43 U.S. 319 | SCOTUS | 1844
LESSEE OF ROBERT GRIGNON, PETER B. GRIGNON, AND MORGAN L. MARTIN, PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR,
v.
JOHN J. ASTOR, RAMSAY CROOKS, ROBERT STUART, AND LINNS THOMPSON.
Supreme Court of United States.
*329 Choate, for the plaintiffs in error.
Crittenden and Lord, for the defendants in error.
*335 Mr. Justice BALDWIN delivered the opinion of the court.
This case comes here on a writ of error from the Supreme Court of the Territory of Wisconsin, the premises in controversy were formerly owned by one Peter Grignon, to whom they were confirmed by an act of Congress, passed 21st February, 1823, to be found in 3 Story's Laws, 1877. He died in March following, intestate, indebted, and leaving two sons who are lessors of the plaintiff, one born in 1803, the other in 1806. They conveyed one-third to Martin, the other lessor, in 1834. The lessors claim as heirs-at-law of Peter Grignon, and the conveyance from them to Martin.
In 1824, letters of administration on the estate of Peter Grignon were duly granted to Paul Grignon, the brother of the deceased, who gave bond for the performance of the trust, according to law. In January, 1826, he presented his petition to the County Court of Brown county, then in the Territory of Michigan, praying for an *336 order from the court, to authorize him to dispose of the real estate of the said Peter, which was granted, a license issued to the administrator to sell in March, 1826. A sale was accordingly made to Augustin Grignon, to whom a deed was executed by the administrator in June, 1826, and duly recorded. The defendants claim title under this sale, by sundry mesne conveyances from the purchaser.
The law of Michigan is set forth in the statement of the case by the reporter.
In the County Court the following proceedings were had:
"At a session of the County Court for the county of Brown, begun and held at the township of Green Bay, in the school-house, on Tuesday, the tenth day of January, one thousand eight hundred and twenty-six.
"Present: the Hon. James Porlier, chief justice, and John Lawe, Esq., associate justice. The court was opened by George Johnston, sheriff.
"The petition of Paul Grignon, administrator on the estate of Pierre Grignon, late of the county of Brown, (deceased,) was filed by his attorney, H.S. Baird, praying for an order from the court to authorize him to dispose of the real estate of said Pierre.
"In consideration of the facts alleged in said petition, and for divers other good and sufficient reasons, it is ordered that he be empowered as aforesaid.
"Minutes read, corrected, and signed by order of the court.
ROBERT IRWIN, Jun., Clerk." TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN, | Brown county, > SS. |The United States of America, to Paul Grignon, administrator of Pierre Grignon, deceased.
Be it known, to all whom it may concern, that at a term of the County Court of the county of Brown, continued and held at the township of Green Bay, in said county, on Tuesday, the tenth day of January, in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and twenty-six, before the Hon. James Porlier, chief justice, and John Lawe, Esq., associate justice, Paul Grignon, administrator of all and singular the goods and chattels, rights and credits, lands and tenements of Pierre Grignon, deceased, late of the county of Brown aforesaid, represents to this court, then and there in session, that the said Pierre died intestate, at Green Bay, in said county of Brown, on the fourth day of March, A.D. 1823; that at the time of his death, *337 the said Pierre was seised in his demesne as of fee in and to the following tracts or lots of land, situated at Green Bay aforesaid, to wit:
Lot number three, on the east side of Fox river, bounded north by land claimed by the estate of Dometile Longevin, south by Augustin Grignon, and four-and-a-half arpens in front, and eighty arpens rear.
Also, lot number five, on the same side of said river, bounded north by Augustin Grignon's claim, and south by land claimed and occupied by John Lawe, Esq., being four acres and sixteen feet wide, and extending back eighty acres.
Also, lot number three, in dispute between said deceased and George Johnston, on the west side of said Fox river, lately occupied by said George Johnston, bounded north by Louis Grignon, and south by land of said deceased, being eight chains and sixty-two links wide, and eighty arpens deep.
Also, lot number four, on the same side of said river, bounded north by the last mentioned claim, and south by land claimed by John Lawe, Esq., being eight chains and fifty links wide, and extending back eighty arpens.
And that it has been ascertained by the petitioner that the goods and chattels belonging to the estate of the said deceased are insufficient to pay all the just debts which he owed at the time of his death, but that the estate will be insolvent; and therefore prays that leave may be granted him to dispose of the tracts and lots of land aforesaid.
Now, therefore, for the causes aforesaid, and for divers other good and sufficient reasons, the court thereunto moving, they do hereby authorize and empower you the said administrator, to dispose of all the right, title, and interest of the deceased in and to the above described tracts and lots of land in such manner as will best serve the interest of all concerned in said estate, requiring of you a due observance of the statute in such case made and provided.
