*1 GRIFFIN v. UNITED STATES. Argued 15-16,
No. 417. April 25, December 1948. Decided 1949. *2 petitioner. With Kelly argued
Francis J. the cause Reynolds and J. Louis
him on the brief were James R.
O’Connor. for the United Murray argued
Charles B. the cause him on Solicitor General
States. With the brief were
Perlman, Attorney Campbell, Assistant Robert General Erdahl R. Philip
S. and Monahan. opinion delivered the Frankfurter Justice
Mr.
Court. (1) Title 28
This was under of brought § case here by dismissal review the the United States Code to
the Court of for the District of Columbia for a new trial appeal from the denial of a motion petitioner discovered after the ground in degree.
had been of murder the first convicted admissibility is the of that
U. S. 866. The decisive issue its exclusion question through
evidence. The arises not
at trial a motion for a new trial order to be but on newly
able to introduce discovered. Griffin, convicted petitioner, Baxter was the outcome killing of Lee Hunter. The
murder Hunter, that shot Griffin quarrel. Admitting he story was that that he did so self-defense. His
claimed playing game card called
the deceased and he were
blackjack, larger share of the that Hunter demanded pay,
pot upon than and that his refusal right, was his with table, around “jumped up
Hunter started my pocket, and told he would kick hand his me
his my out of On cross-examination Griffin
teeth head.” Accordingly, to kill him.
added that Hunter threatened Hunter continued, his Griffin shot Hunter as story
so him This pocket.
advanced toward with his hand his five Gov-
version of occurrence was contradicted petitioner
ernment Each started witnesses. testified argument, nothing and that it had to do with the game which, according account,
card to their was over began. According them,
before the fracas this is happened:
what to Hunter Griffin made some remark taking baby
about Hunter’s around to Griffin’s wife
house; replied petitioner’s Hunter kick he would *3 thereupon down house throat;
teeth his Griffin left the
and within a on gun, returned ten with his minutes Hunter,
return shot who had no from the made move
spot standing. where he Griffin admitted that he was
saw in nothing Hunter’s at the time he shot Hunter. hand
On evidence, 28, the summarized, jury the on March
1947, found Griffin in the on guilty degree; murder first
April 18, 1947, he was on December death; sentenced
8, 1947, the affirmed, App. conviction was 83 U. S. D. C.
20, 164 F. 903; 15, 2d on March this Court denied
certiorari,
On a a little more than month before
day set for execution, began present proceed- Griffin a
ings for new trial. It was based on then affidavits his
counsel who averred that it had come to his recently
knowledge that the attendant at an morgue had found
opened in penknife pocket trousers’ of the deceased prosecutor
and that knew of at this the time of the
trial but failed to introduce this in circumstance
or make it available to the defense. The affidavits further
alleged that there was evidence that playing cards were
on floor immediately after the a shooting, fact which
(cid:127)707 would, defense, had it known have been to the tended that in game
corroborate Griffin’s statement the card was
progress at the of the An shooting. time extended hear-
ing was had on motion for a trial. allegation new
regarding scattered playing cards on the floor at the time
of the fatal shooting adequately met, ground and this new trial not us. need detain to Griffin’s af- discovery,
As after his conviction was
firmed, of pocket the undisclosed knife of the
deceased, the Government conceded that it of this knew at despite
circumstance the time of the trial
knowledge neither introduced the fact evidence nor felt
any duty to make it known to the defense. The Govern- justified
ment this ground on the its view the cir-
cumstance of inadmissible, the knife was knowledge since presence its pocket had deceased not been
communicated to by sight Griffin either or otherwise. Judge
The District took this law view the and denied motion for new trial. In an unreported opinion, he
stated, question justified “The in at- person whether
tacking assailant in self-defense must be determined by presented
the facts which were person to the who pleads He did know,
self-defense. it appears, that [Griffin] an open deceased had knife in pocket, his and there-
fore its existence is An appeal having irrelevant.” been
taken, the Government moved appeal to dismiss the *4 ground by appellant’s that “the issues raised motion
for a fully explored new trial were in the court below and
that disposition made of by them the trial court was
manifestly correct.” The appeal by was dismissed a
unanimous presided Court of Appeals, by judge over a
than whom no one is more alert protecting rights
of the accused.
