Griffin v. State
296 Ga. 415
Ga.
2015
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GRIFFIN v. THE STATE

S14A1485

Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided January 20, 2015

768 SE2d 515

(2011). As lоng as Gibson survives, however, it will continue to be a basis for enumerating error. It would be better to complete the obliteration process by simply overruling Gibson. See (Nahmias, J., concurring); (Nahmias, J., concurring specially in part).

I am authorized to state that Justice Blackwell joins in this concurrence.

Decided January 20, 2015.

Thomas S. Robinson III, for appellant.

Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Paige Reese Whitaker, Arthur C. Walton, Assistаnt District Attorneys, Samuel S. Olens, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Clint C. Malcolm, Assistant Attornеy General, for appellee.

S14A1485. GRIFFIN v. THE STATE.

(768 SE2d 515)

MELTON, Justice.

Following a jury trial, Lester Casey Griffin was found guilty of involuntary manslaughter based on misdemeanor battery as a lesser included offense of malice murder, felony murder, two counts of cruelty to children, aggravated battery, and aggravated assault.1 On appeal, Griffin contends that the resulting convictions must be reversed because the jury rendered inconsistent verdicts. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

1. In the light most favorable to the verdict, the record shows that, on June 28, 2009, two-year-old ‍‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌‍Dylan Helmey was at home with his younger half-brother, Jaiden, and Griffin, who was babysitting.

Griffin was the live-in boyfriend of Dylan’s mother, who had left home at 11:00 a.m. At around 1:30 p.m., Officer Brion Hunt responded to a call that Dylan had stopped breathing. By the time Officеr Hunt arrived, Dylan was dead. The next day, an autopsy was performed, and the medical examiner determined that Dylan sustained over one hundred injuries within twо hours of his death. The most significant injury was a laceration to the right atrium of Dylan’s heart, caused by extreme force. When confronted with the autoрsy results, Griffin admitted that he had gotten angry at Dylan and hit the child in the chest. Finally, he admitted that it was not the first time Dylan had been harmed while in his care.

This evidencе was sufficient to enable the jury to find Griffin guilty of the crimes for which he was convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. .

2. In his sole enumeration of error, Griffin argues that his convictions must be reversed because the verdicts were mutually exclusive. Specifically, Griffin maintains that the verdicts were inconsistent because the jury considered the blow to Dylan’s chest a misdemeanor for the purposes of the involuntary manslaughter verdict and а felony offense for the purposes of the felony murder verdicts. As a result, Griffin contends that all of his convictions must be reversed, see , and that he should be granted a new trial. See . We disagree.

“Verdicts arе mutually exclusive ‘where a guilty verdict on one count logically excludes a finding of guilt on the other. (Cits.)’ [Cits.]” . While guilty verdicts on involuntary manslaughter and felony ‍‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌‍murder are not mutually exclusive as a matter of law, , a mutually exclusive verdict may be rendered in a particular case where the offenses underlying the felony murder and involuntary manslaughter convictions “reflect that the jury, in order to find the defendant guilty [of both offenses], necessarily reached two positive findings of fact that cannot logically mutually exist.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) . A mutually exclusive verdict results when the jury finds that the defendant acted with both criminal intent and criminal negligence at the same instant regarding the same victim involving the same act. See id. (finding mutually exclusive verdict where aрpellant was found guilty of both

felony murder based on aggravated assault and involuntary manslaughter based on reckless conduct as to a single homiсide victim).

. Moreover, if the predicate offense found by the jury for involuntary manslaughter was simple battery or battery, which are misdemeanor offеnses committed with criminal intent, see OCGA §§ 16-5-23 (a), 16-5-23.1 (a), then the intent element of the battery offenses would be logically consistent with the mens rea required for the felony offense of cruelty to children on which appellant’s felony murder conviction is predicated. See OCGA § 16-5-70 (b); (involuntary manslaughter based on simplе battery not inconsistent ‍‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌‍with felony murder based on cruelty to children).

Id. at 133-134 (2).

This precedent controls the result in this case. In addition to involuntary manslaughter based on simple battery, Griffin was found guilty of felony murder predicated on cruelty to a child, felony murder predicated on aggravated battery, and felоny murder predicated on aggravated assault.

Because the predicate offense for involuntary manslaughter was simple battery, it did not requirе proof of criminal negligence, and the intent element of simple battery was not at all logically inconsistent with the mens rea required for the grеater offense of aggravated assault, aggravated battery, or cruelty to children.

(Citations omitted.) . Accordingly, Griffin’s verdicts were not mutually exclusive, and his convictions must stand.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

NAHMIAS, Justice, concurring.

I join the Court’s opinion in full, including its conclusion that the jury’s guilty verdict on the count of involuntary manslaughter based on simple battery, a crime requiring criminal intent, is obviously not mutually exclusive of the guilty verdicts on the other counts, which also required findings of criminal intent. Because this case does not involve аny crime of criminal negligence, it is not necessary for the

Court to repeat the proposition that “ ‘[a] mutually exclusive verdict results when the jury finds thаt the defendant acted with both criminal intent and criminal negligence at the same instant regarding the same victim involving the same act.’ ”

Since the Court dоes so, however, I again note the serious doubts that I, joined by Justice Blackwell, have recently ‍‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌‍expressed about the legal and logical bаsis of that proposition, which this Court first endorsed in . See (Nahmias, J., concurring); (Nahmias, J., concurring). See also (Carley, J., dissenting). I also note that our Court granted a petition of certiorari last month in , to decide whether Jackson and its progeny should be overruled.

I am authorized to state that Justice Blackwell joins in this concurrence.

Decided January 20, 2015.

Robert L. Persse, for appellant.

Richard A. Mallard, District Attorney, Benjamin T. Edwards, Assistant District Attorney, Samuel S. Olens, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attornеy General, Meghan H. Hill, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

S14A1522. RHODES v. THE STATE.

(768 SE2d 445)

THOMPSON, Chief Justice.

Appellant Ron Rhodes appeals from the trial court’s order denying multiple motions he ‍‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌‍filed following entry of his guilty plea. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

On March 6, 2000, appellant, who had been indicted in connection with thе shooting death of a Bibb County convenience store clerk, pled guilty but mentally retarded to charges of malice murder and armed robbery in exсhange for the State’s agreement not to pursue the death penalty against him. On March 14, 2000, the trial court sentenced appellant on these charges to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment. More than thirteen years later, in July 2013 and January 2014, appellant filed numerous motions in the trial court

Notes

1
Griffin was indicted on September 21, 2009, by the Effingham County grand jury for malice murder, felony murder predicated on cruelty to a child, felony murder predicated on aggravated battery, felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, aggravated battery, aggravated assault, and two counts of cruelty to children for two different acts. At a jury trial in November 2010, Griffin was found guilty of involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of malice murder and guilty оf all other charges. Griffin was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for felony murder predicated on cruelty to children, and twenty consecutive years for one of the cruelty to children counts. The remaining charges were merged for purposes of sentencing. On Decembеr 28, 2010, Griffin filed a motion for new trial, which he amended on March 26, 2014. The trial court denied the motion on the day it was amended. Griffin filed a timely notice of appeal, and his case, submitted for decision on the briefs, was docketed to the September 2014 term of this Court.
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