WITNESS, James Porlier, chief justice of the County Court of the county of Brown, at the township of Green Bay, on the 28th of March, A.D. 1826.ROBERT IRWIN, Jun., Clerk B C.
At the trial numerous questions of evidence arose, and many instructions were asked of the court, to whose opinion the plaintiffs excepted; but we do not deem it necessary to notice them in detail, as in our opinion the whole merits of the controversy depend on one *338 single question, had the County Court of Brown county jurisdiction of the subject on which they acted?
Jurisdiction has been thus defined by this court.
"The power to hear and determine a cause is jurisdiction; it is coram judice whenever a case is presented which brings this power into action; if the petitioner presents such a case in his petition, that on a demurrer the court would render a judgment in his favour, it is an undoubted case of jurisdiction; whether on an answer denying and putting in issue the allegations of the petition, the petitioner makes out his case, is the exercise of jurisdiction, conferred by the filing a petition containing all the requisites, and in the manner required by law." 6 Peters, 709. "Any movement by a court is necessarily the exercise of jurisdiction; so, to exercise any judicial power over the subject-matter and the parties, the question is whether, on the case before a court, their action is judicial, or extra-judicial, with, or without the authority of law, to render a judgment or decree upon the rights of the litigant parties. If the law confers the power to render a judgment or decree, then the court has jurisdiction, what shall be adjudged or decreed between the parties, and with which is the right of the case, is judicial action by hearing and determining it." 12 Peters, 718; S.P. 3 Peters, 205. It is a case of judicial cognisance, and the proceedings are judicial. 12 Peters, 623.
This is the line which denotes jurisdiction and its exercise, in cases in personam, where there are adverse parties, the court must have power over the subject-matter and the parties; but on a proceeding to sell the real estate of an indebted intestate, there are no adversary parties, the proceeding is in rem, the administrator represents the land, (11 S. and R. 432;) they are analogous to proceedings in the admiralty, where the only question of jurisdiction is the power of the court over the thing, the subject-matter before them, without regard to the persons who may have an interest in it; all the world are parties. In the Orphans' Court, and all courts who have power to sell the estates of intestates, their action operates on the estate, not on the heirs of the intestate, a purchaser claims not their title, but one paramount. 11 S. and R. 426. The estate passes to him by operation of law. 11 S. and R. 428. The sale is a proceeding in rem, to which all claiming under the intestate are parties, (11 S. and R. 429,) which directs the title of the deceased. 11 S. and R. 430.
As the jurisdiction of such courts is irrespective of the parties in *339 interest, our inquiry in this case is whether the County Court of Brown county had power to act in the estate of Peter Grignon, on the petition of the administrator under the law of Michigan, providing, that where the goods and chattels of a decedent are not sufficient to answer his just debts, on representation thereof, and the same being made to appear to the County Court where he dwelt, or where his real estate lies, it may license the executor or administrator to make sale of so much as will satisfy the debts and legacies.
No other requisites to the jurisdiction of the County Court are prescribed than the death of Grignon, the insufficiency of his personal estate to pay his debts, and a representation thereof to the County Court where he dwelt or his real estate was situate, making these facts appear to the court. Their decision was the exercise of jurisdiction, which was conferred by the representation; for whenever that was before the court, they must hear and determine whether it was true or not; it was a subject on which there might be judicial action. The record of the County Court shows that there was a petition representing some facts by the administrator, who prayed an order of sale; that the court took those facts which were alleged in the petition into consideration, and for these and divers other good reasons ordered that he be empowered to sell. It did then appear to the court that there were facts and reasons before them which brought their power into action, and that it was exercised by granting the prayer of the petitioner, and the decree of the court does not specify the facts and reasons, or refer to the evidence on which they were made to appear to the judicial eye; they must have been, and the law presumes that they were such as to justify their action. 14 Peters, 458. But though the order of the court sets forth no facts on which it was founded, the license to the administrator is full and explicit, showing what was considered and adjudicated on the petition and evidence, and that every requisition of the law had been complied with before the order was made, by proof of the existence of all the facts on which the power to make it depended. 3 Peters, 202; 2 Peters, 165. We all know that even in the old states, the records of these and similar proceedings are very imperfectly kept, that where it consists of separate pieces of paper, they are often mislaid or lost by the carelessness of clerks and their frequent changes; regular entries of the proceedings are not entered on the docket as in adversary cases, nor are the facts set forth in the petition entered at large; and it is no matter of surprise that in so new and remote part of the country as *340 the place where these proceedings were had, this state of things should exist. Nor is it necessary that a full or perfect account should appear in the records of the contents of papers on files, or me judgment of the court on matters preliminary to a final order; it is enough that there be something of record which shows the subject-matter before the court, and their action upon it, that their judicial power arose and was exercised by a definitive order, sentence, or decree. 2 Peters, 165. The petition in the present case called for a decision of the court that the facts represented did or did not appear to them to be sufficiently proved; they decided that they did so appear, whereby their power was exercised by the authority of the law, and it became their duty to order the sale, unless in a case under the 3d section. The subsequent provisions of the act of Michigan relate exclusively to acts and proceedings in the execution of the order of sale or are directory to the administrator to accompany the representation with a certificate of the judge of probate, and to the court, before passing on such representation, to order notice to be given to the parties concerned, to show cause why the license should not be granted; but these provisions do not affect the jurisdiction of the court, they apply only to its exercise. After the court has passed on the representation of the administrator, the law presumes that it was accompanied by the certificate of the judge of probate, as that was a requisite to the action of the court; their order of sale is evidence of that or any fact which was necessary to give them power to make it, and the same remark applies to the order to give notice to the parties. This is a familiar principle in ordinary adversary actions, in which it is presumed after verdict, that the plaintiff has proved every fact which is indispensable to his recovery, though no evidence appears on the record to show it; and the principle is of more universal application in proceedings in rem after a final decree by a court of competent jurisdiction over the subject-matter.
