72 Fla. 79 | Fla. | 1916
—J. C. Griffin was indicted for the crime of assault with intent to commit murder, filed a plea of not guilty, was tried before a jury, was convicted of an assault with intent to commit manslaughter and was sentenced to confinement in the State Prison at hard labor for a period of five years.
The first assignment is as follows: “The court erred in refusing to give Special Charge Number iy2 requested by defendant, to-wit: 'Under the law of this State whoever through culpable negligence or a reckless disregard for the safety of others, inflicts any personal injury or injuries upon another not resulting in death is guilty of assault through culpable negligence.’ ”
The second assignment, which is argued together with the first, is as follows: “The court erred in refusing to give Special Charge Number 2,—to-wit: 'One of the lesser offenses covered by this indictment is assault through culpable negligence, the definition of which I have just charged you, and if you believe from the evidence that a personal injury was inflicted upon Fred Horne not resulting in death, by an assault committed by the defendant, but such personal injury was inflicted by the defendant through culpable negligence, or a reckless disregard for the safety of the said Fred Horne, or others, you should find him guilty of assault through culpable negligence.’ ”
The requested instructions were evidently predicated upon Section 3229 of the General Statutes of 1906, Compiled Laws of 1914, which originally formed Chapter 5212 of the Laws of Florida, (Acts of 1903, page 192) and is as follows: “Whoever through culpable negligence, or a reckless disregard for the safety of others, inflicts any personal injury or injuries upon another, not resulting in death, shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year or by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment.”
It will be observed that the crime set forth in Section 3230 is a felony, while the crime denounced in Section 3229 is a misdemeanor. Undoubtedly the crime of an assault with intent to commit manslaughter is included within an indictment for the crime of an assault with intent to commit murder, with which crime the defendant was charged. We have several times expressly so held. See Williams v. State, 41 Fla. 295, 26 South. Rep. 184, and Bryan v. State, 45 Fla. 8, 34 South. Rep. 243. We would also refer to Taylor v. State, 49 Fla. 69, 38 South. Rep. 380, and Feagle v State, 55 Fla. 13, 46 South. Rep. 182. We have also held that “A man indicted for assault with intent to commit murder may, under such charge, be
Very briefly stated, the evidence establishes that Fred Horne was driving a Ford car, belonging to Mr. Holmes Elmore in which Mr. Elmore was riding, on the night of the 14th of October from Sneads to Blountstown, when Fred Horne was struck by a ball fired from a pistol and seriously wounded, which pistol was discharged by the defendant, J. C. Griffin. At the time that he was struck by the ball Horne did not know who had fired the shot, and also testified as follows: “I had not had any difficulty with the defendant at all. At the time I was shot I was not trying to do anything to him at all; I didn’t see him; there was no reason that I know of for him to shoot me. This happened in Jackson County, Florida, about October 14th last.”
Cleve Lockey, a State witness, testified that on the night when the shooting took place he was walking with the defendant and before they got in the road an automobile passed and then proceeded to testify as follows: “and we went on and heard another one coming up the hill, and he said he believed he would shoot, and I said, ‘No, don’t shoot,’ and when it got close he got up on the bank and got between two little saplings and I passed on
On cross-examination, the witness testified: “We hadn’t stopped only when we heard the car coming he stopped. I don’t know exactly how far we were from the car when the pistol fired, about as far as from here to the further corner of the room. Q. When he pulled out that pistol and said, T believe I am going to shoot’ didn’t you grab at his arm and say, ‘Don’t shoot ?’ A. He didn’t say he would shoot then, he said that when he saw the car coming. When he pulled out his pistol I didn’t grab his arm or grab the pistol and say ‘Don’t shoot,’ I just touched his arm and said ‘Don’t shoot.’ I touched his arm along here (indicating between elbow and wrist) I touched his right arm; he had his gun in his right hand; I didn’t see him aim the gun right down the road like this (indicating on a level) I do not know as a matter of fact whether that the pistol hit something else before it hit the automobile or not; there were some trees there but they were not in the road; we were standing on the side of the
The examination of the witness then proceeded as follows :
“Mr. Buford: I was up on the bank and he was down in the road. It is a graded road about 25 or 30 feet wide. There wasn’t anything in the road that was in sight except that automobile except the trees hanging over the edge of the road. All I know about where he shot is that he told me that he shot right in behind the damn thing.
“By the Court: I said I touched his right arm and I said, ‘J- C. don’t do that,’ and he got down in the road, when he shot I was not touching his arm at the time he shot.
