Groce v. Foster

(cid:127) n (2)Identify prop- and label securities and promptly upon receipt of a client erties GROCE, Plaintiff-Appellant, William

place deposit them in a safe box or other safekeeping practicable. as soon as place (3) funds, complete Maintain records of all Services, Bob FOSTER and Midwestern securities, properties and other of a client Inc., Defendants-Appellees. possession coming lawyer into the appropriate and render accounts to his No. 78068. regarding client them.

(4) Supreme of Oklahoma. Promptly pay or deliver to the client as Court funds, securities, requested a client the July properties possession other lawyer client which the is entitled to re- As Rehearing Corrected on Denial of ceive. Sept.

III. discipline, Complainant

As and Re-

spondent stipulated that Respondent be sus- (5)

pended practice from of law five

years, suspension and that the be made ret- 13, 1983, September

roactive to date

temporary suspension Respondent. Responsibility

Professional ap- Tribunal

proved stipulation and forwarded the rec-

ommendation to this Court.

Taking Respondent into consideration that suspension

has remained under from the

practice period of law for a in excess of ten

years; that he suffered from a Rule 10 dis-

ability at the time he violated Rules Conduct;

Professional and that he has made agreed

restitution to Patterson, recom- discipline approved.

mendation

Respondent Jeffery Steinke is Ordered

Suspended practice from the of law for a (5)

period years, of five Suspen- the Order of 13,1983.

sion made to September retroactive

Respondent pay is directed to all costs of (30) proceedings thirty

these within days promulgation opinion, the date of of this payment of costs shall be a condition of

reinstatement.

Respondent comply shall- also with Rule Reinstatement, I, App. O.S. Ch.

11— 1-A, being practice before reinstated to the

of law.

All the Justices concur. III, Malloy Malloy Malloy, &

Patrick J. Tulsa, Williams, Jr., V. Earl and Leslie Remmel, Remmel, H. & Oklahoma Williams City, appellant. Darrah, Bergin, Christopher L. J.

Michael Huckaby, Fleming, Frailey, Dar- Chaffin & III, Miller, rah, Cunningham, I. and Clell Shaw, Dollarhide, City, Dawson Oklahoma & appellees. OPALA, Justice. proceeding issue

This certiorari tenders an impression whether, limit- of first under the — public-policy exception the termination- doctrine, announced Burk v. at-will first discharge Corporation,1 wrongful K-Mart against employer fires action will lie who refusal to dis- for the latter’s negligence action his common-law miss party, a third who was a customer on-the-job inju- employer, for redress of We answer in the affirmative. ries. I THE ANATOMY OF LITIGATION sought Recovery is for tortious employment in violation of State’s public policy.2 [appellees] The defendants owner, Services, Inc. and its are Midwestern [collectively Foster or em- Bob Foster called employee, plaintiff be- ployer]. Their former [employee [appellant], is low William Groce or Groce]. (an

Groce, working while wellsite, company) oil field service at Control, Hydraulic Well helping employees of suf- [Hydraulic] pipe hoist a when he Inc. Groce, Hy- bodily According harm. fered neg- operating rig, employees, while draulic foot. dropped pipe a’ on his ligently compensa workers’ Groce received Later, employer. he from his tion benefits brought third-party claim3 to recover for Hydraulic, injuries against his work-related Okl., bring on an action Sargent another Co., Okl., job. 12. The same 85 O.S.1981 Nat. Bank & Trust Central Service, §of 12 are: Tong terms Todd v. Frank’s Inc., Okl., created immunity “The by an this section shall extend to action Burk, supra 1 at 28. note ... ... another worker ... even injured job same as the ... employer may though be consid- compensation other exclu- such 3. An to workers' standing position special permits injured sivity provisions worker to ered only doctrine,9 employment-at-will was not service contractor American jobsite, but also customer. adopted Burk10 narrow excep- tort-based Hydraulic informed Foster of his em- When scope tion. Its is limited to a circumscribed suit, ployee’s Foster demanded Groce class of eases which the is shown it at dismiss once.4 Groce refused do so contrary public to be to a clear mandate of § immediately; fired this and was suit5 constitutional, by that is articulated discharge wrongful support for followed. statutory or decisional law.11 In the context below, quest employer of its dismissal public-policy12 exception, employer the “at-will termination rule”.6 Al- invoked is legitimate to advance all inter- free though urged prius Groce at nisi the Burk except may ests those which collide with the public-policy exception protects him from ter- employee’s rights are explicitly that shielded exercising right,7 legal mination for a by law. this for trial court dismissed failure Appeals a claim. The state Court of af- Burk The had been foreshad- granted that We firmed decision. certiorari Cameron,13 owed in Hinson v. where we upon petition.8 Groce’s public-policy five identified which areas wrongful-dismissal may claims be actionable. II (1) are an employee’s These for THE PUBLIC-POLICY EXCEPTION TO (2) participate activity; refusal to in an illegal