Unfortunately, Appeals the Court of thought evidently
that ground for dismissing appeal too was clear
to require explication. appeal It dismissed the without
708 admissibility of the regarding
an of views expression It for a new trial rests.
evidence on which the claim ground so on the District
may well have done That was of this nature inadmissible. this
evidence is is view of some members
the reason for dismissal Appeals a opinion of the Court of on this Court. petition a for habeas appeal
later from the denial of by support interpretation Griffin lends to such an
corpus summary appeal dismissal of the now under review'.
of the Clemmer, 351, 169 F. App.
See v. 83 U. S. D. C. Griffin
2d 961.1 But for bars reliance on such solicitude life
inference, especially corpus the issue on habeas since a a
quite appeal from that on from denial of different a appropriate
motion for new trial. It to us more seems Appeals
for the Court of to address itself to the directly admissibility.
issue of This is so order to rule out the Appeals may, applying
inference the Court of Johnson, v. 106, States
United U. S. have deemed the a newly
denial of motion for new trial on the basis solely trial
discovered matter court’s
discretion. Appeals
Were the Court of to declare that the contro-
verted evidence was admissible to the according law Clemmer, 961, v. App. In 2d U. S. D. C. 169 F. Griffin Appeals appeal
the Court of had before it an from the of a denial
petition corpus alleging for a writ of habeas that Griffin’s detention illegal procured by
was because the conviction conduct on was unfair part prosecutor. of the This was filed Griffin after the Court Appeals appeal had dismissed the from the denial of the motion for granted petition before this Court new trial but this certiorari. finding
The claim of unfairness based the failure to disclose the penknife on Hunter. In effect this was a claim of lack of court, according
jurisdiction v. in the to the doctrine Johnson
Zerbst, 458. The Court of deemed the evidence proceeding. precarious It is too to treat this
to be irrelevant to that admissibility holding
as a on the the evidence. *5 fur- have to consider it would
prevailing District, the basis dogmatic, it not be too
ther whether would conclude that any court to speculation,
of mere to the evidence significance would not have attached
jury been before the defendant had the
favorable to disputed that the If had decided
it. the Court of Columbia District of not admissible
evidence was sus- that had ground of self-defense and on
on a claim there trial, for a new the motion
tained the denial of not to be It is an end of the matter.
would have been petition granted would have
assumed that this Court the determination ruling review the since
for certiorari to rules law as are the a matter of local
would have been in the State courts. prevailing
of evidence did not which ruling that a told, however,
areWe threats” “uncommunicated
permit introduction of by this error” be corrected “egregious
would constitute States, S. v. United 328 U. Court. Fisher 476.
Wig-more that uncommunicated authority is vouched as Wig But all Courts.” “virtually
threats are admissible awith series immediately quoted follows the words
more there prove and limitations which qualifications murder admissibility in trials for questions
are few See contrariety of views. greater have occasioned a way of ed., 1940).2 By 111 (3d Evidence Wigmore, § length Wigmore’s on this pertinent quote statements It is at
subject: to be is now conceded
“This evidence [uncommunicated threats] following
admissible, by virtually discriminations Courts. all But
must be noted:
“(3) opportunity for abuse of this sort of evidence. There much genuine, may only may manufactured; but, be it be even when
Not way justification,— help
employed improperly the defendant compelled have been least, where the Courts
in certain communities at is no that a threat to shoot another
repeatedly to make clear the law
example, jurisdictions most that hold evidence of uncom-
municated threats is inadmissible where there is clear
proof the took the initiative, defendant or where
there is no evidence that the deceased was aggressor the
other than proffered the uncommunicated threats. Were
this the rule in the District, the dismissal appeal of the
may well have been rested on it, since there was weighty
justification sight. for latter kill the to For these reasons various attempted:
limitations have been “ (a) The evidence of threat is inadmissible where there is clear evi- aggressor. jurisdictions dence that the the adopt Most defendant rule, negative
this and none seem to it.
