*1 law, this new breed (1999), of search and seizure the “knock and talk,” warrants our from federal departure where the examples citizens of Arkansas face another attack yet limiting protection of their homes unlawful intrusion. against THORNTON, in this concurrence. J., joins
David GRIFFIN v. STATE of Arkansas
CR 00-1475
Supreme delivered Opinion February denied rehearing April [Petition 2002.] *3 Firm, Miller, Miler Law Leslie and Randel by: Borgognoni appellant. Gen., Adams,
Mark Gen., Katherine Ass’t Pryor, Att’y by: Att’y for appellee.
.a R related offenses Griffin, David entered Appellant, THORNTON, AY Justice. conditional which he was convicted of plea upon drug- the trial court’s denial of his motion to
following evidence obtained a warrantless suppress search of during late-night *4 his residence near Griffin three for reversal. argues points Jonesboro. We with his first agree covert intrusion argument nighttimе his four officers violated the upon by property provisions 2, 15, Constitution, Article Section of the Arkansas and we reverse and remand with instructions to the evidence obtained as a suppress result of the unlawful intrusion his upon property.
I.
law
Principles of
2,
15,
We note that the
of Article
Section
of the
provisions
Arkansas Constitution are similar to those contained in the Fourth
Constitution,
Amendment
the
to
United States
and it
be that
may
the
intrusion
late-night
upon
have also
appellant’s property may
violated the
of federal
provisions
constitutional
law. We have in
cases
2,
harmonized the
many
afforded
Article
Sec
protections
by
tion
of our state constitution with those
the Fourth
provided by
Amendment
to the United States Constitution. See Mullinax v.
State,
Ark.
The that a man’s home is his and that even the principle is home, King prohibited unreasonably intruding upon in the particularly culture of well-developed rough-and-ready frontier, and no less in the Arkansas pronounced Territory. Constitution, our 1836 of our admitted people state newly this in the expressed principle succinctly following language: houses, 9. That shall be people secure in their persons, § seizures, papers possessions from unreasonable searches and warrants, that general officer whereby any may commanded *5 committed, search suspected without evidence places of the fact or to seize or any person not named whose persons offenses are not evidence, are dangerous described and particularly supported by and shall not be liberty, granted. Id. (emphasis added). 15, 2, of in Article Section is articulated now This principle Constitution, that “the which provides Arkansas
the present houses, in their papers be secure persons, this State to people be shall not and seizures unreasonable searches and effects against Id. violated.” Arkan contained in reference to With protections seizures, searches laws unreasonable own state against
sas’s Sullivan, in Arkansas v. noted supra: Court recently Supreme Hass, (1975)] v. 420 U.S. reiterated in [Oregon We Hass greater a matter of its own law impose while “a State is free as to be this Court holds than those activity restrictions on police standards,” it not “may federal constitutional necessary upon federal constitutional restrictions as a matter of such greater impose them.” imposing when this Court refrains specifically law Sullivan, v. Sullivan, In State omitted). Arkansasv. (citation supra wе erred because we based our Ark. 11 S.W.3d526 (2000), to intrude on individual decision officers’ discretion Hmiting police of federal constitutional law. liberty privacy upon principles Sullivan, Arkansas v. supra. law, Arkansas while observ
In the case sub
we
judice,
apply
not
lesser restrictions
that our decision does
upon police
ing
impose
Amendment
to the
than those
the Fourth
activity
guaranteed
in our state that the
It is also a
of law
U.S. Constitution.
principle
evidence has been
rule commands that where
exclusionary
in
of search and seizure
illegally
obtained
violation
protections,
evidence
State,
be
at the trial of the defendant. See
obtained
cannot
used
315 (2001).
44 S.W.3d
Yancey
Arkansas,
are
standards to be followed in
there
rigorous
warrant,
for a
search. We
a search
nighttime
оbtaining
especially
searches with a warrant must be based
note that
upon
nighttime
search warrants to be
circumstances. Arkansas law allows for
exigent
executed
be
in three circumstances:
(1)
place
night
access;
to be seized are
searched is difficult of
(2)
objects
speedy
removal;
imminent
or
the warrant can
(3)
only
danger
or under circumstances the
executed at
safely
successfully
night
Ark. R.
of which is difficult to
occurrence
accuracy.
predict
Crim. P. 13.2(c).
we
Ark.