THE AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT performance important public of an obli- DOCTRINE (3) gation; exercise a right or inter- (4) est; exposure by jurisprudence wrongdoing While Oklahoma of some has (5) long employer; adhered to and continues to retain the performance an act that special began servant English master of loaned where such ed States to discard the formula- employer master neither is develop immediate tion and Feinman, an "American rule”. See injured posi- ... worker nor Development stands in the Employment The principal employer Rule, of an tion intermediate or (1976). at Will 20 Am.J.L.Hist. 122-23 injured immediate ... crystallization The of an rule American is attrib- [Emphasis supplied.] worker....” Wood, Gray uted to Horace whose treatise § See also of 85 O.S.1991 employment on relations Servant, (Master regulate governs procedure that claims 272) § 134 at states: parties. third us, general "With the rule is inflexible or will, hiring prima hiring indefinite is facie a at urged 4. Groce below that the threat- yearly and if servant seeks to out a make it ened to him. "blackball” He withdrew that alle- hiring, is burden him to establish it gation appeal. on by proof. week, hiring day, A at so much year, being or specified, month no time is an 5. for See note 25 terms of 85 infra * * * hiring indefinite and is determinable at § 44. * * the will of either *.” employers Under this doctrine were able to "dis- Generally, employment 6. contract for an in- will, employee[s] they many miss few, at their be or may definite term be terminated without contrac- cause, good cause or no or even cause liability party. at tual Cameron, Okl., the will of either Hinson v. for wrong, morally thereby being guilty without (1987). 742 P.2d added.) legal wrong.” (Emphasis Payne v. Burk, supra Co., 507, 519, 7. 1 at note 28. Western A.R.R. 81 Tenn. (1884), Watters, by part overruled in Hutton v. Appeals' 8. Court decision handed (1915). Tenn. S.W. 19, 1993; January timely down certiorari petition February came on 1993. Burk, supra Sargent, supra at 28. note 1 1300; Todd, supra at note 1 note at 50. Hinson, 552; supra Singh 9. See note at6 v. Cities Okl., Company, Oil Service Burk, supra note 1 at 28. Foster Atlas Ins. Okl. Life (1932). public policy general- 12. The determination of departure The “at-will” doctrine is a from the ly question Hope of law. Pearson v. Lumber & English pre- common law. The latter tradition Co., Inc., Okl., Supply hiring year. sumed a one L. Larson & P. Unjust Dismissal, Borowsky, 2.04 Hinson, century, In the late supra nineteenth Unit- note 6 at 552-553. or contractual encourage or refusal policy would implied.18 con- promise-based express would something that do- — demn, coupled with a detri- employer, when the to avoid assumed economic faith, showing malice retaliation.14 itself, of bad would read into Groce’s em- ment implied ployment contract an covenant Const.,15 6,§ Art. OM. urges Groce pursuing preclude employee from would Clause, gives Open-Court-of-Justice so-called job on the any bodily harm caused redress right to forensic him a constitutional employer’s custom- responsible the tortious acts of an bodily harm any Rejecting today dismissal notion advanced for party and makes er. bring §a 44 suit for exercising right to one’s position, we hold that dis- employer, negligence.16 The party’s charge in for the worker’s refusal retaliation has not met his that Groce who counters § 44 to lawsuit abandon his/her mandate of to that a clear burden show on-the-job injury an third to redress recognized public poli- judicially legislative or legally pro- impermissibly with the interferes violated, persuade to us cy has been seeks recovery regime tected for those who suffer open for the constitutional command It is in work-connected harm. hence breach (a) only to to is directed of the law’s declared legal process rather who those administer (b) individuals, private was framed actionable Today’s than to decision does make provide equality in the administration to for discharge employee for to all resistance (c) legal process, and creates neither new employer-practiced of economic intimi- of forms According nor claim. to the private right court must Far it. What the dation. from negli- third-party employer, because Groce’s of and condemn as a breach declared does Hydraulic pend- is still gence action forcing employee to choose policy is one’s complaint must ing, his denial-of-court-access job pressing a statuto- keeping between or fail.17 § redress rily protected claim of for on-the-job injury,19 No matter how eco- an arguments parties over These may nomically advantageous this conduct be statutory implications of the look the full cannot be com- employer, to the are to our employer’s conduct which central directly obliquely, or to bear loss pelled, em of the case. an at-will consideration on-the-job Having give to harm.20 relationship of setting between ployment his/her Hinson, for supra Tate tice Clause creates a note at 552-553. See v. 14. 