Amy Ruth GRIGGS, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Charlie E. GRIGGS, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
Nos. 14250, 14820
Supreme Court of Idaho.
Aug. 8, 1984.
686 P.2d 68
“[a] willful, intentional disregard for the employer‘s interests; a deliberate violation of the employer‘s rules; or a disregard of the standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of his employees.” Johns v. S.H. Kress & Co., 78 Idaho 544, 548, 307 P.2d 217, 219 (1957).
See Cornwell v. Kootenai County Sheriff, 106 Idaho 823, 683 P.2d 859 (1984); Roll v. City of Middleton, supra; Simmons v. Dept. of Employment, 99 Idaho 290, 581 P.2d 336 (1978). Claimant‘s behavior simply does not fall within the accepted meaning of disqualifying misconduct. All that the employer was here able to demonstrate was that the claimant had some philosophical differences with the employer and that her attendance record for staff meetings was, in its view, less than exemplary. There was conflicting testimony as to the number of times claimant was absent or late for staff meetings as well as the reasons for the tardiness or absence. Philosophical differences on humane treatment of mental patients, coupled with conflicting testimony as to alleged breach of the employer‘s rules, will not mount to the level of misconduct as previously defined by the Court. Disagreeing philosophically with one‘s employer, where that disagreement is not manifested in insubordination or defiance of a directive certainly is not unreasonable, and should not be declared as misconduct precluding a terminated employee from benefits.
The Commission, in considering the evidence presented to the hearing examiner, was required to examine the record of the hearing before the appeals examiner of the Department of Employment and then determine therefrom whether the examiner‘s findings of fact were adequately and sufficiently supported by the record. The Commission should then have considered, if the record did so support the findings, whether the conclusions of law as reached by the examiner were correct. The Commission had before the same written record which is before us. It simply adopted the decision of the appeals examiner as its decision. For my part, I am wholly unable to discern on what basis and on what evidence the Commission relied in its determination of misconduct. At the very least, the Commission had to conclude that the employer had the burden of proving claimant‘s misconduct and it had to find that burden sustained. See Parker v. St. Maries Plywood, supra. Agreeing that an extensive explanation of the examiner‘s determination of each minor factual issue presented is not required, the factual findings in this case do not even begin to touch upon the basic factual issues dealing with claimant‘s performance and are therefore insufficient to justify a denial of the benefits which the law intends to be available for working people discharged through no fault of their own. The very most that can be said here is that Harrelson did not, in the eyes of Pine Crest, turn out to be adapted or adaptable to working in this particular mental institution. She was hired on the basis of a trial period of employment, solid evidence that, just as Pall Malls aren‘t for everyone, working at Pine Crest is not for everyone, which Pine Crest itself recognized.
It is very difficult for me to accept that anyone could carefully peruse this short record and find disqualifying misbehavior.
Francis H. Hicks, Mountain Home, for plaintiff-respondent.
DONALDSON, Chief Justice.
This case is an appeal from an Order of the District Court issued on reconsideration, pertaining to the distribution of property incident to a divorce proceeding. On May 2, 1954, plaintiff-respondent (wife) and defendant-appellant (husband) were married in Maryland. Husband served in the United States Air Force for four years prior to the marriage, and eighteen years during the marriage. During his tour of duty, husband was injured in Vietnam, and was assessed as being disabled to the extent of 20%.
On March 4, 1980, wife brought an action in Idaho for a divorce, and a division of the property of the marriage. The magistrate court granted the divorce and divided the property of the marriage between the parties. The magistrate court specifically found that at the time of the divorce, hus-
Subsequently, husband moved to amend the Findings and Conclusions of the magistrate court, contending that the military disability payments were his separate property. The magistrate court thereafter amended the Findings, Conclusions and Decree to provide that the disability pay was husband‘s separate property.
Wife then appealed the Amended Order of the magistrate court to the district court stating “[t]he sole issue on Appeal is whether the Judge of the Magistrate‘s Division committed error in holding that the defendant‘s military retirement pay is separate property and in awarding the entire amount of such retirement pay to the defendant.” The district court reversed the amended decree of the magistrate court and held that the disability benefits were community property.
Husband appealed from the district court‘s order to the Idaho Supreme Court. However, by stipulation of the parties, the appeal was held in abeyance pending negotiations for post-trial relief. On reconsideration of the district court‘s orders, wife contended that only the division of the military disability payments were before the court. Husband contended that the division of the entire military benefits were before the court. Furthermore, husband informed the court that McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 101 S.Ct. 2728, 69 L.Ed.2d 589 (1981), had been decided by the United States Supreme Court, on June 26, 1981, after both the magistrate court and district court had issued their decisions. On the basis of the McCarty holding, husband asserted that the supremacy clause of the
On reconsideration, the district court held that only the issue of the disability pay was placed in issue on appeal, and concluded that the disability pay was husband‘s separate property in light of McCarty. This decision left intact the status of the magistrate court‘s order which classified the retirement pay as community property. Husband appeals from this order.
I.
Retirement Pay
The district court stated that only the classification of the disability pay was placed in issue on appeal from the magistrate court, and again on reconsideration. We do not express an opinion as to whether the district court erred in this holding, because we view this case as one of those rare occasions in which we choose to exercise our plenary jurisdiction under
A series of recent decisions from our Court and the United States Supreme
However, after both the magistrate and district courts issued their decisions, the United States Supreme Court issued the McCarty decision. We previously stated that the McCarty Court determined that “state courts are precluded from applying community property principles and dividing military retirement pay in divorce actions.” Rice v. Rice, 103 Idaho 85, 87, 645 P.2d 319, 321 (1982).
