43 U.S. 244 | SCOTUS | 1844
THOMAS GRIFFIN AND HUGH ERVIN
v.
ROBERT THOMPSON.
Supreme Court of United States.
*248 The cause was argued by Henderson for Griffin, the defendant.
Henderson, for plaintiffs.
*255 Harrison and Holt for Thompson.
*256 Mr. Justice DANIEL delivered the opinion of the court.
This court is unable to perceive upon what principle of law either of the objects sought by the motion of the plaintiffs in the Circuit Court could have been accorded to them. It cannot be questioned that the defendant in that motion was entitled to the full benefit and operation of his execution, and these were to cause to be made for him of the goods and chattels, lands and tenements, of his debtor, the sum of $1740 02 of lawful money of the United States. With his claim thus solemnly ascertained of record, we are aware of no authority, from any source, which can compel him to commute it, or to receive in satisfaction thereof any other thing which he shall not voluntarily elect. But least of all should such an authority be recognised in a quarter more fruitful than any other of abuses in its exercise; for instance, from the will either of the debtor, or the officer whose position would enable him in some degree to practice on both creditor and debtor. To permit either the debtor or the officer to impose upon the creditor the receipt of depreciated paper in payment, would be to permit not merely a repeal of the judgment, but a violation, a virtual abrogation indeed, of the contract on which it was founded; for none can fail to perceive the thousand fraudulent devices for profit or favour which the toleration of such a practice would naturally call into action to defeat the rights of creditors. The courts of justice might thus be made to subserve only the purposes of dishonesty, and be transformed into engines of monstrous wrong. It has been argued in support of this motion, that bank-notes constitute good and lawful payment if received; that as the law recognises their circulation, debtors may lawfully tender them in payment, and creditors may lawfully receive them though not legally bound to do so. From these postulates it is then attempted to draw the following conclusions: 1. That the marshal is the plaintiff's agent, who by the execution may receive the plaintiff's debt. 2. That he who may lawfully receive payment, may have a lawful tender of payment made to him. 3. That if a tender or payment of bank-notes to the principal, not by him objected to, is a good tender or payment, the like tender or payment to the agent is equally good. This argument, to say the least of it, is wholly untenable. 'Tis undoubtedly true that the creditor may receive either bank-notes or blank paper in satisfaction of his debt, for the reason that his power over that debt is supreme, and he may release it without payment of any kind, if he think proper. But the fallacy of the argument here *257 consists in totally misconceiving the situation and functions of the marshal. He is properly the officer of the law rather than the agent of the parties, and is bound to fulfil the behests of the law; and this too without special instruction or admonition from any person. If, then, when commanded to levy a sum of money, he make a return that he has not done this, but has of his own mere will substituted for money depreciated bank-notes, his return is an admission, on oath, that he has both disobeyed his orders and transcended his powers, for legally he has no powers save those he derives from the precept he is ordered to obey. Can it be doubted that upon application from those whose interests are involved in the performance of his duties by the marshal, it is the right and the duty of the court in such a case to correct the irregularities of its officer, and to compel him to perform his duty? There is inherent in every court a power to supervise the conduct of its officers, and the execution of its judgments and process. Without this power, courts would be wholly impotent and useless. The returns of the marshal in this case upon the final process in his hands, showing the receipt by him of depreciated bank-paper in satisfaction of that process which ordered him to collect money, are held to be departures from the performance of his duty as plainly enjoined by the process itself, are deemed therefore illegal and void, and ought upon the application of the party injured thereby to have been set aside and annulled by the court. In conformity with the principles herein sanctioned, we therefore order it to be certified to the judges of the Circuit Court for the southern district of Mississippi, that satisfaction should not be entered on the execution of fieri facias which was sued out in this case on the 4th of June, 1840, in favour of the said Robert Thompson v. the said Thomas Griffin and Hugh Ervin, for the sum of $1740 02 with interest and costs; and farther, that the execution of fi. fa., which was sued out against the said Thomas Griffin and Hugh Ervin on the sixth day of November, 1841, should not be quashed; and that the motion of the plaintiff in the Circuit Court should be overruled
ORDER.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Mississippi, and on the points and questions on which the judges of the said Circuit Court were opposed in opinion, and which were certified to this court for its opinion agreeably to the act of Congress *258 in such case made and provided, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, It is the opinion of this court, that satisfaction should not be entered on the execution of fieri facias, which was sued out in this case on the 4th of June, 1840, in favour of the said Robert Thompson against the said Thomas Griffin and Hugh Ervin for the sum of $1740 02, with interest and costs: and farther, that the execution of fi. fa., which was sued out against the said Thomas Griffin and Hugh Ervin on the 6th day of November, 1841, should not be quashed: and that the motion of the plaintiff in the Circuit Court should be overruled. Whereupon it is now here ordered and adjudged that it be so certified to the said Circuit Court.