6 Inc., Okl., 1218, everywrong. guarantees Browning-Ferris, or redress termination Markets, Inc., (1992); Super 384 See v. Publix 24 see also Vannerson v. DeMarco 1224-1225 n. Okl., 1053, (Fla.1980); Okl., Royal Kavanagh KLMv. Regents So.2d 1253 Bd. of of of U. Airlines, (N.D.Ill.1983); Dutch 386, (Mo. Kilcher, Simpson S.W.2d 2, Const., West, Inc., provides 1988). § in Art. Okl. 15. v. Hillhaven See also Meech part: McClos Mont. (Mo.App.1990). key Eagleton, 789 S.W.2d open justice be the State shall "The courts every remedy person, speedy and certain Missouri, Burk, 28; every everyinjury supra K. & wrong note 1 afforded West, [Empha- Ry. P. reputation....” Okl. person, property, or T. Co. dismissed, (1913), appeal 232 Ú.S. S.Ct. supplied.] sis L.Ed. 795 . points to v. Atlas Boat 16. Groce Smith Off-Shore (5th Service, Inc., Cir.1981), 653 F.2d 1057 § Its are: terms 19. See 85 was terminated for benefits, savings in- or insurance “No § personal injury 44 suit jured employee, independent Act, U.S.C. 688. The court under Jones determining considered in act shall be wrongful as a violation of found the termination paid compensation be under or benefit clearly public policy articulated in the federal [Emphasis added.] this act.” statute. provide: § 47. terms Its 20. See 85 O.S.1991 points jurisdictions to some (a) pub- agreement by to waive his recognize "No either to which have failed compensation [Workers' act under this employment" lic-policy "at-will (b) Compensation be valid." Open-Court-of-Jus- Act] shall doctrine find that an or claim, any part job injury subject one’s up Compen- the face of an to Workers’ just employer’s jurisdiction as re- threat sation Court’s exclusive over set- expressed pugnant public policy as agreed dispositions.25 tlements and other paying contributing being forced into Compensation explicitly Workers’ Act26 compensation liability insur- supervisory powers confers that court premiums.21 In both it is ance instances agreements over all reached between the on-the-job employee to the cost of whom injured employee either employ- his/her impermissibly harm would be shifted. That responsible party. er To counte- prohibits which the law from employer’s coercing nance an employees may exacting contractually not be secured relinquishing into their claims for redress of impunity through naked intimidation. harm of defeating work-related has effect Compensation supervi- the Workers’ Court’s employee enjoys legis- every explicit Since process sion and contravenes the stat- protection laying lative legislative policy. The employer’s insis- compensation against very claim to his/her tence on negligence Groce’s dismissal of his employer,22 per- own with what modicum of public policy claim hence breach may employer argue today that suasion it 5-7, 12, articulated 85 O.S.1991 is consistent with to fire one UU~k7 n on-the-job presses who same harm statutorily § action authorized party23 stranger utter to the tradi- —an III tionally required loyalty bond of between the DISMISSAL UNDER 12 O.S.1991 job master and servant? To condition a 2012(B)(6) § FAILURE FOR TO employee’s legisla- of abandonment that A STATE CLAIM UPON RE- WHICH tively-bestowed benefit no less a breach of LIEF COULD BE GRANTED WAS public policy making employment than de- IMPROPER UNDER THE FACTS pendent upon employee’s willingness PLED BY THE EMPLOYEE. perjury.24 commit Lastly, attempt Foster’s A pleading coerce Groce must be dismissed for withdrawing Hydraulic into his claim legally cognizable failure to state a party] clearly [the third allegations offends the articulat- beyond unless the any indicate statutory policy that makes the entire prove doubt that the claimant can no set of legal regime recovery for a worker’s on-the- facts which it would entitle If relief.27 § 21. See 85 Its terms are: 24. See v. International Petermann Brotherhood of Teamsters, 184, agreement by any employee pay any Cal.App.2d "No P.2d (1959). portion premium by paid of the to the cost of mutual insurance or other insur- ance, purpose for or carried for maintained §§ 25. See 85 O.S.1991 84. See also Okla- providing compensation required, as herein Kiblinger, homa Gas & Electric Co. v. 167 Okl. valid, any employer shall be who makes 48, 9, (1933). pertinent P.2d The terms of purpose wages deduction for from such § provide compromise any that "[t]he such salary any entitled to the benefits by any cause the worker at amount less guilty act shall be of a misdemeanor.” compensation provided by the Work- Brewer, Okl., Co. v. Parkhill Truck 354 P.2d Compensation only ers’ Act shall be made 774, (1960); Welty 776-77 v. Martinaire Okla approval Compensa- [Workers’ written of the homa, Inc., 1273, Okl., (1994) [Emphasis tion] Court.” added.] (condemning shifting to the em ployee liability payment any part seq. §§ 26. 85 O.S.1991 1 et compensation premium). workers’ insurance §§ 22. 85 O.S.1991 5-7. The terms of Gibson, 41, 45-46, Conley 355 U.S. 78 S.Ct. § 5 state: 99, 102, Atchison, (1957); Topeka, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 firm, person, partnership corporation "No Buell, 557, 569, Ry. and Santa Co. Fe 480 U.S. may discharge any employee because the em- 107 S.Ct. 1417 n. 94 L.Ed.2d 563 claim, ployee good has in faith filed or has Bryan Hosp. Memorial Authori Frazier lawyer retained represent him in said Okl., ty, See also [Emphasis claim....’’ added.] Corp., comments in Buckner v. General Motors Okl., §§ 23. 85 O.S.1991 12 and 44. from which Oklahoma proved, nent sources alleged petition were Groce’s facts gleaned. must be question constitute would termination Burk- within narrow a tortious hold dissent would have the court The exception to the em- public-policy announced of a concern claim non-actionable because ployment-at-will doctrine. today’s opinion implicitly holds that Art. Clause, Open-Court-Of-Justice as applies well state actions.32

