78 Pa. 152 | Pa. | 1875
delivered the opinion of the court, May 10th 1875.
At the point which had been reached in the trial of this cause, when the declarations of George Wenner were admitted in evidence, there had been no proof to warrant the assumption that he had ever been authorized to act as agent for the defendant. The witness Gurnee and the plaintiff had sworn, that Wenner and the defendant had been together at the plaintiff’s store, and that some negotiation was had for the purchase of grain. The defendant declined to buy, and in leaving, he said, according to the statement
The memorandum which the plaintiff testified he received from Wenner when the contract for the grain was made, was also improperly admitted. The record does not show in whose handwriting the memorandum was. It may or may not have been in Wenner’s, but that is indifferent, for it could only have been made competent evidence by proof, either that the defendant had written it, or that he had authorized Wenner to act as his agent. * The first and second specifications of error are sustained.
The testimony specified in the third, fourth and sixth assignments of error should have been received. The defendant had sworn that he had given no order, verbal or written, for the grain purchased from the plaintiff. Wenner was indebted to him in a sum exceeding $900. When the car load of grain was bought, the plaintiff had been requested to ship it to the defendant. The offer was to prove that at the time of the delivery, the defendant bought the grain of Wenner, and gave him a credit on his books for the amount which had been agreed upon as its price, and that Wenner had said about the middle of October 1872, that he had a car load of grain at Ereemansburg, and had requested the defendant to unload it and give him credit on his books. The defendant’s day-book was offered to show the fact that the credit was given on the 18th of October 1872. Now, keeping in view the defendant’s positive denial of any authority in Wenner to bind him, there was nothing in the position of. the parties at the point of time to which these offers related, to create a motive to fabri
The rejection of the letter of Wenner, to which the fifth assignment relates, was right. It was sent from Reading, and although dated on the 18th of October 1872, must be presumed to have been received after the delivery had been accomplished. Declarations, to become part of the res gestee, must have been made at the time of the act done which they are supposed to characterize, and calculated to unfold the nature and quality of the facts they were intended to explain: Enos v. Tuttle, 8 Conn. 250. So far from harmonizing with the other testimony offered, the letter introduced an element entirely inconsistent and in conflict with it. If the fact which it disclosed, that the grain bad been bought in his name had been brought to his notice before delivery, it is to be assumed that the defendant would not have accepted it. The letter would have been admissible only as the act of a participant in a combination by Wenner with the plaintiff to defraud the defendant, and not the slightest suggestion of the existence of such a combination has been made throughout the cause.
There was no such error in the answer of the court below to the defendant’s point, as, of itself, to require a reversal of the judgment. The statements proved to have been made by the defendant in his conversation with Gurnee, were some evidence that he had bought the grain of Wenner and had credited him with its price. By the rigid, rejection of the other testimony, however, they stood alone, and, without any corroboration, they can scarcely be held to have amounted to proof substantial and significant enough to have supported a verdict.
Judgment reversed, and a venire facias de novo awarded.-