Aрpellant Jermaine L. Griffin was convicted on charges of obstruction of justice, in violation of D.C.Code § 22-722(a)(2) (1996), 1 and threatening to injure a person, in violation of D.C.Code § 22-2307 (1996). 2 He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to both of these charges. We cоnclude that on this record the evidence presented at trial was insufficient beyond a reasonable doubt to convict Mr. Griffin of the obstruction of justice charge, and thus, reverse his conviction as to that offense. Because we determine that the evidence was suffiсient beyond a reasonable doubt to convict him of threatening to injure a person, however, we affirm that conviction.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
The government charged Mr. Griffin with the armed murder of a young man named Vandros Kibler who apparently had stolen appellant’s bicycle. The evidenсe of this crime was primarily the testimony of Erica Haynes, who had seen Mr. Kibler take the bike, later told Mr. Griffin of the theft and was subsequently told by appellant that he had killed Mr. Kibler in retaliation (“I had to do what I had to do.”). A jury (after an initial mistrial) eventually acquitted Mr. Griffin of the murder and related weapons charges. The government, however, also charged Mr. Griffin with threats and obstruction of justice based on statements he had made to Monique Haynes, Erica’s sister, while under arrest for the charged murder. The evidence relevant to those charges, on which the jury convicted Mr. Griffin, is as follows.
Government witness Monique Haynes testified that in January 1998, while she was waiting to visit her cousin and ex-boyfriend at the District of Columbia jail, she saw Mr. Griffin. He motioned to her to come over to the glass separating visitors from the inmates. Ms. Haynes complied, and picked up the tеlephone to communicate with him. “He told [her] ... to tell Erica [Monique’s sister] to come down to his court date which was the next day after that and tell his lawyer everything that [she] told the police.” He also stated: “If [she does not] come something bad was going to happen to her.” Ms. Haynes did not remember exactly w)iat Mr. Griffin said except to “tell Erica to tell his lawyer everything that she told the police.” She did not remember “what that bad thing was.” However, “it was something life-threatening[,] something bad.” When asked “what was Jermaine’s tone of voiee[,]” Ms. Haynes replied: “He was just speaking regular.” Later, Ms. Haynes relayed the message to her sister. Monique stated that Erica Haynes “said she was going” to the court, and she looked “scared” after receiving the message from Mr. Griffin. The prosecutor asked Monique Haynes whether she testified at the grand jury that “something bad was going to happen to [Erica’s] life.” She answered, ‘Yes.” On cross-examination, Monique Haynes replied, “No” to defense counsel’s question: “He [Jermaine Griffin] didn’t ask you to tell Erica to he, did he?”
Erica Haynes 3 also testified as a government witness. When she saw Mr. Grif *613 fin one evening, shе borrowed his bike and one dollar to go to the store to get something to eat. Before she went into the store, she advised a man who had a reputation for stealing bikes not to take the bicycle. As she left the store, she saw the same man riding up the street on the bike. Her efforts to stop him failed. She again encountered Mr. Griffin while walking home and told him that his bike had been taken. Mr. Griffin said he could get his bike back. Later, while standing in front of her home, she saw Mr. Griffin speaking with the man who took his bicycle. After she had entered her home, she heard gunshots. When she went outside to see what had happened, she learned that the man who had taken the bicycle had been shot. The next day when she saw Mr. Griffin, he told her that the man who had stolen his bike was dead. He also allegedly said: “I killed him but don’t tell [any]body.” On cross-examination, Erica Haynes said when she аsked Mr. Griffin who shot the man who took his bicycle, he responded “jokingly” and she did not take him “seriously.”
The prosecutor asked Erica Haynes about the time her sister went to the D.C. jail. Erica Haynes confirmed that on the same day her sister Monique went to the jail, she reported that she had seen Mr. Griffin, and “that [Mr. Griffin] wanted [Erica] to be [at the court on the day of his preliminary hearing] so that [she] can talk to his lawyers or whoever about the situation.” In response to the prosecutor’s question as to what Mr. Griffin said would happen if she did not appear, Erica respоnded: “I don’t remember word-for-word but she said that it was life-threatening.”
On cross-examination Erica Haynes acknowledged that when the police first interviewed her in December 1997, she stated that she did not hear gunshots on the night Mr. Griffin’s bicycle was stolen. The police accused her of lying and said she had “to be concerned about her baby” if she did not “cooperate with them.” She then agreed that she had heard gunshots. Erica Haynes also admitted that she had advised her sister that she “thought some Spanish people had done the shooting.” On redirect examination Erica Haynes asserted that she had dissembled about the gunshots because she did not “want to talk to the police at all” and did not “want to be snitching.”