IV to this concern is that the The short answer analysis beyond private- reaches court’s THE FALLACY DISSENT THE OF dichotomy versus-public-remedy and finds its clearly anchor declared A public poli- The mandates of an articulated B jurisdic- body cy from the are drawn analy- The authorities used dissent’s constitutional, statutory, tion’s and decisional opin- sis that the essence of the demonstrate pronouncement today The court’s law.28 reasoning ion’s has been missed. articu- public policy which places its reliance on that today public policy approved is that lated 5-7,2912, by 44- 85 O.S.1991 articulated statutory gives access to from these sections and 84. It is divined third-party tortfeasor al- than sin- considered in combination rather leged to occasioned the worker’s on-the- have gly. impact of all of these job injury. would The dissent distract recognition of a compels our bull’s-eye by ignoring range full retaliatory dis- that is offended Foster’s support the court’s legislative sources that pursuing charge of Groce for conclusion. on-the-job injury against a to an redress exception Peoples the of v. Watson With Hydraulic.30 party, third Co.,33 jurisprudence the offered Sec. Ins. Life attempt to Oklahoma by In its divine factual situations the dissent addresses policy, ignored totality employee of the employer dissent has fires for by By bringing against employer the court.31 and does the law considered suit begin- employee’s ending analysis narrowly- a of an ning and its not deal with issue 2, 6, Const., discharge suing party § for a third for work- of Art. Okl. focused discussion perti- by employee.34 In ignores panoply full related harm suffered dissent Hotels, Inc., occurring daughter she was 65 minor when Parnar v. Americana Haw. 28. Hinson, mother); shopping v. Home with her Deiters De 631 See U.S.A., (M.D.Tenn. 552-553; Petermann, pot F.Supp. supra 1023 supra note 5 at note 1993) (employee appealing fired after decision of 27. 24 at wrongful discharge prior action favor court pertinent §§ of 85 29. For the terms 5- Royal employer); Kavanagh v. KLM Dutch supra 21. see note Airlines, (E.D.Ill.1983) (employ F.Supp. 242 discharged retaining repre to ee after counsel countenance, Today's opinion does not direct- 30. against employer unpaid for him in suit sent right ly indirectly, implied an ex West,Inc., wages); 238 Mont. Meech Hillhaven employer’s for breach of the Art. delicto a (1989) (addressed certified § 6 For the terms of Art mandate. regarding interpretation questions Mon supra § note 6 see Act); Wrongful Discharge Employment tana (Mo.App. McCloskey Eagleton, 789 S.W.2d 518 statutory ignores employee's an 31. The dissent 1990) employer (employee/attomey after be sued on-the-job injury an that was to redress employ ing discharged filing for a suit without party. explic- is a third This claim occasioned itly recognized by approval); Wagner v. General Elec. er’s 85 O.S.1991 12 and 44—47. (E.D.Pa.1991) (employee F.Supp. dis complaining charged about after supra 32. note parties); products v. Schlum to third Whitman Ltd., (N.D.Cal.1992) (dis berger 588 A.2d 760 Md. charge employee gave to notice of intent after employer unpaid compensation); Beam v. sue for 34. The dissent relies DeMarco Publix IPCO, Cir.1988) Markets, (em pl (7th (Fla.1980) (employee 838 F.2d Super So.2d discharge employee bringing injury employer for after oyee discharged for sued after suit party clearly sued another is in breach Watson articulated public policy. broadly After protects for sexual harassment. her That suit, against she was fired. She employer-coerced became aware workers all original complaint abridgement her to in- or relinquishment then amended of their statu- tory right of action clude a cause redress of work-relat- full discharge.35 injuries.37 wrongful her The dissent for Where as a condition contin- analysis stopped employment, express too short its this case. ued implied, an em- employ- ployee expected give court held that an up statutorily- While Watson is discharging employ- harm, protected er was not liable benefit for work-related for being provision ee in retaliation drawn into a null and void. for suit, holding— main harassment the court’s If punished doing Foster Groce for what excluded from dissent’s discussion—was: i.e., explicitly law authorized him do— contrary “... man- [it] a clear party a third date em- on-the-job injury for an —Groce’s ployee seeking legal for redress was a case exercising clear of retaliation for workplace co-worker for sexual harass- right. statutory employer’s conduct, culminating ment in assault and bat- sought, from which relief within would fall tery.” employ- narrow Burk short, reviewing statutory after relevant rule. ment-at-will It was error to dismiss provisions, Maryland recognized court worker’s claim discharge. for firing suing third ON CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY party work-connected delictual harm is GRANTED, THE COURT OF APPEALS’ conduct in breach actionable as declared VACATED; OPINION IS THE TRIAL Here, Groce was not fired for COURT’S DISMISSAL ORDER IS RE- suing suing but rather VERSED AND THE CAUSE REMANDED responsible believed FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS NOT bodily work-related harm. INCONSISTENT THIS WITH PRO- NOUNCEMENT.

