Gerald C. GRIMAUD, John G. Bergdoll, and Matthew R. Battersby, Appellants, v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Honorable Yvette Kane, Secretary of the Commonwealth, Appellee, John M. Perzel, Speaker of the House of Representatives and Senator Robert C. Jubelirer, President Pro Tempore of the Senate, Intervenors.
No. 126 MAP 2002.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Decided Jan. 18, 2005.
865 A.2d 835
Argued May 11, 2004.
Justice EAKIN dissents.
Gerald J. Pappert, Esq., J. Bart DeLone, Esq., John G. Knorr, III, Esq., Calvin R. Koons, Esq., John T. Henderson, Jr., Harrisburg, for Hon. Yvette Kane, Sec. of the Com.
Jason K. Cohen, Esq., Jonathan F. Bloom, Esq., C. Clark Hodgson, Esq., Philadelphia, for John Perzel, Speaker of the House and Senator Robert Jubelirer.
BEFORE: CAPPY, C.J., and CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN, SAYLOR, EAKIN and BAER, JJ.
OPINION
Justice EAKIN.
In the 1998 general election, the majority of the electorate approved amendments to
Before amendment,
All prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses when the proof is evident or presumption great; and the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in case of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.
Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, further providing for bail. The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania hereby resolves as follows:
Section 1. The following amendment to the Constitution of Pennsylvania is proposed in accordance with Article XI:
That section 14 of Article I be amended to read:
§ 14. Prisoners to be bailable; habeas corpus.
All prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses
for which the maximum sentence is death or life imprisonmentOR FOR OFFENSES FOR WHICH THE MAXIMUM SENTENCE IS LIFE IMPRISONMENT or unless no condition or combination of conditions other than imprisonment will reasonably assure the safety of any person and the community when the proof is evident or presumption great; and the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in case of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.
Joint Resolution No. 3, 1995, P.L. 1153, S.B. No. 12. In 1998, the General Assembly passed Joint Resolution 1998-1:
Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, further providing for bail. The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania hereby resolves as follows:
Section 1. The following amendment to the Constitution of Pennsylvania is proposed in accordance with Article XI:
That section 14 of Article I be amended to read: § 14. Prisoners to be bailable; habeas corpus.
All prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses or for offenses for which the maximum sentence is life imprisonment or unless no condition or combination of conditions other than imprisonment will reasonably assure the safety of any person and the community when the proof is evident or presumption great; and the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in case of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.
Joint Resolution No. 1, 1998, P.L. 1327, H.B. No. 1520. The Attorney General prepared a “plain English statement” and the proposed amendment was published. The amendment was submitted to the electorate, which voted in favor of it.
Article I, § 6 (trial by jury):
Before amendment,
Trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof remain inviolate. The General Assembly may provide, however, by law, that a verdict may be rendered by not less than five-sixths of the jury in any civil case.
Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, further providing for trial by jury and waiver of this right. The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania hereby resolves as follows:
Section 1. The following amendment to the Constitution of Pennsylvania is proposed in accordance with Article XI:
That Article I, section 6, be amended to read:THAT SECTION 6 OF ARTICLE I BE AMENDED TO READ:
§ 6. Trial by Jury.
Trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof remain inviolate. The General Assembly may provide, however, by law, that a verdict may be rendered by not less
than five-sixths of the jury in any civil case. Furthermore, in criminal cases the accused may waive the right to a jury trial only with the consent of the Commonwealth. THE COMMONWEALTH SHALL HAVE THE SAME RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY AS DOES THE ACCUSED.
Joint Resolution No. 1, 1996, P.L. 1545, S.B. No. 752. In 1998, the General Assembly passed Joint Resolution 1998-2, which stated:
Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, further providing for trial by jury. The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania hereby resolves as follows:
Section 1. The following amendment to the Constitution of Pennsylvania is proposed in accordance with Article XI:
That section 6 of Article I be amended to read:
§ 6. Trial by jury.
Trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof remain inviolate. The General Assembly may provide, however, by law, that a verdict may be rendered by not less than five-sixths of the jury in any civil case. Furthermore, in criminal cases the Commonwealth shall have the same right to trial by jury as does the accused.
