After a jury trial judgment was entered for the plaintiffs (appellants herein) in the amount of $2,530.00, which represented the difference between the verdict for plaintiffs in the amount of $3,165.00, and а separate verdict for the defendants in the amount of $635.00. The defendants (respondents herein) moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial on four grounds; i. e., insufficiency of the evidence, the verdict being against law set forth in the instructions; insufficiency and lack of evidence to establish defendants’ liability; and that the evidence as a matter of lаw substantiated the basis of defendants’ affirmative defense and counterclaim.
In granting this motion, the trial court held:
“The defendants Motion for a new trial is granted on the grounds that the damages awarded by the jury herein were excessive; and, further, that there was insufficient evidence to justify the verdict, and said verdict was contrary to the law, the plaintiffs are required to remit to the defendants all оf the damages except the sum of $440.-00, and unless within 20 days after service on plaintiffs’ attorney a copy of this order, the plaintiffs file with the clerk, a written consent to reduce the verdict to $440.00 plus costs, the Motion for a New Trial will be granted and trial date set.”
The plaintiffs did not file their written consent reducing the judgment, but instead have appealed from this order granting the new trial. The sum of $440.00 represents the undisputed items in plaintiff’s complaint.
The specifications of error and contentions of the plaintiffs are directed to the authority of the trial court to grant a new trial when there is a conflict in the evidence on the factual issues presented to the jury for determination, and when there is substantial evidence to support the verdict reached by the jury. It is contended that the granting of the new trial, when evi *223 dence is conflicting, is the substitution of the views of the trial court for the findings of the jury and that it is an abuse of discretion for the trial court to grant a new trial under such circumstances.
Appellants rely principally on the following Idaho decisions to sustain their positiоn: Baldwin v. Ewing,
“[Speaking of the right to grant a new trial] In exercising this prerogative the judge is not allowed to substitute his opinion for that of the jury. He should act to reduce the verdict or grant a new trial only in cases where it is clearly excessive and unsupported by the evidence.”
Subsequent to the opinions in these cases this court in Coast Transport, Inc. v. Stone,
“Thе trial court exercises a wide discretion in ruling on a motion for new trial. In cases where a new trial has been granted the record will be liberally construed in support of the оrder. [Citing authorities.]
“Appellant recognizes the foregoing rules. He urges that here, there being no conflict in the evidence as to damages, its sufficiency presents a questiоn of law, and, as such, is not addressed to the discretionary power of the trial court. In such case he urges the trial court cannot set aside the verdict if there is any evidenсe at all sufficient to sustain the verdict. He would apply the rule governing in the case of a motion for a directed verdict. That rule is comparable to the one which governs this court, in cases of appeals taken on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence, to the effect that where there is any competent evidence to sustain the verdict, though conflicting, it will not be set aside. We have held such a rule not applicable to the trial court in passing upon a motion for a new trial. [Citing authorities.]
“ ‘The рrobative force and effect of the evidence is ultimately for the determination of the trial court upon the hearing of a motion for a new trial; this is so even though there is no conflict therein. [Authorities cited.] The trial judge is in possession of many sources of information of value in an inquiry as to whether justice has prevailed or miscarried which is not nоr can be made available to this court; * * Sanchotena v. Tower Co.,74 Idaho 541 , at page 548,264 P.2d 1021 , at page 1025.
“The trial court did not err in granting a new trial, nor in conditioning the *224 new trial upon defendant’s refusal to waive thе items of damage as to which the proof was insufficient.”
The distinction between the rules on non-suit or directed verdict and of motions for new trial, is to be found in Stone v. Matthies,
This court is firmly committed to the proposition that when the trial court is of the opinion that a verdict, based on conflicting evidence, or even when there is no conflict, is not in acсord with law or justice, he may grant a new trial, and such order will not be reversed on appeal, except for manifest abuse of discretion in making the order. Poston v. Hollar,
“The trial judge sees the witnesses on the witness stand, observes the manner of their testifying, notes their appаrent candor or fairness, or the want of it, hears the argument of counsel, and, in short, is in possession of many sources of information valuable in an inquiry as to whether justice has miscarried or not, and which cannot be made to appear in the record of the case which comes to the appellate court; and, appreciating such fact, appellate courts have so frequently held, that it may be announced as settled law, that trial courts possess a discretion to be exercised wisely in the granting оr refusal of new trials, and that such discretion will not be by the appellate court disturbed unless it manifestly and clearly appears to have been exercised unwisely and to have been manifestly abused.”
See also cases set out in footnote 1 .
*225
In the case of Baldwin v. Ewing,
In National Produce Distributors v. Grube,
In the instant case Mr. Grimm did certain land-levelling for defendant Harper on his farm. The work was started prior to potato-planting time. Harper thereafter planted the seed potatoes and later, after harvest, Grimm returned and did more work. The principal issues between the parties were whether Grimm had аgreed to have the field level prior to planting time; whether as leveled at that time, it irrigated properly; whether the work subsequently performed was an item of the initial agrеement, or whether it was performed to correct errors on Grimm’s part in doing the work for which he should not be paid. Harper by his cross-complaint sought damages for loss of crops by reason of the failure of the field properly to irrigate.
As previously pointed out, the jury returned two separate verdicts, one for the plaintiffs, and the other fоr the defendants. The verdict for the defendants was in an amount equal to what Harper had paid to another person to get his land to properly irrigate. Harper, during the сourse of the trial, sought to amend his cross-complaint to include this amount, which amendment was refused by the trial court. Although the evidence concerning this amount, was not beforе them to resolve any material issue it was used by the jury in determination of what Harper was entitled to receive on his counter-claim for loss of crops. *226 Such sum hears no relаtion to the amounts claimed by him in that regard.
Although the evidence on the principal issues was conflicting, that alone does not bar the trial court from exercising his discretion in the granting or refusing to grant a new trial. Under the facts appearing in the record, the trial court did not err in granting the new trial.
Order affirmed.
Costs to respondent.
Notes
. Jacksha v. Gilbert,