V SUMMARY HODGES, C.J., WILSON, and ALMA employment Dismissal from in retaliation JJ., WATT, KAUGER and concur. employee’s part for an refusal to bear that on-the-job LAVENDER, V.C.J., SIMMS, the harm for worker’s which the him SUMMERS, JJ., law authorizes to recover from third HARGRAVE and dissent. sought company-owned hospital). of counsel about at a advice work-related These authorities events); Hindo, Ltd., Neyer, simply v. Tiseo & employee's Smith do not address dismissal (E.D.Pa.1993) (discharge 1993 WL after statutory 57653 because right exerciseda to access he/she employee unpaid compensa sued for legal the courts to seek redress work-related tion); Assoc., Becket Welton & 39 injuries v. Becket Cal. party employer. other than the 815, (1974) (son App.3d Cal.Rptr. 531 114 fired against employer after suit on behalf of Maryland recognizes 35. a cause of action for estate); Corp., his father’s Abrams Bchlin 174 abusive when the motiva- Ill.App.3d 123 Ill.Dec. 528 429 N.E.2d employment tion for termination of contravenes (1 Dist.1988) discharged (employee threat after a clear mandate of Adler v. Ameri- commissions); ening unpaid suit to collect Corp., can Standard 291 Md. A.2d 432 Paine, Webber, Curtis, Inc., Buysse v. Jackson & (8th Cir.1980) (discharge 623 F.2d after employee unpaid compensa sued Watson, supra at note 33 tion); Walther, Inc., Meredith C.E. 422 So.2d (Ala.1982) (employee testifying fired after employees’ public policy clearly becoming behalf of 37. This trust and divinable from later suit); 5-7, 12, plaintiff Magma cluster 44, in the same Daniel Copper (App. 127 Ariz. 45-47 and 84. For terms of 1980) sections, 3, 18, 19, (employee discharged threatening statutory supra after to these (Citations omitted). courts). access Therefore, Moreover, by instituting against jurisprudence an indicates action Oklahoma Const, 6,§ customer, Hydraulic purpose that the of Okla. art. employer’s his Well states, Control, Inc., “open the clauses of other “exercising Groce was not like courts” Const, 2, § limit the courts of the legal rights” under art. 6.1 to the actions of Okla. state, Burk and the of individu- majority states that under and not actions (Okla. result, Cameron, employer. As a Hinson v. 742 P.2d 549 als such Groce’s 1987), discharge could not have been in is actionable when it is Groce’s right to employee exercising to the exercise of his an response the retaliation for done However, Rigsby Murray “open “open the court.” Accord legal right. courts” Co., right Manufacturing an 1991 WL 95710 provision does not create affirmative Ohio Const, Hereinafter, 2, 6, remedy every every wrong art. afforded for and Okla. referred “open provision as the or clause. It injury property, reputation; to provides: courts” person, to and right justice administered without shall be justice of of State shall be "The courts the sale, denial, delay, prejudice.” open every person, speedy and certain to (firing employ- an at will (Tenn.App.1991), (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978) So.2d right (1980) (“there exercising his constitutional to ee for So.2d nois af f'd employer’s premises speech free the dur- civil cause of action the interference with ing working public hours not violate the does right” exercise one’s to to access state). policy courts). of the fact, Supreme In the Montana Court has addition, In “open courts” clause