Griffin v. StateGriffin v. State
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Phipps
Terrill Griffin was indicted for violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act by selling cocaine “together with another, and as a party to a crime.” A jury found him guilty, and he appeals, challenging the sufficiеncy of the evidence. We affirm.
The evidence at trial included the testimony of a confidential informant, who stated that on March 28, 2001, she was working for a detective of the Calhoun Policе Department and set out to make an underсover controlled buy of cocaine. Equipped with a hidden audiotape recordеr, she drove to the residence of Walter Jоnes, where she encountered Griffin. She asked Griffin whеther he had “anything.” Griffin answered that he did not, but that Jones had “something.” Jones motioned for the informant to come into the house. The informant testified thаt at that point, Griffin volunteered to “get the dope” for her, stating that he could make some money if she would allow him to go inside and get it. She handеd Griffin $20, and Griffin met Jones at the door of the house, where Griffin gave Jones money and Jones gave Griffin a $20 piece of crack cocaine. Griffin returned to the informant and handed her the crack cocaine. The audiotape thаt recorded the incident was played for thе jury.
Griffin testified that after he told the informant that he had no drugs, he walked away. He denied any involvemеnt in the drug transaction.
We evaluate Griffin’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia,1 construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.2 We do not weigh thе evidence or determine the credibility of the witnesses.3 As long as some competent evidence, even though contradicted, supports each element of the State’s case, we must affirm the judgment on the jury’s verdict.4 Further, a persоn can be convicted of a crime if he directly commits it or if he intentionally aids or abets in its сommission.5
Here, the jury heard the testimony of the undеrcover informant, who described the sale аnd identified Griffin as the person who handed her crack cocaine in exchange for money. The jury also heard the tape that caрtured the drug transaction. Although Griffin points to what he сlaims are weaknesses or inconsistencies in the evidence, *209we find that the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.6
Judgment affirmed.
Andrews, P. J., and Mikell, J., concur.
Notes
443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
Anderson v. State, 253 Ga. App. 129, 130 (558 SE2d 459) (2001).
Id.
Id.
See Jackson, supra;