On the basis of the McCarty holding, husband filed an appeal to this Court, and a motion for relief from the district court‘s order. While this case was pending appeal, we issued our decision in Rice, supra. In Rice, we recognized that we were required to apply the McCarty holding and thus, we overruled Ramsey, insofar as it conflicted with McCarty. In sum, we concluded that military retirement pay was separate property not subject to division between the parties in a divorce action. Rice, supra.
In 1982, Congress responded to the McCarty decision, by enacting remedial legislation—Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act—as a part of Pub.L. No. 97-252, Title X. Department of Defense Authorization Act, Pub.L. No. 97-252, Tit. X, 96 Stat. 718, 730 (1982). This Act amended chapter 71 of Title 10, United States Code by adding § 1408(c)(1) which provides as follows:
“Subject to the limitations of this section, a court may treat disposable retired or retainer pay payable to a member for pay periods beginning after June 25, 1981, either as property solely of the member or as property of the member and his spouse in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction of such court.”
In view of the above, we have reviewed our opinion in Rice. Because our holding therein was premised solely on the basis of McCarty, which has been effectively overruled, we overrule Rice and reinstate our holding in Ramsey as the law of Idaho.
We must now discuss the specific effect the amendment will have on the case at bar. The effective date of the amendment is February 1, 1983, and thus, the amendment is operative in this case.
This case is not a final decree as defined by the amendment3 because the
II.
Disability Pay
The record discloses that the magistrate court made the following Finding of Fact in its original decree on September 12, 1980.
“The Defendant receives disability pay from the United States Air Force for injuries received in Viet Nam. However, the payment of this disability pay reduces the amount of retirement pay received in the same amount. The only benefit Defendant receives as a result of this exchange of entitlement is that the portion of pay designated as disability pay, is not taxable.”
This finding has never been contested and was incorporated into the district court‘s original order and again on reconsideration. In view of this finding, the magistrate court concluded that the effect of receiving the disability payments was to reduce the retirement benefits proportionately. Thus, the magistrate ruled that the disability pay was community property. Thereafter, the magistrate court amended its decree to provide that husband‘s disability pay was his separate property. On appeal from the magistrate court, the district court determined that the disability pay was community property. However, on reconsideration, the district court then determined that the disability pay was husband‘s separate property.
In classifying husband‘s military disability benefits, a proper analysis must begin with analyzing the nature of the compensation received. We previously classified disability benefits received from a group term disability insurance policy “paid as partial consideration for past employment” as community property. Guy v. Guy, 98 Idaho 205, 207, 560 P.2d 876, 878 (1977). Conversely, in Cook v. Cook, 102 Idaho 651, 653, 637 P.2d 799, 801 (1981), we held that workmen‘s compensation is not received as compensation for a person‘s labors, but rather that “the purpose of the workmen‘s compensation law is to make good the loss or impairment of earning power resulting from on the job injury.” Thus, we concluded that while all property acquired during the marriage is presumed to be community property, workmen‘s compensation benefits received beyond an amount attributable to lost earning power during the marriage were the separate property of the injured spouse. We believe that the nature of the disability benefits considered herein are indistinguishable from the nature of the workmen‘s compensation benefits considered in Cook. Therefore, the disability benefits received subsequent to the divorce should be awarded as husband‘s separate property. However, our analysis does not end here.
Members of the armed forces who acquire a physical disability incurred while entitled to basic pay will generally receive disability benefits when leaving the service. See
Congress has apparently made a policy decision that when a member of the armed forces is entitled to both disability and retirement pay, a service member may compute his total benefits by either of two methods. Both methods are computed by multiplying the last monthly basic pay by either (1) 2½% of years of service credited or, (2) by the percentage of disability received. The service member may elect the method which yields the greater total benefits.
Regardless of the method the service member chooses to compute the total benefits, the legislation further provides that the amount which the service member would receive under the second method (the percentage of disability method) shall be designated as disability retired pay. As such, this amount is excluded from the member‘s gross income as “amounts received ... for personal injuries.”
We believe that
Having given this matter careful consideration, we affirm the order of the district court classifying the disability pay as separate property and, the trial court is instructed to award that portion of the total payment received which has been designated as “disability pay” in accordance with the requirements of
The record on this matter is wholly inadequate to make an accurate division of the property at this time. Thus, we remand this case to the trial court for a division of the community property in accordance with the above views, and with instructions to take additional evidence if necessary to make an accurate division thereof.
Parties to bear their own costs on appeal. No attorney fees on appeal.
SHEPARD, BAKES, BISTLINE and HUNTLEY, JJ., concur.
BAKES, Justice, concurring specially:
The Court‘s opinion affirms the district court‘s ruling that the military disability payments received after divorce are the separate property of the appellant, and that the remaining retirement benefits earned during the marriage are community property. This case is being remanded to the trial court only to consider, with additional evidence if necessary, whether a non-equal
Notes
“(3) ‘Final decree’ means a decree from which no appeal may be taken or from which no appeal has been taken within the time allowed for taking such appeals under the laws applicable to such appeals, or a decree from which timely appeal has been taken and such appeal has been finally decided under the laws applicable to such appeals.”