131 P. 760 | Cal. Ct. App. | 1913
This action was brought to recover money alleged to be due upon a contract, as follows:
"HANFORD, CAL., May 11th, 1907.
"This agreement made and entered into this 11th day of May, 1907, between F. H. Griffin, party of the first part, and W. A. Long, W. R. Newport and Robt. McCourt, parties of the second part, agree to payment of $1500 Dollars in Thirty days from date to be paid to the party of the first part, otherwise one-quarter interest in the Hattie B. Mica and Felspar Mine, situated in Los Angeles County to revert back to F. H. Griffin party of the first part.
"W. R. NEWPORT, "R. L. McCOURT, "W. A. LONG, "Signed.
"F. H. GRIFFIN, "Signed."
In answering the complaint defendants alleged that the contract was intended by the parties to constitute a thirty-day option to purchase a one-quarter interest in certain mining property owned by plaintiff, and given by him to defendants. The court so found and gave judgment accordingly, from which, and an order denying his motion for a new trial, plaintiff appeals.
Where a contract is reduced to writing the intention of the parties should be ascertained from the instrument alone, if possible. (Civ. Code, sec.
The chief contention of appellant is that the evidence shows that at the time of the execution of the contract plaintiff delivered to defendants a bill of sale of the one-fourth interest in the mine, and that if this fact be deemed established, the entire fabric of defendants' evidence, and upon which the court based its decision, is destroyed. A sufficient answer to this contention is that there was a substantial conflict of the evidence touching the question of delivery of the deed; and under the rule the conclusion of the trial court with reference to the delivery or nondelivery of the conveyance, as well to all other facts which the evidence tends to show, must, if necessary in support of the decision, be accepted by this court as established facts.
In the interpretation of a contract it is the duty of the court to give effect to every part thereof, if reasonably practicable. Under this rule, some effect must be given to the words added to the contract at the suggestion of defendants, — namely: that upon failure to pay the one thousand five hundred dollars the one-fourth interest in the property was to revert back to plaintiff. In no other way than by construing the whole contract as an option can effect be given this language. The contract as originally drawn obligated defendants to pay plaintiff the amount specified within thirty days. As thus prepared, it was, upon plaintiff's theory of the case, complete, and fully expressed the intention of the parties; hence the clause added thereto at the suggestion of defendants subserved no purpose whatever. Appellant's contention that the clause in question inserted (at defendants' request) was for plaintiff's benefit and intended as a lien or mortgage for the purpose of securing the sum specified in the contract, is, upon the record, untenable.
The judgment and order are affirmed.
*312Allen, P. J., and James, J., concurred.