Joint Resolution No. 2, 1998, P.L. 1328, S.B. No. 555. The Attorney General prepared a “plain English statement” and the proposed amendment was published. The amendment was submitted to the electorate, which voted in favor of it.
Appellants filed a complaint in the Commonwealth Court seeking a declaration that the amendments were invalid, alleging: (1) each ballot question actually proposed multiple amendments in violation of
Article I, § 14
Appellants argue the bail question violated
Shall the Pennsylvania Constitution be amended to disallow bail when the proof is evident or presumption great that the accused committed an offense for which the maximum penalty is life imprisonment or that no condition or combination of conditions other than imprisonment of the accused will reasonably assure the safety of any person and the community?
Complaint, 10/19/98, at Exhibit A; R.R., at 84a.
The first question is what standard is applicable in determining whether the changes were properly presented as a single question. This Court‘s decision in Pennsylvania Prison Society v. Commonwealth, 565 Pa. 526, 776 A.2d 971 (2001) (plurality), resulted in no clear majority on the standard to apply. We are persuaded by Justice Saylor‘s concurrence
a single-subject test and examined the interdependence of the proposed constitutional changes in determining the necessity for separate votes. See, e.g., Korte v. Bayless, [16 P.3d 200, 203-05] (Ariz.2001) (explaining a “common-purpose formulation” to inquire into whether the proposed amendments are sufficiently related to “constitute a consistent and workable whole on the general topic embraced“); Clark v. State Canvassing Bd., [888 P.2d 458, 462] (N.M. 1995) (applying a “rational linchpin” of interdependence test); Sears v. State, [208 S.E.2d 93, 100] (Ga.1974) (inquiring into whether all of the proposed changes “are germane to the accomplishment of a single objective“) (quotations and citations omitted); Fugina v. Donovan, [104 N.W.2d 911, 914] (Minn.1960) (upholding separate propositions that, although they could have been submitted separately, were rationally related to a single, purpose, plan, or subject).
Id., at 984 n. 1; see also Manduley v. Superior Court, 27 Cal.4th 537, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168, 41 P.3d 3, 28 (2002) (various provisions must be reasonably related to common theme or purpose); Fine v. Firestone, 448 So.2d 984, 990 (Fla.1984) (amendment must manifest “a logical and natural oneness of purpose...“).
Although we are not bound by these decisions, we find them persuasive, and adopt the “subject matter test” for determining whether a ballot question violates
We analyze the ballot question‘s substantive affect on the Constitution, examining the content, purpose, and effect. Pennsylvania Prison Society, at 980. Here, the Commonwealth Court properly noted that merely because an amendment “may possibly impact other provisions” does not mean it violates the separate vote requirement. Grimaud, at 930. The test to be applied is not merely whether the amendments might touch other parts of the Constitution when applied, but rather, whether the amendments facially affect other parts of the Constitution. Indeed, it is hard to imagine an amendment that would not have some arguable effect on another provision; clearly the framers knew amendments would occur and provided a means for that to happen. The question is whether the single ballot question patently affects other constitutional provisions, not whether it implicitly has such an effect, as appellants suggest.
The bail amendments do not substantively affect the right to defend one‘s self, the right to be free from excessive bail, or the reservation that Article I rights remain inviolate. The argument concerning the amendment of
Appellants contend the Attorney General‘s “plain English statement” did not adequately set forth the purpose, limitations, and effects of the bail ballot question. Section 201.1 of the Pennsylvania Election Code provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Whenever a proposed constitutional amendment or other Statewide ballot question shall be submitted to the electors of the Commonwealth in referendum, the Attorney General shall prepare a statement in plain English which indicates the purpose, limitations and effects of the ballot question on the people of the Commonwealth.
The purpose of the ballot question is to amend the Pennsylvania Constitution to add two additional categories of criminal cases in which a person accused of a crime must be denied bail. Presently, the Constitution allows any person accused of a crime to be released on bail unless the proof is evident or presumption great that the person committed a capital offense. A capital offense is an offense punishable by death. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has ruled that a person accused of a crime that is not a capital offense may be denied bail only if no amount or condition of bail will assure the accused‘s presence at trial.