“(b) Furthermore, only (as the threat is admissible most Courts
provide) aggression by where there is some other evidence the of usually expressed by saying deceased. This is that there must have hostility,’ or, shortly,
been some ‘demonstration of more some ‘overt by
act,’ say the deceased. It difficult to whether this limitation
originated gesta” {infra) in the “res notion inor a rule of criminal necessary justification
law that an overt act is a element of of the
self-defence, merely general policy preventing or in a of the abuse any rate, satisfactory limitation, pro-
of this evidence. At it seems a multiplication by quibbles
vided the of as to ‘overt acts’ is avoided
leaving judge; pre- the whole matter in the hands of the trial for it trying pretext
vents the defendant from to use the threats as a mere justifying killing making attempt of one who was no actual injure him.
“(c) condition, suggested, with Another sometimes but inconsistent stringent preceding one,
and more than the is that the threat should only evidence as to who was
be received when there is no other direct eye-witnesses. prac- aggressor, Perhaps in i. e. were no when there (b) (c) best; be the i. e. to admit the
tice a combination of and would by eye-witnesses of the there was some other evidence when eye-witnesses aggression, no to the affair.
deceased’s or there were when
“(4) use, independent preceding, re- Another additional or ‘corrobora-
ceives uncommunicated threat ‘confirmation’ usually coupled with one of This is tion’ communicated threats. of admission. preceding as an alternative condition limitations ground
“(5) geste” invoked as the of “res is sometimes doctrine the occa- receiving evidence; the same notion underlies Indeed,
proof petitioner aggressor. was the mind have had in Appeals might
all we know the Court that would
a rule threats concerning uncommunicated of fabrica- danger yet guard against
admit them and responsibility of upon judge the by
tion the trial placing defendant against alleged such threats
excluding him some hostile proof satisfactory absence At killing. the deceased relevant
manifestation Carter, 197 has some rule. State v.
least one State such con- suggestion
sional that the threats ‘characterize’ deceased’s obscurity employment gestee” “res a veil for of of as
duct. This enough (post, 1795); and it is here
thought examined is elsewhere § evidence, of possible application to this kind say it no
to that has rules; phrases sooner such are be to fit its the
and cannot made thought. legal of
abandoned, the for clearness better
“(6) impossible exact jurisdictions it to ascertain the In some is precedents ignored, laid down inconsistent tests
rule. Previous are to the jurisdictions are cited
succeeding rulings, decisions other up matter comes precedents; local and the oftener the
exclusion of ruling, it is obscured.
for a the more “ threats (7) prosecution may of rebut the evidence of course The plans. seem peaceful It would
by counter-testimony deceased’s of the prose- issue, aggression is in that, whenever the deceased’s
also prose- peaceful plans. The begin of with its evidence cution could 63, ante, by of also, principle may of rebut on the
cution § peaceful character.
the deceased’s sundry
“(8) in which the threats may be other cases There doctrines. apart present from the person be relevant
deceased would “ may admitted, it person be where (9) also of a third threats accused, aggressor. he, and not the was desired to show that
is “ aggression plaintiff (10) or in which the In other issues material, on the are admissible
prosecuting is his threats witness
foregoing principles. “ threats, deceased, amounting (11) but conduct Other not 390, post) may (on principle be indicating a motive to attack § showing prior present rule, admitted, by logic without of the (3d Evidence, 111 Wigmore, communication to the defendant.” § 1940).
ed., 155, 62, 158, reject
La. So. 2d 63. This is not to rule, courts,
unreasonable a some would followed that in,
let the evidence even all oppose where other witnesses
a defendant’s killing. version of the thing
One clear. is There no “federal rule” on this
subject. Utah, Wiggins The decision in v.
does purport down lay general rule, nor does evidentiary problem even formulate the now in con- In
troversy. case, light of the fact that there
was no aggressor, proof other identification of the
offered that a pistol deceased had a few exhibited
minutes before shooting said, and had out though hearing accused, that “he would kill de-
fendant he before went night,” to bed that and this Court
naturally held that this evidence should have ad- been
mitted. It did so “it because would strongly have tended
to show from, where that first shot came and how that
pistol, with one emptied, chamber came be found on ground.” Utah, Wiggins v. supra at 470.
