This is an action on the case for fraud. It was dismissed on motion of defendants. On plaintiffs’ appeal we accept, of course, the properly pleaded allegations of the dismissed declaration.
Upon discovery of the fraud
*
plaintiffs elected to retain possession of the subject property which, according to the declaration, they had purchased in reliance on defendants’ fraudulent representations, and to sue for damages. This they had a right to do
(Elson
v.
Harris, 356
Mich 175; followed in
Nowicki
v.
Podgorski,
Plaintiffs insisted below, and now insist, that they may of right recover damages according to the following allegation appearing in their declaration as-last amended:
“That plaintiffs have sustained loss by reason of such fraud and misrepresentation, in that they have received from rent and profits from the operation of said property sums totaling $12,540, and have expended funds and incurred obligations totaling $18,006.30, and have sustained a net loss of $5,466.30, all as per itemized statement attached hereto, marked exhxibit ‘E’ and prayed to be made a part hereof, and plaintiffs, therefore, pray for judgment against the defendants in the sum of $7,500.”
Judge McCree dismissed without opinion. The parties agree that the judge’s assigned reason for dismissal was that plaintiffs had failed to allege, or offer to prove, any legally recoverable measure of damage. We agree with the judge’s ruling as applied to this case.
The proper measure of the defrauded party’s damage, in cases like this, is the difference between the actual value of the premises as of the time of contract and the value thereof had same been as represented (24 Am Jur, Fraud and Deceit, § 227, p 55;
Paquin
v.
Van Houtum,
The most that can be said for plaintiffs’ suit as pleaded is that they had, in the court below, a right to recover nominal damages. In such cases we do not reverse. See
Vachon
v.
Todorovich,
Affirmed. Costs to defendants.
Notes
The fraud committed by defendants was, in essence, that of representing that there was no legal restriction against use of the premises as a 5-apartment building; whereas the faet was that municipal authority had ordained that the premises might lawfully be utilized for 2-apartment purposes only. Plaintiffs were, despite such ordinance, permitted to continue 5-apartment use during the years they retained possession..
The faet that plaintiffs' interest in the realty subject matter was subsequently terminated did not of itself bar recovery. See
Cole
v.
Oatman,