In Butlerv.
cited with
following:
approval
*6
We find the United States
Court case of
Supreme
Welsh
Wisconsin,
740,
2091,
466 U.S.
104 S. Ct.
It is axiomatic that the
“physical entry
home is
the chief evil against which the
of the Fourth
wording
Amendment is directed.” And a principal protection against
intrusions
unnecessary
into private
is the warrant
dwellings
requirement imposed by
Fourth Amendment on agents
of the government
seek to enter
who
the home for purposes
therefore,
of search or arrest. It is not
that
surprising,
Court has recognized, as “a basic
of Fourth
principle
law,”
Amendment
that searches and seizures inside a home
without a warrant are
unreasonable.
presumptively
Consistently with these long-recognized
principles,
York,
Court decided in
v. New
Payton
Butler,
that,
haveWe
also held
supra.
in order to enter a residence or
without violation
private
dwelling
unreason-
prohibitions against
searches,
able
both
and
cause
probable
circumstances
exigent
must
State,
Mitchellv.
present.
294 Ark.
As a where consent is general freely voluntarily the “knock and talk” has been as a consen given, procedure upheld sual encounter and a valid means to consent to search a request *7 Cormier, 1103, house. v. See United States 220 F.3d 1110-09 (9th 903, United v. Cir.2000); States 90 F.3d 909 (4th Taylor, Cir.1996); Kim, 947, United States v. 27 F.3d 951 United v. (3d Cir.1994); States Tobin, 1506, Cruz, F.2d 923 1511-12 (11th 838 F. Cir.1991); Supp. 543; Green, 624, at State v. 2d 598 So. 626 (La. Ct. State App.1992); Land, 106 P.2d Or. 1157-59 App. (1991). believe that We this “knock and talk” has been procedure States, well-defined in Davis v. United F. 2d Cir. (9th where the Ninth 1964), Circuit Court of stated: Appeals
Absent orders from the express person possession against any there possible is no rule of trespass, private public conduct se, which makes it or a illegal per condemned invasion of the person’s privacy, anyone openly at peaceably, high noon, to walk and knоck on the up steps front door of any man’s “castle” with the honest intent of asking questions salesman, thereof whether the occupant be a questioner a pollster, or an officer of the law.
Id.
In some other
a
jurisdictions,
officer
a
conducting
“knock and talk” must inform
consent,
that he
person
refuse
may
consent,
revoke
or limit the
Ferrier,
of consent. See State v.
scope
II. Facts law, Informed these we consider the principles following factual circumstances. Griffin was an with his office optician on 49 near The Flighway offices are near the and a highway, Jonesboro. residence two-story Griffin’s belonging is located a parents office, of hundred behind the couple yards accessible aby private drive. Griffin’s own the house and parents the main occupy part the house. Their residence is accessible a front door. Grif- through fin’s residence floor, is in the basement or lower accessible aby door. This sliding residence glass has a room apartment into sitting which the door and two sliding glass small bedrooms are opens, to the room. adjacent from the sitting residence and the Separate out which are some office are a shed and several other buildings, and the office. Some two weeks before distance from the house 25, 1999, encountered Bobbie Griffin Officer August Johnson the back fence toward the road across the walking property There is no indication that Griffin hours. gave during daylight his consent to this intrusion upon property. that hours on Officer testified during daylight August Johnson
25, 1999, another officer he received an anonymous tip through home, and from his office or Griffin selling drugs Johnson did testified that the circumstances of the not constitute tip probable warrant could be issued. cause which search upon cause, the lack of Officer Notwithstanding probable Johnson recruited Baxter and Wes auxiliary Bobby Deputy deputies Phillips and Rod and the four officers went to the Abernathy, premises *8 that their it about 10:10 was According testimony, p.m. night. black, and their vehicles fifteen to pitch they parked twenty yards from the house where could not be seen from the they sliding glass door that into Griffin’s basement made an opened apartment. They of one of the vehicles between the cars and inspection parked the when the of the vehicle were house discovered doors thеy open. in the All No contraband was discovered vehicle. four of the officers were carrying flashlights. Horton, Karen