is not “open interpreted its constitutional courts” public policy” a “clear mandate of pre- which Const, Ill, 6,§ provision, Mont. art. which is an employer discharging vents from em- provision, almost identical to Oklahoma’s ployee bringing against a lawsuit Const, 2, § to Okla. art. be a “mandate to employer. customer A of that clear mandate equal provide to to access causes public policy application is crucial to the recognized law.” Meech Hill- exception to the termination-at-will doc- West, Inc., haven Mont. Throughout trine. opinion, the Burk (1989). Although provi- Montana’s emphasized public policy Court that the ex- sion was amended in the amendment ception only applied very should be in a had the court’s no effect decision that cases, narrow class of i.e. those there courts, guarantee “the was directed at the exists clear mandate of For provide equality and it was framed to instance, the Court stated: justice.” administration of 776 P.2d at 492. light “In vague meaning of the of the term Supreme The Montana Court had traced the public we believe the policy origins “open provision por- courts” tightly must be circumscribed.” Magna tions of the Carta and noted that the added). (Emphasis at 28-9 meaning portions historically of those have Cooperative also Smith v. Farmers Ass’n interpreted remedy been to secure a Butler, (Okla.1992). law, i.e., those who administer above, As noted it is not the courts.2 against conduct “open pro- courts” This is further seen in a Court Missouri designed guard. vision is purpose It’s Appeals decision which the court affirmed to ensure that deny State does not dismissing court’s lower order the em- litigant legitimate to have a ployee’s wrongful discharge action for failure heard a court. Other than the fact that McCloskey claim. v. Eagleton, state a the Oklahoma Constitution contains the (Mo.App.1990). employee, S.W.2d 518 “open provision, courts” majority points attorney, argued employer, that his a law any no clear mandate of firm, him in fired retaliation for However, contravening Groce’s termination. realtor, action in his own name jurisdictions other specifically have deter- bank court and others. The noted that the mined that statutory constitutional or “open “open provision of courts” the Missouri Con- courts” are not clear mandates designed rights stitution create public policy preventing employers from dis- person but to legitimate allow a with a charging employees who file actions recognized by the law to the courts. or others. words, In other could avail himself protections “open Wagner of the v. General Elec. provision only courts” “if (E.D.Pa.1991), if he had a grant- court legitimate, recognizable claim” summary judgment the in employer. 789 at being S.W.2d wrongful discharge There action for where the em- claim, no such ployee the court determined the em- alleged bring- he was terminated for ployee cognizable had failed to state a ing community action. the in which Markets, Super See also DeMarco v. Publix expressed he lived. The had con- Woody Dept. including also v. State ex rel. Magna Correc antees comment on the Carta tions, (Okla.1992) (Okla. Meech, provision, see 776 P.2d at 491-93 E. and Const, 6, "probably originated art. with the Coke, The Second Part the Institutes the Magna ”) Carta ... For a discussion the (4th 1671). pt. England, Laws ed. background "open historical guar- courts”