But assuming even the “federal rule” is that
evidence described in the motion for a new trial would be
admissible, it does not follow that it must also be the rule
for the District of Columbia. This Court, decisions, its *8 Congress,
and its of statutes, enactment have often
recognized appropriateness of one rule for the District
and another jurisdictions other so far they as are
subject to federal law. Thus, the “federal rule” first-
degree murder cases that, jury by unless the unani-
mous vote agrees that the penalty death, should be
the court fix must the sentence at imprisonment
life. 35 1151, Stat. 1152, 18 U. 567, § S. C. now 18
U. S. C. 1111 § (1948), States, Andres v. United 333
U. S. 740. But a defendant convicted of first-degree
murder in the District cannot look to jury to soften penalty; he must given be the death sentence. 31
713 22-2404, Johnson 799, 1321, § D. C. Code Stat. 43 Stat. States, 225 Furthermore, the Court’s S.U.
v. United 405. States, 463, makes U. S. v. United 328 Fisher
decision in Ap reverse the Court refused to
clear that when we any establishing were
peals for the District we which the murder statutes interpreting rule” in
“federal Columbia than District of over places other
apply In this Court has jurisdiction. fact, has Congress
which . . “Congress recognized out that . pains point at to
been pertaining separate provisions” expediency exclusively the District justice applicable
criminal gov to the Criminal Code in contradistinction
Columbia jurisdiction elsewhere.
erning amenable to offenses federal States, 405, 418. 225 S.
Johnson United v. U. of the position
Many statutes reflect this distinctive 35 Compare law. Stat. criminal matters of
District now statute), (“federal” adultery 18 516
1149, U. C. § S. 1332, 31 Stat. p. (1948), 18 2415 with
repealed, S. C. U. adultery statute); compare (District §
D. C. Code 22-301 (“federal” 2032 2031, (1948) C. 1143,
35 Stat. 18 U. S. §§ 798, 567, 41 43 Stat. statute) 31 Stat.
rape 1322, with Stat. compare 35 (District rape statute); 22-2801 §
D. C. Code robbery (1948) (“federal” 1144, § S. C.
Stat. 18 U. 22-2901 (Dis C.
statute) 1322, with D. Code § 31 Stat. C. 1144, 35 Stat. U. S. robbery statute); compare
trict C. repealed, now (“federal” statute), larceny
466§ D. 22-2201 § C. Code
p. 2415 with 31 Stat. (1948),3 statute). fact, In two vol requires
(District larceny laws “all general permanent to contain
umes Columbia, in force in the District of
relating or except application 3, 1941, such laws are
January being reason laws of
in the District of Columbia larceny adultery repeal specific provisions on significance. from their illustrative
does not detract
United general permanent States and in their nature.” (1940
See Preface to District of ed.). Columbia Code
If Congress can enact substantive rules of law criminal
exclusively for the Columbia,4 District of Court the
Appeals for the District of Columbia not ought to be opportunity
denied to formulate appro rules of evidence
priate for the District, long so as the rules do chosen not
offend statutory or constitutional limitations. position spouses strikingly witnesses illus- apart
trates the District stands from rule of
evidence prevailing generally in federal courts. The
federal courts spouse testify have held that one cannot
against spouse other unless the defendant waives the
privilege. States, 304; Miles v. United 103 U. S. Bassett States, 496;
v. United 137 U. S. cf. United States v.
Mitchell, 1006, 2d (C. Cir.). 137 F. A. 2d Since this
Court the Funk case open question left whether States,
this rule should changed, be Funk v. United certainly nothing
4“. . . There is punishing anomalous in differently jurisdictions. of murder
crime different It is but the
application legislation anomalous, conditions. if But it be
very argument questions little be can drawn from to solve the
controversy. years The difference existed number of between places jurisdiction, for,
the District and other under national as we seen, qualified
have verdict has existed in District since Code,
the enactment of District and did not exist when the
Criminal Code was enacted. . . .