One of Griffin’s testified that she was in guests, the room of basement residence when she saw a Griffin’s living bunch of out in the of the shed flashlights vicinity coming through Griffin, the who in the woods. She advised was a back room on with his that four or five men were daughter, telephone approach- the house. Horton her testified officers told not to ing move, and then ordered her to the door. As she moved open door, the forward to Griffin from the back room open emerged he had been where on the with his and he telephone daughter, to the door to meet the officers. stepped Officer testified that the cars were not visible patrol Johnson house, officers looked in the car beсause it parked door, had an and confirmed that the had officers walked open around before with Griffin. then stated premises talking Johnson knocked, he believed first then walked around because nobody door, came to and then returned to knock at which time again, asserts, answered the He then Griffin door. to his earlier contrary that the search did not until was consent testimony, begin given. no advice that no consent to search signed, It is undisputed search, and no to consent to could re&se that Griffin was given It is the search read before began. disputed were Miranda rights search, limitations consent to his upon Griffin imposed whether demanded that the later revoked his consent he or whether found a sealed The officers a search warrant. obtain officers locked cabinet in Grif- in a container containing methamphetamine and a also discovered drug paraphernalia fin’s They bedroom. firearm.
III. Standard review
of
a defendant’s motion to
denying
reviewing ruling
an
determination based on the
we make
independent
suppress,
circumstances and view the evidence
light
totality
to the State. We reverse
if the trial court’s
most favorable
only
of
evidence.
v.
is
Burris
ruling
clearly against
preponderance
State,
State,
66, 954
v.
330 Ark.
S.W.2d 209 (1997); Wofford
the trial
IV Analysis that the initial For his first on Griffin point appeal, argues entry 2, under his constituted a search Article prohibited upon premises He contends that the law Section of the Arkansas Constitution. enforcement officers made an unlawful intrusion onto his property a search warrant or cause to obtain a late at without night probable of a and warrant. He search was not result freely argues to the search. consent voluntarily given The State urges Article Section protections the Arkansas Constitution are not because there awas applicable consent to the search. The trial court’s on this relate findings point in to an evaluation of large Griffin’s conduct after he part answered door, his and a conversation with began officers seeking to come in and look for a permission lab. How- methamphetamine ever, we must first address the threshold of whether an question search had commenced illegal before the officers engaged Griffin in conversation at the door. sliding glass we address issue whether
Accordingly, an search had illegal before already Griffin answered his begun door. The trial court’s only to this threshold issue finding relating was that the officers did not violate Griffin’s to privacy by merely on the knocking door and to enter his requesting permission home. This finding might circumstances like those appropriate Davis, described in where it is declared that there supra, is no invasion of “for privacy noon, anyone open to walk peaceably, high up steps knock on the front door of man’s ‘castle’with the any honest intent asking questions thereof. . . Id. occupant [.]” However, those factual circumstances are not found in this case. The facts in this case bear little resemblance to those described Davis, With supra. whether the initial regard approach by officer was with an' honest intent of we asking questions, Johnson note that Officer testified that the freely officers lacked Johnson warrant, cause to probable get rise thereby warrant- giving less “knock and talk” tactic. On cross-examination of Officer John- son, the occurred: following colloquy Q: And you Etter, received this informatiоn from Officer Gary
Etter? A: That’s correct. Q: Now at that what point, information did have you besides
Mister Etter’s statement? A: None. Q: At that did think point, you you could stop get search
warrant? *10 A: No. But I’ve heard in the where he past at his selling’ drugs optical place down at Valley View. Well, rumor,
Q: based on that hearsay could have you gone a search warrant. got
A: No sir. fact,
Q: did Okay. even discuss ya’ll search warrant? getting A: No sir.
Q: Did you to find the attempt any way out basis for Officer Etter’s statement to the you day or before? day A: No sir.
