46 S.W.2d 1007 | Tex. Crim. App. | 1932
Lead Opinion
Conviction for transporting intoxicating liquor; punishment, one year in the penitentiary.
Appellant lived in Tyler, Texas, but on the day of his arrest herein was in Palestine, Anderson county, Texas, and was seen about 4:30 p. m. leaving the home of his brother-in-law, in a Chevrolet coupe. Officers who saw him leaving said he was putting something in the car which looked like sacks. They followed and at a point about a mile out overtook and passed him. They turned their car back in the road, stopped same, and one off the officers got out and started back to the car of appellant. As the officer approached, appellant got out of his car, came meeting the officer, and said “Boys don’t search me; I am loaded”. The two cars were driven back to Palestine where search of appellant’s car disclosed the presence of fifty-two half gallon jars of whisky. Appellant offered no testimony. The state introduced only two witnesses.
We see no error in either of the matters complained of. The acts, conduct and statement of appellant at and prior to the time of his arrest by the officers afforded ample ground for a reasonable belief on their part that he was transporting the intoxicating liquor. The statements made by appellant to Mr. Ballard and communicated by the latter to Messrs. Oldham and Lively would be circumstances affording additional ground for the belief of the officers that appellant was loaded and hauling the whisky at the time they saw him leave Palestine. However if there be any question as to the admissibility of the testimony of Mr. Ballard, based upon the statement of Mr. Lively that he only relied on what he saw and heard at the time he stopped appellant on the road, — still in view of the fact that the officers were otherwise entirely justified in searching appellant’s car, and that the testimony was plain that he was then engaged in the transportation of whisky, and the further fact that the jury gave to him the minimum penalty, we would hold in any event that the admission of the testimony of Mr. Ballard, if doubtful, would not suffice to bring about a reversal. Appellant cites Tendia v. State, 111 Texas Crim. Rep., 627, 13 S. W. (2d) 849, and McCoppy v. State, 110 Texas Crim. Rep., 569, 9 S. W. (2d) 741, but the facts of said cases are so unlike those involved in the instant case that we do not feel called upon to discuss them. They hold nothing contrary to our conclusion here.
Believing no error appears, the judgment will be affirmed.
Affirmed.
Rehearing
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING.
In the light of appellant’s motion for rehearing we have again carefully examined the facts, but are unable to agree with his contention that the officers were without probable cause in
It is urged that the statement made by appellant at the time he was stopped by the officers should not be considered because it is claimed the search had already commenced when the officers stopped the car. We do not go into a discussion of that matter, but the facts are very similar to those found in Carter v. State, 113 Texas Crim. Rep., 433, 22 S. W. (2d) 659 and Pena v. State, 111 Texas Crim. Rep., 218, 12 S. W. (2d) 1015. See also Williams v. State, 118 Texas Crim. Rep., 369, 40 S. W. (2d) 144; Johnson v. State, 118 Texas Crim. Rep., 293, 42 S. W. (2d) 422.
Appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.
Overruled.