“Congress certainly enacting recognized Code, District
expediency provisions separate for the District It of Columbia.
was said at bar not denied that the District Code only lawyers having
was not District, the work of the in mind District, well, through
the needs of the expressed but its citizens as organizations yielding
various bodies of In to the recom- them. Congress given precedent.
mendations made no new It local had Territories, separate to the
control and it enacted a code Alaska.” States, v. United
Johnson 417-418.
715 rule” for “federal 373, presumably U. it is still the 371, S. rule however, the has District, In
the lower courts. Hill, 127, C. Halback v. App. 49 D.
long been otherwise. 169, D. C. Buford, App. 1007;
261 F. v. 81 U. S. Buford States, 81 v. United cf. Dobbins
170, 567, 568; 156 F. 2d 1358, D. C. 257; F. 2d 31 Stat. App. 218,
U. S. D. C. the fact example afforded
Code 14-306. Another is § spouse just that one provided the statute cited also in District in in testify
could favor of the other cases Com contrary. rule” was still to the
when “federal States, 189; Fuey Moy Jin v. United S.
pare U. States, in
Hendrix v. overruled United both States,
Funk v. supra. United of the evidence set problem admissibility
The and its for a new trial is serious
forth the motion appar- problem full difficulty.
wise solution Court and at the bar of this
ently explored below, not appropriate for give it the consideration
counsel did importance. general of a federal issue of
determination Under such argued
It even their briefs. was not it a rule is not for us to announce
circumstances been said con- Nothing that has
District Columbia. as an intended possible various choices is
cerning the rules about preference among competing
expression of threats, nor as the admissibility of uncommunicated Court of upon the freedom of the restriction
slightest with- purposely own We
Appeals make its choice. any merits of any expression opinion on the
hold admissibility of this evidence. permissible views the Court in our decisions forecloses
Certainly nothing any range of choices selecting from one some rational basis. That
open having one it, each appellate recognized been
court has heretofore evidence; the local rules of determining
tribunal just experience with has active
also is court practical governing considerations trials for murder,
plainly preoccupation outside the of this Court.
It precisely for such reasons that for a decade the
Court has declined to review all convictions for first-
degree murder Columbia, District of with single
exception, and in every one of these cases some local
rule of evidence was in part at least The involved. infra,
Appendix, p. 719, a gives summary legal of the is-
sues in involved fourteen cases which we denied
petition for certiorari. This of disposition course mani- uniformity
fests of respect by this Court for District rul-
ings on evidence.5 Reference to disposition this course of
of attempts to secure review here for mür- convictions of
der in the District in no wise disregards repeated our
admonition that denial of a petition for imports certiorari
nothing to the merits of a lower court decision. These
denials do not remotely imply approval of the various
rulings on evidence made in these cases by the Court compare impressive To this disposition course of with the fact granted
that we have little petitions over of pauperis 5% forma on behalf of convicts is to though treat they merely statistics as were figures meaning. without The pauperis mass of these in forma
petitions, usually by laymen, drawn pathetically are trivial and by frivolous endeavors procure those incarcerated to their freedom hope
after all other has faded. To draw inferences from this 5%
figure fungible is to treat as denials of certiorari because no federal question raised, is denials because the state remedies were not ex hausted, jurisdictional and denials for other unrelated reasons. The petitions fourteen for certiorari for the District of were Columbia wholly of They different nature. were all cases which the petitioner represented by counsel and in which the of Court
Appeals for the District of seriously Columbia had considered errors
claimed to have occurred in the they course of were all trial — adjudications on the merits. Our consistent denials under these evidence,
circumstances are mute approval not of disapproval, or of Appeals
but deference to the Court of for the District of Columbia prevailing rules of evidence in the District. is Appeals they do establish for District. What rec- this to practice has become settled for Court of rules of evidence for
ognize that the formulation purely is a law
District of Columbia matter local specific Congressional
be determined —in the absence highest appellate court for
legislation by the —
District. case, noted, been was,
Previous to this there as has
single exception refusal, consistent for to this Court’s
past a conviction decade, bring here review disposition exception of the
murder the District.6 The necessity
powerfully significance underlines pass initially on this issue.