Q: Did he offer you any as to where that explanation information came from? us,
A: No. call in and tell and we People and check. And if go they wanna let us in we do. ‘em Eighty percent of let us come in and look.
Q: Eighty percent them? Well, A: I’d say fifty I mean eighty percent. ask ‘em if you you look, can come in аnd and they just come in. say Officer admitted on cross-examination that any Johnson to obtain a search attempt no warrant would have been futile because cause existed to probable a search warrant. The support only information that the officer, officers had awas from a fellow tip Officer admits that this information was not enough Johnson obtain a warrant. to Officer According testimony, Johnson’s officers received the earlier in the but tip decided to act on day, at 10:10 in the tip This evening. evidence a conclusion supports that the nighttime was an effort approach to search Griffin’s prem ises without a warrant and without cause. probable
With to the issue as regard to when the search actually began, predominance evidence shows that the fоur clearly law enforcement officers Griffin’s door approached sliding-glass basement residence shed, woods through of a vicinity so could carrying flashlights see in the darkness. pitch-black We do not consider that these actions conform to the Davis, supra test “for noon, anyone openly to walk peaceably, high up and knock on the door of steps man’s . . castle. Id. Not any only *11 related in not meet the standards
did the actions of the officers of the evidence shows Davis, clearly predominance supra, was summoned to the had before Griffin an unlawful search begun door. stealth, their vehicles where
The officers parking employed be from the of Griffin’s residence. They could not seen entry they then then, a car because the door was open, inspected parked knock, an initial сhecked out a shed and either before or after the shed around the Whether the walk around of walked premises. little We before or after an initial knock is of consequence. of no for a “knock and search” doctrine know authority holding search that after it is to warrantless knocking, begin permissible before comes to the door. anyone an determination of the
Based totality upon independent Burris, the circumstances under we conclude that an illegal supra, search Article Section Arkansas Consti by prohibited tution had before Griffin was summoned to his door begun asked for consent to search. remand we must reverse and for
Accordingly, suppres evidence obtained Because this resolves sion of search. illegal evidence, the issue of we need not address the suppression other issues raised by appellant.
Reversed and remanded.
Corbin, Brown, and Hannah concur. JJ., IMBER, not J., participating.
majority D CORBIN, L. I with the Justice, concurring. agree IONALD obtained that the evidence in this case was ille- because the officers their warrantless search before gally began they even to obtain write consent. I emphasize attempted separately concern about “knock and Before this talk” searches my general. fashionable, the were of consent search became so type police unreliable before could forced investigate anonymous tips case, to seize evidence. For in this the police attempt example, had would have a controlled buy drug Appellant, attempt or an undercover the services of а confidential informant using officer. the advent of “knock and talk” With police procedures, however, are with actual work and free to dispense “cut to the chase” of evidence. In “knock and seizing my opinion, tool, not as an be used as investigative should only talk” procedures substitute investigation. a complete Furthermore, that this of war- I majority type agree home should only permitted intrusion into rantless person’s as in Ark. a.m. and 8:00 the hours of 6:00 p.m., provided between *12 warrant, to a If searches conducted P. 13.2(c). pursuant R. Crim. cause, after cannot be served based on a finding probable judge’s three then makes one of findings, unless specific 8:00 judge p.m. searches, even less than reasonable talk” based on suspi- “knock and Otherwise, cion, likewise officers will to should be limited. аttempt their as did here. It darkness of the to they use the night advantage, in this case snuck on me that the officers intentionally troubles up dark, their cars far so that the after enough away parking Appellant would not see them. of the house occupants case, that the lead officer in this Officer Even more is troubling not to inform admitted that he made conscious decision Johnson, he was of his to refuse consent. Pie that right explained Appellant because, occasions off not information on some better offering any refuse and in the he has informed of their suspects right past, words, In other denied consent to search. Officer they Johnson of his refrained from right intentionally informing Appellant he was afraid that invoke his refuse because might actually Appellant issue, should this I BROWN that we On аgree right. Justice the Arkansas Constitution as right interpret requiring before “knock and talk” searches will refuse consent be explained be upheld. in
BROWN this concurrence.
JJ., join
Hannah,
R
In recent
Justice, concurring.
years,
BROWN,
L.
