2005 Ohio 7028 | Ohio Ct. App. | 2005
Lead Opinion
{¶ 2} This case arose out of two traffic accidents that occurred on August 24, 2000, at the intersection of U.S. 62 and State Route 32 in Brown County, Ohio. The first accident involved a motorcycle and a tractor trailer. Upon learning of the first accident, Mathew Miller, a volunteer firefighter with the village of Sardinia, responded to the scene.
{¶ 3} Upon arriving at the scene, Miller's supervisor instructed him to direct traffic around the accident. While Miller was directing traffic, a second accident occurred between Grooms and Delbert Crawford, who was driving a vehicle owned by his brother Richard. The accident occurred as their respective vehicles attempted to cross the intersection simultaneously. According to appellants, Miller waived the Crawfords' vehicle into the intersection at the same time that Grooms was crossing the intersection.
{¶ 4} On May 26, 2001, Grooms filed a complaint against the Crawfords, Miller, and Sardinia. The complaint alleged that the accident occurred because Delbert Crawford was negligently operating Richard's vehicle, and because Miller was negligently directing traffic at the intersection.2 On June 26, 2001, the Crawfords answered and cross-claimed against co-defendants Miller and Sardinia.
{¶ 5} In their cross-claim, the Crawfords alleged the negligent, willful, wanton, or reckless actions, or inactions, of Miller and Sardinia caused the accident. In their answer to the complaint and cross-claims, Sardinia and Miller admitted that Miller was directing traffic at the scene, but denied that he did so negligently, recklessly, or wantonly. Sardinia and Miller also raised the affirmative defense of sovereign immunity.
{¶ 6} Sardinia and Miller moved for summary judgment, and on April 11, 2005, the trial court granted summary judgment to Sardinia and Miller on the basis of sovereign immunity. In its written decision, the court concluded that Sardinia, through Miller, was performing a governmental function when he was directing traffic at the accident scene. A political subdivision such as Sardinia is immune from liability for governmental functions unless one of the exceptions in R.C.
{¶ 7} Grooms and the Crawfords now appeal. All three appellants raise similar issues in conjunction with the following single assignment of error:
{¶ 8} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS-APPELLEE'S, MATTHEW MILLER AND THE VILLAGE OF SARDINIA, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT."
{¶ 9} Immunity from suit presents a question of law that is properly determined by summary judgment. Conley v. Shearer,
{¶ 10} Summary judgment is appropriate when the following have been established: (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the non-moving party, reasonable minds can only come to a conclusion adverse to the non-moving party. Harless v. WillisDay Warehousing Co. (1978),
{¶ 11} R.C. Chapter 27443 establishes a three-tier analysis for determining whether a political subdivision is immune from liability. Cater v. Cleveland,
{¶ 12} Second, R.C.
{¶ 13} Finally, R.C.
{¶ 14} For general immunity to apply under the first tier of the analysis, a court must find that the defendant seeking immunity is a political subdivision that was engaged in a governmental or proprietary function. It is undisputed that Sardinia is a political subdivision as defined in R.C.
{¶ 15} Activities that promote or preserve the public peace, health, safety, or welfare; the provision of police, fire, emergency medical, ambulance, and rescue services or protection; the regulation of the use of, and the maintenance and repair of, roads, highways, streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, and public grounds; the regulation of traffic, and the erection of traffic signs, signals, or control devices. See R.C.
{¶ 16} The trial court concluded that Sardinia was performing a governmental function when Miller was directing traffic at the scene of the accident. We agree. Responding to an accident scene and directing the flow of traffic promotes the public safety, involves emergency services, and concerns the maintenance and regulation of the use of roads, highways, and streets. See Dolisv. City of Tallmadge, Summit App. No. 21803,
{¶ 17} The second tier of the analysis requires a court to determine whether any of the exceptions to immunity listed in R.C.
{¶ 18} "(1) * * * [P]olitical subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to persons or property caused by the negligent operation of any motor vehicle by their employees upon the public roads, highways, or streets when the employees are engaged within the scope of their employment and authority.
{¶ 19} "* * *
{¶ 20} "(2) * * * [P]olitical subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to persons caused by the negligent performance of acts by their employees with respect to proprietary functions of the political subdivisions.
{¶ 21} "(3) * * * [P]olitical subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to persons or property caused by their failure to keep public roads, highways, streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, aqueducts, viaducts, or public grounds within the political subdivisions open, in repair, and free from nuisance * * *.
{¶ 22} "(4) * * * [P]olitical subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to persons or property that is caused by the negligence of their employees and that occurs within or on the grounds of buildings that are used in connection with the performance of a governmental function * * *.
{¶ 23} "(5) * * * [A] political subdivision is liable for injury, death, or loss to persons or property when liability is expressly imposed upon the political subdivision by a section of the Revised Code * * *."
{¶ 24} The trial court determined that (B)(1) and (B)(2) do not apply because they pertain to the operation of motor vehicles and proprietary functions; and (B)(4) and (B)(5) do not apply because they pertain to activities on the grounds of buildings and liability expressly imposed by the Revised Code. We agree.
