28 F. 597 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Rhode Island | 1886
The respondents in this case, on March 8, 1883, commenced, in the supreme court of the state of Rhode Island, an action of debt on a bond dated August 2é, 1868, and executed by Thomas C. Durant as principal, and the complainant and S. Dexter Bradford as sureties, binding them jointly and severally to Rowland
The complainant now brings this bill in aid of his defense to that action, and in support of his prayer for an injunction he alleges that, in the"course of certain proceedings in the circuit court of the United States for the Eastern district of Pennsylvania, Oliver Ames was appointed receiver of the Credit Mobilier of America, and, as such receiver, was authorized to execute to said Durant a release of all sums of money then due from him to the company, and from all actions and demands whatsoever, and that on October 27,1881, the said Ames executed and delivered such release to said Durant accordingly. He further alleges that Durant was not allowed to set up the release as a bar to the entering of a decree in the suit of Isaac P. Hazard et al. v. Thomas C. Durant et al., because he was in contempt of that court for violation of one of its decrees rendered therein. The respondents demur to this bill, and assign, as ground- of demurrer, that there is no equity in the bill, and that the validity of the release, and the validity of the decree of the supreme court of Rhode Island as affected by the release, were in issue in the action at law which is here sought to be enjoined, and were decided adversely to the claim of the complainant by the judgment on the demurrers.
The travel of the action at law, so far as it relates to this question, was as follows: The seventh plea set up the release above described as a bar to the action, and to that plea the respondents demurred generally and specially, and the demurrers were sustained, as appears by the last paragraph of the opinion in Hazard v. Griswold, above cited. The complainant then filed an amended plea, in which he set. up the release “as a further and equitable plea in this behalf.” The respondents moved to strike out this plea, on the ground that the courts of the United States cannot entertain equitable defenses to legal claims in actions at law, and the motion was granted, and the amended plea was stricken out.
The complainant in this bill now argues that the effect of the judgment oh the demurrer was only to determine that the seventh plea was bad as a legal defense to the action. We think he is right in this position. The judgment on the demurrer did not determine the validity of the release or of the judgment; it only determined that a
The demurrer will be sustained.