[¶ 1] G.L.D. аppealed from district court orders denying his motion to compel discovery and his petition for discharge from treatment as a sexually dangerous individual. We conclude the court abused its discretion in denying G.L.D.’s motion to compel discovery. We reverse the order denying the mоtion to compel discovery, and we vacate the order denying the petition for discharge and remand for further proceedings on that petition.
I
[¶ 2] In 2007, G.L.D. was committed to the custody of the Department of Human Services for treatment as a sexually dangerous individual and, in 2011, this Court аffirmed an order denying his petition for discharge.
In re G.L.D.,
[¶3] In February 2013, G.L.D. petitioned for discharge from commitment as a sexually dangerous individual. In April 2013, Dr. Lynne Sullivan submitted an evaluation to the district court on behalf of the State, concluding G.L.D. remains a sexually dangerous individual. Dr. Sullivan’s evaluation referred to a comprehensive review of G.L.D.’s chart at the State Hospital and noted conflicts with other residents and staff at the State Hospital.
*101 [¶ 4] G.L.D. requested production of the following documents from the Morton County State’s Attorney’s office:
REQUEST NO. 1: [G.L.D.’s] complete medical file, including but not limited to:
a. All North Dakota State Hospital chart notes from March 6, 2013 to present;
b. All medical records pertaining to the back injuries [G.L.D.] received while a patient at the North Dakota State Hospital, including any and all records pertaining clinical/hospital visits outside of the North Dakota State Hospital.
REQUEST NO. 2: Any and all reports and documents pertaining to the alleged assault on [G.L.D.], including, but not limited to, any and all documents pertaining to the finаl disposition of the alleged assault investigation.
The State objected to G.L.D.’s requests, claiming the documents were not in the possession of the Morton County State’s Attorney’s office and G.L.D.’s requests were not relevant to whether he continues to be a sexually dangerous individual and wеre not calculated to lead to the production of admissible evidence. The State also claimed G.L.D.’s request for documents pertaining to an alleged assault of him was extremely broad and did not specify a date and approximate time of the alleged аssault.
[¶ 5] G.L.D. thereafter moved the district court to compel production of documents pertaining to his complete medical file, including all chart notes at the State Hospital after March 6, 2013, all medical records about back injuries he received while a patiеnt at the State Hospital, and all medical records for visits to clinics or hospitals outside the State Hospital. G.L.D. also sought all reports and documents about an alleged assault of him at the State Hospital, including documents pertaining to the final disposition of the investigation of the alleged assault. G.L.D. claimed the location of the documents was irrelevant because the state’s attorney could request those documents from the State Hospital. He also claimed the documents “regarding the assault ... begs the question as to how many times [he] has been assaulted by anyone” at the State Hospital. He argued the requested documents were relevant to whether he continues to be a sexually dangerous individual because those documents involved his behavior. The State responded that it had complied with G.L.D.’s request fоr progress notes after March 2013. The State also said the request for “medical records, as opposed to treatment records,” including incident reports of an alleged assault, were not relevant to G.L.D.’s progress in treatment or prognosis about whether he remains a sexually dangerous individual.
[¶ 6] The district court denied G.L.D.’s motion to compel discovery, ruling his medical records were not relevant to the issue of whether he remains a sexually dangerous individual, those records were available to him as his own records, and no information established hе could not otherwise obtain those records through appropriate requests for his medical information. The court determined G.L.D.’s request was not for relevant information and was not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible information. The court also ruled the rеcords of an incident on March 6, 2013, which resulted in G.L.D. being “written up for his behavior,” were not relevant. The court explained a log in Dr. Sullivan’s report showed a behavioral incident between G.L.D. and staff, but there was no mention of an assault between patients at the State Hospital. Thе court also said the State’s response to G.L.D.’s *102 discovery request indicated all the chart notes after March 2013 had been provided to him and it appeared the information about a conflict with another patient was provided to G.L.D. in a chart note. The court exрlained G.L.D.’s request was vague, had likely been complied with, and the information was not relevant to issues before the court.