{¶ 25} The only issue is whether the exception to immunity under (B)(3) applies. The trial court found, as a matter of law, that negligently directing traffic at an accident scene does not constitute negligent failure to keep the roads free of obstructions and in repair; nor does it amount to a nuisance. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the finding of the trial court.
{¶ 26} In Manufacturer's Natl. Bank of Detroit v. Erie Cty.Road Comm. (1992),
{¶ 27} In reaching its decision, the Court relied upon cases such as Frankhauser v. Mansfield (1969),
{¶ 28} In Franks v. Lopez (1994),
{¶ 29} In Harp v. City of Cleveland Heights,
{¶ 30} In addition, the Court held that the political subdivision must have either actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition. "There is constructive knowledge if such nuisance existed in such a manner that it could or should have been discovered, that it existed for a sufficient length of time to have been discovered, and that if it had been discovered it would have created a reasonable apprehension of a potential danger." Id. at 512.
{¶ 31} From the foregoing Ohio Supreme Court cases addressing political subdivision liability under R.C.
{¶ 32} In the instant case, the existing dangerous condition from which the accident between Grooms and the Crawfords occurred was not within Sardinia's control. The dangerous condition existed because of the first accident between the motorcycle and the tractor. The accident between the motorcycle and tractor also did not create a condition that was a danger to ordinary traffic. By its very nature, an auto accident on a regularly traveled portion of a road disrupts the ordinary flow of traffic. Consequently, we find as a matter of law that Sardinia was not liable under R.C.
{¶ 33} We note, in passing, that our decision is not inconsistent with other courts who have addressed the liability of a political subdivision under similar facts. See Willis v.Commodity Specialists Co.,
{¶ 34} Appellants argue that the general immunity available under R.C.
{¶ 35} "The political subdivision is immune from liability if the injury * * * or loss * * * resulted from the exercise of judgment or discretion in determining whether to acquire, or how to use, equipment, supplies, materials, personnel, facilities, and other resources unless the judgment or discretion was exercised with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner."
{¶ 36} Appellants' contention fails because it misapplies R.C.
{¶ 37} We turn now to the trial court's determination that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Miller was entitled to immunity.
{¶ 38} Pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 39} "(a) His acts or omissions were manifestly outside the scope of the employee's employment or official responsibilities; (b) His acts or omissions were with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner; (c) Liability is expressly imposed upon the employee by a section of the Revised Code."
{¶ 40} At issue in this case is whether Miller's acts in directing traffic were with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.
{¶ 41} "Malice" is the willful and intentional design to do injury or the intention or desire to harm another, usually seriously, through conduct that is unlawful or unjustified.Jackson v. Butler Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1991),
{¶ 42} "Wanton" misconduct is the failure to exercise any care whatsoever. Fabrey v. McDonald Village Police Dept.,
{¶ 43} Appellants contend that the trier of fact should make the determination as to whether a political subdivision employee's acts are negligent, reckless or wanton. Relying onHunter v. City of Columbus (2000),
{¶ 44} Generally speaking, as appellants note, the issue of malicious, wanton, or reckless conduct is a jury question. The standard for showing such misconduct, however, is high. Fabrey,
{¶ 45} During deposition, Miller admitted that he was coming off of very little sleep when he responded to the accident. He admitted he had little training in directing traffic and that the intersection was too much for one person to control. He did not recall waiving Crawford's vehicle into the intersection, and he admittedly "just froze" when he saw that Grooms' and Crawford's vehicle were about to collide.
{¶ 46} No reasonable jury could conclude from the foregoing that Miller acted with malice, bad faith, wantonly, or recklessly when he directed traffic at the scene of the accidents. At worst, his actions were negligent. Accordingly, appellants' contention that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Miller is also not well-taken.
{¶ 47} Appellants' assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 48} Judgment affirmed.
Young, J., concurs.
Walsh, J., dissents.
Dissenting Opinion
{¶ 49} Because I disagree with the majority's reasoning and conclusion with regard to Miller's immunity, I respectfully dissent.
{¶ 50} The Ohio Supreme Court has viewed wanton and reckless conduct interchangeably. See Thompson v. McNeill (1990),
{¶ 51} Adopting the position of 2 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1965) 587, Section 500, the Ohio Supreme Court defined "recklessness" as follows:
{¶ 52} "`The actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of others if he does an act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.'" Thompson,
{¶ 53} Here, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to appellants as required by Civ.R. 56(C), I cannot conclude as a matter of law that Miller's conduct could not be viewed as wanton or reckless misconduct for which he enjoys no immunity. See R.C.
{¶ 54} Miller, who was sleep deprived, had little or no training in directing traffic, and yet was in fact directing traffic around the accident. Miller himself stated that the flow of traffic in the intersection was too much for one person to direct alone. As a result, he was directing traffic into one lane of travel, while admittedly not directing the traffic already in that lane. According to appellants, Miller directed Crawford to proceed from a stop sign, directly into Grooms' path. Miller has no recollection of doing so. Miller's actions, directing one vehicle into the path of another vehicle who had the right of way, were at the very least negligent, and a question of fact exists as to whether his conduct can be described as wanton or reckless. I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter for a trial on the merits.