9H plaintiffs if the theo- visibility which Even court limited publicity and cern about the context, lawsuit, ry employment it to the would but employee received due metamorphose supposedly ex- narrow participation employee continued active ception ... the monster that swal- into holding that constitu- litigation. employment-at-will rule. lowed When- guaranteeing access to courts provision tional dispute employer and ever a between an public policy, not a clear mandate to culminate an at-will threatens employee: court noted that employee’s discharge, employee, in the choice; “brought an act of free a lawsuit by retaining attorney simply and as result of no other sued another he sue, threatening procure could that singular dispute be- than a coercive force through which to him con- is unavailable caught was not two minds. Plaintiff tween employment security. per- KLM tract — Scylla Charybdis and would an between suasively argues that em- inherent who, duty jury threat- employee called ployment-at-will relationship it had with statutory penal- ened with termination understanding plaintiff was an that ties, independent had free and choice— no organization managers and its function F.Supp. would result in harm.” 760 either effectively more in an of trust' atmosphere at harmony cooperation; when this Jersey appellate court also found A New fault, regardless it destroyed, of who is. in a ease no clear mandate is in of all concerned to termi- the interest discharged relationship. nate their The rule advocat- employee brought an action over a after complaint ironically penal- ed in the would dispute. Kay Finlay salary Alexander v. company discharging an ize a at-will Jewelers, Inc., N.J.Super. 503, 506 A.2d employment when the relation- (1986), denied, 104 cert. N.J. ship completely Plaintiff can- has soured. A.2d 449 allegation not on stake claim the general by discharging him KLM violated A federal district court addressed issue public policies right in favor of the Airlines, Kavanagh Royal v. KLM Dutch right to free access to the counsel public swpra, and found no of a violation courts.” policy. The court held: recently, Depot Home More in Deiters v. question right “There no U.S.A., F.Supp. to free access to the courts are counsel and (M.D.Tenn.1993), the court concluded that However, policies. important public these guar- provision the Tennessee constitutional usually expressed in freedoms are terms anteeing not create access to “does government, not limitations on public policy excep- unambiguous clear and inter- parties. The invocation of employment tion to the at will doctrine.” policies of these est effectuation specifically holding an rights Other courts at-will- create new common law would be employee may bring unprecedented; does not violate party’s to counsel or to free another his/her measures, employee alleges the by taking where the to the courts statutory pro- retaliatory spiteful in na- contravened a constitutional or though even ture, access to courts include: lawfully guaranteeing to him vision are available Ltd., Schlumberger measures Whitman v. simply because resort to these (N.D.Cal.1992); Corp., Beam v. IPCO party for su- penalizes somehow the other (7th Cir.1988); instance, v. Peo- squabble developed 838 F.2d 242 Watson ing. For if a 588 A.2d regularly ples conduct- Sec. Ins. Md. merchants who between Life and, Neyer, another, although Tiseo & Smith ed business with one (E.D.Pa. Hindo, Ltd., so, March they contract to do WL were not under 1993). “open mentioning courts” commit a tort Without would one of the merchants following held that dis- they provisions, the if other that would no he told the bringing charge employee for of an at-will longer do if suit were filed? business bring threatening lawsuit lows that the district court did err any public policy: dismissing did not violate the action for failure to state Assoc., upon v. Becket & granted. Becket Welton Cal. claim which relief could be Cal.Rptr. O.S.1991, 2012(B)(6). App.3d I would affirm the Corp., Ill.App.3d v. Abrams Echlin order of the court dismissing district (1 884, 528 N.E.2d 429 123 Ill.Dec. Dist. action. Paine, Webber, 1988); Buysse & v. Jackson (8th Cir.1980) Curtis, F.2d 1244 I am authorized state that Vice Chief law); (construing Minnesota Meredith v. C.E. LAVENDER, HARGRAVE, Justice Justice Walther, Inc., (Ala.1982); and, So.2d join and Justice SUMMERS with me in the Magma Copper

