can
based
hold that DTPA
charge
per
$50
could
both
that Landlord
upon
interpretations of
con
erroneous
sys-
operating
conditioning
the air
hour for
allowing recovery under
tract.
Cases
hours, plus the cost of the elec-
tem after
17.46(b)(12)
predicate liability
uniformly
consumed,
not have
tricity
Tenant could
interpretive
misrep
rather than
on factual
by claiming
escaped
obligation
its
DTPA
*4
Royal
Insurance Co.
Globe
resentations.
that Landlord
unconscionability.
It follows
Inc.,
Consultants,
v. Bar
891 law, point urges that Under Texas court must Tenant’s seventeenth granting partial provision a condi trial court erred determine whether is certain un- by examining summary judgment entire document. 427, pro- part Wakefield, Hudson v. disputably S.W.2d (Tex.1983). specter raises again accom Normally condition is vision.” language. electricity. The record panied by identifying certain double reflects, however, Landscape partial summary Design and Construction Co. that the Inc., carefully include Excavating, Harold Thomas was tailored to v. charges. undisputed Tenant fur- (Tex.Civ.App. only the — Dallas n.r.e.). prefer claims that Landlord used incorrect writ ref’d Courts ther adequately billing procedures. The record provision a contract as a covenant construe City of the than as a condition. propriety procedures rather establishes is Refining, Inc. Universal Oil Products no material fact issue raised. Co., (Tex.App . —Hous We do find merit Tenant’s sec writ). ton Contracts [14th Dist.] there insuffi point ond of error that to avoid forfeiture are to be construed jury’s cient evidence to possible Schwarz-Jordan Inc. of wherever brought DTPA claim was that Tenant’s Co., Houston Delisle Const. 17.50(c) faith. Section of the act bad (Tex.1978). attorney’s prevailing fees awards plainly in a DTPA suit where it is found
Examination defendant requirement groundless brought to be claim reveals the estimate that the It a condition of defeasance. does not alter in bad faith for harassment. op underlying obligation excess party complaining under section 17.- most, erating meth costs. At affects the 50(c) prove a claim has burden to payment od which the is assessed. To Dairyland County Mutu in bad faith. provision construe the estimate as a condi Childress, al Ins. Co. Having tion would result a forfeiture. meaning (Tex.1983). faith of bad provided services, already *6 precisely never been defined. One has payment. would be denied We will avoid has stated a claimant commentator such a harsh construction. probably “will be re this section under prove the consumer’s claim year quired
Tenant further that the base computed motivated a malicious discrimina from which the excess are Knights White Consequently, tory purpose.” Lynn, as a of law. is 1982 matter Of An Knights: Analysis Black and argues, “oper- under the no Deceptive Amendments to 1979 ating provision could have cost” been Act, 33 941, Practices Trade present- 1983. find that S.W.L.J. until Southern, Brunstetter support (1979). See sufficient ed evidence fact, was, finding year (Tex.Civ.App.—San ton the base S.W.2d An Glasgow v. Hall 1981). 1980. io “a that bad faith has been defined: noted complains Point sixteen knowledge have acting so must person to al a trial amendment refusal allow know that facts circumstances to such lease was lege that base wrong and, her with such his or actions Trial are within 1982. amendments disregard knowledge, acts with intentional Dur of the trial court. sound discretion rights of others.” Co., Asphalt Rock ham Uvalde (Tex.App. writ ref’d n.r. — Austin (Tex.Civ.App.—San ton An e.). 1980, writ). record reflects that io alleged the bad testimony not ade The evidence allegedly new not reflect Tenant’s year argument. raise faith quately the base knowledge that its claims double refusing permit court did not err trial false. legal misrepresentation were amendment. Certainly points no evidence to a malicious
intent on part. ap- Under either
plicable definition, requirements of bad
faith are not met. is modified to omit the attorney’s
award of appellee. fees to the modified,
As the judgment is affirmed.
WHITHAM, J., concurs.
WHITHAM, Justice, concurring.
I concur the result. MARTIN, Jr.,
Dudley Appellant, Texas, Appellee.
The STATE of
No. C14-85-009-CR. Texas, Appeals
Court of (14th Dist.).
Houston 16, 1986.
Jan.
Rehearing Denied Feb.