The ballot question would amend the Constitution to disallow bail also in cases in which the accused is charged with an offense punishable by life imprisonment or in which no condition or combination of conditions other than imprisonment of the accused will reasonably assure the safety of any person and the community. The ballot question would extend to these two new categories of cases in which bail must be denied the same limitation that the Constitution currently applies to capital cases. It would require that the proof be evident or presumption great that the accused committed the crime or that imprisonment of the accused is
necessary to assure the safety of any person and the community. The proposed amendment would have two effects. First, it would require a court to deny bail when the proof is evident or presumption great that the accused committed a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment. Second, it would require a court deciding whether or not to allow bail in a case in which the accused is charged with a crime not punishable by death or life imprisonment to consider not only the risk that the accused will fail to appear for trial, but also the danger that release of the accused would pose to any person and the community.
Complaint, 10/19/98, at Exhibit A; R.R., at 84a. Appellants contend the sum of the Attorney General‘s statement (1) identified the purpose of the ballot question as disallowing bail to persons charged with crimes punishable by life imprisonment and to persons deemed dangerous, and (2) stated the effect of the amendment was to deny bail to those people. Further, the statement identified the limitations as being the same for persons charged with crimes punishable by life imprisonment and persons deemed dangerous as for those accused of capital offenses. Appellants, relying on standards set forth in the Commonwealth Court‘s decision in Pennsylvania Prison Society, which was reversed by this Court, believe the electorate should have been told the most significant reason for preventive detention is flight risk, and that this Court observed preventative detention: (1) would incarcerate for future offenses rather than punish for past offenses; (2) presumes the accused is guilty rather than innocent; (3) presumes the accused will commit additional crimes if released on bail; and (4) contravenes the purpose of bail for the accused to prepare for trial. See Commonwealth v. Truesdale, 449 Pa. 325, 296 A.2d 829, 836 (1972). Appellants also assert the implied effect on
“[T]he duties of the Attorney General do not include providing an in depth illustration of how a proposed amendment to the constitution may affect the public.” Lincoln Party v. General Assembly, 682 A.2d 1326, 1332 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1996). Although not bound by this decision, we find it insightful. A comprehensive recitation of all ramifications of a constitutional amendment is not the goal of this summary—such a comprehensive consideration lies in the legislative history. The Attorney General is to present a “statement,” not a treatise. The Attorney General here provided a sufficient explanation of the purpose, limitations, and effects of the bail amendment and thus, complied with the statutory requirements.
Appellants argue the bail ballot amendment should be found null and void because the General Assembly‘s Joint Resolutions published in 1996 and 1998, proposing to amend
Bills or joint resolutions introduced in the General Assembly proposing amendments to the Constitution of Pennsylvania shall be printed in such a manner as to indicate the words to be added to or deleted from the Constitution.
Regarding the differences between the 1996 and 1998 resolutions, the same amendment was agreed upon by the General Assembly in two successive legislative sessions. The language of the resolutions was identical and followed a natural progression of not including the struckthrough language from Joint Resolution 1995-3 in Joint Resolution 1998-1. No constitutional violation exists because “[a]rticle XI does not require identical language or content in the resolutions (as opposed to the proposed amendment itself)....” Mellow v. Pizzingrilli, 800 A.2d 350, 359 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002) (emphasis in original). Here, where the language was identical and the format was reasonably close to enable the electorate to understand it, there was no violation.
Appellants argue the question pertaining to
Shall the Pennsylvania Constitution be amended to provide that the Commonwealth shall have the same right to trial by jury in criminal cases as does the accused?
Complaint, 10/19/98, at Exhibit A; R.R., at 84a. Appellants contend the amendment amended not only
Applying the test previously discussed, the amendment does not facially affect other parts of the Constitution. See Pennsylvania Prison Society, at 980. Only one substantive change is made, that is, to give the Commonwealth the right to trial by jury. Thus, the Commonwealth Court did not err in concluding the single jury trial ballot question was properly submitted to the electorate.