for the Court essentially was affirmed in that case conviction procedure principle
on the the law of evidence trials in the District Columbia
governing criminal Appeals for the District keeping
in the of the Court of ad- Court. “The is not to be exercised this *12 by law in not affected
ministration of criminal matters law is general limitations or federal
constitutional relat- . . peculiarly of local concern. . Matters matter not England regarding appeals in criminal cases situation importance by of this Court abstention
without illumination on estab already by courts. Between the cases decided two criminal Appeal Appeal by Criminal of
lishment of the Court Criminal appeals in been 585
Act of end of there have been period there have to In the same
murder cases that Court. Such
only of Lords. appeals that Court House four from or only if Public Prosecutions
appeals be “the Director of can taken Attorney of prosecutor the certificate or defendant obtains Appeal involves a of Criminal that the decision of Court
General public importance, that it is desirable
point exceptional of of law brought.” The appeal public should be
in the that a further interest c,. 1907, 7 VII, 23. Appeal Act, Edw. Criminal figures the kindness
We indebted for the above are Hartley England, Hon.
Attorney the Rt. Sir Shaweross. General of
ing to law enforcement in the District are entrusted
the courts of the District. Our policy is not to inter-
fere with the local rules of law which they fashion, save
in exceptional situations where egregious error has been
committed.” Such were the views which determined
decision in States, Fisher v. United S. 463, U. 476.
While the Fisher case evoked dissent, it was a decision
rendered after Appeals the Court of fully had declared its law,
views of the and none of the considerations that
moved the in that dissenters case is even present remotely
in the case now before us.
We must therefore remand the case to the Court of
Appeals with decide, instructions to in the first instance,
what prevail rule should in the District of Columbia.
To do otherwise would constitute unwarranted de
parture from wise practice rule our consideration of
cases coming here from the Court of Dis
trict. “There cogent are reasons this Court should why questions undertake to decide of local law without
the aid of expression some judges of the views
local courts who familiar are with the intricacies and
trends of practice. local law and ordinarily We do not
decide questions such they may without that aid where
conveniently be decided the first instance the court special
whose function it questions is to resolve of the law jurisdiction
local presides. over which it Hud
dleston v. Dwyer, 322 232, 237, and cases cited. in exceptional
Only cases will this Court review a deter
mination of a question by such the Court of Appeals for
the District.” Busby v. Electric Utilities Employees
Union, 323 74-75.
Remanded. dissenting opinion [For Murphy, Mr. see Justice
post, p. 721.] OF THE
APPENDIX TO OPINION COURT. Summary Disposition of Petitions Death Certiorari to the Court for the District of Columbia to Review First-degree Sentences on Murder Conviction since 1938.
i —* o *15 Murphy, Mr. dissenting. Justice *16 the murder
Baxter has been sentenced to die for Griffin killing justification
of Lee His for the was self- Hunter. open an knife found that Hunter had
defense. He has a new trial on pocket
in his when he was He seeks shot. The first newly-discovered
the of that evidence. basis at
question is that would be admissible whether evidence
a new trial.
It is clear to me that it is admissible. Uncommuni- designs
cated and on the defendant cannot show threats may in that killing, they
his motive but demonstrate is the design
a on the defendant did in fact exist. This (3d in all “virtually Wigmore,
rule Courts.” Evidence
ed., p. rule. 1940), certainly 547. It is the federal § Mexico, 225
Wiggins Utah, v. 465; Trapp v. New A a thoroughly 968. And it is rule. de-
F. desirable with evi- present jury
fendant should be entitled to the credence to of lending theory
dence his the case. Griffin’s example a good policy
case is of behind the rule: open only
for the is supporting knife testimony.