[¶ 7] At an evidentiary hearing, Dr. Sullivan testified for the State- and Dr. Robert Riedel testified for G.L.D. The court also heard testimony from G.L.D. and from a prospective employer of G.L.D. The district court thereafter denied G.L.D.’s petition for discharge, determining there was clear and convincing evidence he continues to be a sexually dangerous individual. The court explained there was clear and convincing evidence: (1) that G.L.D. had engaged in sexuаlly predatory conduct as defined under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(9); (2) that he has a congenital or acquired condition that is manifested by a sexual disorder, a personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction; (3) that his condition makes him likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct constituting a danger to others; and (4) that there is a nexus between his condition and the danger to others which shows his disorder is linked to a serious difficulty in controlling his behavior. In determining G.L.D. has serious difficulty controlling his behavior, the court cited testimony by Dr. Sullivan that G.L.D. had a number of behavioral write ups during the past review period and stated that Dr. Sullivan opined G.L.D. continues to be unable to control his behavior.
II
[¶ 8] Commitment proceedings for sexually dangerous individuals are civil proceedings.
In re M.D.,
[¶9] At a discharge hearing, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence the committed individual remains a sexually dangerous individual. N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-18(4);
Hehn,
(1) the individual has engaged in sexually predatory conduct; (2) the individuаl has a congenital or acquired condition that is manifested by a sexual disorder, a personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction; and (3) the disorder makes the individual likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct.
In re Thill,
*103
[¶ 10] In addition to the three statutory requirements, the State must also prove a constitutionally required element that the individuаl has “serious difficulty controlling his behavior.”
E.W.F.,
construe[d] the definition of a sexually dangerous individual to mean that proof of a nexus between the requisite disorder and dangerousness encompasses proof that thе disorder involves serious difficulty in controlling behavior and suffices to distinguish a dangerous sexual offender whose disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist in the ordinary criminal case.
In re G.R.H.,
Ill
[¶ 11] G.L.D. initially argues the district court erred in denying his motion to compel discovery. He claims his requests for production of documents were reasonable and relevant, and he argues the requested documents are relevant to his ability tо control his behavior, including whether he is hostile and aggressive towards staff and other patients at the State Hospital. He asserts he has a right to the requested documents to challenge whether he continues to be a sexually dangerous individual. The State responds it was not in possession of the requested documents and the documents were equally available to G.L.D. The State also argues the documents were not relevant because they were medical records and not treatment records. The State asserts the court did not abuse its discretion in denying G.L.D.’s motion to compel production of the documents.
[¶ 12] We have recognized that commitment proceedings for sexually dangerous individuals are civil proceedings.
M.D.,
[¶ 13] A district court has broad discretion regarding the scope of discovery in a civil proceeding, and its discovery decisions will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.
Western Horizons Living Ctrs. v. Feland,
[¶ 14] Under N.D.C.C. ch. 25-03.3, a retained or appointed attorney has the right to obtain individually identifiable health information regarding a committed individual in a commitment proceeding. N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-05(2). Moreover, upon request, any confidential records provided to the state’s attorney under N.D.C.C. ch. 25-03.3 must be made available to a committed individual’s attorney. N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-06. Under those provi *104 sions, a committed individual has a right to obtain individually identifiable health information and any confidential records provided to the state’s attorney.
[¶ 15] Here, the district court denied G.L.D.’s request for production of documents, stating the requests for medical records and for an incident report оn March 6, 2013 were not relevant to this matter. The court also said “it would appear this information [about the incident on March 6, 2013] was provided to [G.L.D.] in the chart note” and the request was vague, had likely been complied with, and was not about information relevant to the issue before the court. The discovery issues raised by G.L.D. involve his ability to challenge a relevant issue about his ability to control his behavior. In the context of commitment of a sexually dangerous individual, we have held an individual’s serious difficulty in controlling behavior need not be behavior that is sexual in nature.
Wolff,
[¶ 16] This record does not establish what incident reports or records were provided to G.L.D. On the record before this Court, we conclude the district court misapplied the law in not requiring that G.L.D. be provided with confidential records provided to the state’s attorney and any other incidеnt reports, chart notes and medical records in the control of the State Hospital. We therefore conclude the court abused its discretion in denying G.L.D.’s motion to compel production of documents. We decline to speculate on the effect of that dеnial on the ultimate determination of whether G.L.D. remains a sexually dangerous individual. We conclude, however, G.L.D. was entitled to obtain any confidential records provided to the state’s attorney and any other incident reports, chart notes and medical records in the cоntrol of the State Hospital to challenge his continued commitment as a sexually dangerous individual.
IV
[¶ 17] We reverse the order denying the motion to compel discovery, and we vacate the order denying the petition for discharge and remand for further proceedings on that petition.