Appellants challenge the adequacy of the Attorney General‘s “plain English statement,” which explained:
The purpose of the ballot question is to amend the Pennsylvania Constitution to give the Commonwealth, as representative of the people and the victim, the same right to a jury trial in criminal cases as is currently given to the accused. Beginning in 1935, Pennsylvania law provided that the accused in a criminal case could waive his or her right to a
jury trial as long as both the court and the Commonwealth consented. Because the accused could be tried without a jury only if the Commonwealth consented, the Commonwealth had the same right to a jury trial as did the accused. With the constitutional amendments of 1968, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was given the authority to issue rules of procedure. In 1968, the Supreme Court adopted a rule of criminal procedure that continued the statutory practice requiring the Commonwealth‘s consent when an accused waives the right to a jury trial. In 1973, however, the Supreme Court amended the rule to remove the need for the Commonwealth‘s consent which took away from the Commonwealth the same right to a jury trial that is given to the accused.
In 1977, the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted law that returned to the Commonwealth the same right to a jury trial that is given to the accused, but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared the 1977 law unconstitutional because it conflicted with the 1973 amendment to the Court‘s procedural rule.
The effect of the ballot question would be to restore the law to what it was prior to the Supreme Court‘s 1973 rule, namely, that the Commonwealth would have the same right to a jury trial in a criminal case as does the accused, which is also consistent with federal law. The right of an accused to a jury trial would not be affected by the proposed amendment.
A limitation on the proposed amendment is that it would give the Commonwealth no greater a right to a jury trial than is given to the accused.
Complaint, 10/19/98, at Exhibit B; R.R., at 84a. Appellants complain the statement is: (1) not objective because the Attorney General cites supportive federal law; (2) inaccurate in paragraph one because the Commonwealth represents the people, not the victim; and (3) inaccurate in paragraph two because the accused could waive the right to a jury trial
[T]he jury amendment will fundamentally change Pennsylvania‘s Constitutional scheme (i) by identifying government power as a right, (ii) by placing government power in Article I, rather than in a subsequent, Frame of Government Article[,] and (iii) by equating and juxtaposing the rights of an individual with the power of government prosecutors, despite Article I, Section 25 (Reservation of Rights in the People); the Attorney General fails to inform the electorate that the purpose and effect is to change the purpose of a jury, to empower the government to force a jury on the accused even when the accused believes he cannot have a fair trial with a jury; the Attorney General fails to inform the electorate that the purpose and effect is to shift discretion away from the trial court (Pa.R.Cr[im].P.1101) to the prosecutor to require a jury trial; and, the Attorney General fails to inform the electorate that
Article I[,] § 7 (Free press and speech; libels),§ 9 (Rights of accused in criminal prosecutions), [§]25 (Reservation of rights in the people) andArticle V[,] § 10(c) (Judicial administration) are effected by an affirmative vote on the ballot question.
Appellants’ Brief, at 54-55 (footnotes omitted). As stated previously, an in-depth illustration of how the proposed amendment will affect the public is not required in the “plain English statement.” The Attorney General‘s statement sufficiently informed the electorate of the purpose (to give the Commonwealth the same right to a jury trial as the accused), the limitation (to give the Commonwealth no greater right than the accused), and the effect (a restoration of the law prior to this Court‘s 1973 rule, consistent with federal law, that the Commonwealth would have the same right to a jury trial in a criminal case as does the accused).
Appellants question the competency of the 1996 resolution proposing amendment of
Appellants allege the House of Representatives failed to comport with
Here,
The Commonwealth Court committed no error in granting the Commonwealth‘s motion for summary judgment and denying appellants’ motion for summary judgment.
Order affirmed.
Chief Justice CAPPY files a concurring and dissenting opinion in which Justice NIGRO and BAER join.
Chief Justice CAPPY, concurring and dissenting.
Today, the majority dilutes the heretofore strict and mandatory “separate vote” requirement contained in Article XI, Section 1 of our Constitution. It does so to the detriment of the citizens of our Commonwealth. Indeed, the majority‘s adoption of the “subject matter test” is not only inconsistent with the plain language of the Constitution, but also with the Framers’ intent as to how to safeguard the citizenry with respect to the amendment of that social compact, and our six-year-old decision in Bergdoll v. Kane, 557 Pa. 72, 731 A.2d 1261 (1999). In adopting this test, the majority dispossesses the voters who may wish to amend certain facets of our fundamental law, but not others, of the right to do so, and instead, encumbers them with a Hobson‘s choice between accepting all proposed amendments or none of them. Accordingly, while I concur as to the result reached by the majority regarding the constitutionality of the amendment to
The majority, however, has ignored these mandates with respect to
Here, the language of the Constitution setting forth the requirements for legislative amendment could not be clearer.