OBERT
and talk”
has
“knock
phenomenon
procedure
either a
or a
come into
as a substitute
nighttime
vogue
obtaining
search warrant. Police officers
accost
his
daytime
simply
person
home,
or her
because
do not have sufficient
to establish
proof
The
obtain a
cause for a search warrant.
officers
police
probable
verbal consent to search the home from
homeowner
pro-
ceed with the search. The
has been
as
procedure
upheld
passing
Constitution,
under the Fourth Amendment
to the U.S.
muster
See,
of whether it takes
or аt
regardless
during
day
night.
place
Pendleton,
v.
What is troublesome about the “knock and talk” procedure,
when it occurs at
which was the circumstance in
particularly
night
us,
the case before
is the intimidation factor
two to four
(usually
officers are
and the
involved)
either ver
police
message conveyed,
insinuation,
that if a consent is not
bally
given,
police
officers will
a search warrant and come back. “Knock
simply get
debate,
and talk” has become the
of much
because it
subject
part
is unclear whether the
individual is ever
aware that
consenting
fully
he or she can invoke constitutional
and refuse to
protections
give
See,
consent.
United States v.
108 F.3d
Cir.
e.g.,
Jerez,
(7th
1997)
the inherent coerciveness of a knock-
(particularly discussing
and-talk which occurs “in the middle of the
Scott
night”);
Ferrier,
366 Md.
stitution to officers must inform require homeowners of their to refuse a consent to search before a valid search may Ferrier, case, commence. SeeState v. In that four officers supra. *13 conducted a “knock and talk” on the home because appellant’s they did not want to reveal the of their informant a identity to magistrate in order to a search warrant. The get that the appellant argued “knock and talk” at her home violated her to under right privacy the Constitution. The Washington Court Washington Supreme and determined that the agreed Constitution Washington provided than the greater U.S. Constitution with protection to the respect to be free from seizures, unreasonable right searches and id. at 111 Gunwall, State v. 720 P.2d (citing 808 (Wash. and held as 1986)),1 follows: 1 In Washington the govern Gunwall, Court six factors which Supreme developed greater
whether or not it will extend
under its constitution than the federal courts
protection
extend under the federal constitution. One of
wording
those factors is whether
relevant state and federal constitutional
is similar.
provisions
analog
While Arkansas’s
to the Fourth Amendment is worded
that is not
similarly,
extending greater
a barrier to our
under the Arkansas Constitution. Other state
protections
have
e.g.,
courts
done so. See,
Virmani v.
Health Serv.
350 N.C.
Presbyterian
Corp.,
(1999) (“We
S.E.2d 675
have said that even where
of the state and federal
provisions
identical,
Constitutions are
‘we have the
to construe our own constitution differ-
authority
from the construction
the United States
Court of the Federal
ently
by
Constitution,
Supreme
long
as
as our citizens are
rights
guaranteed
accorded no lesser
than
are
thereby
by
”);
federal
Belton,
v.
Id. at and talk” “knock did between not distinguish Court Supreme State, v. Id. See also Graves conducted day night. searches state 1998) Mississippi 862 (Miss. (interpreting So. 2d right a waiver” “knowledgeable to require constitution search, “consent where the refuse, which is defined as consent to refuse a cogni- that or she has right being knows he defendant or her in zant of his rights premises”). decision, state, either or court currently requires
No statute by that home- consent a homeowner a written sign advising that form can the search before the search begin. of a refuse owner law Yet, are used individual enforce- such consent forms being “knock and in as came to in a recent light ment Arkansas agencies submitted to this Court for decision. See Scott S. talk” case review I think 2002). on (submitted Ct. No. CR2000-51 Jan. to execute forms has merit. homeowner consent Requiring using a form before the search would be tangible consent begins proof form, addition, The of the that a cоnsent given. language is the fact ensure that the individual that would presented can be It would not eliminate all consent refused. controversy consent, “knock remove some and talk” but it would surrounding and homeowners as battles between officers credibility afflict our courts well as other currently evidentiary quagmires context, form has done for in this much as Miranda waiver police interrogations. *14 of a consent form would
A for execution written requirement this court taken to be consistent other actions has guard against under constitution. unreasonable searches and seizures our state For this court been in the of other vanguard jurisdictions has example, a his or her “castle” unreasonable in and person against protecting Ark. R. P. and seizures at See Crim. 13.2(c) searches night. (setting make a must for a search). out findings nighttime specific magistrate this rule and made certain that We have enforced strictly a its when an affidavit for night officers criteria satisfy presenting State, 13, a Fouse v. Ark. 989 S.W.2d time search to See 337 judge. State, 512, Ark. S.W.2d v. 314 863 572 146 Richardson (1999); 353, State, (1991). v. Ark. 820 446 Garner 307 S.W.2d (1993); 804 I with the that an invalid search Though agree began majority case, the consent
before in this I offer written consent given form as additional unreasonable protection against daytime searches. nighttime Hannah,
Corbin
JJ„ join.
