delivered the opinion of the Court.
This сase tests by habeas corpus the validity of Article 2 (11) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U. S. C. § 802, 1 as applied to á civilian tried by court- *279 martial for a capital offense while emplоyed overseas by the United States Army. It is a companion case tо No. 22, Kinsella v. Singleton, ante, p. 234, which involves the application of the same Article tо noncapital offenses committed by dependents accоmpanying soldiers stationed outside the United States, and to No. 21, McElroy v. Guagliardo, and No. 37, Wilson v. Bohlender, post, p. 281, involving noncapital offenses committed by armed-services employees while stationed overseas — all of which cases are decided today.
Petitioner, a civilian employee of the United Statеs Army attached to an Army installation in France, was tried by a general court-martial for the capital offense of premeditated murder as defined in Article 118 (1) of thé Uniform Code of Military Justice. He was 'found guilty of the lesser and included offense of unpremeditated, murder, and sentenced to confinement at hard labor for the term of-his natural life. The'sentence was subsequently reduced to 35 years. While serving this sentence at thе United States Penitentiary at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, he filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that Article 2 (11) was unconstitutional as applied to him, for the reason that Congress lacked the power to deprive him of a civil trial affording all of the protections of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the Constitution. • The writ was dismissed,
*280 We are of the opinion that this case is controlled by Reid v. Covert, supra. It decided that the apрlication of the Article to civilian dependents charged with cаpital offenses while accompanying servicemen outside thе United States was unconstitutional as violative of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.- We have carefully considered the Government’s position as to the distinctions between civilian dependents and civilian emplоyees, especially its voluminous historical materials relating to сourt-martial jurisdiction. However, the considerations pointed out in Covert hаve equal applicability here. Those who controlled the mаjority there held that the death penalty is so irreversible that a dependent charged with a capital crime' must have the benefit of а jury. The awesomeness of the death penalty has no-less impaсt when applied to civilian employees. Continued adherenсe to Covert requires civilian employees to be afforded the same right of trial by jury. Furthermore, the number of civilian employees is much smaller than the number of dependents, and the alternative procedures available for controlling discipline as to the former more' effеctive. See McElroy v. Guagliardo, post, p. 281. For the purposes of this decision, we cannot say that there are any valid distinctions between the two classes оf persons. The judgment is therefore reversed.
It is so ordered.
Notes
Art. 2. “The following persons are subject to this chapter:
“(11) Subject to any treaty or agreemеnt to which the United States is or may be a party or to any accеpted rule of international law, persons serving with, employed by, or аccompanying the armed forces outside the United States and outside the following: that part of Alaska east of longitude 172 degrees wеst, the Canal Zone, the main group of the Hawaiian Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.”
In the light of our opinion in No. 21, McElroy v. Guagliardo, handed down today, post, p. 281, we deny the contention that the article is honseverable.