Furthermore, in interpreting a constitutional provision, a court also may consider the circumstances attending its formation and the construction probably placed upon it by the people. Tate, 22 A. at 643. A review of the debates surrounding the adoption of the “separate vote” requirement confirms this plain meaning interpretation approach to
We took this approach to
In engaging in this analysis, the Court in Bergdoll implicitly eschewed a more liberal approach which would have focused upon the “interrelatedness” of the amendments to a “single subject.” This “interrelatedness” approach was expressly argued by the Commonwealth in Bergdoll, Commonwealth‘s Brief at pp. 17-20, and proffered by a single concurring Justice, who echoed the position voiced by Judge Pelligrini in his dissent in the Commonwealth Court below. Bergdoll, 694 A.2d 1155, 1159 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997). It is no different from the “subject matter test” embraced by the majority today. Yet, we did not adopt this approach in Bergdoll. This is because the literal and plain meaning approach employed by us in Bergdoll was inconsistent and irreconcilable with this “interrelatedness” approach advocated by the Commonwealth and the concurrence.2
Finally, and contrary to the approach taken by the Court in Bergdoll, the majority‘s approach will make constitutional
Application of the straightforward and proper approach—the one mandated by the terms of Article XI, Section 1, the Framers’ intent, and Bergdoll—to the amendments at issue, leads to the conclusion that while the proposed amendment to
Based upon the above amendment, it becomes clear that the proposal contains two distinct amendments: (1) disallow bail for those accused of a crime for which the maximum penalty is life imprisonment and (2) disallow bail for those who are a safety risk to any person and the community. See Commonwealth v. Truesdale, 449 Pa. 325, 296 A.2d 829, 835-36 (1972). By combining these two amendments into a single ballot question, the voter is confronted with an impossible and unconstitutional Hobson‘s choice if he or she believes that bail should be disallowed only for those individuals facing life
In sum, for all of the above reasons, while I find the amendment to
Justice NIGRO and BAER join this concurring and dissenting opinion.
Notes
§ 1. Proposal of Amendments by the General Assembly and their adoption
Amendments to this Constitution may be proposed in the Senate or House of Representatives; and if the same shall be agreed to by a majority of the members elected to each House, such proposed amendment or amendments shall be entered on their journals with the yeas and nays taken thereon, and the Secretary of the Commonwealth shall cause the same to be published three months before the next general election, in at least two newspapers in every county in which such newspapers shall be published; and if, in the General Assembly next afterwards chosen, such proposed amendment or amendments shall be agreed to by a majority of the members elected to each House, the Secretary of the Commonwealth shall cause the same again to be published in the manner aforesaid; and such proposed amendment or amendments shall be submitted to the qualified electors of the State in such manner, and at such time at least three months after being so agreed to by the two Houses, as the General Assembly shall prescribe; and, if such amendment or amendments shall be approved by a majority of those voting thereon, such amendment or amendments shall become a part of the Constitution; but no amendment or amendments shall be submitted oftener than once in five years.
As the interrelatedness approach—expressly before the Court in Bergdoll—was not adopted in that decision, and because such an approach is clearly inconsistent with the Bergdoll Court‘s analytical construct, the approach that was taken in Bergdoll represents binding precedent from this Court. The doctrine of stare decisis requires adherence to recent decisions as precedential authority. See Burke v. Pittsburgh Limestone Corp., 375 Pa. 390, 100 A.2d 595 (1953). It ensures predictability and stability in the affairs of government and people and it is essential to the rule of law. While the doctrine may be disregarded when faced with an unsupportable or erroneous holding, or where the reason for a rule of law no longer exists and application would cause injustice, see Ayala v. Phila. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877, 888-89 (1973), notably absent from the majority opinion are any reasons why the approach in Bergdoll is no longer supportable or erroneous. Indeed, the majority fails even to mention Bergdoll.