J
HANNAH,
IM
I
in the
concur
decision in
Justice, concurring.
case,
this
but would argue
greater
restraints on
use
2,
15,
of the “knock and talk.” Article
section
of the Arkansas
a
Constitution is
limitation on the
of
power
government
pro
vides
unlawful search and seizure.
v.
protection against
Grimmett
270-A,
State, 251
case,
Ark.
476
217
In
S.W.2d
this
are
(1972).
we
occasions,
with the search of a
a
home. On number of
this
dealing
court has stated the old cliche that “a man’s home is his castle.”
State,
112,
v.
Guzman
Ark.
283
In the we now from our deci majority opinion, earlier depart sions wherein this has court declared that the Arkansas Constitution no than Fourth provides United States greater Amendment to the protection Hartness,
Constitution. 339 Rainey Ark. 5 State, S.W.3d 410 Fultz v. 333 (1999); Ark. 222 S.W.2d We noted (1998). each previously document is wording comparable, through this years, construing part Constitution, Arkansas we have followed the United States Court’s cases. Stout v. Supreme Ark. S.W.2d Current (1995). of the United interpretation States Constitution in the federal courts no our mirrors own longer our interpretation constitution. Arkansas, our constitution us to continue lend requires in the area greater of warrantless protection searches. This is evident in the fact that a warrantless search is unreasonable. presumptively
805
More
671,
State,
(2001).
partic
States Supreme that Court stated: wherein 456 (1948), on acting shows that police is a heady thing; history Power the Constitution requires cannot be trusted. And so thеir own before violate on the desires of police magistrate pass Constitutional cannot be true to that of the home. We privacy without a absence of a search warrant and excuse the requirement from the constitutional those who seek by exemption showing that course of the situation made that the exigencies mandate imperative. threat to the a serious and talk” of
The “knock practice police poses and seizure. Our unlawful search and right against privacy be a home cannot that consent to search constitution requires coerced, or or threats whether implied by explicitly implicitly, unsubstanti out with bare Guzman, Where go overt. supra. police to residences access activity try gain ated illegal allegations search, the intent of oral consent to and businesses obtaining by on and clear. The encumbrances is understandable placed police warrant doubtless a search obtaining requirements However, held this court has long less effective. make home must given a warrantless search of one’s that consent to 753, 940 S.W.2d State, v. and voluntarily. Humphrey freely State, burden to The State has a heavy v. Guzman (1997); supra. that consent freely clear and testimony positive prove by Ark. 595 S.W.2d voluntarily given. Scroggins *16 State, See also Norris v. (1980); supra. Humphrey, S.W.2d 918 The State failed to meet its burden this (1999). in case. The facts of case this make clear the the “knock danger police notes, and talk” theAs the federal courts poses. majority opinion to the front door or police coming to others compare salespersons who a door. The of may approach this lawfully validity person’s is While is there no a comparison highly questionable. doubt police officer one’s to door sell tickets to the might approach policeman’s ball, or sell raffle tickets to a the function in same charity as capacity a in the to door an occu- salesperson might, approaching question contraband, about activities or pant the of alleged illegal presence officer’s is inconsistent that police of a purpose wholly case, In that he she or comes to the salesperson. door clothed in the of the authority and in the literally likely eyes house’s with the of the State that the occupant, greatest power ever deal with face to in аverage face his or her life. person may We also to note that the ought average does not salesperson generally armed, come that increase although sales. might arguably The facts of case this will not the idea that these simply support officers like were the Avon police child just Girl lady selling First, Scout cookies. would avoid average salesperson likely at the door 10:00 While showing up someone so p.m. bothering late cookies, would result lower sales of likely the police