The granting the license to sell is an adjudication upon all the facts necessary to give jurisdiction, and whether they existed or not is wholly immaterial, if no appeal is taken; the rule is the same whether the law gives an appeal or not; if none is given from the final decree, it is conclusive on all whom it concerns. The record is absolute verity, to contradict which there can be no averment or evidence; the court having power to make the decree, it can be impeached only by fraud in the party who obtains it. 6 Peters, 729. A purchaser under it is not bound to look beyond the decree; if there is error in it, of the *341 most palpable kind, if the court which rendered it have, in the exercise of jurisdiction, disregarded, misconstrued, or disobeyed the plain provisions of the law which gave them the power to hear and determine the case before them, the title of a purchaser is as much protected as if the adjudication would stand the test of a writ of error; so where an appeal is given but not taken in the time prescribed by law. These principles are settled as to all courts of record which have an original general jurisdiction over any particular subjects; they are not courts of special or limited jurisdiction, they are not inferior courts, in the technical sense of the term, because an appeal lies from their decisions. That applies to "courts of special and limited jurisdiction, which are created on such principles that their judgments, taken alone, are entirely disregarded, and the proceedings must show their jurisdiction;" that of the courts of the United States is limited and special, and their proceedings are reversible on error, but are not nullities, which may be entirely disregarded. 3 Peters, 205. They have power to render final judgments and decrees which bind the persons and things before them conclusively, in criminal as well as civil causes, unless revised on error or by appeal. The true line of distinction between courts whose decisions are conclusive if not removed to an appellate court, and those whose proceedings are nullities if their jurisdiction does not appear on their face, is this: a court which is competent by its constitution to decide on its own jurisdiction, and to exercise it to a final judgment, without setting forth in their proceedings the facts and evidence on which it is rendered, whose record is absolute verity, not to be impugned by averment or proof to the contrary, is of the first description; there can be no judicial inspection behind the judgment save by appellate power. A court which is so constituted that its judgment can be looked through for the facts and evidence which are necessary to sustain it; whose decision is not evidence of itself to show jurisdiction and its lawful exercise, is of the latter description; every requisite for either must appear on the face of their proceedings, or they are nullities. The Circuit Court of this district has original, exclusive, and final jurisdiction in criminal cases, its judgment is a sufficient cause on a return to a writ of habeas corpus; "on this writ this court cannot look behind the judgment and re-examine the charges on which it was rendered. A judgment in its nature concludes the subject in which it is rendered, and pronounces the law of the case. The judgment of a court of record, whose jurisdiction is final, is as conclusive on *342 all the world as the judgment of this court would be. It is as conclusive in this court as it is on other courts. It puts an end to all inquiry into the fact by deciding it." 3 Peters, 204, 205.
"To determine whether the offence charged in the indictment be legally punishable or not, is among the most unquestionable of its (the Circuit Court) powers and duties; the decision of the question is the exercise of jurisdiction, whether the judgment be for or against the prisoner, it is equally binding and remains in full force until reversed." 3 Peters, 204, 205.
