425 Mass. 31 | Mass. | 1997
A jury determined that the defendants, Thomas J. Campbell and Bonnie J. Glenn, were civilly liable to the plaintiff, Deirdre A. Griffiths, executrix of the estate of Sherman C. Griffiths, for the death of her husband, Detective Sherman C. Griffiths of the Boston police department.
Campbell, an accountant, and Glenn, the principal of a real estate firm, bought the apartment building located at 102-104 Bellevue Street, in the Dorchester section of Boston, in March, 1987. Campbell was the day-to-day manager, supervising any renovations and collecting the rents. The tenants remained the same after the purchase as before (with one irrelevant exception).
The plaintiff offered the following evidence.
Campbell would visit the building to collect rent and, at other times, would be present when contractors were doing work in the apartments. When Campbell collected rent for apartment no. 104-3, he would be met by different individuals who claimed to be the occupant’s brother or cousin. Campbell was never able to see all the apartment.
The plaintiff’s expert said that the defendants were
The plaintiff highlights the following points in support of her argument that Campbell should have been aware of drug sales in his building: he was aware of the prior drug arrest in the apartment building; an inference that, because Campbell was on the premises often, he would have noticed excessive foot traffic in and out of the apartment building; testimony from two workers that a “casual observer” would have been aware of drug traffic; imputed knowledge to the defendants that this was a neighborhood known for its drug use
The plaintiff argues that, even if the landlord did not install
Landlords may be liable for ignoring criminal activities that occur on premises and were known or should have been known to them. See Fund v. Hotel Lenox of Boston, Inc., 418 Mass. 191 (1994).
A landlord “is not a guarantor of the safety of persons in a building’s' common area. A landlord is not free, however, to ignore reasonably foreseeable risks of harm to tenants, and others lawfully on the premises, that could result from unlawful intrusions into common areas of the leased premises.” Whittaker v. Saraceno, 418 Mass. 196, 197 (1994).
In Whittaker, supra, we focused on the foreseeability of the criminal conduct and the ability to prevent that conduct. Id. at 197-201. In that case, we held that the landlord of a commercial office building could not be held liable for negligence for failing to prevent an attack against a woman who worked in the office building because the landlord could not have rea
Further, the cases in which we have imposed liability are those in which a person legally on the premises is attacked, and the owner or landlord knew of or should have known of both the previous attacks and the potential for a recurrence based on a failure to take measures to make the premises safer. The plaintiff did not offer any evidence of prior shootings. The landlord knew or should have known of one prior drug raid. Here, Detective Griffiths would have been in no better position than he was on the evening of February 17, 1988, had Campbell notified police of his suspicion.
An injury to a police officer who is hurt while engaged in police business cannot be attributed to the landlord based solely on the landlord’s failure to notify the police of the landlord’s suspicions of illegal activity. Even if Campbell had known that drugs were being sold out of the apartment building and was negligent in not reporting that fact to the police,
If we were to conclude that a homicide was reasonably foreseeable based on the failure of a landlord to act on a suspicion of illegal drug activity, we would be permitting inference upon inference to impose liability. That we cannot do. “There must be limits to the scope or definition of reasonable foreseeability based on considerations of policy and
So ordered.
For cases arising out of similar set of facts, see Commonwealth v. Luna, 418 Mass. 749 (1994); Commonwealth v. Lewin (No. 3), 408 Mass. 147 (1990); Commonwealth v. Lewin, 405 Mass. 566 (1989).
We view the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See MacCormack v. Boston Edison Co., 423 Mass. 652, 659 (1996).
One downstairs tenant said that soon after she moved into the building she became aware that there was drug dealing upstairs and she began going there to buy drugs herself.
The plaintiff did not offer any evidence of drug arrests in this particular section of Dorchester with the exception of the arrests directly related to this case.
The evidence as to the reason that the intercom system was installed was that it was in response to a complaint of a tenant on the first floor who did not want to be disturbed by people visiting the third floor of the building.
The plaintiff introduced a check and check stub from Campbell to a contractor for the installation of two doors. The stub read that the doors installed were for “104-2 and O/S” and were for apartment no. 104-2 and
The plaintiff also argues that Campbell’s failure to object to the tenant’s use of the “two by fours” was a proximate cause of the shooting. No evidence was offered that a police lock or other heavy duty security device more commonly accepted by the plaintiff’s expert would have led to a different result from the use of the “two by fours” used to secure the door to apartment no. 104-3. Therefore, the landlord’s acquiescence to the method used to secure the door cannot be said to be a proximate cause of the shooting.
The plaintiff argues that Campbell should have told the police of the barricade. The plaintiff asserts that it is a reasonable inference that Campbell saw part of the barricade when collecting the rent. Even if this assertion were true, the police already knew that the door would be difficult to break down.
The police learned of the drug activity and were at the address with a search warrant.
On the result we reach, we need not discuss the so-called fireman’s rule. That rule precludes recovery from a negligent third party if the officer’s occupation exposes him to a particular risk in his professional capacity. Cf. Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693 (1973).