showing so late would make a up raise the level of deeper impression Second, and intimidation. a pressure would not accuse a salesperson That, too, aof raises level of person felony. and makes anxiety Third, coercion more where their car could not likely. parking seen is not the tactic of the who would likely average salesperson not the customer perceive as a taking sales surprise helpful would, however, It a have to catch technique. the occu- tendency of the house pant Fourth, off and increase guard submit. pressure the facts of the number officers although at the door is in conflict, it is clear there were at least two and then four. initially Avon ladies do not travel in the intent is generally Again, packs. —clear to intimidate and make it more will likely person give Fifth, oral consent. don’t salespersons carry generally flashlights Sixth, check the and cars on the to the yard door. a way salesperson door, would front to the not a likely go door on the sliding glass side of the house. short, In there is in these fаcts to a claim that nothing support were on Griffin’s lawful for a It is property purpose. difficult to that these facts a would free imagine given feel person Amendment under the Fourth even the officer’s request
decline Bostick, 501 U.S. Florida v. federal courts. See analysis indicates he fact, recog- testimony Officer’s (1991). Johnson’s not and talks” did on “knock he approached nized people him. free feel were to ignore always talk” is gain entry designed The “knock practice warrant, form and in fact without any obtaining search without *17 cause, It even reasonable is designed or really suspicion. reasonable both the afforded of all by to avoid the encumbrances protections From that and the United States Constitutions. per- the Arkansas alone, be with “knock and talk” should viewеd the spective disfavor. the avoid a warrant is from
The intent to obtaining apparent of cases on this issue. The of and from the facts other facts this case the in force and intimidate is The show police up plan simple. he testified that oral consent. Officer into person would conduct giving Johnson and it “knock talks” until is and midnight, apparent time. late at was the favored Absent a of showing exigent that night circumstances, have a search could not executed warrant Johnson P. late an hour. Ark. R. Crim. 13.2(c). so above,
He that the method noted he also testified using got of the time. further consent Officer up eighty percent Johnson forms, them, did not he had consent but that he use testified that a to advise and believed he was under no person they compulsion to the That in and of itself need not consent search. statement well that some have believed reveals acknowledgment persons may had but to the The “knock and no choice to submit search. issues, the con- talk” raises and reinforces significant unfortunately that enforcement should not be on their own. cern law acting be to do the work
The better would necessary police approach to a warrant. in the law to entitle the search The police preference warrant, a it is that evidence than is for so less strong persuasive a a search will the issuance of would warrantless justify support 721 warrant. State S.W.2d search Broadway, (1980). cir-
The
in this
were not faced with any
case
exigent
police
had to
on
at all. There was no reason the
cumstances
police
proceеd
The
obtained under
chose to act.
oral consent
night
than
is
the facts
this case
not valid consent. Rather
simply
cases,
better
in these
I believe the
with oral consent
struggle
be
which would more consistent
our
cases on
approach,
search and
past
seizure,
would
that
require
consent
advises
signed
of their
That would
the erosion
person
rights.
protect against
unlawful search and seizure
the “knock
against
posed by
and talk” method
used
The “knock
being increasingly
police.
by
and talk”
too
search carries
of coerced consent. This
high danger
Ferrier,
been
has
other
recognized
courts.
State v.
P.2d
(Wash.
held
in a
1998), Washington
Court
that
search
Supreme
from a “knock and
arising
must inform the
talk,“police
person
consent,
consent,
he
refuse
revoke
may
limit the
of con-
scope
The
sent.
Court held that under a
Mississippi Supreme
search
talk,”
“knock
there
be a
resulting
must
knowledgeable
waiver. Gravesv.