his self-defense an question open can little knife is
There be in and defendant,
element of a on proof design But some
is admissible under the rule above. stated of which exceptions rule,
courts have made to this three in
might Wigmore, be considered relevant case. this a founda-
supra, (3). exceptions § The have central kind jury’s ability
tion: distrust of this evaluate Many evidence. rules of exclusion are bottomed clearly
this when distrust, misplaced of course. But it is capability
directed at the value jury’s weighing in murder uncommunicated threats The evi- trial. is it is simple; inflame;
dence not calculated to is far it
more difficult fabricate than are threats; communicated prosecution easily question importance; can its and provides support a defendant’s self-defense solid stronger
theory. Griffin’s case evidence is While prosecution Wiggins’, than supra,
for the it was self- plea
difference very is distinction. tes- question.
defense doubt on that Defendant’s raises doubt.
timony, plea, his raises further supporting jury’s
It is might change clear that this evidence depend upon make mechanical admissibility
verdict. To often in the size doubt illogical variations jury’s function. “It judge’s mind is invasion of the pertinent remark, here to that both the effect [the testimony credibility were to be
witnesses’] [their] Utah, 469.
weighed jury.” Wiggins supra, v. at *17 exclu- attempt justify
The Court makes to the little Instead,
sion of it cites v. United this evidence. Fisher
States, upset S. 463. 328 U. The Fisher case declined
an “long evidence rule that been the law of the Dis- had
trict of which deficiency Columbia”: “mental does
not show not “a factor legal irresponsibility” is relevant
in murder determining guilty whether an accused is
in the or second stated degree.” first Court the
general rule that in relating “matters law enforcement
the are District” District entrusted to the courts of the
in a case in have “radical which reversal would been a
departure concepts” from common law and thus “more
properly subject or legislative power for the exercise of
at least for the discretion District.” of the courts of the 471, 473,
In Court case- judiciary’s considered the
by-case ill changes method suited which sweeping for
were and necessary insanity. are in the law of It rec-
ognized that an indirect ad- problem, attack on
mitting past premedi- evidence of one’s life as in relevant
tation, lead to rather might the trial of one’s whole life specific
than of charged. offense
Despite radical change, nature three mem- thought judiciary
bers of this Court should make attempt injustice to correct of the common-law arguments were rejected. they
rules. Those But were
rejected upon I only the limited to which basis have
referred.
Today the Court extends the Fisher It rule. calls a holding
Fisher that no District of Columbia rules of
evidence are in this Court. reviewable The Fisher case authority
is no for a proposition. such is no war- There
rant for it in And statute. our denial of peti- thirteen
tions for in certiorari death in the in cases District years
last ten cannot establish such In proposition. complete
the last ten Court, only Terms of of all 5.1%
petitions in certiorari have pauperis been forma
granted. percentage And the of petitions certiorari, than in
other pauperis, granted period the same forma
has fluctuated between 14.9 and 22.7.1 deny When we twenty petitions
nineteen out of pauperis, forma
four petitions, out of of peti- five other the denial capital years
tions thirteen cases ten reflects no
greater policy in those cases than it does in any other
class cases. This is particularly true when sam-
ple compared cases—is so small number —fifteen
of cases we asked review, sample when the are
considers “Nothing murder cases. only is so fallacious facts, except figures.” For figures which do not re- peculiar
veal the facts of each a policy cannot reflect case any kind. of our appellate powers may worthy
Self-limitation be
thing, but it is attractive me when behest of
Congress Congress is otherwise. has given this Court
1 Report of Annual the Director of the Office of Administrative Courts United States Table A 1. trials. power to review District of Columbia ultimate power Court’s phrased, how the decision is
No matter for the evi- premises responsible that it is is such expound. Court of rule asks the
dence from law” departure is common rules no “radical
There Fisher’s. We should case, as there Griffin’s
declare the evidence admissible. trial admissible,
If the motion for new A granted. contrary
should determination would be be manifestly a reason- discretion,2 abuse of there is possibility3
able that the would lessen verdict jury
first-degree murder. Justice, Mr. and Mr. Douglas, Justice Chief Rutledge opinion. join this
Justice
Johnson,
States
v.
United
States, 2d 118 F. Berry Georgia, States, 675; v. 511. 10 Ga. F. 2d United v.