59 Ga. App. 491 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1939
On February 28, 1936, J. J. Hightower filed a,petition against J. F. Groover, alleging in substance that he was the owner of a described tract of land in Douglas County, ten acres thereof being bottom land through which a branch flowed and emptied into Beaver Run Creek; that within two years prior to the filing of the suit the defendant had constructed a dam across Beaver Run Creek, below plaintiff’s land, causing the water to back up the creek to a point within about 600 feet of where the branch emptied into the creek, and that during the crop seáson immediately preceding the filing of this suit the dam had caused the water to back up the creek and in turn had raised the water under ground in plaintiff’s bottoms, causing him to fail to make and gather his crop of corn and other valuable crops of the value of $250; that the backwater from the dam caused the branch through his land to flow at a reduced rate, and caused sand, trash, and other matter to accumulate in the creek and branch, thereby filling the branch with sand and other matter and causing it to overflow the plaintiff’s land during heavy rains; that a short time before the filing of the suit the dam had washed awajr, and the branch run was washing out, and plaintiff’s bottom land could be used fot
The plaintiff introduced evidence to the effect that, prior to the construction of the dam across Beaver Bun Creek in 1935, his bottom land was fertile and produced good crops; that he made an average of 30 loads of corn, 12 bushels to the load, on this land each year before the dam was built; that after the dam was erected the creek and branch began to fill up with sand, and the water ran back in his ditches, causing his land to overflow and to become so wet and soggy that he could not make any crop on his bottom land in 1935; that he planted it in 1936, but made nothing; that after the dam was washed away in 1936 the sand began to wash out of the creek. He also testified that, in the fall of 1935 and spring of 1936, corn was worth about 75 cents per bushel. •
The evidence for the defendant tended to show that the land at the bridge or head of the lake was ]uw, swampy, and marsh land, covered with willows and briars before the dam was erected, and that he had this land cleaned of its rubbish; that the water was not any higher at the bridge, nor was the flow of the stream hindered or retarded any more at this point (this being the place where the plaintiff contended the eddy water from the dam came to), after the construction of the dam than it was prior thereto. The evidence for the defendant showed that in the distance from the mouth of' the branch that flowed through the plaintiff’s land to the bridge or head of the'creek there was a fall of one foot in each
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $100. The defendant made a motion for new trial which was overruled and he excepted.
It is argued by counsel for the plaintiff in error in their brief that the court erred in srrbmitting to “the jury the question of damages for loss of crops for the year 1936, along with the issue as to damages for the year 1935, as the suit was filed in February, 1936, before crops for that year were planted. It is true that “Damages for a continuing trespass are limited to those which have occurred before action is commenced” (Code, § 105:1406; Savannah &c. Canal Co. v. Bourquin, 51 Ga. 378 (3)), but no exception to the charge of the court in respect to the above matter appears in the record, and it can not be raised here for the first time, (a) The amount of the verdict of the jury was well within the range of the evidence as to the amount of damage for the loss of crops for the year 1935.
The fourth special ground of the motion for new trial complains that the court erred in giving in charge to the jury the definition of a nuisance. “A nuisance is anything that works hurt, inconvenience, or damage to another; and the fact that the act done may otherwise be lawful shall not keep it from being a nuisance. The inconvenience complained of shall not be fanciful, or such as would affect only one of fastidious taste, but it shall be such as would affect an ordinary reasonable man.” Code, § 73-101. “It shall be lawful for all corporations and individuals owning or controlling lands upon opposite sides of any non-navigable stream, to construct and maintain a dam or dams across such stream for the development of water power and other purposes, together with canals and appurtenances thereof; Provided, that this section shall not be construed to release individuals or corporations constructing such dam or dams and appurtenant works from liability to private property for damages resulting from the construction and operation thereof, either by overflow or otherwise.” Code, § 85-1306. It was contended by the plaintiff that the construction and maintenance of the dam across the creek by the defendant caused the
Special grounds 5, 6, and 7 of the motion for new trial complain of the charge of the court where he gave to the jury in substance the principles of law embodied in Code, §§ 85-1305 and 105-1407, to the effect that the owner of a stream not navigable is entitled to the same exclusive possession thereof as he has of any other part of his land, and that any one building or obstructing the water course below his laird so as to injure or damage him is subject to an action for damages therefor. The charge complained of expressed a correct principle of law, was adjusted to the pleadings and the evidence, and was not error.
The following charge of the court was excepted to and assigned as error in that it was not a correct statement of the law applicable to the pleadings and the evidence, and that it was misleading and confusing to the jury: “[a] Gentlemen, water will seek its level, and in doing so the courts will take judicial cognizance of the following facts, just as much as you,would take judicial cognizance of the fact that if I drop a book it falls to the floor.
Judgment reversed.