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION.
“Mr. Smith: When that pistol fired he stepped right down, (off of embankment) and shot and looked like he was in the rut of the graded road; looked like about the middle of the road, the buggy goes in about the middle of the road, the road is about 30 feetwide and the embankment about a foot and a half high; when I grabbed at his arm wasn’t when the pistol fired; I didn’t grab him when he was fumbling with his clothes. I said, 'J. C. don’t shoot,’ and then he stepped down and the pistol fired.”
“It was about three feet or something like that, two and one-half feet from the bow to the place where it hit Horne; no I don’t know exactly the distance between the back seat and the back of the back seat and the back of the front seat. It was a Ford car; when the top lets down the bows go down back of the back seat, the bows come down I reckon about five feet from where Fred was shot, judging from the way the ball hit the bow and the way it hit him, it was traveling on a level.
CROSS-EXAMINATION.
“Mr. Smith: I don’t know whether or not the place into which the bullet entered this bow was something like two inches higher from the ground than the wound in Horne’s back was from the ground; looked to be on a
RE-DIRECT.
“The place where he was shot was a little bit down grade; the first hill we went up was up hill and the next was a long slant hill; and we were going down that when we were shot.
"By the Court: I could tell whether the bullet went straight through or not; it went straight through.
re-cross.
“I don’t know whether that bullet struck something else before it hit this bow or not; it didn’t strike nothing else. Q. You saw it all the time from the time it left the pistol? A. There wasn’t anything else in the way; just as soon as we passed I looked back,—I had my arm around the back of the seat and had on a pair of button shoes and they hurt my feet, and I started to unbutton them and as I started to stoop down the pistol fired. The car was about twenty feet from the parties when the pistol fired; it wasn’t about as far as the corner of this building; I thought it was a tire bursted at first; we were going about eighteen miles -an hour.”
The defendant testified in his own behalf as follows: “My name is J. C. Griffin; I went down to Shady Grove with Lockey to get some shells; we were going hunting Friday night; we went down to the pond to a picnic, and went from there to Shady Grove; I never would plead
CROSS-EXAMINATION.
“R. H. Buford: I just shot right straight up just to be shooting, I suppose; no bad intention at all, just to be shooting; I don’t know why I shot when people were passing in an automobile. I just thought I would shoot straight up; no, sir, I didn’t think I would scare them; I did not intend to scare them or hurt them; as to the distance to embankment where we were standing when I shot the pistol, I was just stepping down like that (illustrating); I had the pistol in my right hand right straight up; the road does not make a curve where we were • it doesn’t make any curve, it is straight; we were ,*ot at the bottom, no sir, there is no curve there; the hill does not make a curve from the bottom to the top so that you cannot see the top; the shooting was done below Lockey’s nearly a quarter; you can’t see the house from there because there is a strip of woods there; we were on a slant there, no sir, the reason you can’t see the house is not because the road makes k curve, it is a perfectly straight road, just like this was the ditch, this is the road, here, and here comes a wagon rut (indicating), I was standing right here on this embankment; just as I stepped down I held the pistol in this position and he was standing over here on my side and
“By fhe Court: Mr. Lockey got hold of my right arm, I had my pistol in right hand and he jerked my arm down as the pistol went off; he, Lockey, was on the right side of me.
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION.
“I had no intention whatever of shooting the pistol down the road in the direction they went; if Lockey had not struck my arm and knocked it down that pistol would not have fired down the road towards the automobile at all; I had it right straight up.”
We have given all the material testimony which bears upon the shooting of the pistol. ■
As we have held, in order to warrant the conviction of a defendant under an indictment, charging him with assault with intent to commit murder, of any of the grades or degrees of unlawful homicide, the evidence must establish the intent of the defendant to commit the crime. See Williams v. State, 41 Fla. 295, 26 South. Rep. 184; Knight v. State, 42 Fla. 546, 28 South. Rep. 759; Johnson v. State, 53 Fla. 45, 43 South. Rep. 779. We are of the opinion that the intent of- the defendant to commit the offense for which he was convicted is established by the evidence. See Peterson v. State, 41 Fla. 285, 26 South. Rep. 709, and Jones v. State, 66 Fla. 79, 62 South. Rep.
While we have examined the other errors assigned, we are of the opinion-that the two assignments just discussed are the only ones which merit treatment.
The judgment will be affirmed.
Taylor, C. J., and Cockrell, Whitfield and Ellis, JJ., concur.