ANALYSIS
Mr. Griffin contends that as a matter of law, the evidence was insufficient to convict him beyond a reasonable doubt of obstruction of evidence “because the third element — that defendant made a threat with the specific intent to influence, delay, or prevent Erika Haynes’ truthful testimony — was not met in this case.” Hence, the trial court should have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal. The government argues thаt based upon reasonable inferences, it satisfied its burden beyond a reasonable doubt to prove obstruction of justice.
“In reviewing a claim of evidentiary insufficiency, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, recognizing the province of the fact finder to weigh the evidence, resolve issues of credibility and to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence presented.”
Smith v. United States,
D.C.Code § 22-722(a) (2001) provides in pertinent part:
(a) A person commits the offense of obstruction of justice if thаt person: ....
(2) Knowingly ... threatens or corruptly persuades another person, or ... endeavors to influence, intimidate or impede a witness ... in any official proceeding, with intent to:
(A) Influence, delay, or prevent the truthful testimony of the person in an official proceеding;
To establish that Mr. Griffin committed the offense of obstruction of justice, the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that:
1. That [he] endeavored to influence, intimidate or impede Erica Haynes;
2. That [he] did so by threatening Erica Haynes, or sending a threatening communication to her;
3. That [he] did so with the specific intent to:
Influence, delay or prevent Erica Haynes’ truthful testimony in a preliminary hearing in a court of the District of Columbia; and
4.That [he] knew or believed that Erica Haynes was a witness.
See CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE District of Columbia, No. 4.81 (4th ed. 2002).
On this record we are unable to conclude that thе evidence presented at trial was sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt to establish Mr. Griffin’s specific intent to influence or prevent Erica Haynes’ truthful testimony in a preliminary hearing.
See Brown v. United States,
Drawing the inferences the government advocates would take us into the realm of speculation. The record shows that Mr. Griffin did not ask Erica Haynes to come down and testify or lie in his behalf at his preliminary hearing. Rather, in a regular voice, he asked that she speak with his lawyer to tell him what she had said to the police. It is simply too much of a stretch to conclude that Mr. Griffin’s message instructed Erica Haynes to lie at his preliminаry hearing, or that by importuning her to tell his lawyer what she had told the police (a statement that in fact inculpated him) he somehow intended false testimony to be put before the tribunal. In short, on this limited and attenuated record, to convict Mr. Griffin of obstructing justice, jurors would have to еngage in speculation and the drawing of several inferences which would not comport with the reasonable doubt standard required for a criminal conviction. As we said in
Curry v. United States,
We reach a different conclusion, however, concerning Mr. Griffin’s conviction of threatening to injure a person. To satisfy its burden, the government must present credible evidence:
1. That the defendant uttered words to another; [4]
2. That these words were of such a nature as to convey fear of serious bodily harm of injury to the ordinary hearer; and
3. That the defendant intended to utter these words as a threat. [5]
Baish, supra note 4, at 42 (citing CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, No. 4.17 (3d ed. 1978)). See also D.C.Code § 22-1810 (2001) (“Whoever threatens within the District of Columbia ... to injure the person of another ... shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.”).
Mr. Griffin contends that the government failed to prove the second element of this offense. He argues that “[bjeeause the jurors were not presented with the words allegedly used by [him], they were unable to evaluate whether the words spoken would have been considered threatening by the ‘ordinary listener.’ ” The government responds that “based on the context in which [Mr. Griffin] communicated his message to Erica [Haynes], the jury could infer that [his] words were a threat.”
*616
Here, according to testimony from Monique Haynes, Mr. Griffin’s message to Erica Haynes was “tell Erica to come down tо his court date ... and tell his lawyer everything that [she] told the police.” The penalty for not complying with his wishes was, “something bad was going to happen to her,” “something life-threatening.” “No precise words are necessary to convey a threat. It may be bluntly spoken, or done by innuendo or suggestion.”
Clark v. United States,
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we reverse Mr. Griffin’s conviction on the charge of obstruction of justice, but affirm his conviction for threatening to injure a person; and we remand this case to the triаl court for resentencing.
So ordered.
Notes
. Recodified at D.C.Code § 22-722 (2001).
. Recodified at D.C.Code § 22-1810 (2001). Mr. Griffin was sentenced to four to twelve years in prison on the obstruction charge and a concurrent sentence of three to nine years in prison on the threats offense.
.Erica Haynes’ first name also appeаrs in the record as "Erika.”
4. "[T]he government need not prove that the threatening words were conveyed directly to the potential victim; proof that the words were communicated to a third party suffice[s].”
United States v. Baish,
5. The government challenges the correctness of this third element of the offense, citing the less demanding language of
Campbell v. United States,