115 Ga. 592 | Ga. | 1902
It appears from the record that certain creditors filed an equitable petition against the Finger and Shelley Manufacturing Company, and had a receiver appointed to take charge of the assets of the insolvent company. W. D. Griffith, receiver of the Athens Leather Manufacturing Company, was made a party plaintiff, and, in connection with other creditors, obtained verdict and judgment against the defendant company for a large amount. The receiver of the defendant company collected the assets of the company, and the money was applied to preferred debts, leaving the judgment of Griffith, receiver, unpaid. Thereupon Griffith by an amendment to his intervention alleged that the original stock of the defendant company had consisted of 139 shares of the value of $100 each; that this stock was increased in January, 1896, by 139 additional shares, and the increase subscribed for by the holders of the original stock; and that none of the new shares had been paid for. He prayed that the subscribers be made parties, and that the receiver be directed to collect the unpaid subscriptions. The stockholders were made parties, and Griffith alleged, by another amendment, that the debt to him as receiver had been contracted after the increase in the stock, and that he had extended credit upon the faith of the new issue of stock, and that until after the failure of the defendant company he did not know that this stock had not been paid for. The stockholders answered, denying any indebtedness for the stock, and denying having subscribed for any stock which had not been fully paid for. They alleged that the new stock was issued to them in payment of dividends due them by the company, and was not subscribed for but paid as such dividends. It was agreed by the parties that the'issues thus raised should be referred to the judge without the intervention of a jury, and that he should determine all questions of law and fact and render a decree in the case. The judge heard the case and rendered a decree against certain of the stockholders for a small amount. He decreed that each of these stockholders should pay a certain part of this, proportioned to his holdings of the stock, and entered judgment against each of them severally for his part. With this decree or judgment the judge filed an elaborate written opinion, in which he gave his reasons for the decision and decree rendered, and stated in part his conclusions from some of the evidence which seems to have been before him. Griffith and the receiver of the
It is well established in this and other courts that error can not be assigned upon mere reasons given by the judge for the judgment rendered. The judgment may be right and the reasoning wrong. It has therefore been held that the judgment itself is the only part of the record on which error can be assigned in a case of this sort. In the case of Smith v. Railway Co., 86 Ga. 195, it was held that “ error is not assignable on the reasons of the judge for granting a new trial;” and Bleckley, C. J., in discussing the question, said: “ The judgment granting a new trial rests upon the whole motion, not being put by the order upon any particular ground. The opinion of the court discusses the reasons of the presiding judge for deciding as he did. But these reasons, whether illogical or not, are no part of the judgment, and consequently are not open to attack by assigning them as error. The only reviewable action of the court in deciding the motion is the judgment which the court
Judgment affirmed,.