If the jurisdiction of the court in a civil case is not alleged in the "pleadings, the judgment is not a nullity, but though erroneous, is obligatory as one, (3 Peters, 206,) and in a proceeding in rem, an erroneous judgment binds the property on which it acts, it will not bind it the less because the error is apparent, and the judgment is of complete obligation." 3 Peters, 207. The judgment of the Circuit Court, in a criminal case, "is of itself evidence of its own legality, and requires for its support no inspection of the indictments on which it is founded. The law trusts that court with the whole subject, and has not confided to this court the power of revising its decision." 3 Peters, 207.
These principles have been applied by this court to sales made under the decrees of Orphans' Courts: where they have power to judge of a matter of fact, "they are not required to enter on record the evidence on which they decided that fact. And how can we now say but that the court had satisfactory evidence before it, that one of the heirs was of age? If it was so stated in terms on the face of the proceedings, and even if the jurisdiction of the court depended on that fact; it is by no means clear, that it would be permitted to contradict it, on a direct proceeding to reverse any order or decree made by the court. But to permit that fact to be drawn in question in this collateral way, is certainly not warranted by any principle of law." 2 Peters, 165, Thompson v. Tolmie.
"If the purchaser (under a decree of the Orphans' Court) was responsible for their mistakes in point of fact, after they had adjudicated upon the facts, and acted upon them, those sales would be snares for honest men." 2 Peters, 169, cited 11 S. and R. 429.
"The purchaser is not bound to look farther back than the order of the court. He is not to see whether the court were mistaken in the facts of debts and children. The decree of an Orphans' Court in a case within its jurisdiction is reversible only on appeal, and not *343 collaterally in another suit. A title under a license to the administrator to sell real estate, "is good against the heirs of the intestate, although the license was granted upon the certificate of the judge of probate, not warranted by the circumstance of the case."
"The license was granted by a court having jurisdiction of the subject: if it was improvidently exercised, or in a manner not warranted by the evidence from the probate courts; yet it is not to be corrected at the expense of the purchaser, who had a right to rely upon the order of the court, as an authority emanating from a court of competent jurisdiction." 2 Peters, 169, and 11 Mass. 227, cited.
In that case the jurisdiction of the court was held to attach, "when the acceptor dies intestate, and any of the persons entitled to his estate is a minor, (2 Peters, 165;) so in this case it attaches on the decease of any person indebted beyond the personal estate he leaves, and when jurisdiction is once attached to a subject, or exists over a person, this court has adopted as a rule applicable to all courts of records that their decisions are conclusive; "it has a right to decide every question which occurs in a cause, and whether its decision be correct or otherwise, its judgment, until reversed, is binding on every other court." 1 Peters, 340. In Voorhees v. The Bank of the United States the same principle is applied to sales or executions under judgments on adversary process, and such must hereafter be taken to be the established law of judicial sales, as well relating to those made in proceedings in rem, as in personam. 10 Peters, 473.
We do not deem it necessary, now or hereafter, to retrace the reasons or the authorities on which the decisions of this court in that, or the cases which preceded it, rested; they are founded on the oldest and most sacred principles of the common law. Time has consecrated them; the courts of the states have followed, and this court has never departed from them. They are rules of property, on which the repose of the country depends; titles acquired under the proceedings of courts of competent jurisdiction must be deemed inviolable in collateral action, or none can know what is his own; and there are no judicial sales around which greater sanctity ought to be placed, than those made of the estates of decedents, by order of those courts to whom the laws of the states confide full jurisdiction over the subjects.
These sales are less expensive than when made on executions; more time is allowed to make them; the discretion of the court is exercised as to time, manner, and the terms of sale; whereas on sales *344 by a sheriff, all is by compulsion and no credit is allowed; he cannot offer one entire piece of property for sale in parcels; the administrator can divide and sell as best subserves the interest of the heirs, and sell only so much as the emergency of the case requires.
It has been contended by the plaintiff's counsel, that the sale in the present case is not valid, because Peter Grignon had not such an estate in the premises as could be sold under the order of the County Court, it being only an equitable one before the patent issued in 1829; but the title became a legal one by its confirmation by the act of Congress of February, 1823, which was equivalent to a patent. It was a higher evidence of title, as it was the direct grant of the fee which had been in the United States by the government itself, whereas the patent was only the act of its ministerial officers.
These views of this case decide it, without examining the exceptions to the admission of evidence, the ruling of the court on the instruction prayed, or their charge to the jury. So far as either were unfavourable to the plaintiff, they are most fully sustained by the foregoing principles and cases; the County Court of Brown county had undoubted jurisdiction of the subject; their proceedings are irreversible; the title of the purchaser cannot be questioned; and the judgment of the court below must be affirmed with costs.
ORDER.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Supreme Court of the Territory of Wisconsin, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, It is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that the judgment of the said Supreme Court of the Territory of Wisconsin in this cause be, and the same is hereby affirmed with costs.
