[¶ 1] J.G. аppeals from a district court order denying his petition for discharge from civil commitment as a sexually dangerous individual under N.D.C.C. ch. 25-03.3. Concluding the district court did not err in finding J.G. engaged in sexually predatory conduct and the State established by clear and convincing evidence that J.G. remains a sexually dangerous individual, we affirm.
I
[¶ 2] In November 2002, J.G. was initially committed as a sexually dangerous individual, and his commitment was not aрpealed. J.G. petitioned for discharge in 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2008, and each petition was subsequently denied. J.G. did not appeal the denial of any of these petitions. In June 2009, J.G. petitioned for discharge, and aftеr a November 2010 hearing, a district court denied his petition. J.G. appealed, arguing insufficient evidence supported his continued commitment, and we summarily affirmed. Matter of J.G.,
[¶ 3] Dr. Benson testified and wrote in her report that she is not certain J.G.’s crime of indecent exposure at age 12 constitutes the statutory definition of sexually predatory conduct. In her tеstimony and report, Dr. Benson expressed her concern with the difficulty in determining whether J.G. is likely to reoffend, because the juvenile actuarial instruments used to predict future risk are no longer apprоpriate now that J.G. is an adult. She testified case history and clinical judgment are less effective in predicting who will reoffend. In his testimony and report, Dr. Lisota identified a number of dynamic risk factors he beliеves indicate a high risk of future sexually offensive behavior. He also noted that because of J.G.’s diagnosed cognitive and personality disorders, as well as his failure to complete sex offendеr treatment, J.G. would likely have serious difficulty controlling his behavior.
[¶ 4] After reviewing both experts’ reports and hearing their testimony, the district court found the State established by clear and convincing evidencе J.G. is likely to reoffend and has serious difficulty controlling his behavior. The district court ordered him to remain committed as a sexually dangerous individual.
[¶ 5] J.G. argues the State did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that he remains a sexually dangerous individual under N.D.C.C. ch. 25-03.3.
[¶ 6] The district court had jurisdiction under N.D. Const, art. VI, § 8, and N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-02. The appeal was timely under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-19. We have jurisdiction under N.D. Const, art.
II
[¶ 7] On appeal, J.G. argues the district court erred in finding the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that he engaged in sexually predatory conduct and that he is likely to reoffend.
[¶ 8] We review the civil commitment of a sexuаlly dangerous individual under a modified clearly erroneous standard of review. Matter of Rubey,
[¶ 9] At a discharge hearing, the State has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the petitioner remains a sexually dangerous individual. Matter of Midgett,
[A]n individual who is shown to have engaged in sexually predatory conduct and who has a congenital or acquired condition that is manifested by а sexual disorder, a personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction that makes that individual likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct which constitute a danger to the physical or mental health or safety of others.
In addition, to satisfy the due process requirements of Kansas v. Crane,
A
[¶ 10] J.G. first argues the district court’s finding he engaged in sexually prеdatory conduct was not supported by clear and convincing evidence, because his index offense of indecent exposure did not constitute a “sexual act” or “sexual contact” under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(6) or (7). He argues that under Interest of Maedche,
“Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prohibits the relitigation of claims or issues that were raised or could have been raised in a prior action between the same parties or their privies, and which were resolved by final judgment in a court of competent jurisdiction. Under res judicata principles, it is inapрropriate to rehash issues which were tried or could have been tried by the court in prior proceedings.”
[¶ 11] J.G. did not argue his underlying conduct did not meet the statutory definition of “sexually predatory cоnduct” under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8) in any of the six
B
[¶ 12] J.G. also argues the district court erred in finding he is likely to reof-fend. J.G. relies on Dr. Bеnson’s report and testimony in which she contends the actuarial risk assessment instruments are not appropriate because they are intended for juveniles. Dr. Benson testified the use of clinical judgmеnt is a less effective and problematic way to assess an individual’s risk of reoffense. She testified an “inherent difficulty” exists when trying to prove the likelihood of reoffense in an adult male whose last sexual charge occurred when he was twelve years old. Dr. Benson further testified that adolescents are by nature more impulsive and that developmental changes as one ages must be kept in mind whеn assessing an adult whose only offenses occurred when he was a child.
[¶ 13] Dr. Lisota testified, however, about a number of dynamic risk factors he found to be “problematic.” Factors Dr. Lisota reportеd as problematic included significant social influences, hostility toward women, general social rejection and loneliness, lack of concern for others, impulsiveness, poor cognitivе problem-solving, negative emotionality, sex drive and sexual preoccupation, sex as coping, deviant sexual preference, and cooperation with supervision. He conсluded in his report J.G. poses a high risk of sexually offensive behavior. In her testimony, Dr. Benson agreed her examinations identify similar dynamic risk factors, though not labeled exactly the same, and her results of J.G.’s risk factors were “consistent” with Dr. Lisota’s.
[¶ 14] The district court found, in regard to J.G.’s likelihood of reoffense:
The Respondent’s behavior through the history of the case shows a likelihood of re-offense. In recent histоry is the example of him propositioning a peer, and then being offending by the rejection and assertion of boundaries; which demonstrates his inability to understand the rights of others in addition to showing his inability to control his behavior by not following institutional rules.
To the other extreme, in his early history, there are the Respondent’s offenses against peers in the juvenile rehabilitative system. Looking at this range shows a likelihоod of re-offense.
The Court cannot accept Dr. Benson’s theory that the juvenile risk evaluation tools are no longer valid due to the passage of time. The example of recent behavior shows the concern has not abated through the passage of time.
The Court also finds the failure of the Respondent to successfully complete treatment has relevance and is an important fact in the proof of the third prong. This Court recognizes and understands the challenge the Respondent faces is even greater than normal due to his Cognitive Difficulties. Nevertheless, thе danger the Respondent presents remains paramount.
Dr. Lisota’s testimony identified multiple dynamic factors regarding the Respondent that are problematic for the present. Those factоrs are identified at pages 7-8 of Dr. Lisota’s written report. All of those factors are relevant to the proof of the likelihood of re-offense. Of particular concern are the faсtors Sexual preoccupation, and deviant sexual preference. The Court finds these factors*345 not just prove the likelihood of re-offense but significantly increase the danger presеnted by this Respondent.
[¶ 15] A review of the district court order shows the court based its decision to deny J.G.’s petition for discharge on specific findings after it found Dr. Liso-ta’s testimony more credible. “The district court is the best credibility evaluator in cases of conflicting testimony, and we will not second-guess the district court’s credibility determinations.” Matter of Hanenberg,
[¶ 16] We conclude from our review of the record, the district court’s order denying J.G.’s petition for discharge from commitment is not based on аn erroneous view of the law and is supported by clear and convincing evidence J.G. remains a sexually dangerous individual under N.D.C.C. ch. 25-03.3. We therefore conclude the district court did not clearly err in denying J.G.’s petition.
Ill
[¶ 17] We affirm the district court order.