Daniel Ariz. expressed views herein. (App.1980). P.2d Moreover, contrary to the inference of the

majority opinion, this case is not about the

employer reading implied “an covenant of

relinquishment” employment

courts into the contract. There

is no indication that order for Groce to be employed he must waive Clyde STALLINGS, Denver Atkinson Rather, right. some constitutional the em- Reynolds, Appellants, and Cecil ployer doing any prudent what business do; asking employees would it is its not to Indeed, sue customers the business. COMMISSION, TAX OKLAHOMA motivation case at bar Appellee. quite discharging seems Groce clear to No. 73769. Litigation employee me. between an aof business and a customer of that business Supreme Court Oklahoma. going negative to have some effect July relationship of the business and its customer. why It is therefore understandable the em-

ployer relationship would to sever desire actively pursuing

with an who was

litigation against employer. a customer of the

Such at-will vio- public policy of

lates no this state. involving

Neither is this action one a dis-

charge in retaliation for a workers’ O.S.1991,

compensation pursuant to 85 suggested majority opinion. 5-7 as Groce, employee,

The burden was prove discharged that he was in contra

vention of a clear mandate of policy, Hotels, Inc.,

Earner Americana 65 Haw. (1982), and Groce has beyond

failed to meet that burden. It is prove

doubt that could no set Groce of facts him would entitle to relief under Okla

homa law. Gunn v. Consol. Rural Water & (Okla.

Sewer District No. P.2d 1345

1992). Since the did not have a

legally recognized cause of action under the case,

facts and circumstances it fol- see notes malpractice occurring sue for medical 21 and 25. by SIMMS, Justice, right to such as the exercised citizens DISSENTING: be property right to own or the to arms. bear public poli Today majority extends the Rather, it a constitutional mandate ad exception doc cy to termination-at-will placed upon to dressed the courts of narrow in beyond well boundaries trine any person to open Oklahoma their doors to policy public it. to circumscribe This tended legally cognizable provi with a claim. Such in Burk v. K-Mart exception first announced designed limit sions are to the actions of (Okla.1989), adopted was Corp., 770 P.2d government pri rather than the actions of understanding apply that it would Depot vate individuals. v. Home Deiters Id. To only in a “narrow class cases.” Inc., (M.D.Tenn. U.S.A., F.Supp. day’s pronouncement permits the 1993); Royal Kavanagh v. ELM Dutch Air not fit within apply in a case does (N.D.Ill.1983). lines, class, respect I therefore must that narrow fully dissent. (Okla. Hoebel, In Moses v. 646 P.2d 601 1982), unanimously this Court held that Okla of action tort recognized Burk a cause “open provision prohibited homa’s courts” wrongful discharge where the enjoining prosecution district court from contrary discharge was “a that the shows personal injury plaintiff until action public policy as articulated mandate of clear paid expenses of defendants from constitutional, statutory or decisional by inju arising an earlier action from the same majority at finds law.” plaintiff ries which the had dismissed while (Groce) termination proceeding. trial was We stated: contrary in this case was litigants access to court. guaranteeing Open-Court-of-Justice Clause “Under constitution, obligation of the state ad- First, not Groce’s access to court has been judicated against Moses cannot serve as by employer. his His the actions of denied prose- to his bar courthouse party action the third was affect 6,§ Art. 2 Okl. cution another case. termination, by the all indica proceed Const. Moses’ with his appears tions it action subsequent protected claim a words, is viable. other Groce’s ac judge’s attempted clause. use courts is not hindered. See De cess obligation adjudicated in of the unsatisfied Markets, Super Marco v. Publix prevent case Moses from the dismissed (trial (Fla.1980) fn. court So.2d plain- pursuing claim in the refiled case employee’s action for dismissal Open-Court-of- ly both the contravenes proper employee’s per of our own constitution as Justice Clause injury against employer on be sonal federal and state minimum well pending and daughter half of was still neither process.” standards of due daughter nor his had been denied

Case Details

Case Name: Groce v. Foster

Court Name: Supreme Court of Oklahoma

Date Published: Sep 28, 1994

Citation: 880 P.2d 902

Docket Number: 78068

Court Abbreviation: Okla.